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رسالة مؤرخة 11 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2024 موجهة إلى رئيس مجلس الأمن من فريق الخبراء المعني باليمن

يتشرف أعضاء فريق الخبراء المعني باليمن بأن يحيلوا طيه التقرير النهائي للفريق، الذي أُعد وفقاً للفقرة 3 من القرار 2707 (2023).

وقد قُدم التقرير إلى لجنة مجلس الأمن المنشأة عملاً بالقرار 2140 (2014) في 6 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024، ونظرت اللجنة فيه في 19 أيلول/سبتمبر 2024.

وسنكون ممتنين لو تفضلتم بإطلاع أعضاء مجلس الأمن على هذه الرسالة والتقرير وإصدارهما بوصفهما وثيقة من وثائق المجلس.

(توقيع) ديبى براساد داش

منسق

(توقيع) جاسر الشاهد

خبير

(توقيع) ريموند دوبيل

خبير

(توقيع) باتريسيا بينتو سواريس

خبيرة

(توقيع) ميريام زامباتي

خبيرة



التقرير النهائي لفريق الخبراء المعني باليمن المنشأ عملاً بقرار مجلس الأمن 2140 (2014)

موجز

إن النزاع في اليمن، الذي بدأ قبل عقد من الزمن كنزاع مسلح داخلي ثم توسع فأصبح مواجهة إقليمية، قد تصاعد الآن ليتحول إلى أزمة دولية كبرى. وشكّلت حرب غزة نقطة تحول في الديناميكيات الإقليمية، وأدى ما نجم عنها لاحقاً من آثار غير مباشرة إلى وقف عملية السلام اليمنية. ولا يمكن توقيع اتفاق خريطة الطريق إلا عندما يكون الوضع الإقليمي موافقاً ويتوقف الحوثيون عن مهاجمة السفن في البحر الأحمر.

واستغل الحوثيون الوضع الإقليمي وعززوا تعاونهم مع "محور المقاومة" في انتهاك لنظام الجزاءات المفروضة عملاً بقرار مجلس الأمن 2140 (2014). وتشير المعلومات التي جمعها الفريق إلى أنهم يتلقون المساعدة التقنية والتدريبات والأسلحة والدعم المالي من جمهورية إيران الإسلامية والجماعات المسلحة العراقية وحزب الله. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، أنشئت مراكز عمليات مشتركة في العراق ولبنان تضم تمثيلاً حوثياً، بهدف تنسيق الأعمال العسكرية المشتركة التي يقوم بها محور المقاومة.

وعلاوة على ذلك، فإن التعاون المتزايد بين الحوثيين والجماعات الإرهابية مثل تنظيم القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية أمر مثير للقلق. وقد اتفق الحوثيون والجماعات الإرهابية على وقف النزاع الداخلي وعلى نقل الأسلحة والتنسيق بشأن الهجمات ضد قوات حكومة اليمن. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، لوحظت زيادة في أنشطة التهريب، بما في ذلك تهريب الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة، بين الحوثيين وحركة الشباب، مع وجود مؤشرات على وجود إمدادات عسكرية مشتركة أو مورد مشترك. وسيكون للجزاءات المفروضة على الحوثيين تأثير محدود ما لم تتخذ الإجراءات المناسبة ضد جميع منتهكي نظام الجزاءات.

وإن عمليات نقل الأعتدة والتكنولوجيا العسكرية المتنوعة المقدمة للحوثيين من مصادر خارجية، بما في ذلك الدعم المالي المقدم لهم وتدريب مقاتليهم، هي عمليات غير مسبقة من حيث حجمها وطبيعتها ونطاقها.

وخلال العرض العسكري الذي أقيم في صنعاء في أيلول/سبتمبر 2023، استعرض الحوثيون العديد من القذائف التسيارية، والقذائف الانسيابية، والصواريخ الموجهة المضادة للسفن، وصواريخ أرض - جو، والطائرات المسيّرة، والطائرات المسيّرة الهجومية أحادية الاتجاه، وسفن الهجوم السريع، والزوارق غير المأهولة، ومنظومات المراقبة الكهرو بصريّة، والألغام البرية والبحرية. ولا يمتلك الحوثيون القدرة على تطوير وإنتاج معظم المعدات المذكورة أعلاه دون مساعدة خارجية. ومنذ كانون الثاني/يناير 2023، اعترضت حكومة اليمن العديد من المواد العسكرية وذات الغرض المزدوج. وفي كانون الثاني/يناير 2024، اعترضت الولايات المتحدة سفينتين في المياه الدولية تحملان معدات فتاكة، بما في ذلك مكونات قذائف ومركبة غاطسة غير مأهولة، قيل إنها كانت في طريقها إلى مناطق خاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين.

واعتمد الحوثيون استراتيجية تصعيد تدريجي من خلال استهداف السفن التجارية والبحرية في البحر الأحمر. ووقعت عملية اختطاف سفينة غالاكسي ليدر (Galaxy Leader) في 19 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023، ولا يزال أفراد طاقمها البالغ عددهم 25 فرداً والمنتجون إلى جنسيات مختلفة محتجزين حتى الآن. ورداً على ذلك، تم تشكيل قوات تحالف بحرية دولية بهدف ردع الحوثيين وتأمين حرية الملاحة. غير أن الحوثيون لم يرتدعوا بعد، وهم يواصلون مهاجمة السفن. فقد سُئِن ما لا يقل عن 134 هجوماً من مناطق خاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين ضد سفن بما في ذلك سفن حربية من المملكة المتحدة لبريطانيا العظمى وأيرلندا الشمالية والولايات المتحدة، باستخدام قذائف من طرازات جديدة.

وعلى الصعيد الداخلي، يكتف الحوثيون عملياتهم ضد حكومة اليمن، محاولين إحراز تقدم على عدة جبهات. كما يقوم الحوثيون بتجنيد أعداد كبيرة من الشباب والأطفال اليمنيين والمهاجرين غير النظاميين والمرتبقة من القبائل الإثيوبية. والوضع العسكري الداخلي هش، وإشعال أي شرارة على الصعيد الداخلي أو الخارجي قد يتسبب باستئناف المواجهات العسكرية.

ويواصل الحوثيون، بهدف دعم أنشطتهم العسكرية، اعتماد العديد من التدابير غير القانونية لتوليد موارد كبيرة لأغراضهم العسكرية. كما أنهم يستغلون سيطرتهم على قطاع الاتصالات لطلب الأموال العامة لطائراتهم المسيّرة التي تشكّل "القوة الجوية" و"قواتهم للدفاع الساحلي"، وذلك عن طريق إرسال ملايين الرسائل إلى المشتركين في شركات الاتصالات. ويستخدم الحوثيون شبكات مختلفة تعمل في إطار ولايات قضائية متعددة، بما في ذلك الشركات الوهمية وشركات الصرافة، لتمويل أنشطتهم، خاصة من قطاع النفط والغاز النفطي المسال. وتستخدم شبكات الحوثيين وثائق مزورة مثل شهادات بلدان المنشأ، وتلجأ إلى المناقلة بين السفن، وتنتشر سفناً تقوم بوقف تشغيل النظام الآلي لتحديد هوية السفن بانتظام أثناء الرحلات لتجنب الكشف عن الموانئ التي تزورها هذه السفن، والطرق التي تسلكها، أو لتجنب عمليات التفتيش التي تقوم بها آلية الأمم المتحدة للتحقق والتفتيش. كما لا يزال الحوثيون ضالعين في استخدام عناصر مسلحة على نطاق واسع وبشكل غير قانوني لتجميد أو مصادرة أصول الأفراد والكيانات، والاستيلاء على إدارة الشركات، والانخراط على نطاق واسع في عمليات تهريب الأسلحة والمخدرات ومعدات الاتصالات ذات الاستخدام المزدوج والمبيدات الحشرية والأدوية والممتلكات الثقافية اليمنية.

ولا يزال الأفراد المدرجة أسماؤهم بموجب نظام الجزاءات، ومن يتصرفون نيابة عنهم أو بتوجيه منهم، والكيانات التي يملكونها أو يتحكمون فيها، يتلقون الأموال والأصول المالية والموارد الاقتصادية الأخرى أو يملكونها أو يتحكمون فيها، بصورة مباشرة أو غير مباشرة. وكانت فعالية الجزاءات المالية محدودة. ويرجع ذلك جزئياً إلى النهج الذي يعتمده المجتمع الدولي للحؤول دون أن تخلف الجزاءات المالية أي تأثير سلبي غير مرغوب فيه على الصعيد الإنساني، وجزئياً إلى افتقار الحكومة إلى القدرة على تجميد الأصول التي تسيطر عليها فعلياً السلطات المعيّنة من قبل الحوثيين والموجودة في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرتهم.

وكانت هناك عدة محاولات من قبل الحوثيين لطباعة أوراق نقدية في الخارج. واشتد التنافس، حيث أصدر البنك المركزي اليمني في صنعاء عملة معدنية جديدة من فئة 100 ريال في 30 آذار/مارس 2024، ما لبث البنك المركزي اليمني في عدن أن أعلن أنها مزيفة. وقام البنك المركزي اليمني في عدن مؤخراً بإلغاء تراخيص ستة بنوك رائدة في صنعاء وهدد بفصلها عن نظام جمعية الاتصالات المالية بين المصارف على مستوى العالم (نظام سويفت). وتتولى هذه البنوك إجراء عدد كبير من التحويلات المالية الدولية، خاصة نيابة عن العديد من الكيانات التي يسيطر عليها الحوثيون. وبالتالي، فإن الحظر أثر على المصالح

الاقتصادية للحوثيين الذين هددوا بعد ذلك بالعودة إلى الحرب وشن هجمات عبر الحدود ضد البنية التحتية الاقتصادية الحيوية في المملكة العربية السعودية. كما تعرّض منزل محافظ البنك المركزي اليمني بعدن، الكائن في صنعاء للهجوم، وصارت المحكمة المعيّنة من قبل الحوثيين ممتلكاته.

ومع ذلك، وبفضل جهود الوساطة الجادة التي بذلها أصحاب المصلحة في الوقت المناسب، قام البنك المركزي اليمني في عدن بسحب أوامر إلغاء التراخيص الصادرة ضد البنوك. وتم وقف تصعيد النزاع وتجنب الحرب. غير أن ذلك دفع بحكومة اليمن والمجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي إلى إبداء مستويات عالية من عدم الرضا عن استجابة المجتمع الدولي. ويسلط هذا الحادث الضوء على الكيفية التي يمكن أن تتحول بها مشكلة اقتصادية إلى حرب شاملة، مما يؤكد الطابع الهام والملح لمعالجة التحديات الاقتصادية القائمة منذ فترة طويلة التي تهدد السلام والأمن والاستقرار في اليمن. ويؤكد التفاعل بين المصالح الاقتصادية والصراع على السلطة السياسية والأعمال العسكرية تعقد الوضع في اليمن. وخلفت هجمات الحوثيين على السفن التجارية في البحر الأحمر تأثيراً مضاعفاً، وكان اليمن هو الطرف الأكثر تضرراً. وأدى الارتفاع الكبير في تكاليف النقل والتأمين إلى ارتفاع أسعار السلع الأساسية على مستوى العالم. كما أن الحظر الذي يستمر الحوثيون في فرضه على تصدير النفط الخام والذي أدى إلى استنفاد احتياطي النقد الأجنبي وخفض قيمة الريال اليمني خلف عواقب سلبية أثرت بشدة على تقديم الخدمات العامة في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحكومة. وقد أدى ذلك إلى اندلاع احتجاجات منتظمة واضطرابات عامة ومشاحنات بين المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي والحكومة، مما هدد الاستقرار السياسي والاقتصادي في البلد.

ولا تزال انتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني وقانون حقوق الإنسان مستمرة، خاصة من قبل الحوثيين. وتشمل هذه الانتهاكات تنفيذ هجمات عشوائية على المدنيين والأعيان المدنية، وأعمال العنف الجنسي المرتبط بالنزاعات، والعنف الجنساني بما في ذلك العنف القائم على أساس الميل الجنسي والهوية الجنسية، وكذلك التعذيب وغيره من أشكال المعاملة أو العقوبة القاسية أو اللاإنسانية أو المهينة. وهناك العديد من حالات الاحتجاز التعسفي والاختفاء القسري وعرقلة وصول المساعدات الإنسانية وإيصالها وتوزيعها. ووردت عدة تقارير عن انتهاكات جسيمة للإجراءات القانونية الواجبة، غالباً ما أدت إلى صدور أحكام بالإعدام، وهي أحكام نُفذت على ما يبدو لقمع المعارضة.

وإن الاحتجاز التعسفي من قبل الحوثيين للعاملين في مجال تقديم المساعدة الإنسانية، الذين احتُجزوا بمعزل عن العالم الخارجي، والاستيلاء على ممتلكات الجهات الفاعلة في المجال الإنساني أمر مثير للقلق بشكل خاص. فهذه الأعمال تعيق تنفيذ الولايات الإنسانية وتعرقل جهود الأمم المتحدة لتعزيز السلام والأمن في اليمن. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، فإن تجنيد الأطفال واستخدامهم في النزاع يهدد استقرار المجتمع اليمني في المستقبل وأفاق السلام والأمن المستدامين.

ويستخدم الحوثيون المخيمات الصيفية لنشر الكراهية والعنف والتمييز. ويواجه العاملون في مجال التعليم الذين يقاومون تسييس النظام التعليمي أعمالاً انتقامية شديدة، تشمل الاحتجاز التعسفي والاختفاء القسري. وعلاوة على ذلك، فمن الأمور المثيرة للقلق ما يُلاحظ من أن الحوثيين يُنتجون الألغام الأرضية محلياً، حيث يستخدمون آليات تفجير محددة لزيادة احتمال وقوع أضرار بشرية. وقد أصبح إبطال مفعول الألغام الأرضية أكثر خطورة بالنسبة لعمال إزالة الألغام، لا سيما وأن الحوثيين لا يتبعون خطة لزرع الألغام. ويجب معالجة هذه الانتهاكات السياسية والاقتصادية والأمنية والإنسانية المتشابكة على نحو شامل.

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* تعمم المرفقات باللغة التي قُدمت بها فقط ودون تحرير رسمي.

أولا - مقدمة

1 - يغطي هذا التقرير المقدم إلى مجلس الأمن عملاً بالفقرة 3 من القرار 2707 (2023) الفترة الممتدة من 1 أيلول/سبتمبر 2023 إلى 31 تموز/يوليه 2024⁽¹⁾، ويتضمن النتائج المحدثة المستخلصة من بعض الحالات التي تم التحقيق فيها في إطار التقرير النهائي للفريق المؤرخ 2 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023 (S/2023/833).

2 - ومدد مجلس الأمن ولاية الفريق في 14 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023 بموجب قراره 2707 (2023) حتى 15 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2024. ومن بين أعضاء الفريق الخمسة الذين عينهم الأمين العام (انظر S/2024/50 و S/2024/418)، بدأ سريان عقود خبير الأسلحة والخبير المالي وخبير الشؤون الإقليمية في 19 كانون الثاني/يناير 2024، وبدأ سريان عقدي خبيرة الجماعات المسلحة وخبيرة القانون الدولي في 5 حزيران/يونيه و 15 تموز/يوليه 2024، على التوالي. ونتيجة لذلك، فإن التحقيقات في انتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني وقانون حقوق الإنسان للفترة المشمولة بالتقرير لا تزال في مراحلها الأولى.

3 - واعتمد الفريق أفضل الممارسات والأساليب التي أوصى بها الفريق العامل غير الرسمي التابع لمجلس الأمن والمعني بالمسائل العامة المتعلقة بالجزاءات (S/2006/997). وشدد الفريق على التقيد بالمعايير المتعلقة بالشفافية، والموضوعية والمصادر، والأدلة الوثائقية، والتثبت من المصادر المستقلة التي يمكن التحقق منها، وإتاحة الفرصة للرد⁽²⁾. وواصل الفريق تعاونه مع فريق الدعم التحليلي ورصد الجزاءات المنشأ عملاً بالقرار 1526 (2004)، وعمل عن كثب مع فريق الخبراء المنشأ عملاً بالقرار 2713 (2023).

4 - وفي عام 2024، سافر أعضاء الفريق إلى إسرائيل والإمارات العربية المتحدة وفرنسا والمملكة العربية السعودية والمملكة المتحدة لبريطانيا العظمى وأيرلندا الشمالية والولايات المتحدة الأمريكية واليمن (عدن والمكلا)⁽³⁾. وأرسل الفريق طلباً إلى جمهورية إيران الإسلامية لإتاحة الفرصة لزيارة طهران في الفترة من 28 إلى 30 تموز/يوليه 2024. غير أن جمهورية إيران الإسلامية أعربت عن عدم قدرتها على استضافة الوفد في الموعد المقترح، وذلك بسبب عملية الانتخابات الرئاسية الجارية. واقترح الفريق بعد ذلك موعداً آخر، هو 24 آب/أغسطس 2024، لعقد اجتماع في طهران. ولا يزال الفريق بانتظار الرد. وأجرى الفريق عمليات تفتيش مادي للأعتدة، بما في ذلك مكونات القذائف والذخائر التي صادرتها المملكة العربية السعودية والولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وحكومة اليمن. وعقد اجتماعات بالحضور الشخصي وتواصل عن بُعد مع طائفة واسعة من المحاورين، بما في ذلك مختلف الدول الأعضاء. كما التقى الفريق برئيس الوزراء ووزير الخارجية ومسؤولين آخرين في حكومة اليمن خلال زيارته إلى عدن والرياض في آذار/مارس وتموز/يوليه 2024.

(1) انتهت الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير النهائي للفريق (S/2023/833) في 31 آب/أغسطس 2023؛ وبالتالي، يغطي هذا التقرير الفترة من 1 أيلول/سبتمبر 2023 إلى 31 تموز/يوليه 2024. وكان آخر موعد للنظر في الردود الواردة من الدول الأعضاء والكيانات على أسئلة الفريق هو 15 آب/أغسطس 2024.

(2) ترد في المرفق 1 معلومات إضافية عن منهجية الفريق وفرصة الرد.

(3) تُكتب أسماء جميع المواقع الرئيسية في اليمن وفقاً لخريطة نظام المعلومات الجغرافية للأمم المتحدة الواردة في المرفق 2.

5 - ووجه الفريق 204 رسائل رسمية، منها 161 رسالة إلى 46 دولة من الدول الأعضاء و 43 رسالة إلى منظمات وكيانات وشركات، وفي 15 آب/أغسطس 2024، لم يكن قد تلقى ردودا على 128 منها (انظر المرفق 3). وبلغت نسبة عدم الرد على المراسلات 62 في المائة.

ثانياً - الأعمال التي تؤثر على السلام والأمن والاستقرار في اليمن

ألف - الديناميات الإقليمية

6 - ألفت التطورات الإقليمية المعقدة والمتغيرة بسرعة خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير بظلالها على التقدم المحرز في عملية السلام في اليمن في عام 2023⁽⁴⁾. وقد شكلت حرب غزة نقطة تحول في السياسة الإقليمية، وتأثر النزاع اليمني بمشاركة الحوثيين في تلك الحرب⁽⁵⁾ والهجمات في البحر الأحمر⁽⁶⁾ والضربات الجوية التي نفذتها الولايات المتحدة والمملكة المتحدة ضد هذه الجماعة⁽⁷⁾.

7 - وقد استغل الحوثيون الوضع الإقليمي لتعزيز استقرار نظامهم، خاصة في ظل تردي الأوضاع الاقتصادية وانتشار السخط في مناطقهم. كما هدفوا إلى تعزيز مكانتهم في "محور المقاومة"⁽⁸⁾ واكتساب شعبية في المنطقة.

8 - كما أن المحاولة التي قام بها المبعوث الخاص للأمين العام إلى اليمن لدفع عملية السلام قدما من خلال الإعلان عن خريطة الطريق للسلام في اليمن في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2023 لم تستطع مجابهة التأثير السلبي للتطورات الإقليمية. وعلاوة على ذلك، أثار التصعيد العسكري بين جمهورية إيران الإسلامية وإسرائيل في نيسان/أبريل والهجوم الإسرائيلي على ميناء الحديدة في تموز/يوليه 2024، عقب هجوم الحوثيين بمسيّرة على تل أبيب بإسرائيل شكوكًا جدية بشأن استئناف عملية السلام.

9 - وقد اعتبر الحوثيون التدابير الأخيرة التي اتخذها البنك المركزي اليمني في عدن ضد ستة بنوك في صنعاء بمثابة حرب اقتصادية ضدهم. ومما دفع بالحالة إلى شفير الحرب قيام زعيم الحوثيين عبد الملك الحوثي (YEi.004) باتهام المملكة العربية السعودية بالوقوف وراء هذه التدابير، وتهديده بمهاجمة المطارات والموانئ والمنشآت النفطية والمصارف السعودية إذا استمر الوضع على ما هو عليه⁽⁹⁾. ومع ذلك، وبفضل

(4) شكّلت زيارة الحوثيين إلى الرياض في سبتمبر/أيلول 2023 مؤشراً على التقدم الملموس المحرز في عملية السلام اليمنية.

(5) هدد الحوثيون، بصفتهم عضواً في محور المقاومة، بمهاجمة إسرائيل ردّاً على غاراتها الجوية على غزة. ومنذ 19 أكتوبر/تشرين الأول 2023، أطلق الحوثيون عدة قذائف وطائرات مسيرة هجومية أحادية الاتجاه على إسرائيل وهاجموا سفناً تجارية في البحر الأحمر "مملوكة لإسرائيل أو متجهة إليها".

(6) في 10 كانون الثاني/يناير 2024، اتخذ مجلس الأمن القرار 2722 (2024) الذي طالب فيه بأن يكف الحوثيون فوراً عن جميع الهجمات على السفن التجارية وسفن النقل، وأحاط فيه علماً بحق الدول الأعضاء، وفقاً للقانون الدولي، في الدفاع عن سفنها ضد الهجمات، بما في ذلك الهجمات التي تقوض الحقوق والحريات والملاحية.

(7) شكلت الولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي تحالفات بحرية لتأمين الممرات الملاحية في البحر الأحمر، واستخدمت الولايات المتحدة تدابير تصعيدية بشكل تدريجي ضد الحوثيين.

(8) يشير مصطلح "محور المقاومة" إلى تحالف جيوسياسي في الشرق الأوسط بين من يعارضون ما يسمى بالنفوذ الغربي ويدعم أطرافه بعضهم البعض في مختلف النزاعات والصراعات ضد من يعتبرونهم أعداء مشتركين. ومن شأن مفهوم "العمل الجماعي ووحدة الساحات" بين أطراف محور المقاومة أن يحمل دلالة على مشاركة الحوثيين في أي نزاع إقليمي مستقبلي.

(9) نشرت وسائل الإعلام التابعة للحوثيين صوراً جوية لمواقع سعودية مهمة (انظر المرفق 4).

جهود الوساطة التي بذلها أصحاب المصلحة في الوقت المناسب، تمت تهدئة الوضع حاليًا (انظر الفقرة 42).

10 - ولا يمكن توقيع اتفاق خريطة الطريق⁽¹⁰⁾ إلا عندما يكون الوضع الإقليمي مناسباً ويتوقف الحوثيون عن مهاجمة السفن في البحر الأحمر. ومع ذلك، فإن الحوثيين لم يرتدعوا بعد، ولا تزال عملية السلام متوقفة.

11 - وفي هذه الأثناء، كان الحوثيون يعملون على تعزيز التعاون مع أعضاء آخرين في محور المقاومة ويتلقون الدعم من الجماعات المسلحة في العراق ولبنان والجمهورية العربية السورية وغزة. وقد بحث الفريق في العلاقات بين الحوثيين والجماعات المسلحة العراقية واللبنانية، كدراسات لحالات فردية، استناداً إلى تكثيف الأنشطة المشتركة بين هذه الجماعات في الآونة الأخيرة. ويشير الفريق إلى أن الجزاءات المفروضة على الحوثيين ستكون محدودة التأثير طالما لم تُعالج الشبكة التي تقيمها هذه الجماعة مع الجماعات المسلحة الإقليمية.

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 1: تعاون الحوثيين مع الجماعات المسلحة العراقية

12 - كشفت التحقيقات التي أجراها الفريق عن وجود متزايد للحوثيين في العراق في السنوات القليلة الماضية. وقد زادت الحرب في غزة الروابط السياسية والعسكرية بين الحوثيين والجماعات المسلحة العراقية. وأكد زعيم الحوثيين عبد الملك الحوثي في حزيران/يونيه 2024 أن الحوثيين ينسقون الأنشطة العسكرية مع ما يُسمى المقاومة الإسلامية في العراق⁽¹¹⁾. وأصدرت كتائب حزب الله، وهي إحدى الجماعات الرئيسية في المقاومة الإسلامية في العراق، بيانًا مشتركًا مع الحوثيين بشأن دورهم في محور المقاومة⁽¹²⁾. وأكدت كتائب حزب الله أنها ستهاجم الأهداف الأمريكية والبريطانية بكل ما في وسعها، إذا ما هوجم اليمن (انظر المرفقين 5 و 6).

13 - وأكدت مصادر مختلفة أن حملات جمع التبرعات انطلقت في العراق لدعم الحوثيين، خاصة من قبل كتائب حزب الله⁽¹³⁾. وفي كانون الثاني/يناير 2022، تولى عملية جمع التبرعات التي قامت بها كتائب حزب الله أمير الموسوي، المتحدث باسم تجمع شباب الشريعة، وهو منظمة جامعة خاضعة لسيطرة الحزب (انظر المرفق 7). ولم يتمكن الفريق من تقدير حجم الدعم المالي المقدم للحوثيين. ونقلت مصادر سرية أخرى أن الحوثيين تلقوا أيضًا دعمًا ماليًا من العراق من خلال توفير شحنات من النفط.

14 - ووفقًا للتقارير التي تلقاها الفريق، فإن الجماعات المسلحة العراقية ترسل خبراءها ومقاتليها إلى اليمن منذ عام 2015 للإشراف على الدورات التدريبية للحوثيين ونقل التكنولوجيا العسكرية إليهم والقتال إلى جانب المقاتلين الحوثيين. وأبلغت مصادر سرية الفريق بأن قوات الحشد الشعبي في العراق، التي

(10) أعرب مسؤولون رفيعو المستوى عن قلقهم من أن الحوثيين قد ينفذون المرحلة الأولى فقط من خريطة الطريق للحصول على منفعة مالية.

(11) وفقًا لمصادر، تضم المقاومة الإسلامية في العراق كتائب حزب الله وكتائب سيد الشهداء وحركة أنصار الله الأوفياء وحركة حزب الله النجباء.

(12) تحدث أمين عام كتائب حزب الله، الحاج أبو حسين الحميداي، إلى عبد الملك الحوثي مشددًا على أهمية الحفاظ على الجاهزية والتنسيق العالي المستوى بين قوى المحور (انظر المرفق 6).

(13) أعلنت جماعات مسلحة شيعية أخرى مثل حركة حزب الله النجباء وسيد الشهداء وعصائب أهل الحق ومنظمة بدر دعمها للحوثيين.

أصبحت جزءاً لا يتجزأ من القوات المسلحة العراقية في عام 2019⁽¹⁴⁾، قامت مؤخراً بتوفير التدريب لنحو 80 مقاتلاً حوثياً في مركز بهبهان التدريبي⁽¹⁵⁾ في منطقة جرف الصخر⁽¹⁶⁾. وكان من بين المقاتلين قادة من ألوية النصر يتبعون للحوثيين، نُشروا في المحافظات الساحلية مثل حجة والحديدة. وأشارت المصادر إلى أن المقاتلين سافروا إلى العراق بجوازات سفر مزورة، وأن هذه الزيارات ازدادت بعد افتتاح مطار صنعاء في نيسان/أبريل 2022 (انظر المرفق 9). ونقلت المصادر أن الغرض الرئيسي من الدورات التدريبية الأخيرة كان تعزيز قدرات الحوثيين على استهداف السفن في البحر الأحمر بدقة.

15 - وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، قام الحوثيون بتنسيق عمليات عسكرية مشتركة مع الجماعات المسلحة العراقية ضد إسرائيل في الأشهر القليلة الماضية. وفي حزيران/يونيه 2024، أكد المتحدث باسم المقاومة الإسلامية في العراق والحوثيين إطلاق هجمات مشتركة ضد مدن إسرائيلية مثل حيفا وأشدود (انظر المرفق 10)⁽¹⁷⁾. وادعى عبد الملك الحوثي أيضاً في بيان متلفز أدلى به في حزيران/يونيه 2024 أن جماعته كانت تخطط لشن هجمات بالاشتراك مع المقاومة الإسلامية في العراق ضد إسرائيل من مرتفعات الجولان (انظر المرفق 11). وأكدت المصادر إنشاء غرفة عمليات في العراق تضم ممثلين عن عدة جماعات مسلحة، تشمل الحوثيين، وذلك من أجل الاضطلاع بهذه العمليات.

16 - ويقوم بأنشطة الحوثيين في العراق أحمد الشرفي المعروف أيضاً باسم أبو إدريس، وهو مؤسس أول مصنع عسكري للحوثيين في صعدة عام 2010. كما أكدت مصادر سرية متعددة أنه يشرف أيضاً على شراء الأعتدة للحوثيين، ويرتب الدورات التدريبية مع الجماعات المسلحة للمقاتلين الحوثيين، وينظم زيارات القادة الحوثيين إلى بغداد (انظر المرفق 12).

17 - وقد عمل الشرفي بهمة على عقد اجتماعات مع مختلف رؤساء الجماعات المسلحة وزعماء القبائل والمسؤولين بهدف زيادة نفوذ الحوثيين في العراق (انظر المرفق 13). ويشير الفريق إلى أنه بدأ مؤخراً بعقد اجتماعات مع مسؤولين عراقيين رفيعي المستوى. والتقى الشرفي في حزيران/يونيه بمستشار الأمن القومي العراقي قاسم الأعرجي، وهو أول لقاء معن مع مسؤول عراقي من هذا المستوى الرفيع (انظر المرفق 14). ووفقاً لمصادر سرية، نقل الشرفي أيضاً أنشطة الفريق من مكاتب سرية في منطقتي الجادرية وعرصات الهندية في بغداد إلى مكتب تمثيل معترف به رسمياً. ونقلت مصادر سرية أن الحوثيين يستخدمون أيضاً مكتباً آخر في مدينة النجف.

18 - وأبلغ مسؤولون كبار في حكومة اليمن الفريق بأن وزير الداخلية في الحكومة سيتناقش مع نظيره العراقي بشأن أنشطة الحوثيين في العراق.

(14) انظر: <https://x.com/IraqiPMO/status/1145735482518724608>.

(15) قالت مصادر إن الحوثيين تلقوا أيضاً تدريبات في معسكر آخر في العراق بالقرب من الحدود السعودية.

(16) قُتل العديد من المقاتلين الحوثيين، بمن فيهم ضابط رفيع المستوى، في الغارة الجوية التي شنتها الولايات المتحدة على هذه المنطقة في آب/أغسطس 2024 (انظر المرفق 8).

(17) قال العميد يحيى سريع، المتحدث العسكري باسم الحوثيين: "استهدفت العملية المشتركة الأولى سفينتين كانتا تحملان معدات عسكرية في ميناء حيفا. أما العملية الثانية فاستهدفت سفينة انتهكت قرار حظر الدخول إلى ميناء حيفا في فلسطين المحتلة". وأضاف أن "العمليات المشتركة نفذت بعدة طائرات مسيرة وكانت الإصابة دقيقة".

19 - ويشكل التدريب والمساعدات العسكرية والدعم المالي الذي تقدمه الجماعات المسلحة العراقية إلى الحوثيين انتهاكاً لحظر الأسلحة والجزاءات المالية. والفريق بانتظار رد حكومة العراق على طلبه الحصول على معلومات بشأن الأمر الذي سبق ذكره.

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 2: تعاون الحوثيين مع حزب الله

20 - يعتبر الفريق أن حزب الله هو أحد أهم داعمي الحوثيين وهو مشارك في ما يلي:

- (أ) هيكل صنع القرار لدى الحوثيين (انظر الفقرة 72)؛
- (ب) الدعم العملي، من خلال التدريب العسكري (إما على تقنيات المشاة أو على منظومات الأسلحة) المقدم في اليمن وجنوب لبنان (انظر المرفق 15)؛
- (ج) الدعم الفني، مثل تجميع منظومات الأسلحة؛
- (د) الدعم المالي، بما في ذلك تعبئة الموارد واستخدامها للأغراض العسكرية (انظر الفقرة 108)؛
- (هـ) التوجيه الأيديولوجي، وخاصة في التلقين العقائدي للشباب الذي يتم خلال ما يُسمّى بالمخيمات الصيفية (انظر الفقرة 149)؛
- (و) الدعم في مجال إدارة الدعاية الإعلامية بما في ذلك إعداد محتويات الحملات العسكرية⁽¹⁸⁾.

21 - وفي الفترة ما بين تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2023 ونيسان/أبريل 2024، أدلى ممثلو الحوثيين والمتحدثون باسمهم بالعديد من التصريحات عبر وسائل إعلام في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية ولبنان، أشاروا فيها إلى وجود آلية تنسيق مشتركة بين جميع الجماعات المسلحة المنضوية تحت لواء محور المقاومة. ويشير التحليل الذي أجراه الفريق لهذه البيانات وأشرطة الفيديو التي عُرضت إلى وجود تحالف بين هذه الجماعات على المستوى السياسي والعسكري، مع وجود درجة معينة من التنسيق العملي تحت لواء قيادة مشتركة، وإلى الوجود المزعوم لما يُسمى بمركز القيادة والتحكم أو لآلية شبكية تقوم بتنسيق العمليات بشكل مشترك (انظر المرفقات 16-22)⁽¹⁹⁾.

22 - ووفقاً لمصادر سرية، يقع مركز القيادة والتحكم هذا في بيروت، ويتأسسه محمد سعيد إيزادي، رئيس فيلق القدس، وهو الشعبة المعنية بالشؤون الفلسطينية ضمن قوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية.

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 3: التواجد الحوثي في البلدان الأخرى

23 - أفادت مصادر سرية بأن الحوثيين قد بدأوا منذ عام 2018 على أقل تقدير في تشغيل "مكاتب اتصال" في عدة بلدان لتيسير تعزيز قدراتهم، من خلال الدعم التدريبي والمادي والمالي، في انتهاك

(18) تقع مكاتب قناة المسيرة التابعة للحوثيين بالقرب من مكاتب قناة المنار التابعة لحزب الله.

(19) يبدو أن شن هجوم واسع النطاق على إسرائيل في 14 نيسان/أبريل 2024، من خلال إطلاق قذائف وطائرات مسيرة في وقت واحد من إيران (جمهورية - الإسلامية) والجمهورية العربية السورية والعراق ولبنان واليمن يؤكد وجود آلية من هذا القبيل.

للقرار 2216 (2015). وكان للحوثيين مكتب اتصال في الجمهورية العربية السورية أفادت التقارير بأنه قد أُغلق في عام 2023 (انظر المرفقين 23 و 24).

باء - الديناميات المحلية

1 - أعمال الجماعات المسلحة التي تهدد السلام والأمن في اليمن

(أ) التصعيد العسكري من جانب الحوثيين

24 - يعكف الحوثيون على تعزيز قدراتهم في الخطوط الأمامية من خلال نقل الأسلحة والمعدات والمقاتلين الجدد، خارجين بذلك عن حالة شبه الهدنة التي كانت سائدة منذ نيسان/أبريل 2022. وقد كثف الحوثيون عملياتهم العسكرية ضد القوات التابعة للحكومة وحاولوا إحراز تقدم في عدة جبهات مثل حجة وشبوة والضالع ومأرب وكرش والجوف وتعز وصعدة والحديدة. واستخدم الحوثيون في هذه العمليات القذائف والطائرات المسيّرة والمدفعية والقناصة والأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع والألغام الأرضية. ووفقاً لما أفادت به مصادر الفريق، فقدت حكومة اليمن 329 جندياً وأصيب 883 آخرون خلال النصف الأول من عام 2024 (انظر المرفق 25).

25 - وبحسب المصادر، فقد استخدم الحوثيون الطرق المفتوحة حديثاً لزيادة التعزيزات العسكرية ونقل الأسلحة والمعدات وتحصين مواقعهم. وقام الحوثيون في الآونة الأخيرة بتشييد أنفاق على طريق الحوبان - تعز، وهم يقومون أيضاً ببناء طرق جديدة على طول الخطوط الأمامية في مأرب (شبوة والبيضاء ومكيراس ويافع والضالع وكرش وتعز) (انظر المرفق 25، الشكل 25-1).

26 - وفي حزيران/يونيه، تلقت حكومة اليمن معلومات تفيد بأن الحوثيين يخططون لمهاجمة عدة خطوط أمامية في كرش ومأرب وتعز. واستجابةً لذلك، اتخذت الحكومة العديد من التدابير الاحترازية لحشد قواتها.

27 - ووفقاً لتعميم حصل عليه الفريق، فقد صدرت تعليمات للقوات المسلحة التابعة للحكومة بأن تتأهب تحسباً لهجمات مباغتة يحتمل أن يشنها الحوثيون على عدة جبهات وبأن تتخذ الاحتياطات اللازمة (انظر المرفق 25، الشكل 25-2).

28 - وتعتقد حكومة اليمن أنه يتعين على المجتمع الدولي دعمها سياسياً وعسكرياً للتصدي لقدرات الحوثيين وتأمين خطوط النقل البحري في البحر الأحمر.

29 - ويرى الفريق أن الحالة العسكرية الداخلية تتسم بالهشاشة، خاصةً مع محاولات الحوثيين المستمرة للسيطرة على مواقع جديدة. وقد تؤدي أي محفزات داخلية أو خارجية إلى استئناف المواجهة العسكرية.

(ب) التجنيد الجماعي للمقاتلين الجدد

30 - أدى الخطاب الحوثي خلال حرب غزة إلى تجنيد عدد كبير من المقاتلين الجدد من أجل "تحرير فلسطين من الأعداء". ويشكك معظم المحاورين اليمنيين في وجود أي احتمالات على الإطلاق لأن يتوجه هؤلاء المقاتلون المجندون حديثاً إلى غزة، بل يعتقدون أنه قد يُزج بهم في معارك مع حكومة اليمن.

31 - وما فتئ الحوثيون ينخرطون بنشاط في تجنيد وتدريب أفراد في معظم المحافظات الخاضعة لسيطرتهم. وأطلق الحوثيون حملة تجنيد وتدريب واسعة النطاق تحت اسم "طوفان الأقصى". وأبلغ مسؤولون

حكوميون الفريق بأن الحوثيين قد جندوا منذ تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023 عدة آلاف من الأشخاص، من بينهم أطفال. وتراوح عدد المقاتلين حسب التقديرات بين 220 000 في عام 2022 و 350 000 في وقت إعداد التقرير، مقارنة بما عدده 30 000 في عام 2015. ولئن كان الفريق لم يتمكن من التحقق بشكل مستقل من عدد المقاتلين المجندين حديثاً، فإن أي تعبئة واسعة النطاق ستكون مدعاة للقلق (انظر المرفق 26).

(ج) تجنيد المهاجرين والمرتبقة الإثيوبيين

32 - أبلغ الفريق بأن الحوثيين يستغلون المهاجرين الإثيوبيين غير النظاميين، ويجبرونهم على الانضمام إلى صفوفهم، وعلى القتال ضد حكومة اليمن، وعلى الانخراط في أنشطة الاتجار بالمخدرات. ووفقاً لما أفادت به مصادر سرية، يوجد 92 000 مهاجر غير نظامي في المحافظات الجنوبية. وأفادت مصادر أخرى بأن الحوثيين جندوا أيضاً مرتبقة من قبيلتي تيجراي وأورومو الإثيوبيتين، بمرتبات تتراوح بين 80 دولاراً و 100 دولار. ولم يتمكن الفريق من التحقق من هذه المعلومات وهو يواصل التحقيق في الأمر.

(د) علاقة الحوثيين بالتنظيمين الإرهابيين القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية وحركة الشباب

الحوثيون وتنظيم القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية

33 - أعربت مصادر سرية عن قلقها من احتمال عودة تنظيم القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية (QDe.129) إلى الظهور بدعم من الحوثيين (انظر الفقرة 36). فبعد وفاة خالد سعيد باطرفي الذي يعرف أيضاً باسم أبو المقداد الكندي (S/2019/83، الفقرة 71)، في 9 آذار/مارس 2024، عيّن تنظيم القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية قائداً جديداً يدعى سعد بن عاطف العولقي⁽²⁰⁾. وهو من مواليد محافظة شبوة (S/2018/594، المرفق 30) ويُعتقد أنه قائد عسكري قوي. وقد أعاد تنظيم القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية تنشيط قنواته الإعلامية بدعوى دعم أنشطة التجنيد والتحريض على شن الهجمات.

34 - ويتميز هذا التحالف الانتهازي⁽²¹⁾ بالتعاون في المجالين الأمني والاستخباراتي، وقيام الجماعتين بتوفير ملاذات آمنة لأفراد بعضهما البعض وبتعزيز معاقلهما وبتنسيق الجهود لاستهداف القوات التابعة للحكومة.

35 - وأبلغت مصادر الفريق بأن كلتا الجماعتين قد اتفقتا على وقف الأعمال العدائية وتبادل الأسرى. وتلقى الفريق معلومات من حكومة اليمن تفيد بأن القائد السابق في تنظيم القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية سامي ديان⁽²²⁾، الذي حُكم عليه بالسجن لمدة 15 سنة في عام 2014، قد أطلق الحوثيون سراحه في صنعاء. ويحمل هذا، إلى جانب حلّ جبهة التنظيم ضد الحوثيين في محافظة البيضاء، دلالة على التعاون القائم بين التنظيم والحوثيين.

(20) انظر: https://x.com/Dr_E_Kendall/status/1767231710322655630.

(21) انظر: www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/05/04/houthis-team-up-feared-al-qaeda-branch-new-threat-yemen.

وعلی الرغم من انتقاد تنظيم القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية للحوثيين بسبب الهجوم الذي شنوه في رداً بمحافظة البيضاء بتاريخ آذار/مارس 2024، لم يستهدف التنظيم الحوثيين في الآونة الأخيرة (انظر المرفق 27).

(22) تفيد التقارير بأنه كان قائداً مهماً في تنظيم القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية، وكان يشغل منصب نائب أمين الظواهري.

36 - ومنذ بداية عام 2024 والجماعتان تتسقان عملياتهما مع بعضهما البعض بشكل مباشر. واتفقت الجماعتان على أن يقوم الحوثيون بنقل أربع طائرات مسيّرة، إضافة إلى صواريخ حرارية وأجهزة متفجرة، وبتوفير التدريب لمقاتلي تنظيم القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية. وعلاوة على ذلك، ناقشت الجماعتان إمكانية أن يقدم التنظيم الدعم في الهجمات التي تُشن على أهداف بحرية. ووفقا لمصادر الحكومة، تشمل مخزونات التنظيم الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة وما يتصل بها من ذخائر، والقنابل، والأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع، والألغام الأرضية، وكذلك الصواريخ الفراغية ومنظومات الدفاع الجوي المحمولة.

37 - وقد استخدم تنظيم القاعدة في شبه الجزيرة العربية مؤخرا الطائرات المسيّرة والأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع في هجماته ضد القوات التابعة للحكومة في أبين وشبوة⁽²³⁾. وتزايد استخدام التنظيم للطائرات المسيّرة وخاصة الطائرات ذات المدى الأطول، هو أمر مثير للقلق.

38 - ويستخدم التنظيم في قتاله ضد القوات التابعة للحكومة أساليب حرب العصابات ويستغل الأطفال في القيام بأنشطة استطلاع للحصول على معلومات عن المواقع التابعة للحكومة. ووفقا لما أفادت به حكومة اليمن، فقد أسفر استخدام الأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع في 49 مرة خلال الفترة بين عام 2023 ومنتصف تموز/يوليه 2024 عن مقتل 84 جنديا (66 في عام 2023 و 18 في عام 2024)، وعن إصابة 133 جنديا (89 في عام 2023 و 44 في عام 2024).

الحوثيون وحركة الشباب

39 - وفقا لما أفادت به مصادر سرية، يقوم الحوثيون بتقييم الخيارات المتاحة لتنفيذ هجمات في البحر من الساحل الصومالي من أجل توسيع نطاق منطقة عملياتهم. ولتحقيق هذه الغاية، يعمل الحوثيون على تعزيز علاقاتهم مع الجماعة الإرهابية حركة الشباب المجاهدين (حركة الشباب) (SOe.001).

40 - ووفقا لحكومة اليمن، هناك أنشطة تهريب متزايدة بين الحوثيين وحركة الشباب، يتعلق معظمها بالأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة⁽²⁴⁾. وامتلاك الجماعتين أسلحة من نفس الطرازات وأرقام تسلسلية من نفس الدفعات (انظر المرفقات 126-151) يشير إما إلى توريد الأسلحة ونقلها بصورة غير مشروعة بينهما، أو إلى وجود مورد مشترك، أو إلى كليهما. ويواصل الفريق التحقيق في الأمر بالتعاون مع فريق الخبراء العامل بموجب القرار 2713 (2023).

41 - وتهدد الجهود التعاونية المتزايدة بين الحوثيين وحركة الشباب في تهريب الأسلحة ونقلها بصورة غير مشروعة السلام والأمن في اليمن والمنطقة.

2 - أثر التصعيد الاقتصادي

42 - لا يزال التفاعل بين الأعمال الاقتصادية والسياسية والعسكرية يشكل تهديدا خطيرا للسلام والأمن والاستقرار في اليمن. والآثار المترتبة على أعمال الحوثيين الموجهة ضد الاقتصاد في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة حكومة اليمن لا تقتصر على مجرد التداعيات الاقتصادية. وعلى سبيل المثال، فإن الهجمات المستمرة على السفن في البحر الأحمر وخليج عدن، وحظر تصدير النفط الخام، والقيود المفروضة على

(23) ذكرت المصادر حوالي خمس هجمات من هذا النوع استخدمت فيها طائرات مسيّرة ومواد متفجرة إضافية.

(24) يعمل الفريق على التحقق من الأسماء التي تلقتها حكومة اليمن.

التجارة المحلية، والتدخل في أنشطة البنوك والمؤسسات المالية (انظر المرفق 28)، وإصدار العملات المعدنية (انظر الفقرة 103)، والاستيلاء على طائرات تابعة للخطوط الجوية اليمنية وتجميد أموالها (انظر المرفقات 178-180) هي أمور لها آثار بعيدة المدى في المجالين السياسي والأمني. والتوترات الاقتصادية المستمرة، وخاصة بعد أن ألغى البنك المركزي اليمني في عدن تراخيص ستة بنوك تتخذ من صنعاء مقراً لها وهدد بمنعها من استخدام نظام جمعية الاتصالات المالية بين المصارف على مستوى العالم "سويفت"⁽²⁵⁾، قد زجت باليمن في أتون نزاع كبير محتمل، حيث هدد الحوثيون بالعودة إلى الحرب بسبب المسألة (انظر المرفق 29).

43 - وعلى المنوال نفسه، فإن الأعمال السياسية والعسكرية تؤثر بشكل مباشر على الاقتصاد، مما يؤدي إلى تفاقم دوامة عدم الاستقرار في اليمن. فقد تسببت التهديدات والهجمات المنتظمة التي يشنها الحوثيون على السفن المبحرة عبر البحر الأحمر، وخاصة منذ منتصف تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023، في تعطيل التجارة الدولية والاقتصاد اليمني. وأدى ذلك إلى زيادة تكاليف الشحن والتأمين وتأخير وصول البضائع إلى اليمن، وهو ما تُرجم بدوره إلى زيادة في أسعار مختلف السلع، ولا سيما السلع الأساسية. وبالمثل، أدى استمرار الحظر المفروض على تصدير النفط الخام إلى خسارة في الإيرادات بنسبة 43 في المائة مع ما يترتب على ذلك من خسارة في العملة الأجنبية، وانخفاض في قيمة الريال اليمني، وارتفاع حاد في معدلات التضخم. ووصل سعر صرف الريال اليمني إلى مستوى قياسي بلغ 1 900 ريال يمني مقابل دولار الولايات المتحدة في تموز/يوليه 2024، مقارنة بـ 1 452 ريالاً في أيلول/سبتمبر 2023. وقد أثرت كل هذه العوامل على قدرة الحكومة على تزويد الشعب بالخدمات الأساسية مثل دفع المرتبات وتوفير الكهرباء والمياه والتعليم. وغالباً ما أدى تدهور الظروف الاقتصادية إلى إثارة الاضطرابات العامة والنزاع.

44 - واستغلت الأحزاب السياسية هذه الأوضاع الاقتصادية المتردية، مما أدى إلى حدوث مواجهات سياسية داخل مجلس القيادة الرئاسي، وبالتالي تهديد الاستقرار السياسي في اليمن (انظر الفقرة 46). ولا يزال الافتقار إلى الفرص الاقتصادية يدفع الأفراد إلى الانخراط في أنشطة غير مشروعة، بما في ذلك الانضمام إلى الجماعات المسلحة أو الشبكات الإجرامية المنظمة، مما يزيد من زعزعة الاستقرار في المنطقة.

3 - الوضع الداخلي

(أ) تباين الآراء داخل حكومة اليمن

45 - لا تزال بنية حكومة اليمن غير متماسكة. وقد وجه المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي انتقادات لحكومة اليمن في العديد من الأمور، مؤكداً أنه سيعلم في نهاية المطاف إقامة دولة مستقلة في الجنوب. بيد أن المجلس ليس واثقاً من قدرته على الحصول على الاعتراف الدولي وتلبية المتطلبات الاقتصادية والسياسية لإقامة دولة مستقلة، وذلك وفقاً لما أفادت به المصادر.

(25) نظام "سويفت" يقوم على شبكة ترانس عالمية تستخدمها المصارف والمؤسسات المالية لتبادل المعلومات المتعلقة بالمعاملات المالية بشكل آمن وموثوق.

46 - وأفادت المصادر بأن المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي غير راضٍ عن أداء الحكومة⁽²⁶⁾ بسبب المشاكل التي تواجه الاقتصاد⁽²⁷⁾، ونقص الخدمات العامة. ويعتقد المجلس، باعتباره شريكا في حكومة اليمن وباعتباره القوة الرئيسية في الجنوب، أن "ضعف أداء" الحكومة سيؤثر على شعبيته في الجنوب، وخاصة في عدن. وكشفت المصادر أن عيدروس الزبيدي، قائد المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي، أعلن مؤخرا أن مجلسه سينسحب من مجلس القيادة الرئاسي ومن الحكومة إذا استمر الوضع الاقتصادي الحالي.

47 - أما من الناحية السياسية، فقد دأب المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي على رفض انعقاد جلسات البرلمان (مجلس النواب) في عدن، انطلاقا من فرضية أنه يمثل إرث النظام القديم. وبحسب المصادر، فإن المجلس يروج بدلا من ذلك لهيئة التشاور والمصالحة⁽²⁸⁾ لتحل محل البرلمان.

48 - وعلاوة على ذلك، لا يزال المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي عازفا عن الانضمام إلى القوات الموحدة تحت قيادة واحدة⁽²⁹⁾، على نحو ما قرره رئيس مجلس القيادة الرئاسي⁽³⁰⁾، ويفضل أن يظل مستقلا. وقد أبلغت المصادر الفريق بأن وزارة الدفاع طلبت من المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي تزويدها بقائمة بأسماء الجنود التابعين للجماعة للمساواة بين مرتبات جميع الجنود المنتسبين إلى فصائل مختلفة، لكن المجلس لم يقدم هذه القائمة حتى الآن. فقد أشارت المصادر إلى أن هناك تباينا كبيرا في مرتبات الجنود، وأنه يلزم إجراء مراجعة شاملة لقوائم بعض الجماعات التابعة لحكومة اليمن. وهناك جماعات تقوم بزيادة أعداد جنودها بإضافة أسماء غير موجودة أو أسماء موظفين يعملون في وزارات أخرى لكي تحصل على المزيد من المرتبات.

(ب) الحوادث الأمنية

49 - أدى التنافس على ممارسة النفوذ في الجنوب إلى وقوع حادث في حضرموت بين جماعتين مسلحتين تابعتين لحكومة اليمن. فمنعت قوات النخبة، مدعومة من المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي، قوات درع الوطن من دخول مدينة المكلا، وأصدر المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي بيانا أشار فيه إلى أنه من الأفضل لقوات درع الوطن حماية الوادي والصحراء في المنطقة، مع ترك المناطق الساحلية لقوات النخبة التي درجت تاريخيا على حمايتها. وقد أبلغ مسؤولو حكومة اليمن الفريق بأن المسألة قد تم حلها بسهولة، وأن قيادة القوات المشتركة المنشأة حديثا، والتي تضم ممثلين عن جميع القوات، لن تسمح بتكرار مثل هذه الحالات.

(26) اتخذ رئيس الوزراء اليمني الجديد، أحمد بن مبارك، العديد من المبادرات لتحسين الخدمات العامة ولمكافحة الفساد. ومما لا شك فيه أن حكومة اليمن تحتاج إلى المزيد من الدعم المالي لتحقيق الاستقرار.

(27) أصدر المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي أيضا على ضرورة تنفيذ القرارات الاقتصادية التي اتخذها مؤخرا البنك المركزي اليمني في عدن.

(28) هيئة التشاور والمصالحة هي يمنية أنشأها الرئيس اليمني السابق عبد ربه منصور هادي من أجل جمع مختلف المكونات لدعم مجلس القيادة الرئاسي ولتوحيد القوى الوطنية.

(29) أصدر رئيس مجلس القيادة الرئاسي والقائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة القرار رقم (40) لسنة 2023 بشأن إنشاء هيئة العمليات المشتركة في عام 2024. وأصدر مجلس القيادة الرئاسي أيضا أمرا توجيهيا بدمج العديد من الأجهزة الأمنية والاستخباراتية تحت اسم "الجهاز المركزي لأمن الدولة" خلال فترة ستة أشهر. بيد أن المصادر أخبرت الفريق بأن عملية الدمج تواجه تحديات. وعملا بالأمر التوجيهي القاضي بالدمج، فقد أنشأ أيضا جهاز متخصص هو جهاز مكافحة الإرهاب ومقره عدن، ويرأسه قيادي بارز في المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي.

(30) أحرز بعض التقدم في عملية إعادة التوحيد، تحت قيادة قوات مشتركة وغرفة عمليات مشتركة، وفقا لمصادر الحكومة. بيد أن العملية تسير ببطء بسبب نقص الموارد.

50 - وفي الآونة الأخيرة، أدى حادث أمني خطير إلى أزمة داخلية مستتت بمكانة المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي في الجنوب. فقد اختطف ضابط في الجيش اليمني، وهو المقدم علي عشان الجعدي، على خلفية نزاعات شخصية على امتلاك أراضٍ. وقد اتهم في هذه القضية يسران المقطري، رئيس فرع جهاز مكافحة الإرهاب في عدن المدعوم من المجلس. وقررت اللجنة الأمنية العليا، برئاسة وزير الدفاع، توقيف المقطري وإلقاء القبض عليه لتورطه في عملية الاختطاف. وعلى الرغم من إلقاء القبض على العديد من المشتبه فيهم، لم تُحسم هذه المسألة بعد، ولم يُلق القبض حتى الآن على المشتبه فيه الرئيسي.

51 - وتسبب هذا الحادث في اندلاع مظاهرات وأعمال شغب في عدن وأبين، وهي موطن القبيلة التي ينتمي إليها الضابط المختطف. وأبلغت مصادر سرية الفريق بأن عددا من الأفراد المنتمين إلى خلايا حوثية قد أُلقي القبض عليهم في عدن والضالع وأبين أثناء محاولتهم استغلال الوضع. فكان هؤلاء الأشخاص يخططون لتحريض الحشود ضد حكومة اليمن والمجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي وجهاز مكافحة الإرهاب. وأضافت المصادر أن الوضع لا يزال مضطربا، وأن رئيس مجلس القيادة الرئاسي لم يعد إلى عدن، حتى منتصف شهر آب/أغسطس، بسبب الوضع المتوتر في المدينة.

ثالثا - الأمن البحري

ألف - هجمات الحوثيين على السفن التجارية والحربية

52 - امتد نطاق النزاع في اليمن من البر إلى البحر الأحمر وخليج عدن، مما أدى إلى تدهور الأمن البحري بشكل كبير. وتسبب تصعيد الحوثيين لهجماتهم⁽³¹⁾ على السفن التجارية والحربية في البحر الأحمر وخليج عدن والمحيط الهندي في تعطيل حركة النقل البحري الدولي في هذه المنطقة الجيوسياسية الرئيسية. وأسفر تحويل الجماعة وجهة أعمالها إلى البحر عن زيادة نفوذها في المنطقة. ولم يشهد العالم مثل هذا الحجم من الهجمات على السفن المدنية باستخدام منظومات الأسلحة منذ الحرب العالمية الثانية.

53 - وعلى الرغم من ادعاء الحوثيين أنهم سيستهدفون السفن "المرتبطة بإسرائيل"، فقد كشفت التحقيقات التي أجراها الفريق أن الحوثيين يستهدفون بشكل عشوائي السفن المبحرة في البحر الأحمر وخليج عدن (انظر المرفق 100).

54 - ويكشف التحليل الذي أجراه الفريق للبيانات التي أتاحتها المنظمة البحرية الدولية، ومكتب المملكة المتحدة لعمليات الملاحة التجارية البحرية، والقيادة المركزية للولايات المتحدة، أنه قد جرى تنفيذ ما لا يقل عن 134 هجوما من مناطق خاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين على سفن نقل أو سفن تجارية وعلى سفن حربية تابعة للولايات المتحدة وللمملكة المتحدة في البحر الأحمر وخليج عدن خلال الفترة ما بين 15 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023 و 31 تموز/يوليه 2024. ويلاحظ الفريق أن الحوثيين استخدموا في الهجمات التي شنوها على السفن قذيفة تسيارية جديدة لم يُكشف عنها سابقا وهي حاتم-2 (انظر الفقرة 71). ومن بين

(31) اعتبارا من 14 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023، كَتَّف الحوثيون هجماتهم على السفن وتحديدًا تلك المتجهة إلى إسرائيل أو المرتبطة بها (المرحلتان الأولى والثانية). وفي المرحلة الثالثة، توعد الحوثيون في 9 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2023 باستهداف أي سفينة مبحرة في طريقها إلى الموانئ الإسرائيلية. وفي المرحلة الرابعة، يواصل الحوثيون منذ 24 أيار/مايو 2024 مهاجمة سفن كل شركة مرتبطة بإسرائيل أو تحمل بضائع لإسرائيل، وذلك ردا على الهجوم الإسرائيلي على رفح في جنوب قطاع غزة. ويمكن الاطلاع على بيان للحوثيين بشأن الموضوع على الرابط التالي: <https://youtu.be/pBfd4W808zk>.

السفن التجارية التي استهدفتها الهجمات، كانت هناك 31 ناقلة صهريجية للنفط أو لغاز البترول المسال أو للمواد الكيميائية. وقد تعرضت سبع من السفن المذكورة للقصف ولكنها تمكنت من مواصلة الإبحار. وأسفرت الهجمات عن مقتل ما لا يقل عن أربعة ملاحين (انظر المرفق 30).

55 - وفي 19 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023، تعرضت سفينة *غالاكسي لير* للهجوم والاختطاف (انظر المرفق 31). ولا يزال الحوثيون يحتجزون السفينة وأفراد طاقمها البالغ عددهم 25 شخصا والذين يتمتعون إلى جنسيات مختلفة. ووفقا لما أفاد به خبراء في الملاحة الجوية، فكان يلزم حصول طاقم الطائرة الهليكوبتر على تدريب متخصص للهبوط على سفينة *غالاكسي لير* أثناء تحركها. وتشير المناورات التي قامت بها قوات الكوماندوس على متن السفينة إلى استخدام أساليب لم تكن مرتبطة من قبل بممارسات الحوثيين. ولا يستبعد الفريق احتمال حصول كل من طاقم الطائرة الهليكوبتر وقوات الكوماندوس المشاركة في العملية على تدريب متخصص من مدربين أجنبية.

56 - وفي اليوم التالي، صرح حزام الأسد، عضو المجلس السياسي للحوثيين، بأن القيادات الحوثية هي التي اتخذت قرار الهجوم على السفينة، وإن كان محور المقاومة قد عمل بالتنسيق مع جمهورية إيران الإسلامية وبتوجيهات منها. وذكر أيضا أن هذا الهجوم كان مجرد بداية لعمليات الحوثيين البحرية (انظر المرفق 32)⁽³²⁾.

57 - وغرقت ناقلة السوانب *روبيمار (Rubymar)* التي كانت تحمل 22 000 طن من فوسفات الأمونيوم بعد تعرضها للقصف من قبل الحوثيين، في 18 شباط/فبراير 2024، تاركاً وراءها بقعة من الوقود. ويمثل هذا خطرا على البيئة والأمن البحري حيث تقتقر حكومة اليمن إلى القدرة على احتواء التسرب المحتمل⁽³³⁾.

58 - ويلاحظ الفريق أيضا أن حوالي ثلث هذه الهجمات التي استهدفت السفن قد وقع في خليج عدن، وهو موقع بعيد عن الخطوط الأمامية وخارج التغطية الرادارية ونطاق المتابعة لدى الحوثيين (انظر المرفق 30). وعلاوة على ذلك، فإن العديد من السفن المستهدفة في هذه المنطقة توقف تشغيل نظامها الآلي لتحديد الهوية قبل دخولها، مما يشير إلى أن الحوثيين قد تلقوا مساعدة خارجية في تحديد هوية السفن وتحديد مواقعها واستهدافها. وقد أعلن الحوثيون مسؤوليتهم عن معظم هذه الهجمات. ويواصل الفريق التحقيق في الأمر.

59 - ووفقا للتحليل الذي أجراه الفريق، فقد قام التحالف بين الولايات المتحدة والمملكة المتحدة باعتراض أو تدمير ما يزيد على 800 من القذائف والطائرات المسيّرة والسفن السطحية غير المأهولة والمركبات الغاطسة غير المأهولة وصواريخ أرض - جو. وعلاوة على ذلك، فقد قام التحالف أيضا بتعطيل مراكز القيادة والعديد من مرافق التخزين وبإبطال مفعول الرادارات. وأفادت التقارير بأن هذه الضربات قد أضعفت

(32) بيانات أدلى بها في مقابلة مع صحيفة "العربي الجديد"، وهي أحد الوسائل الإعلامية القطرية، بتاريخ 20 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023.

(33) باءت خطط سحب السفينة بالفشل بعد أن رفضت هيئات الموانئ في عدن وجيبوتي والمملكة العربية السعودية استقبال السفينة، حسبما أفاد به مشغل السفينة اللبناني. وحتى الآن، توجد ثلاث سفن غارقة تشكل مخاطر على البيئة وسلامة الملاحة. انظر: wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/Documents/Circular%20Letter%20No.4890%20-%20Mv%20Rubymar%20-%20Call%20For%20Contributions%20Of%20Oil%20Pollution.pdf و www.lloydslist.com/LL1148431/Houthi-claim-first-casualty-as-Rubymar-sinks-two-weeks-after-attack

القدرات الاستراتيجية للحوثيين، مما قلل بشكل كبير من قدرتهم على شن هجمات واسعة النطاق. ومع ذلك، لم يتمكن الفريق من التحقق من أثرها الحقيقي (انظر المرفق 33).

باء - التهديدات الصادرة عن الحوثيين ضد الشركات البحرية

60 - حصل الفريق على نسخ من ثلاث رسائل موجهة إلى شركات ملاحية من مركز تنسيق العمليات الإنسانية، الذي أنشئ في 17 شباط/فبراير 2024 تحت إشراف مهدي المشاط، رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى للحوثيين. ودلت هذه الرسائل على أن تلك الشركات مُنعت من المرور عبر البحر الأحمر ومضيق باب المندب وخليج عدن وبحر العرب والمحيط الهندي، وإلا سيتم استهدافها (انظر المرفقات 34-36).

سفينة التخزين والتفريغ العائمة صافر

61 - لا تزال سفينة التخزين والتفريغ العائمة صافر (*Safer*) راسية في ميناء رأس عيسى على البحر الأحمر، إلى جانب سفينة اليمن (*MOST Yemen*) (S/2023/833)، الفترات 51-54). ونُقل ما يقرب من 1,1 مليون برميل من النفط الخام من سفينة التخزين والتفريغ العائمة صافر إلى سفينة اليمن في الفترة من 25 تموز/يوليه إلى 25 آب/أغسطس 2023. وقد سُجّلت سفينة اليمن في ليبيريا تحت اسم نوتিকা (*Nautica*) ورفعت علم ليبيريا. ومع ذلك، وحتى بعد انتهاء سريان ذلك التسجيل، لم تُسجل السفينة تحت العلم اليمني. وأفادت التقارير بأن التطورات الجارية في البحر الأحمر أدت إلى تأجيل المهام المتبقية. ويشمل ذلك إزالة سفينة التخزين والتفريغ العائمة صافر من اليمن لإعادة تدويرها والتخلص منها، بالإضافة إلى تأجيل شراء الصندل والمعدات المرتبطة به اللازمين لإتمام عملية إنقاذ السفينة. ولم يُتخذ أي قرار حتى الآن بشأن الاستفادة من قيمة الخردة لسفينة التخزين والتفريغ العائمة صافر ومن عائدات بيع النفط المخزن في سفينة اليمن. ووفقا للمعلومات التي قدمتها حكومة اليمن إلى الفريق، فقد فرض الحوثيون السيطرة الكاملة على منطقة عمليات السفينتين وعيّنوا طاقما للإشراف على العمليات على متن السفينة الجديدة اليمن. وأبلغ ممثل شركة صافر لعمليات الاستكشاف والإنتاج، وهي الشركة المالكة لسفينة التخزين والتفريغ العائمة صافر، الفريق بأن الشركة ليس لها دور في تدريب الطاقم التابع للحوثيين والإشراف عليه، مؤكدا أنها لا تتحمل أي مسؤولية عن أي عواقب ناجمة عن هذا الترتيب.

62 - وبالنظر إلى الوضع المتدهور في منطقة البحر الأحمر وإلى فرض الحوثيين سيطرتهم على الموقع، فهناك مخاوف كبيرة بشأن خطر وقوع أضرار بيئية. فإذا أُصيبت السفينتان بأضرار، قد يحدث تسرب نفطي، مع ما يترتب على ذلك من عواقب وخيمة على البيئة البحرية وسكان المناطق الساحلية، الذين يعتمد الكثير منهم على صيد الأسماك بشكل كبير لكسب سبل عيشهم.

رابعا - الأسلحة وتنفيذ حظر الأسلحة المحدد الأهداف

انتهاكات لحظر الأسلحة على نطاق غير مسبوق

63 - عملا بأحكام الفقرات 14 إلى 17 من قرار مجلس الأمن 2216 (2015)، يركز الفريق على تنفيذ مجموعة من أنشطة الرصد والتحقيق من أجل تحديد أي انتهاكات لحظر الأسلحة المحدد الأهداف تنطوي، بوجه مباشر أو غير مباشر، على توريد الأسلحة أو بيعها أو نقلها إلى أفراد وكيانات أدرج المجلس واللجنة المنشأة عملا بالقرار 2140 (2014) أسماءهم في قائمة الجزاءات، أو لفاندهم. وعملا بالفقرة 16 من القرار 2624 (2022)، يركز الفريق على المكونات المتاحة تجاريا التي يستخدمها الأفراد المدرجون في قائمة

الجزءات والكيان في تجميع كافة أنواع القذائف والطائرات غير المأهولة والنواقل الهجومية البحرية ومنظومات أسلحة محددة (مثل القذائف الموجهة المضادة للدبابات ومنظومات الدفاع الجوي المحمولة ومنظومة المراقبة الكهروبصرية) وقطع الغيار اللازمة لما سبق ذكره، إلى جانب المساعدة التقنية أو التدريب وغيرها من أشكال المساعدة فيما يتصل بالأنشطة العسكرية أو بتوفير أي أسلحة وأعتدة ذات صلة أو صيانتها أو استخدامها.

1 - منظومات الأسلحة التي حصل عليها الحوثيون وجمّعوها واستخدموها بدعم خارجي

64 - تشير الشهادات المتعددة التي جمعها الفريق من خبراء عسكريين ومسؤولين يمينيين وحتى أفراد مقربين من الحوثيين إلى أنهم لا يملكون القدرة، دون دعم خارجي، على تطوير وإنتاج منظومات أسلحة معقدة مثل القذائف التسيارية القصيرة المدى والقذائف التسيارية المتوسطة المدى والقذائف الانسيابية للهجوم البري والقذائف التسيارية الموجهة المضادة للسفن والقذائف الانسيابية الموجهة المضادة للسفن وصواريخ أرض - جو والمركبات الجوية الاستطلاعية غير المأهولة والطائرات المسيّرة الهجومية الأحادية الاتجاه (ومنصات الإطلاق ومراكز القيادة الخاصة بكل منها على حدة)، ومنظومات الدفاع الجوي المحمولة والمركبات الغاطسة غير المأهولة والقذائف الموجهة المضادة للدبابات ومنظومات المراقبة الكهروبصرية والرادارات البحرية وأجزاء التسديد المزودة بالقدرة على التصوير الحراري ومناظير القنص. وتبرز هذا الدعم الخارجي عملياتاً اعتراض الأعتدة من قبل دول أعضاء ووكالات إنفاذ متعددة منذ عام 2018 (انظر المرفق 37).

65 - ولاحظ الفريق وجود أوجه تشابه بين وحدات الأعتدة المتعددة التي يشغلها الحوثيون والأعتدة التي تنتجها وتشغلها جمهورية إيران الإسلامية أو الجماعات المسلحة التابعة لمحور المقاومة. ويدل ذلك على أن هذه الأعتدة ربما لم تطوّر من قبل الحوثيين أنفسهم. وعلاوة على ذلك، تشير أوجه التشابه إلى أن المخططات والمعارف التقنية اللازمة لتصنيع وتجميع منظومات الأسلحة هذه بشكل مستقل ربما تكون قد نُقلت إلى الحوثيين من قبل جمهورية إيران الإسلامية⁽³⁴⁾ أو من جانب جماعات من الخارج. وعلاوة على ذلك، يستمر نقل مكونات محددة، ولا سيما تلك التي تتسم بخصائص تقنية معقدة. ويتبين ذلك من خلال عمليات التفتيش التي أجراها الفريق على المكونات التي تم اعتراضها على الحدود البحرية والبرية، وعلى حطام الأعتدة التي استخدمها الحوثيون الذي يظهر بوضوح الاسم التجاري والطرز والعلامات والأرقام المتسلسلة وملصقات مراقبة الجودة المشابهة للأعتدة المنتجة خارج اليمن، ولا سيما في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية.

66 - ومنذ 19 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2023، وردا على حرب غزة والضربة الجوية الإسرائيلية على السفارة الإيرانية في دمشق، فقد استهدفت الأراضي الإسرائيلية من قبل الحوثيين (انظر المرفق 99) وجمهورية إيران الإسلامية وعدة جماعات مسلحة تابعة لمحور المقاومة بقذائف تسيارية متوسطة المدى وقذائف انسيابية للهجوم البري وطائرات مسيّرة هجومية أحادية الاتجاه، حيث اعتُرضت غالبيتها أو تحطمت وهي في طريقها نحو هدفها. وفي رسالة موجهة إلى مجلس الأمن بتاريخ 6 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023، بيّنت إسرائيل أن الحوثيين أطلقوا في 19 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2023، خمس قذائف انسيابية للهجوم البري و 30 طائرة مسيّرة هجومية أحادية الاتجاه من طراز صمد-3 باتجاه إقليمها، تلتها قذيفة تسيارية متوسطة المدى في 27 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر، أعقبها قذيفة تسيارية أخرى متوسطة المدى وقذيفتان انسيابيتان للهجوم البري في 31 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر.

(34) في 29 أيار/مايو 2024، أفادت وكالة تسنيم للأنباء، وهي وسيلة إعلامية إيرانية، بأن التكنولوجيا الإيرانية للقذائف الموجهة المضادة للسفن أصبحت الآن في أيدي الحوثيين (المرفقان 38 و 39).

67 - وخلال ليلة 13 إلى 14 نيسان/أبريل 2024، كانت الأراضي الإسرائيلية هدفا لهجوم واسع النطاق، حيث أُطلق ما يزيد على 300 من القذائف التسيارية المتوسطة المدى والقذائف الانسيابية للهجوم البري والطائرات المسيّرة الهجومية الأحادية الاتجاه من المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين وكذلك من إيران (جمهورية - الإسلامية) والعراق ولبنان⁽³⁵⁾. ويوضح هذا الهجوم الذي سمّته جمهورية إيران الإسلامية "الوعد الصادق" مستوى التنسيق بين الحوثيين وجمهورية إيران الإسلامية والجهات المتورطة الأخرى من غير الدول (انظر المرفق 101).

68 - وفي 5 حزيران/يونيه 2024، عرض الحوثيون لقطات فيديو لعملية إطلاق قذيفة تحمل اسم "فلسطين" تتوافق مع القذيفة التسيارية المتوسطة المدى التي أطلقت على مدينة إيلات، في إسرائيل (انظر المرفق 102). ويلاحظ الفريق وجود أوجه تشابه بين هذه القذيفة التي لم يسبق توثيقها في ترسانة الحوثيين وقذيفة "خبير سكن"، وهي قذيفة تسيارية متوسطة المدى تفوق سرعتها سرعة الصوت، تشكل جزءا من الترسانة المتطورة لجمهورية إيران الإسلامية، واستُعرضت للمرة الأولى في 11 شباط/فبراير 2022 خلال العرض العسكري الذي أجري في طهران (انظر المرفق 46).

69 - وفي 19 تموز/يوليه 2024، شنّ الحوثيون هجوماً موجهاً ضد مدينة تل أبيب، في إسرائيل، بواسطة طائرة مسيّرة هجومية أحادية الاتجاه تحمل اسم "يافا". وتشير المعلومات المتوفرة لدى الفريق إلى أن هذه الطائرة المسيّرة هي نسخة مشابهة للطائرات المسيّرة من طراز صمد-3 مزودة بمحرك أحدث وربما بالكترونيات جوية فضائية مطوّرة. والمحرك الذي جُهزت به هذه الطائرة المسيّرة شبيه بالمحرك الإيراني من طراز MD275 الذي تصنعه شركة MADO (انظر المرفق 103).

70 - ويلاحظ الفريق وجود أوجه تشابه كبيرة بين الأعتدة الموثقة والأعتدة التي تطورها جمهورية إيران الإسلامية أو تشغلها (53 صنفاً). وتقوم بتشغيل أصناف مشابهة أيضاً جماعات مسلحة في العراق (20 صنفاً) ولبنان (11 صنفاً) والأرض الفلسطينية المحتلة (خمسة أصناف) والبحرين (صنف واحد) والصومال (صنف واحد) (انظر المرفقات 40-83).

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 4: العرض الضخم الذي أجراه الحوثيون للأعتدة العسكرية

يسلط العرض العسكري الضخم الذي أجراه الحوثيون للأعتدة العسكرية في صنعاء في 21 أيلول/سبتمبر 2023 الضوء على وجود أعتدة جديدة، مقارنةً بالأعتدة المستعرضة خلال العرض السابق في 21 أيلول/سبتمبر 2022 (S/2023/833، الفقرات 101-103). وتشمل الأعتدة الجديدة، التي تتشابه في خصائصها مع الأعتدة المصنوعة في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية أو المنتجة فيها، طرازين من القذائف التسيارية المتوسطة المدى، وطراز واحد من القذائف الانسيابية للهجوم البري، وطراز واحد من القذائف الانسيابية الموجهة المضادة للسفن وطرازين من القذائف التسيارية الموجهة المضادة للسفن وطراز واحد من الطائرات المسيّرة الهجومية الأحادية الاتجاه وطرازين معدّلين من الطائرات المسيّرة الهجومية الأحادية الاتجاه وثلاثة أطرزة معدلة من صواريخ أرض - جو وثلاثة أطرزة من منظومة المراقبة الكهرو بصريّة. ولاحظ الفريق أيضاً طراز واحد من سفن الهجوم السريع، وطرازين من السفن السطحية غير المأهولة^(أ) (الطرازان مجهزان برادارات بحرية)، وطرازين من العربات المصفحة (انظر المرفقات 84-94).

(أ) قارب هجومي سريع موجه عن بعد على منته متفجرات.

(35) أطلقت 220 من هذه القذائف والمركبات من المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين.

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 5: التصريحات التي أدلى بها مسؤولون إيرانيون

أعلن الفريق الأول رستم قاسمي، القائد المساعد لفيلق القدس التابع لقوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية، خلال مقابلة أجرتها معه قناة روسيا اليوم في 21 نيسان/أبريل 2021، عن وجود مستشارين عسكريين إيرانيين في اليمن وتوريد التكنولوجيا الإيرانية لصناعة الأسلحة. وثبتت المقابلة نفسها ميمري تي في (Memri TV)، وهي وسيلة إعلامية إيرانية.

وفي 22 أيلول/سبتمبر 2020، أفادت "نور نيوز"، وهي وسيلة إعلامية إيرانية أخرى، بأن العميد أبا الفضل شكارجي، كبير المتحدثين الرسميين باسم هيئة الأركان العامة للقوات المسلحة الإيرانية، أعلن على شاشة التلفزيون عن نقل خبرات تقنية في مجال الدفاع إلى الشعب اليمني، وتبادل الخبرات والمعارف معه.

وفي 1 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2019، ذكرت وكالة تسنيم للأخبار أن اللواء محمد باقري، رئيس هيئة الأركان العامة للقوات المسلحة الإيرانية، أصرح لقناة "فينيكس تي في" (Phoenix TV) الصينية خلال زيارة أجراها لبيجين بما يلي: "نحن نقدم للجيش الشعبي اليمني مساعدة استشارية وفكرية وتتولى قوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية القيام بذلك" (انظر المرفقات 95-98).

2 - قذيفة من طراز جديد تستخدم لمهاجمة سفينة تجارية


71 - في 25 حزيران/يونيه 2024، أعلن الحوثيون مسؤوليتهم عن مهاجمة السفينة *MSC Sarah V* في بحر العرب باستخدام قذيفة جديدة لم يفصح عنها سابقاً (انظر المرفق 104). وبعد مضي يوم واحد على ذلك، نشروا مقطع فيديو يُظهر إطلاق القذيفة، وعزفوها على أنها قذيفة حاطم-2، وهي قذيفة تسيرية تفوق سرعتها سرعة الصوت يُزعم أنها صُنعت في اليمن. ويلاحظ الفريق أن مظهر هذه القذيفة شبيهه أيضاً بمظهر قذيفة "خبير سكن" الإيرانية (انظر الفقرة 69).

3 - دور قوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية وحزب الله في عملية صنع الحوثيين للقرار

72 - أشارت عدة مصادر سرية إلى الدور المهيمن الذي يضطلع به الفريق الأول عبد الرضا شهلاني من فيلق القدس التابع لقوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية ونائبه وهو أحد كبار كوادر حزب الله، في هيكل القيادة والتحكم للحوثيين. ويتمثل دور الفريق الأول شهلاني الذي يعمل تحت مسمى "مساعد جهاد"⁽³⁶⁾ في إسداء المشورة وتقديم المساعدة لعبد الملك الحوثي (YEI.004) في الأنشطة الاستراتيجية والجهادية والعسكرية. ويُزعم أن الفريق الأول شهلاني يتولى الإشراف على القوات الجوية الفضائية (القذائف والمسيرات)، والقوات البحرية، وجميع المناطق العسكرية، إلى جانب التعبئة والخدمات اللوجستية.

(36) يعمل كبير ضباط الاتصال لدى فيلق القدس التابع لقوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية والمعار إلى كتائب حزب الله أيضاً تحت مسمى مساعد جهاد وينويه أحد كوادر حزب الله.

الشكل الأول
الهيكل التنظيمي للحوثيين



المصدر: سري.

4 - المساعدة والتدريب المقدمان من الأخصائيين والتقنيين الأجانب للحوثيين

73 - يلاحظ الفريق تحوّل الحوثيين من جماعة مسلحة محلية محدودة القدرات إلى منظمة عسكرية قوية، حيث توسع نطاق قدراتهم التشغيلية متجاوزاً بكثير حدود الأراضي الخاضعة لسيطرتهم. وقد كان هذا التحول ممكناً بفعل نقل الأعتدة (انظر الفقرات 64-66) والمساعدة والتدريب اللذين قدمهما فيلق القدس التابع لقوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية وحزب الله والأخصائيين والتقنيين العراقيين للحوثيين. وهذا ما أكّته للفريق مصادر متعددة، وأبرزته تقارير إعلامية متنوعة، وأفادت به تصريحات مسؤولين إيرانيين.

74 - وأعلمت مصادر الفريق أن المقاتلين الحوثيين ما فتئوا يتلقون، منذ عدة سنوات، تدريبات تكتيكية و/أو تقنية خارج اليمن. وأكدت هذه المصادر أيضاً أن المقاتلين سافروا من صنعاء إلى المواقع التالية في الخارج بجوازات سفر مزورة (انظر الفقرة 14، والمرفق 9):

(أ) جمهورية إيران الإسلامية: في أوائل عام 2020، دُرب 200 مقاتل في جامعة الإمام الخامنئي للعلوم والتكنولوجيا البحرية، وهي مرفق تدريب تابع لقوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية يقع في زيباكينار، على ساحل بحر قزوين. وفي أواخر عام 2022، دُرب 54 مقاتلاً في تكنة الإمام علي لقوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية الواقعة في باغ بخشي، في غرب طهران؛

(ب) لبنان: منذ عام 2020 على الأقل، دُرب مقاتلون في ساحات التدريب التابعة لحزب الله في قلعة جبور، في جنوب لبنان⁽³⁷⁾؛

(ج) العراق: أجرت قوات الحشد الشعبي عدة دورات تدريبية (انظر الفقرات 12-19).

5 - شراء الأعتدة والحصول على المساعدة عن طريق تمثيل الحوثيين في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية

75 - في عام 2019، عُين إبراهيم محمد الديلمي بموجب مرسوم صادر عن الحوثيين⁽³⁸⁾ سفيراً فوق العادة ومفوضاً لليمن لدى إيران⁽³⁹⁾، وهي خطوة ترقى إلى مستوى اعتراف الدول بسلطة الحوثيين (انظر المرفقين 105 و 106؛ وانظر أيضاً S/2020/326، الفقرة 42).

76 - ووفقاً لمصدر سري، حتى أواخر عام 2022، كان عدنان قاسم علي قفلة، المدير العام الحالي للموارد البشرية في وزارة الداخلية التي عينها الحوثيون، يشغل منصباً رفيعاً في مكتب الحوثيين في طهران، حيث تلقى تدريباً استخباراتياً على يد فيلق القدس التابع لقوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية.

77 - وأخبرت مصادر الفريق أن اللواء محمد أحمد الطالباني (S/2021/79، المرفق 27)، مدير المشتريات في وزارة الدفاع المعينة من قبل الحوثيين، الملحق بمكتبهم في طهران، هو المسؤول عن الشحن غير المشروع للأعتدة إلى الحوثيين بواسطة شبكة من الأفراد والكيانات. وهو يتولى أيضاً القيام بترتيبات لكفالة أن يتلقى المقاتلون الحوثيون تدريباً في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية (انظر الفقرة 79، ودراساتنا الحاليتين الإفراديتين 6 و 11).

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 6: آلية الإمداد التي يقودها اللواء الطالباني

وفقاً لمصادر سرية، أمر الطالباني في عام 2022 أن يُنقل إلى جيبوتي مخلص جمركي يماني كان يتولى تسيير تخليص الأعتدة المهربة الموجهة للحوثيين.

وبعد ضبط 52 صاروخاً مضاداً للدبابات من طراز دهلاوية في 10 آذار/مارس 2022 في منفذ شحن الحدودي من قبل الجمارك اليمنية (S/2023/130، الفقرات 54-56)، انكشف أمر المخلص. وأفيد بأنه اعتُقل في شباط/فبراير 2024 في جيبوتي.

6 - تهريب الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة بحراً من قواعد البحرية الإيرانية

78 - أعلمت مصادر سرية الفريق بتهريب ثلاث شحنات من كميات كبيرة من الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة، بحراً، من جمهورية إيران الإسلامية إلى الحوثيين، في الفترة ما بين تموز/يوليه وأيلول/سبتمبر 2022. ونُقلت هذه الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة على متن مركب شراعي زودت به السلطات الإيرانية طاقماً يمانيّاً. وتضمنت عملية النقل الأولى 9 000 بندقية هجومية. وتضمنت عمليتا النقل الثانية

(37) في 21 أيار/مايو 2023، حضر ثلاثة صحفيين من الحوثيين يعملون لدى قناة المسيرة التابعة للحوثيين مناورة تظهر محاكاة لهجوم على مستوطنة إسرائيلية من قبل حزب الله (انظر المرفق 15). ويلاحظ الفريق أن المقاتلين الحوثيين غالباً ما يجرون دورات تدريبية مماثلة (انظر المرفق 16).

(38) انظر: <https://en.ypagecy.net/125613>.

(39) في عام 2011، ساعد حزب الله الحوثيين على تأسيس قناة المسيرة في منطقة "الضاحية" وهي إحدى ضواحي بيروت.

والثالثة بنادق هجومية ورشاشات خفيفة وثقيلة. وكانت الأسلحة معبأة في أكياس خضراء، كما لوحظ خلال عمليات الاعتراض السابقة (S/2019/83، المرفق 16؛ و S/2021/79، المرفق 14، الشكل 14-6؛ و S/2022/50، الشكل الحادي عشر والمرفق 20؛ و S/2023/130، الشكل الرابع). وقد أجريت عملية النقل الأولى انطلاقاً من ميناء سرخور طاهروئي التابع للبحرية الإيرانية، في مقاطعة هرمزكان، في حين أجريت عمليتا النقل التاليتان انطلاقاً من ميناء تشاباهار التابع للبحرية الإيرانية، وهو الميناء الذي سبق أن أبلغ الفريق عن حدوث عمليات نقل أسلحة انطلاقاً منه (S/2017/924، الفقرات 112-114؛ و S/2018/193، الفقرة 70). وتم إيواء أفراد الطاقم في شقة في هذا الميناء. وخلال عمليات النقل هذه، جرى تفريغ شحنات الأسلحة في قوارب أصغر حجماً على بعد 12 ميلاً بحرياً من الساحل، بالقرب من الحدود اليمنية العمانية.

79 - ويُزعم أن التخطيط لهذه العملية جرى على يد المسؤول الحوثي عبد الله يحيى الحاكم، الملقب باسم أبو علي (YEI.002). وفي جمهورية إيران الإسلامية، تولى الطالب (انظر الفقرة 77)، وأبو ليث رصد عمليات النقل. ويُزعم أن هذين الضابطين هما جزء من خلية الاتصال التي تتولى تنسيق عمليات نقل الأعتدة إلى المنطقة الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين ورصدها.

80 - وقد تبين أن البنادق الهجومية، التي تم تحديدها على أنها بنادق من طراز 1-56، تشبه البنادق الهجومية التي تم اعتراضها بين عامي 2018 و 2023 (S/2023/833، المرفقات 24-27).

7 - تهريب مكونات القذائف ومعدات المراقبة بحراً

81 - في 11 كانون الثاني/يناير 2024، اعترضت الولايات المتحدة مركبا شرعياً عديم الجنسية على متته مكونات قذائف، موجهة إلى الحوثيين، بالقرب من ساحل الصومال. وشملت الأصناف المضبوطة نظم دفع وتوجيه ورؤوساً حربية لقذائف انسيابية موجهة مضادة للسفن، وخمسة محركات تعمل بالوقود السائل، وأربع توليفات لمضخات توربينية، ومكونات متعددة لقذائف تسليحية قصيرة المدى، و 14 كاميرا حرارية (انظر المرفقات 107-109). وتتميز مكونات القذائف الانسيابية الموجهة المضادة للسفن بخصائص مشابهة لقذيفة غدِير الإيرانية والقذائف الإيرانية الانسيابية للهجوم البري من طراز "351" (انظر المرفق 110).

82 - ووفقاً للولايات المتحدة، يزعم أن القبطان الذي أقام في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية لمدة عامين تقريباً، ومالك المركب الشرعي وشقيقه، وهما مواطنان إيرانيان، كانوا يعملون لصالح قوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية. ويُزعم أن المركب الشرعي غادر كونارك في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية بعد تفتيشه من قبل البحرية الإيرانية، وتوجه إلى قاعدة البحرية الإيرانية في تشاباهار (انظر الفقرة 78؛ وانظر أيضاً S/2017/924، الفقرات 112-114؛ و S/2018/193، الفقرة 70) للتردد بالوقود واعتراض بعد حوالي ستة أيام من الإبحار.

8 - تهريب الأعتدة الفتاكة والأجهزة الإلكترونية بحراً

83 - في 28 كانون الثاني/يناير 2024، اعترضت الولايات المتحدة مركباً شرعياً عديم الجنسية في بحر العرب. وشملت المواد المضبوطة 200 من الأكياس التي تحتوي على متفجرات، و 17 منصة إطلاق صواريخ مضادة للدبابات من طراز دهلاوية الإيراني، ومكونات مركبة غاطسة غير مأهولة، ومكونات ثلاث منظومات

مراقبة كهروبصرية (S/2023/833، المرفقان 29 و 63)، وأدوات خراطة لصناعة مدفع عديم الارتداد يُرغَّب على مناصب ثلاثية القوائم أو يُحمَل، وقذائف هاون من عيار 120 ملم و 81 ملم (انظر المرفق 111).

84 - ويلاحظ الفريق ما يلي:

(أ) حُبِّنت بعض الأعتدة المضبوطة في أغلفة مثل أغلفة الأعتدة التي اعترضتها الولايات المتحدة في عرض البحر في 6 أيار/مايو 2021⁽⁴⁰⁾ (S/2022/50، الفقرة 65، الشكل الثاني عشر)؛

(ب) تتشابه بعض هذه المكونات مع مكونات قذيفة بركان-3 التسيارية القصيرة المدى التي أطلقها الحوثيون في 7 آذار/مارس 2021 على محافظة الدمام في المملكة العربية السعودية (S/2023/833، المرفق 36، الشكل 36-5)؛

(ج) تشبه نظم التحكم بأرياش النفط وتوجيهها، والمكونات المتعلقة بالتحكم، والملصقات المثبتة على هذه الأرياش قذيفة قيام-2 من طراز القذائف التسيارية القصيرة المدى التي أطلقتها جمهورية إيران الإسلامية في 8 كانون الثاني/يناير 2021 ضد قاعدة أمريكية في إربيل، العراق⁽⁴¹⁾، والتي أعلنت جمهورية إيران الإسلامية مسؤوليتها عنها (S/2023/833، الفقرة 75 والمرفقات 30-37)؛

(د) تتوافق العلامات والملصقات المثبتة على عدة وحدات من الأعتدة مع الأعتدة المذكورة أعلاه التي اعترضت في 11 كانون الثاني/يناير 2024 (انظر الفقرة 83، والمرفقات 112-114)، ومع بعض الأعتدة التي اعترضتها المملكة المتحدة في 25 شباط/فبراير 2023، من سفينة قادمة من جمهورية إيران الإسلامية (S/2023/833، الفقرات 74-76، والمرفقات 30-37)؛

(هـ) يتشابه المخروط الأمامي للمركبة الغاطسة غير المأهولة مع المخروطات الأمامية للأعتدة الجديدة التي عرضتها القوات البحرية التابعة لقوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية في أوائل عام 2022 (انظر المرفق 114، الأشكال من 114-23 إلى 114-26)؛

(و) هناك أوجه تشابه مع عدة وحدات من الأعتدة التي تنتجها جمهورية إيران الإسلامية (انظر المرفق 114).

85 - وأبلغت القيادة المركزية عن ضبط الولايات المتحدة لمكونات مركبات غاطسة غير مأهولة وتدمير مركبتين من هذا النوع مؤخراً، يُزعم أن الحوثيين استخدموهما (الشكل الثاني). ويعني ذلك ضمناً توافر منظومة الأسلحة هذه واستعمالها وقدرة الحوثيين على استعمالها. ويشكل ذلك تهديداً جديداً وخطيراً للأمن البحري حيث يمكن أن يلحق أضراراً جسيمة بالسفن المستهدفة.

(40) حصل الفريق على إحدائيات من جهاز ملاحى يُزعم أنه عُثر عليه على متن هذا المركب الشراعي، تشير إلى أنه كان في موقع قريب من ميناء جاسك في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية، قبل يومين من اعتراضه (S/2022/50، المرفق 20، الشكل 20-44).

(41) انظر: www.memri.org/tv/general-hajizadeh-irgac-aerospace-missile-attack-us-iraq-beginning-revenge-casualties-arab-countries-expel-region-else

الشكل الثاني

الأنشطة في البحر الأحمر، 17 شباط/فبراير 2024



Feb. 17 Summary of Red Sea activities

TAMPA, Fla. – Between the hours of 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. (Sanaa time), Feb. 17, CENTCOM successfully conducted five self-defense strikes against three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, one unmanned underwater vessel (UUV), and one unmanned surface vessel (USV) in Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. This is the first observed Houthi employment of a UUV since attacks began in Oct. 23.

CENTCOM identified the anti-ship cruise missiles, unmanned underwater vessel, and the unmanned surface vessel in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and determined they presented an imminent threat to U.S. Navy ships and merchant vessels in the region. These actions will protect freedom of navigation and make international waters safer and more secure for U.S. Navy and merchant vessels.

4:46 PM · Feb 18, 2024 · 573K Views

المصدر: القيادة المركزية للولايات المتحدة.

9 - الأعتدة العسكرية والأعتدة ذات الاستخدام المزدوج التي ضبطتها حكومة اليمن

86 - منذ كانون الثاني/يناير 2023، ضبطت الجمارك اليمنية كميات كبيرة من الأعتدة في منفذ شحن الحدودي أو في عدن من قبل جهاز مكافحة الإرهاب، يزعم أنها كانت في طريقها إلى المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين (انظر المرفقات 115-121).

10 - بيع الأعتدة في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين

(أ) الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة والأعتدة المرتبطة بها

87 - يلاحظ الفريق أن العديد من الأسلحة التي يتم الاتجار بها في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين تشبه الأسلحة التي يستخدمها الحوثيون والأسلحة التي ضبطت في عرض البحر منذ عام 2018.

88 - ويلاحظ الفريق أيضاً أن 26 طرازاً مختلفاً من الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة، الموثقة في الصومال، تحمل أرقاماً متسلسلة تتسق مع دفعات الأسلحة المعروضة للبيع في المنطقة الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين أو التي تم اعتراضها منذ عام 2018 وهي في طريقها إلى الحوثيين. ويشير ذلك إما إلى أنه كان هناك مورد مشترك، وإما إلى أن بعض الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة نُقلت إلى الحوثيين عبر الصومال أو نُقلت من اليمن إلى الصومال (انظر المرفقين 126-144 و 147-151)⁽⁴²⁾. ووثق الفريق أيضاً طرازاً

(42) لوحظ أيضاً وجود بعض الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة الموثقة في عدة بلدان أخرى.

واحدا من الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة وطرارزا واحدا من أجهزة الرؤية الحرارية يحملان رقمين متسلسلين يتفقان مع الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة التي وُثِّقت في أفغانستان (انظر المرفقين 146 و 152).

89 - ووفقاً للمصادر، ينظم الحوثيون عمليات الشراء والبيع غير المشروعة للأسلحة في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرتهم ويسيطرون على هذه العمليات، وهو ما قد يتعارض مع أحكام حظر الأسلحة المحدد الأهداف وتجميد الأصول. ويتعاون عدة قادة حوثيين مع تجار الأسلحة أو يديرون متاجر أسلحة ويكسبون إيرادات كبيرة من هذه التجارة، من ضمنها الضرائب. وقد حدد الفريق مئات من البائعين الذين يعملون بشكل رئيسي في صنعاء وصعدة والحديدة، ويلاحظ الفريق أن معرضاً للأسلحة أقيم في شباط/فبراير 2024 في صنعاء عُرضت فيه أسلحة صغيرة وأسلحة خفيفة صُنعت في الآونة الأخيرة (انظر المرفقات 122-125).

90 - ومن بين الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة المعروضة للبيع في السوق السوداء، فقد وثق الفريق أكثر من 11 000 سلاحاً⁽⁴³⁾ (S/2023/833، الفقرة 104)، من بينها عدة مئات من الأسلحة التي تحمل علامات تشير إلى أنها صُنعت حديثاً، وهو ما يدل على حدوث عمليات نقل في الآونة الأخيرة. ويؤكد كبر حجم الأعددة وتنوع المجموعات التي تنتمي إليها على السهولة التي تمكّن بها الحوثيون من التحايل على حظر الأسلحة.

91 - ومن بين الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة المذكورة أعلاه، يتسم 31 سلاحاً بخصائص وعلامات مشابهة لما تنتجه جمهورية إيران الإسلامية من أسلحة صغيرة وأسلحة خفيفة. غير أن إيران أبلغت الفريق بأن خصائص الأعددة المذكورة تختلف عن خصائص الأعددة التي تنتجها (المرفقات 144-145 و 151).

92 - وكشفت تحقيقات الفريق أنه من بين الـ 73 مسدساً التي أنتجت في البرازيل وعرضت للبيع في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين، نُقل مسدسان بشكل قانوني في الفترة ما بين عامي 2021 و 2023 إلى المملكة العربية السعودية، وشُمل 37 مسدساً منها بشهادة مستخدم نهائي صادرة في كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2022 عن السلطات التنزانية، ونُقل 20 مسدساً بشكل قانوني في عام 2015 إلى جيبوتي، ويمكن أن يكون ذلك جزءاً من الشحنة التي حولها فارس محمد مناع (SOi.008) عن وجهتها في عام 2015، والتي نُقلت لاحقاً بشكل غير قانوني إلى المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين (انظر المرفقات 153-157).

93 - وعلاوة على ذلك، من أصل 255 مسدساً تم إنتاجها في تركيا، وثّق الفريق نقل مسدسين إلى السلطات العراقية في عام 2015، ونقل 184 مسدساً بين عامي 2022 و 2023 على النحو التالي: مسدس واحد إلى بائع أسلحة في تشيكيا، واثنان إلى بائعي أسلحة في المملكة العربية السعودية، و 180 مسدساً إلى بائعي أسلحة في السودان، ومسدس واحد إلى بائع أسلحة في الولايات المتحدة (انظر المرفقات 158-164).

94 - ووثق الفريق نقل مسدس واحد منتج في تشيكيا ومسدس واحد منتج في سلوفاكيا في الفترة ما بين عامي 2022 و 2023 إلى أحد البائعين المذكورين في المملكة العربية السعودية (انظر المرفقين 165 و 166).

95 - وقد طلب الفريق معلومات من الدول الأعضاء المعنية بشأن مواصلة نقل هذه الأصناف إلى المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين. والفريق بانتظار ردود من جمهورية تنزانيا المتحدة والسودان والمملكة العربية السعودية.

(43) حلل الفريق حسابات البائعين على وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي وقِيم اتساق الأطرزة والأرقام المتسلسلة للأعددة المعروضة.

11 - الأنشطة البحرية المشبوهة

96 - حصل الفريق على معلومات من مصدر سري تفيد بأن المرافق المينائية في مينائي الحديدية والصليف تُستخدم لتفريغ كميات كبيرة من الأعتدة العسكرية. وكشفت تحقيقات الفريق عن وصول ست سفن إلى الموانئ الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين دون الحصول على رخصة تخليص من آلية الأمم المتحدة للتحقق والتفتيش. ويواصل الفريق التحقيق في التورط المحتمل للسفن المحددة في النقل غير القانوني للسلع المحظورة إلى الحوثيين.

97 - وتخضع السفن المتجهة إلى الموانئ الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين للتفتيش من قبل آلية التحقق والتفتيش في جيبوتي. والآلية غير مسؤولة عن منح رخص التخليص النهائية لمواصلات السفن طريقها إلى موانئ البحر الأحمر. فمند شباط/فبراير 2023، تم رفع جميع القيود المفروضة على استيراد السلع، باستثناء السلع التي تعتبر محظورة، عبر الموانئ الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، كانت هناك طفرة ملحوظة في كل من عدد السفن وتنوع البضائع المتجهة إلى هذه الموانئ. غير أن الآلية قد واجهت تحديات كبيرة فيما يتعلق بتوافر التمويل واستدامته خلال السنوات الأخيرة.

98 - وكشفت تحقيقات الفريق بشأن السفن الست المذكورة أعلاه ما يلي:

(أ) السفينة *Almas* (IMO-8864957)، ترفع علم جزر القمر: كانت هذه السفينة قبل وصولها إلى مرسى رأس الخطيب الخاضع لسيطرة الحوثيين، في محافظة الحديدية في 18 أكتوبر/تشرين الأول 2023، ترسو في بندر عباس، في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية، بين 20 أيلول/سبتمبر وأوائل تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2023 (انظر المرفق 167)؛

(ب) السفينة *Kasra-3* (IMO-9109184)، ترفع علم تنزانيا: كانت هذه السفينة قبل وصولها إلى مرسى الصليف الخاضع لسيطرة الحوثيين في 6 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2023، ترسو في بندر عباس، في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية في 25 أيلول/سبتمبر 2023. ثم مضت بعد ذلك إلى إيران وعادت إلى مرسى الصليف في 22 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023، حيث مكثت إلى غاية 30 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023 (انظر المرفق 168)؛

(ج) السفينة *AH-Union* (IMO-9109005)، ترفع علم بنما: وصلت هذه السفينة إلى ميناء الصليف في 5 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2023؛

(د) السفينة *Dubai-1*: وصلت هذه السفينة إلى ميناء الصليف في 9 كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2023، وفي 23 آذار/مارس 2024، وأفيد بأنها ترفع علم سري لانكا. ومع ذلك، نفت السلطات السريلانكية وجود هذا التسجيل وأبلغت أن رقم المنظمة البحرية الدولية (988850) غير صحيح. ويلاحظ الفريق أنه منذ عام 2020، تبحر السفينة *Dubai-1* بين إيران وجيبوتي والصومال وعمان واليمن وكثيراً ما يوقَّف تشغيل النظام الآلي لتحديد هوية السفن الخاص بها، وهو ما يشير إلى وجود أنشطة مشبوهة (انظر المرفق 169)؛

(هـ) السفينة *Alakh Shakti* (IMO-419956818)، ترفع العلم الهندي: وصلت هذه السفينة إلى ميناء الصليف في 27 أيلول/سبتمبر 2023؛

(و) السفينة (Mahdar) (IMO-417898786): وصلت هذه السفينة إلى ميناء الصليف في 25 نيسان/أبريل 2024، وأفيد بأنها ترفع العلم السريلانكي. غير أن السلطات السريلانكية نفت وجود هذا التسجيل.

99 - وكشفت تحقيقات الفريق أن سفنا مختلفة تنقل سلعا محظورة أو مقيدة تستخدم حاليا وثائق تبين التسجيل المزور للسفن في سري لانكا.

100 - ولم يصدر حتى الآن رد من سلطات إيران وتتاوانيا وجزر القمر والهند على رسائل الفريق.

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 7: استخدام وثائق تسجيل السفن السريلانكية المزورة

في 18 كانون الثاني/يناير 2022، اعترضت الولايات المتحدة مركبا شرعيا عديم الجنسية في خليج عمان وصادرت 40 طنا من سماد اليوريا. والمركب هو نفسه الذي ضُبط في 11 شباط/فبراير 2021 وعلى متنه شحنة من الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة قبالة سواحل الصومال (S/2022/50)، الفقرتان 62 و 63 والمرفق (19). وتفيد الوثائق التي وجدت على متنه، ومن ضمنها شهادة تسجيل سفينة سري لانكية مزورة، أن المركب الشرعي يحمل اسم الاتحاد (S/2023/130)، الفقرة 44 والشكل (8-15).

وحقق الفريق في وثيقة تسجيل السفينة باري-2 التي اعترضتها المملكة العربية السعودية في البحر في 24 حزيران/يونيه 2020، أثناء نقلها شحنة كبيرة من الأسلحة الصغيرة والأسلحة الخفيفة من طرازات مماثلة لتلك التي سبق اعتراضها وهي في طريقها إلى الحوثيين. وعلى الرغم من أن السفينة مسجلة في سري لانكا حسب ما يزعم، يقدر الفريق أن وثيقة التسجيل مزورة (S/2021/79)، الفقرة 74، والمرفق 15، والشكل (15-19).

وفي عام 2017، أبلغ فريق الرصد المعني بالصومال وإريتريا أيضا عن معلومات بشأن سفينة متورطة في الاتجار غير المشروع بالفحم. وفي هذه الحالة أيضا، اكتشف الفريق استخدام وثائق تسجيل سفن سري لانكية مزورة يستخدمها المتجرون (S/2017/924)، الفقرة 208، المرفقان 1-2 و 3-2.

خامسا - تنفيذ العقوبات المالية

انتهاكات أحكام تجميد الأصول

101 - لا يزال الأفراد المشار إليهم في القرار 2140 (2014)، ومن يتصرفون نيابة عنهم أو بتوجيه منهم، والكيانات التي يملكونها أو يتحكمون فيها، يتلقون الأموال والأصول المالية والموارد الاقتصادية الأخرى أو يمتلكونها أو يتحكمون فيها، بصورة مباشرة أو غير مباشرة، على النحو المفصل أدناه، منتهكين بذلك نظام الجزاءات المالية.

102 - ومن شأن تفسير أكثر صرامة للقرار السالف الذكر أن يشمل، بموجب أحكام تجميد الأصول، جميع أشكال الأموال والأصول المالية والموارد الاقتصادية التي حصلت عليها السلطات التي عينها الحوثيون. وفي حين يُزعم أن الحوثيين يحولون جزءا معينا من عائدات الجمارك والضرائب، ورسوم خدمات الاتصالات، وعائدات بيع الوقود والغاز لأغراض عسكرية، يجب استخدام جزء من تلك الموارد لتوفير الخدمات الأساسية للسكان من قبل سلطات صنعاء. وقد كانت فعالية الجزاءات المالية محدودة. ويرجع ذلك

في جزء منه إلى النهج الذي يعتمده المجتمع الدولي لمنع أي تأثير سلبي غير مرغوب فيه قد تخلفه الجزاءات المالية على الصعيد الإنساني، وفي جزء آخر إلى افتقار الحكومة إلى القدرة على تجميد الأصول التي تخضع للسيطرة الفعلية للسلطات التي عينها الحوثيون والموجودة في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين. وبالتالي، تركز تحقيقات الفريق على المنافع المالية التي حصل عليها الحوثيون أو التي يتحكمون فيها بشكل غير قانوني، لأغراض عسكرية.

1 - سك النقود المعدنية والطباعة المزعومة للعملة على يد الحوثيين

103 - إن الحوثيين، بصرف النظر عن توجيههم رسالة قوية بشأن مطالباتهم بحقهم الاقتصادي السيادي في إصدار عملتهم الخاصة، اعتمدوا هذا التدبير لتوليد الأموال بدون الاعتماد على مصادر خارجية. فيوسعهم أن يستخدموا تلك الأموال بسهولة لأغراضهم العسكرية بدون أي خشية من كشف أمرهم.

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 8: تزوير العملات الورقية وجوازات السفر

لاحظ الفريق ثلاث محاولات قام بها الحوثيون لجلب العملات الورقية وجوازات السفر المطبوعة في الخارج بشكل غير قانوني.

- سبق للفريق أن أبلغ عن ضبط سندات إذنية مزورة بقيمة 35 بليون ريال يمني وجوازات سفر مزورة طبعت بطريقة غير قانونية في الخارج وهُرِّبَت إلى اليمن (S/2018/594، الفقرات 142-144 والمرفق 53، و S/2019/83، الفقرة 125، و S/2022/50، الفقرتان 90 و 91).
- وأبلغ الفريق في تقريره السابق عن محاولة أخرى قام بها الحوثيون في آب/أغسطس 2023 لطباعة عملات ورقية مزورة بواسطة مطبعة في الصين (S/2023/833، الفقرتان 175 و 176). وكشف تحقيق آخر أجراه الفريق أن محمود سعيد حزام العامري، الذي اتصل بشركة الطباعة المذكورة، لا يمثل حكومة اليمن وأن جواز السفر (رقم 07865754) الذي يحمل اسمه، أصدره الحوثيون في صنعاء (انظر المرفقين 170 و 171).
- ووردت للفريق مؤخرا معلومات عن مزاعم بأن السلطات التي عينها الحوثيون عن طريق ممثلهم قد اتصلت بشركة في إندونيسيا لتوريد ورق الأمن والحبر ولوازم طباعة أوراق العملات الورقية المصرفية والسندات الإذنية والطوابع المالية وجوازات السفر. وطلب الفريق من إندونيسيا إجراء التحقيقات اللازمة. كما راسل الفريق الشركة المعنية طالبا منها تقديم المعلومات ذات الصلة. ومع ذلك، لم يتلق الفريق أي رد من أي من الجهتين. وكشفت تحقيقات الفريق أن أيا من البنك المركزي اليمني في عدن أو حكومة اليمن لم يتقدم بأي طلب من هذا القبيل لدى هذه الشركة. وأبلغت مصادر الفريق أن الحوثيين حصلوا بحسب ما يُزعم، على جوازات سفر فارغة طبعت من خلال هذه الشركة في عام 2016. ولم يتمكن الفريق من التحقق من صدق هذه المزاعم. ومع ذلك، كشفت التحقيقات أن بعض الأفراد سافروا إلى الخارج لأغراض التدريب العسكري بجوازات سفر مزورة صادرة عن الحوثيين (انظر المرفق 9). ويواصل الفريق التحقيق في الأمر.

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 9: عملة الحوثيين المعدنية الجديدة

في 30 آذار/مارس 2024، أعلن البنك المركزي اليمني في صنعاء عن إصدار نقود معدنية من فئة 100 ريال يمني بحجة استبدال العملات الورقية التالفة. وكشفت تحقيقات الفريق وجود عملات ورقية قديمة من فئة 100 ريال يمني، تبلغ قيمتها 12 بليون ريال يمني، لا تزال قيد التداول. وأبلغت مصادر الفريق أن الحوثيين تمكنوا من سك تلك النقود المعدنية محليا، لعدم قدرتهم على طباعة العملات الورقية في اليمن التي تتطلب، في جملة أمور، ورق الأمن وخيطا وحبرا خاصا، وهي جميعا أشياء واجهوا صعوبة في الحصول عليها من الخارج. وأبلغت المصادر الفريق أن الحوثيين سيصدرون المزيد من هذه النقود المعدنية أو العملات الورقية لتمويل أنشطتهم الحربية، وليحددوا مكانتهم كمركز القوة لاقتصاد مستقل.

أما البنك المركزي اليمني في عدن، الذي يمثل الحكومة المعترف بها دوليا، فيعتبر نفسه الكيان القانوني الوحيد الذي يتمتع بسلطة إصدار العملة اليمنية. وتقوض الخطوة التي قام بها الحوثيون شرعية البنك المركزي اليمني في عدن، وتتعامل مع عملاته الورقية على أنها مزورة. ولذلك، سارع البنك المركزي اليمني في عدن إلى إصدار بيان صحفي أعلن فيه أن نقود الحوثيين المعدنية مزورة (انظر المرفق 172).

2 - جمع الأموال من أجل الطائرات المسيّرة التي تتألف منها "القوات الجوية" و "قوات الدفاع الساحلي"

104 - لا يزال قطاع الاتصالات السلكية واللاسلكية يشكل مصدرا مهما لدر الإيرادات للحوثيين. وقد أدى نشر خدمات الجيل الرابع من قبل شركات الاتصالات الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين إلى زيادة الإيرادات بشكل كبير. وأبلغت مصادر الفريق أن جزءا كبيرا من الإيرادات يُستخدم لأغراض عسكرية بما في ذلك لشراء معدات الاتصالات ذات الاستخدام المزدوج.

105 - واستغلالا لإمكانات هذا القطاع، يعمل الحوثيون بنشاط على التماس الأموال العامة، بما في ذلك من خلال توجيه ملايين الرسائل، بهدف تعزيز أنشطتهم العسكرية (انظر المرفق 173).

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 10: رسائل من أجل "القوات الجوية"

كشفت تحقيق الفريق أن الحوثيين أطلقوا حملة جمع تبرعات لطائراتهم المسيّرة التي تتألف منها "القوات الجوية" عبر توجيه رسائل نصية جماعية. وقد خصصوا حسابات محددة في البنك المركزي اليمني في صنعاء لجمع التبرعات بالريال اليمني وبتدولار الولايات المتحدة على السواء (الحسابان رقم 1128-10262 ورقم 01-1019-10262) (انظر الشكل).

ترجمة غير رسمية للقطعة شاشة تظهر رسالة نصية تلتزم تبرعات من الناس للقوات الجوية

7:08 PM

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كشفت مصادر الفريق أن إحدى الرسائل الأخيرة التمسّت الدعم لـ "قوات الدفاع الساحلي".

3 - جمع الأموال للطائرات المسيّرة من وزارة التعليم

106 - علم الفريق من مصادره أن مكتب التربية والتعليم المعين من الحوثيين في صنعاء يجبر المدارس في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين بشكل منتظم على دفع مبالغ مالية لأغراض تتعلق بالطائرات المسيّرة. وتلقى الفريق نسخة من الإيصال الذي يثبت تحصيل الحوثيين مبلغا قدره 250 956 20 ريالاً يمنياً (انظر المرفق 174). ويتواصل التحقيق في هذه المسألة.

4 - الدعم المالي المقدم للحوثيين من خارج اليمن

107 - كشف تحقيق أجراه الفريق أن الحوثيين يستخدمون شبكات مختلفة من الأفراد والكيانات تعمل في ولايات قضائية متعددة بما في ذلك إيران (جمهورية - الإسلامية) وتركيا وجيبوتي والعراق واليمن، لتمويل أنشطتهم. وهم يستعينون بالعديد من البنوك والشركات الوهمية وشركات الصرافة وشركات الشحن والميسرين الماليين. وأجرى الفريق مقابلات مع مسؤولي بعض شركات الصرافة وشركات الشحن والبنوك الذين أكدوا اتباع طريقة العمل هذه، طالبين عدم الكشف عن هويتهم.

108 - وأبلغ الفريق بأنه جرى مؤخرا تشكيل لجنة خاصة تعنى بزيادة إيرادات الحوثيين، والتخطيط للإنفاق العسكري بما في ذلك الإتفاق على الأسلحة، وذلك تحت إشراف خبير رفيع المستوى يُعرف باسم "أبو رضوان" المرتبط بقوة الرضوان التابعة لحزب الله، حسبما زُعم. وأفيد أنه يقدم المشورة بشأن زيادة الرسوم الجمركية والضرائب والجبايات وتعريفات شركات الاتصالات. وفي الآونة الأخيرة، قام الحوثيون بزيادة الرسوم الجمركية على بعض السلع، وفرضوا رسوما جديدة وزادوا الجباية من شركات الاتصالات بنسبة 35 في المائة تقريبا (انظر المرفق 175).

109 - ووفقا للمصادر، يجري تحويل مبلغ كبير بشكل غير قانوني، بتوجيه من سعيد الجمل، الذي يُزعم أنه ينتمي إلى فيلق القدس التابع لقوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية، دعما للحوثيين. كما أشارت مصادر سرية، طلبت عدم الكشف عن هويتها، إلى التورط المزعوم للعديد من الأفراد، بمن في ذلك كبار القادة الحوثيين، والكيانات التي تسهل الدعم المالي للحوثيين، وهم نبيل علي أحمد الهده، وعبد الله نجيب أحمد الجمل، وهو أحد أقارب سعيد الجمل ومقيم في اليمن، وعبدني ناصر علي محمود، وهو تابع للحوثيين وشريك تجاري لسعيد الجمل، وإبراهيم الناشري العضو في جماعة الحوثيين، وبعض الشركات الرائدة التي يملكها أو يسيطر عليها محمد صلاح فليته ومحمد عبد السلام. ويُزعم أن احتياجات الشركات التابعة للحوثيين من العملات الأجنبية لشراء الواردات قد يسرتها لجنة المدفوعات التابعة للحوثيين.

110 - وخلال التحقيقات، تلقى الفريق تقارير بشأن التورط المزعوم للكيانات التالية في التحويل غير المشروع للأموال لصالح الحوثيين في اليمن وخارجه على حد سواء:

- (أ) شركة Al Aman Kargo Ithalat Ihracat Ve Nakliyat Limited Sirketip؛
- (ب) الشركة العالمية إكسبرس للصرافة والتحويلات؛
- (ج) شركة نابكو للصرافة والتحويلات المالية؛
- (د) شركة الروضة للصرافة والتحويلات المالية؛
- (هـ) شركة الرضوان للصرافة.

111 - ولم يتمكن الفريق من التحقق بشكل مستقل من صحة التورط المزعوم للأفراد والكيانات المذكورة أعلاه. وتلقى الفريق العديد من الوثائق، ولا يزال التحقيق جارياً.

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 11: رجل أعمال يمني متورط في عمليات شراء ومدفوعات لصالح الحوثيين

يحقق الفريق في قضية يُزعم فيها تورط رجل أعمال يمني على صلة بالقيادة الحوثية العليا، في شراء أسلحة للحوثيين باستخدام أموال جرى تحويلها عبر عدة شركات للصرافة. وأبلغ الفريق أن هذا الشخص كان يعمل وكيلًا للتخليص الجمركي وأنه حاول تسهيل تخليص شحنة ضبطتها الجمارك اليمنية في 10 آذار/مارس 2022 في منفذ شحن الحدودي، ضمت 52 صاروخاً مضاداً للدبابات أو قطع غيار صواريخ من طراز دهلاوية لصالح الحوثيين (انظر دراسة الحالة 6).

وأفيد أنه تورط في عمليات شراء ومدفوعات متعلقة بمواد عسكرية مختلفة حصل عليها الحوثيون. وأنشأ شركة في جيبوتي وعاش هناك تحت اسم مختلف، مستخدماً جواز سفر مزيف، توجد نسخة منه لدى الفريق. كما تفحص الفريق نسخاً لعدة مستندات تظهر إيداعات نقدية وتحويلات أموال باسم ثلاث شركات صرافة في جيبوتي واليمن (انظر المرفق 176)

(أ) دعم مالي إيراني مزعوم لتفريب الأسلحة

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 12: تمويل تفريب الأسلحة

قام الفريق خلال تحقيقه الجاري، بتفحص العديد من الوثائق. وأبلغ الجنرال رستم قاسمي، مساعد قائد فيلق القدس التابع لقوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية وسائل الإعلام أن "جميع الأسلحة التي يمتلكها اليمنيون هي نتيجة مساعداتنا" (انظر دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 5، والمرفق 95). وتتضمن وثيقة اتهامية مؤرخة في 7 آب/أغسطس 2024⁽¹⁾، رفعها مسؤولون من الولايات المتحدة إلى محكمة محلية للولايات المتحدة بولاية فيرجينيا، تفاصيل مبالغ مزعومة دفعها مواطنان إيرانيان هما ميركازي المعروف أيضاً باسم شهاب رجي، وشقيقه يونس ميركازي، لقبطان المركب الشراعي يونس. وزُعم أن هذين الأخوين اللذين يملكان مركب يونس ويعملان لصالح قوات حرس الثورة الإسلامية قد كلفا القبطان، الذي يعيش في جمهورية إيران الإسلامية، بتفريب عتاد عسكري من ذلك البلد إلى جهات أخرى متلقية، تشمل الحوثيين. وفي الفترة من آب/أغسطس 2023 وحتى نهاية كانون الثاني/يناير 2024، أجرى القبطان عدة رحلات تفريب، بتنسيق وتمويل من الأخوين شهاب ويونس، بحسب ما زُعم. وترد فيما يلي تفاصيل المعاملات المالية:

- آب/أغسطس 2023: دفع شهاب للقبطان ما يقرب من 100 مليون ريال إيراني من حسابه المصرفي.
- أيلول/سبتمبر - تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2023: تلقى القبطان مدفوعات من شهاب ويونس عن طريق نظام الحوالة المصرفي⁽²⁾ ووزع المال على عائلته وآخرين.
- 26 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2023: دفع يونس للقبطان ما يقرب من 800 مليون ريال إيراني من حسابه المصرفي عن طريق نظام الحوالة المصرفي.

- 26 تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023: دفع شهاب للقبطان ما يقرب من 300 مليون ريال إيراني من حسابه المصرفي.
 - 3 كانون الثاني/يناير 2024: دفع يونس للقبطان ما يقرب من 800 مليون ريال إيراني من حسابه المصرفي عن طريق نظام الحوالة المصرفي. وبعد ذلك، قام القبطان، من خلال عدد من سماسرة الحوالات، بتوزيع أجزاء من المبلغ على عائلات أفراد الطاقم الذين يعملون لحسابه على متن المركب يونس. كما تواصل القبطان مع عائلته بشأن شراء عقار وبناء منزل جديد.
- (أ) انظر: www.justice.gov/d9/2024-08/mirkazei_superseding_indictment.pdf.
- (ب) نظام غير رسمي لتحويل الأموال من خارج النظم المصرفية التقليدية.

(ب) الدعم المالي المقدم من العراق

112 - وردت للفريق معلومات من مصادر مختلفة عن دعم مالي تلقاه الحوثيون من العراق. وقد دأب الشباب العراقيون على إطلاق حملات منتظمة تلتزم الدعم المالي لأجل الحوثيين في اليمن (انظر الفقرة 13).

5 - التحصيل المزعوم لرسوم عبور غير قانونية لقاء تأمين المرور البحري الآمن

113 - نقلت مصادر الفريق مزاعم بأن الحوثيين يجبون رسوما غير قانونية من بعض وكالات الشحن البحري لقاء سماحهم لسفنهم بالإبحار عبر البحر الأحمر وخليج عدن بدون أن يتعرضوا لها. كما أبلغت مصادر الفريق أن وكالات الشحن هذه تتسق مع شركة تابعة لقيادي حوثي رفيع المستوى، وأنه يتم إيداع الرسوم في حسابات مختلفة في ولايات قضائية متعددة من خلال شبكة نظام الحوالة المصرفي وتسويات تطوي على غسيل الأموال القائم على التجارة. وتقدر المصادر مبلغ عائدات الحوثيين من الرسوم التي يفرضونها لقاء عمليات العبور الآمن غير القانونية هذه بحوالي 180 مليون دولار شهريا. ولم يتمكن الفريق من التحقق بصورة مستقلة من صحة هذه البيانات.

6 - مصادرة الأصول

114 - لا يزال نظام "الحراسة القضائية"، الذي أنشأه الحوثيون في عام 2017 لإدارة أموال وممتلكات معارضيهم المتهمين بالخيانة، يُطبق للاستيلاء على الأصول على نطاق واسع وبشكل غير القانوني، باستخدام القوات المسلحة. وفي وقت سابق، كان صالح مسفر صالح الشاعر (YEI.007) هو "الحارس القضائي" بموجب هذه الآلية. ويواصل الحوثيون استهدافهم للكيانات التجارية والأفراد المعارضين لهم، من خلال تجميد أصولهم ومصادرتها والاستيلاء عليها بشكل منتظم، بما يشمل منزل محافظ البنك المركزي اليمني في عدن، والاستيلاء على إدارة الشركات، في تجاهل تام لسيادة القانون (انظر المرفقات 177-180).

(أ) الاستيلاء على أموال شركة الخطوط الجوية اليمنية وأصولها وإدارتها

115 - كشف تحقيق أجراه الفريق أنه بناء على تعليمات من وزارة المالية المعينة من الحوثيين، أصدر البنك المركزي اليمني في صنعاء تعليماته إلى جميع البنوك التجارية بتعليق صرف أموال شركة الخطوط الجوية اليمنية من جميع حساباتها المصرفية بجميع العملات (المرفقات 178-180). ولا يزال هناك مبلغ بقيمة 100 مليون دولار تحت سيطرة الحوثيين منذ أكثر من عام حتى الآن.

116 - وعلاوة على ذلك، في 25 و 26 حزيران/يونيه 2024، احتجز الحوثيون طائرات الخطوط الجوية اليمنية المذكورة أدناه في مطار صنعاء أثناء عودتها من جدة وعلى متنها حجاج:

| الطائرة | رقم الرحلة | بلد المقصد | تاريخ الوصول |
|--------------|------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| A320-A-70AFC | IY 5555 | جدة - صنعاء | 25 حزيران/يونيه، 2024 |
| A320-C-70AFC | IY 5547 | جدة - صنعاء | 26 حزيران/يونيه 2024 |
| A320-F-70AFF | IY 5559 | جدة - صنعاء | 26 حزيران/يونيه 2024 |

117 - واحتُجزت طائرة أخرى من طراز إيرباص A330-3-F70AFE أيضا في صنعاء. كما أن شركة الخطوط الجوية اليمنية ممنوعة من استخدام قطع الغيار الموجودة في حظيرة الصيانة التابعة لها في صنعاء.

118 - وكشفت التحقيقات التي أجراها الفريق أن الحوثيين أرادوا أن تقوم الخطوط الجوية اليمنية بتسيير ثلاث رحلات أسبوعية من صنعاء إلى عمان وإلى وجهات دولية أخرى. كما يُحظر على الشركة تشغيل حسابات مصرفية في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحكومة. وعندما أعربت الشركة عن عدم قدرتها على الاستجابة لهذه المطالب لعدم تمكنها من الوصول إلى أموالها، استولى الحوثيون على الطائرة المذكورة أعلاه. كما استولى الحوثيون على الإدارة التشغيلية للشركة في صنعاء من خلال أشخاص موالين لهم ورفضوا الاعتراف بمجلس إدارتها الذي يعمل من عدن⁽⁴⁴⁾. وبالتالي، فإن هذا يشكل حالة استيلاء من جانب الحوثيين على أصول وأموال وإدارة شركة للطيران مملوكة للحكومة باستخدام القوة بهدف تحقيق المزيد من الفوائد المالية من خلال زيادة عدد الرحلات الجوية الدولية ووجهاتها، على حساب شركة الخطوط الجوية اليمنية.

119 - وعلى الرغم من توصل حكومة اليمن والحوثيين إلى تفاهم لحل هذه المشكلة، لا تزال الأموال تحت سيطرة الحوثيين.

(ب) مصادرة أصول شركتين للأدوية

120 - في 10 حزيران/يونيه 2024، أصدرت النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة التابعة للحوثيين في صنعاء مذكرة للبنك المركزي اليمني في صنعاء تطلب من جميع المصارف وشركات الصرافة حجز وتجميد جميع الأرصدة والحسابات والتحويلات التي تخص اثنتين من كبريات شركات الأدوية في اليمن وهما الشركة الدوائية الحديثة والشركة العالمية لصناعة الأدوية ومديريها وموظفيها (انظر المرفق 181).

(44) انظر: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3346352.htm>.

الشكل الثالث

نسخة من المذكرة المؤرخة 10 حزيران/يونيه 2024 الصادرة عن النيابة الجزائرية المتخصصة للحوثيين في صنعاء

الرقم: ٢٤٤٢
التاريخ: ١٤٤٥/١٢/١٥
المرفقات:

العدل أساس الحكم
النيابة العامة
النيابة الجزائرية المتخصصة

الأخ / رئيس وحدة جمع المعلومات بالبنتك المركزي
تحية طيبة وبعد ،،،

وبناء على مذكرة لجنة حصر وإستلام ممتلكات القوتّر رقم (243/39838) وتاريخ 1445/12/3 هـ الموافق 2024/6/9م والمتضمنة طلب حجز أرصدة وحسابات ككلاً من:

| الرقم | الاسم | الصفة |
|-------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | الشركتان الدوائريّتين العديّتين | |
| 2 | الشركتان العالميتان لمتاجرة الألبان | |
| 3 | وليد محمد سعيد الشطّيت | المدير العام للشركتين |
| 4 | خضير قاسم عبد الله الخليلي | مدير الشؤون التجارية |
| 5 | أنور حميد عبد السلام محمد الأشعري | المدير المالي |
| 6 | مختار علي أحمد الخليلي | مدير الموارد |
| 7 | سماح عبد الوارث سعيد الأظفري | مدير البحث والتطوير |
| 8 | علي عبد الجليل عبد الوهاب علي | مدير الحسابات |
| 9 | عليه عبد الله محمد الخليلي | مدير المطبوع |
| 10 | فاطمة أحمد حسن مقلّب عيشان | مدير المشتريات |
| 11 | عبد الرقيب عبد الله محمد التهجري | رئيس قسم الحسابات |
| 12 | محمد أحمد صالح هادي المعمري | أمين الصندوق |

وعليه /
يتم التمهيم على جميع البنوك وشركات الصرافة بجمع وتجميد كافة أرصدة وحسابات وممتلكات الملتصقين أعلام وممتلكاتنا بما تم وبصورة عاجلة.

والله الوافق،

القصاصي / صمام الدين مفضل
وكيل النيابة الجزائرية المتخصصة بالأمانة

وحدة جمع المعلومات للنيابة العامة
المسوّدة
10/6/24

المصدر: سري.

7 - التهريب

121 - عكف الحوثيون على تجميع كميات كبيرة من الموارد غير المشروعة من خلال التهريب المنظم لمواد مختلفة مثل الأسلحة والمخدرات ومعدات الاتصالات (انظر المرفق 182)، والسلع المحظورة مثل المبيدات الممنوعة (انظر المرفق 183)، والعقاقير غير المسموح بها (انظر المرفق 184)، والتراث الثقافي (انظر الفقرة 123 والمرفق 185).

(أ) تهريب المخدرات والاتجار بها

122 - سُجّل تزايد في تهريب المخدرات والاتجار بها داخل اليمن، إذ أبلغت السلطات في اليمن عن ضبط شحنات مخدرات واعتراض القوات البحرية الدولية لمراكب شراعية تنقل هذه الشحنات. كما يجبي الحوثيون الضرائب والرسوم غير القانونية من مزارعي القات (*Catha edulis*). ومؤخراً، فرضوا جبايات جديدة على مزارعي القات في محافظة إب تجاوزت نسبتها 300 في المائة.

دراسة الحالة الإفرادية 13: المخدرات المضبوطة من حاويات للسكر في ميناء عدن

أبلغ جهاز مكافحة الإرهاب الفريق بمصادرة كمية كبيرة من المخدرات في ميناء عدن من إحدى حاويات السكر (رقم 536854) على متن السفينة *Vanesa MSC* القادمة من البرازيل. وانتهت القضية بإدانة محمد إبراهيم أحمد المطري بالسجن لمدة 25 عاما، خُفضت في الاستئناف إلى 12 عاما. ودقق الفريق في سجلات القضية وأجرى مقابلات مع مسؤولي جهاز مكافحة الإرهاب في عدن في آذار/مارس وتموز/يوليه 2024، كشفت عن تورط الحوثيين في تهريب المخدرات التي جرى ضبطها.

(ب) التمويل من خلال تهريب الممتلكات الثقافية والاتجار بها

123 - أبلغت مصادر مختلفة الفريق أن الحوثيين منغمسون في تهريب القطع الأثرية والتحف التي تشكل جزءا من التراث الثقافي لليمن والاتجار بها وبيعها في الخارج.

124 - وفي 26 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2023، ضبطت الجمارك اليمنية كتابا أثريا يحتوي 19 صفحة مصنوعة من الجلد كُتبت عليها بماء الذهب (باللغة العبرية) (انظر الشكل الرابع).

الشكل الرابع

كتاب أثري باللغة العبرية صادرته الجمارك اليمنية



المصدر: الجمارك اليمنية.

8 - استيراد النفط والغاز النفطي المسال باستخدام وثائق مزيفة

125 - وردت للفريق معلومات من عدة مصادر تفيد أن شركات خاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين تستورد النفط والغاز النفطي المسال بواسطة شهادات بلد المنشأ المزيفة، عبر ميناء الحديدية وميناء رأس عيسى، متجاوزة في بعض الأحيان عمليات التفتيش التي تقوم بها آلية الأمم المتحدة للتحقق والتفتيش. ويجري هذا الأمر بطريقتين: بعض السفن تسافر إلى البلد المحدد، مع إطفاء أجهزة الإرسال والاستقبال لنظام التعرف الآلي لتجنب كشفها، بينما تقوم سفن أخرى بعمليات مناقلة بين السفن في البحر بدون زيارة الموانئ المذكورة في شهادات بلد المنشأ.

126 - وكشفت التحقيقات الجارية للفريق أنه خلال الفترة من 1 كانون الثاني/يناير 2023 إلى تموز/يوليه 2024، تلقت بعثة الأمم المتحدة للتحقق والتفتيش 44 طلباً لتفتيش سفن الغاز النفطي المسال. ورُفض طلب واحد من هذه الطلبات. وبيّنت التحقيقات كذلك أنه بالنسبة إلى شحنة 18 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2023 لسفينة *LPG OM* وشحنة 8 حزيران/يونيه 2024 لسفينة *Raha Gas*، كان ميناء خالد في الإمارات العربية المتحدة هو ميناء المنشأ⁽⁴⁵⁾.

127 - ويتناول تحقيق الفريق حالياً سفناً مرتبطة بحزب الله وبقيادات حوثية رفيعة المستوى، وقد جمع معلومات عن العديد من الأفراد والكيانات والمسارات. بيد أن الفريق لم يكشف عن هذه التفاصيل في هذه المرحلة بسبب عدم اكتمال الأدلة التي تربط بين حلقات سلسلة التوريد بأكملها، والخطر المحتمل على بعض المصادر السرية.

128 - وكشفت تحقيقات الفريق أن السلطات المعنية من قبل الحوثيين قامت بتحصيل ما يقرب من 994 مليون ريال يمني كرسوم جمركية على واردات الوقود عبر الموانئ الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين خلال الفترة من 1 نيسان/أبريل 2022 إلى 30 حزيران/يونيه 2024، احتُسبت وفقاً لسعر الصرف السائد في مناطق سيطرة الحكومة. وإذا أخذت في الاعتبار الرسوم الأخرى غير القانونية وهامش الربح المحقق من ذلك، فإن إجمالي دخل الحوثيين من هذا القطاع وحده يقدر بـ 1,34 تريليون ريال يمني خلال الفترة المذكورة أعلاه. وذكرت مصادر الفريق أن جزءاً كبيراً من هذا المبلغ تم تحويله لأغراض عسكرية. ومع ذلك، لم يتمكن الفريق من التحقق بشكل مستقل من المبلغ المحوّل.

9 - تحصيل الأموال مقابل مشتريات معدات اتصالات وهمية

129 - أبلغت مصادر الفريق بأن كيانات خاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين قد اعتمدت أسلوب عمل آخر فقامت بتحويل نحو 132 مليون دولار أمريكي لشراء أجهزة ومعدات اتصالات وبناء أبراج لتوسيع نطاق شبكة الاتصالات. ويُزعم أن حصّة كبيرة من تلك الأموال قد وصلت إلى كبار قادة الحوثيين من خلال حسابات مختلفة. وتقوم شركات الاتصالات بشطب هذه المبالغ كخسائر، زاعمة أن المعدات استولت عليها حكومة اليمن عند الحدود، لكن دون إجراء أيّ عمليات شراء أو إنشاءات.

(45) فُرضت عقوبات على كل من هاتين السفينتين وعلى مالكيتهما وهما شركة عرفات للشحن، وشركة *KDS Shipping Limited*، على التوالي، على يد مكتب مراقبة الأصول الأجنبية التابع لوزارة الخزانة الأمريكية. (انظر المرفق 186). وانظر أيضاً: <https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240815>

130 - وتلقى الفريق معلوماتٍ تفيد بأن الحوثيين قد باعوا، في حالة أخرى، أجهزة المودم للمشاركين بسعر 75 دولاراً، والتي كانت قد اشترت بسعر 56 دولاراً (مقارنة بالتكلفة الفعلية البالغة 8 دولارات) من شركة مرتبطة بالقيادي الحوثي أحمد حامد. وذكر مصدر سري في قطاع الاتصالات، طلب عدم الإفصاح عن هويته، أنّ المتلقين المزعومين شملوا كبار القادة الحوثيين أو أفراداً مرتبطين بهم، وهم محمد علي الحوثي، وعبد الله يحيى الحكيم، وأحمد حامد، ومسفر النمير، وإسماعيل حميد الدين. ولم يتمكن الفريق من التحقق بشكل مستقل من صدق هذه الادعاءات. والمسألة قيد التحقيق.

سادساً - الأعمال التي تنتهك القانون الدولي الإنساني والقانون الدولي لحقوق الإنسان

131 - تشير التحقيقات، بما في ذلك المعلومات التي جُمعت من المصادر وتحليل الوثائق⁽⁴⁶⁾، إلى انتهاكات واسعة النطاق للقانون الدولي الإنساني والقانون الدولي لحقوق الإنسان، بما في ذلك الهجمات العشوائية على المدنيين، والاحتجاز التعسفي، وحالات الاختفاء القسري، والتعذيب، والعنف الجنسي المرتبط بالنزاع والعنف الجنساني، وانتهاكات الحق في المحاكمة العادلة. وتتصل المخاوف الإضافية بتجنيد الأطفال واستخدامهم في النزاع في اليمن، وعرقلة وصول المساعدات الإنسانية وإيصال المساعدات.

ألف - الهجمات العشوائية على المدنيين والأعيان المدنية

132 - تشير مصادر الحكومة إلى أن الفترة الممتدة من 1 كانون الثاني/يناير إلى 30 حزيران/يونيه 2024 شهدت مقتل 128 مدنياً (من بينهم 33 طفلاً وست نساء) وإصابة 93 مدنياً (من بينهم 35 طفلاً وثمان نساء). وكانت محافظة البيضاء الأكثر تضرراً، تليها محافظات عمران والجوف وتعز⁽⁴⁷⁾. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، تم شن 101 من الهجمات على أعيان مدنية، بما في ذلك أماكن العبادة والمدارس والمنشآت الطبية والممتلكات الخاصة. وقد أعاققت هذه الهجمات الوصول إلى الخدمات الأساسية وقوّضت الحق في الصحة والحق في التعليم والحق في مستوى معيشي مناسب، وحرية الدين (الفقرات 136 و 137 و 139). وأبلغت مصادر سرية الفريق عن مقتل ما لا يقل عن 13 مدنياً وإصابة 26 آخرين في غارتين جويتين قادهما التحالف بين الولايات المتحدة والمملكة المتحدة في 8 أبريل/نيسان و 30 مايو/أيار 2024 في محافظة الحديدة. وأسفر الهجوم الذي شنته إسرائيل على ميناء الحديدة في 20 تموز/يوليه 2024 عن مقتل ما لا يقل عن 9 مدنيين وإصابة 83 آخرين. وسيواصل الفريق التحقيق في تأثير الغارات الجوية الدولية على المدنيين.

1 - الضحايا المدنيون من جراء الألغام الأرضية والأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع والذخائر غير المتفجرة


133 - لا تزال الإصابات في صفوف المدنيين، بمن فيهم النساء والأطفال، بسبب الألغام الأرضية والذخائر غير المتفجرة والأجهزة المتفجرة اليدوية الصنع، مرتفعة.

(46) لم يشارك خبير القانون الدولي الإنساني بعد في بعثات إلى اليمن والمنطقة (انظر الفقرة 2).

(47) تشير معلومات مفتوحة المصدر إلى وقوع ما لا يقل عن 393 هجوماً على المدنيين بين أيلول/سبتمبر 2023 وآذار/مارس 2024، والتي يُزعم أنها أسفرت عن مقتل 367 شخصاً وإصابة 44 آخرين. وانظر <https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org>.

الشكل الخامس

الحوادث الناجمة عن الذخائر غير المنفجرة والخسائر المدنية في الحديدة، 1 حزيران/يونيه 2023 - 31 أيار/مايو 2024



المصدر: بعثة الأمم المتحدة لدعم اتفاق الحديدة، تحديث الإجراءات المتعلقة بالألغام لشهر أيار/مايو 2024.

ملاحظة: الأرقام الواردة في هذا الشكل هي أرقام تم الإبلاغ عنها من مصادر متعددة ولم تتحقق منها بعثة الأمم المتحدة لدعم اتفاق الحديدة بشكل مستقل.

134 - ومن 17 أيلول/سبتمبر 2023 إلى 28 تموز/يوليه 2024، أبطّل "مشروع مسام" مفعول 37 804 صنفا من الأعددة في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحكومة، بما يشمل ما يلي: 232 لغماً مضاداً للأفراد، و 3 097 لغماً مضاداً للدبابات و 33 488 ذخيرة غير منفجرة و 177 جهازاً متفجراً يدوي الصنع⁽⁴⁸⁾. وفي شهر تموز/يوليه وحده، تخلصت الأفرقة من 4 230 منها⁽⁴⁹⁾. وأبلغ مسؤولون حكوميون الفريق أنه خلال النصف الأول من عام 2024، قُتل ما لا يقل عن 61 مدنياً وأصيب 119 آخرين بجروح من جزاء الألغام الأرضية والألغام البحرية وغيرها من مخلفات الحرب. وتشير التحقيقات إلى أن الحوثيين ينتجون الألغام الأرضية محلياً ويضعون فيها آليات تفجير محددة لزيادة احتمالية إلحاق أضرار بشرية. وعلاوة على ذلك، أصبحت عملية إبطال مفعول الألغام الأرضية أكثر خطورةً على المتخصصين في إزالة الألغام (انظر المرفق 187؛ وانظر أيضاً S/2023/833، الفقرة 84).

2 - الهجمات على المدنيين والأعيان المدنية

135 - جمع الفريق معلوماتٍ عن مقتل وإصابة مدنيين بجروح، من بينهم نساء وأطفال (انظر المرفق 188). وأفادت التقارير أن الحوثيين شنوا هجمات عشوائيةً على الأحياء السكنية باستخدام القنابل الصاروخية والمدفعية والطائرات المسيّرة والقناصة. وثمة أخبار متداولة عن مقتل ما لا يقل عن 153 شخصاً

(48) يشارك "مشروع مسام" في إزالة الألغام الأرضية وغيرها من الأجهزة المتفجرة في اليمن. انظر: www.projectmasam.com/eng/news

(49) انظر: www.projectmasam.com/eng/project-masam-clears-4230-landmines-unexploded-ordnance-and-improvised-explosive-devices

وإصابة 180 آخرين بجروح (من بينهم نساء وأطفال وكبار في السن) أثناء الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير. وكانت محافظات تعز والضالع ومأرب والحديدة والبيضاء قد تأثرت بذلك بشكل خاص في النصف الأول من عام 2024.

136 - ويحقق الفريق في هجمات شُنّت على أعيان مدنية، بما في ذلك المدارس والمنشآت الطبية والمباني الدينية. وحتى أواخر تموز/يوليه 2024، كانت القوات أو الجماعات المسلحة قد قامت، بحسب التقارير الواردة، باحتلال ما لا يقل عن 35 مدرسة ومنشأة طبية. واحتلّت أربع مدارس وهوجمت ثلاثة مبانٍ دينية خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير⁽⁵⁰⁾. وأفادت مصادر حكومية عن وقوع اعتداءات ممنهجة طالت مؤسسات إعلامية (أعمال نهب وإغلاق ومصادرة معدات ومواد) خلال النصف الأول من عام 2024، في انتهاك لحرية التعبير. وأفادت التقارير بأن الحوثيين وضَعوا متفجرات في مناطق زراعية ورعية بالقرب من آبار المياه وساحات اللعب ومنازل المدنيين المهجورة سابقاً. وعطلّوا طرق النقل الحيوية، الأمر الذي أثر على حركة الأفراد وتدفق البضائع عبر اليمن، وتسبّب في إطالة أوقات السفر وزيادة تكاليف نقل البضائع (انظر المرفق 189).

137 - ويواصل الحوثيون احتجاز أو مصادرة الممتلكات الخاصة بطريقة منهجية دون اتباع الإجراءات القانونية الواجبة من أجل قمع المعارضة وتمويل الأنشطة الحربية (انظر الفقرات 114-120). فعلى سبيل المثال، أفادت التقارير أن ما لا يقل عن 108 مساكن نُهبِت وضوّدت خلال النصف الأول من عام 2024. ويسهم تجريد الأفراد من ممتلكاتهم أو أصولهم في ازدياد أعداد النازحين داخلياً، ويزيد من الطلب على المساعدات الإنسانية في سياق يشكل فيه الوصول إليها وتوزيعها تحدياً بالغاً (انظر المرفق 189، الفقرة 2).

138 - ويحقّق الفريق في هجمات مزعومة ضد ممتلكات ثقافية في اليمن (انظر الفقرتين 123 و 124، والمرفق 185 والمرفق 189، الفقرة 3).

139 - وتشكّل هجمات الحوثيين على السفن التجارية في البحر الأحمر منذ تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2023 هجماتٍ غير مشروعة على أعيان مدنية (انظر الفقرات 52-59). والاحتجاز التعسفي لأطقم السفن، مثل احتجاز طاقم السفينة غالاكسي/ليدر، محظور بالقدر نفسه بموجب القانون الدولي الإنساني والقانون الدولي لحقوق الإنسان (انظر الفقرتين 55 و 56). وبالنظر إلى أن السفن التي تتعرض للهجوم غالباً ما تحمل شحنات عالية الخطورة، مثل النفط، ثمة خطر بحدوث أضرار بيئية جسيمة، وهو ما يشكّل انتهاكاً للحق في بيئة صحية (انظر الفقرتين 54 و 57).

باء - الاحتجاز التعسفي والاختفاء القسري

140 - وصل الفريق إلى معلومات عن الاحتجاز التعسفي التي ارتكبتها بعض أطراف النزاع. وتفيد التقارير عن استهداف ممنهج للأفراد الذين يُنظر إليهم على أنهم معارضون لنظام الحوثيين، بما في ذلك أفراد من الطائفتين البهائية والإسماعيلية والمدافعون عن حقوق الإنسان والصحفيون والقضاة ورجال الأعمال. ويُزعم أن الوضع قد تدهور بعد توتر العلاقات مع بعض الحكومات الغربية بسبب هجمات الحوثيين في البحر الأحمر. ومع ازدياد الانتقادات لسياسات الحوثيين، ازداد قمع النظام للمعارضة. وأنّهَم المنتقدون بالتجسس وتقويض أمن

(50) وفقاً لمصادر سرية، شُنّ الحوثيون على أقل تقدير الهجمات التالية: 20 على نُور العبادة، و 10 على منشآت تعليمية، و 5 على منشآت طبية، و 80 على مناطق سكنية، بالإضافة إلى حوادث أخرى.

الدولة (انظر المرفق 190). وتفيد التقارير أن عائلات بأكملها، مع أطفالها، اعتُقلت واحتُجزت بمعزل عن العالم الخارجي، ويُشتبه في أن بعض الاعترافات المتلفزة قد انتزعت بالإكراه.

141 - وأبلغ مسؤولون في حكومة اليمن الفريق عن نمط استهداف المعلمين وخبراء التعليم، ومعظمهم في صنعاء. وتفيد التقارير بأن الضحايا، الذين عارضوا مراجعة المناهج الدراسية التي تهدف إلى تسييس نظام التعليم، قد اعتُقلوا تعسفاً، أو تعرضوا للتعذيب أو للمعاملة أو العقوبة القاسية أو اللاإنسانية أو المهينة، أو احتُجزوا بمعزل عن العالم الخارجي. ويُزعم أن ما لا يقل عن سبعة من المتخصصين في التعليم قد احتُجزوا منذ أيلول/سبتمبر 2023 وتوفي أحدهم أثناء الاحتجاز. وأظهر جسده، حسبما أفيد، آثار إصابات في الوجه. وكان خمسة من هؤلاء الأفراد يتعاونون مع منظمات دولية في مجال مبادرات التعليم (المرفق 191).

142 - في حزيران/يونيه 2024، احتجز الحوثيون تعسفاً 13 من موظفي الأمم المتحدة والعديد من العاملين في منظمات غير حكومية ومنظمات المجتمع المدني، من بينهم ثماني نساء⁽⁵¹⁾. وعلى الرغم من نداءات المجتمع الدولي للإفراج الفوري وغير المشروط عنهم، إلا أن جميع المحتجزين لا يزالون بمعزل عن العالم الخارجي، دون أن تُتبع الإجراءات القانونية الواجبة حيالهم أو دون أن يُسمح لهم بالتواصل مع أسرهم والمنظمات المعنية. ويواجه المحتجزون اتهامات بالتجسس لصالح جهازَي الاستخبارات الأمريكية والإسرائيلية وغيرها. وتُبنت اعترافات مزعومة لبعض المحتجزين تصوّر الحوثيين على أنهم مضطرون للدخول في نزاع مع الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل، ومن ثم تبرير اعتماد سياسات وتشريعات قمعية (انظر الفقرة 156)⁽⁵²⁾.

1 - التعذيب وغيره من ضروب المعاملة أو العقوبة القاسية أو اللاإنسانية أو المهينة

143 - يواصل الحوثيون تعريض المحتجزين للتعذيب أو المعاملة أو العقوبة القاسية أو اللاإنسانية أو المهينة (S/2023/833، الفقرات 124-131). وتفيد التقارير أن الضحايا يتعرضون لقلع الأظافر، والصعق بالكهرباء، والتعليق من القدمين، والإعدام الزائف، والضرب، والتجوع، والحرمان من استخدام المراض. ويوضع المحتجزون في زنانات انفرادية معتمة لفترات طويلة، مما يؤدي إلى آثار جسدية ونفسية شديدة، مثل الشلل وفقدان الذاكرة والعاهات البدنية الدائمة والعمى. وكثيراً ما يُحرم هؤلاء من الحصول على الرعاية الطبية، ما يؤدي في بعض الأحيان إلى وفاتهم. وتشير التحقيقات إلى تعرّض النساء للاعتداء الجنسي كشكل من أشكال التعذيب. وتلقّى الفريق تفاصيل عن هويات خمسة أشخاص قيل إنهم توفوا خلال الفترة المشمولة بالتقرير بسبب التعذيب الذي تعرضوا له خلال سنوات الاختفاء القسري. وهناك عارضة أزياء يمنية اعتُقلت في تشرين الثاني/نوفمبر 2021، ولا تزال رهن الاحتجاز، وتفيد التقارير أنها تعرضت للتعذيب لإجبارها على التوقيع على اعترافات مكتوبة مسبقاً، كما خضعت لاختبارات العذرية، مع استمرار ورود تقارير عن تعرضها لمزيد من العنف الجنسي.

2 - انتهاكات الحق في محاكمة عادلة

144 - أبلغ مسؤولون حكوميون الفريق أن المحكمة الجزائية المتخصصة التي يقودها الحوثيون في صنعاء أصدرت العديد من أحكام الإعدام، في انتهاك للإجراءات القانونية الواجبة. وثمة مخاوف بشأن استقلالية

(51) أبلغت مصادر الفريق عن احتجاز ما مجموعه 67 فرداً تعسفاً خلال العملية، من بينهم أقارب وأطفال، وقد أُطلق سراحهم لاحقاً.

(52) انظر: www.middleeastmonitor.com/20240613-houthis-publish-confessions-of-us-israel-spy-network

المحكمة ونزاهتها، إذ يقال إنَّ القضاة تم تعيينهم بسبب ولائهم للحوثيين. ووفقاً للتقارير، فقد تم احتجاز الضحايا لسنوات دون توجيه تهم إليهم، وتم حرمانهم من الاتصال بمحاميين وبعائلاتهم، وتم احتجازهم في الحبس الانفرادي لأشهر. وعندما يُسمح بتوكيل محامين، غالباً ما يُحرمون من الوصول إلى الأدلة. ويتم تجاهل قرينة البراءة. وأفادت التقارير أن المحكمة أصدرت أحكاماً بالإعدام رجباً وصلباً. وأبلغ الفريق بما لا يقل عن 67 حكماً بالإعدام أصدرتها المحكمة الجنائية المتخصصة في النصف الأول من عام 2024 (المرفق 192). وفي 1 حزيران/يونيه 2024، حكمت المحكمة على 44 شخصاً بالإعدام، معظمهم بتهمة التجسس. واعتُقل الضحايا في نيسان/أبريل أيار/مايو 2020، لا سيما في محافظات صنعاء وذيمار وعمران، واحتُجزوا بمعزل عن العالم الخارجي. وفي كانون الأول/ديسمبر 2023، حُكم بالإعدام على ناشطة في مجال حقوق الإنسان والرئيسة السابقة لفرع اليمن التابع لاتحاد قيادات المرأة العربية في جامعة الدول العربية. وبحسب التقارير الواردة، لم يُسمح لها بالاتصال بعائلتها والحصول على تمثيل قانوني. وفي 14 تشرين الأول/أكتوبر 2023، جمعت قوات الحوثيين، بحسب ما زُعم، 30 رجلاً مداناً لإعدامهم رمياً بالحجارة. إلا أن تنفيذ الإعدام تم إيقافه خشية رد الفعل الشعبي العنيف (انظر الفقرة 148)⁽⁵³⁾.

جيم - العنف الجنسي والجنساني المرتبط بالنزاع

145 - تشير المعلومات المقدّمة إلى الفريق إلى أن العنف الجنسي والجنساني المرتبط بالنزاع والعنف الجنساني لا يزالان منتشرين. وهناك العديد من التقارير التي تتحدث عن العنف الجنسي، بما في ذلك كشكل من أشكال التعذيب، الذي يُرتكب أثناء الاحتجاز ضد النساء والأطفال والرجال.

146 - ووفقاً لمصادر في حكومة اليمن، فإنّ "الزبنيات"⁽⁵⁴⁾ متورطات في عمليات اختطاف واختفاء قسري وابتزاز للنساء والفتيات، بما في ذلك أثناء المظاهرات والتجمعات العامة الأخرى. وتفيد التقارير أن العديد من الناشطات تعرضن للضرب والاحتجاز التعسفي، وغالباً ما كان إطلاق سراحهن مشروطاً بتقديم تعهد من ولي أمرهنّ (مَحْرَم).

147 - ويُعدّ العنف الجنسي ضد المرأة مدمراً بشكل خاص في المجتمع اليمني، حيث تحظى عقبة المرأة بتقدير كبير وتؤثر على سمعة أسر بأكملها. ويواصل الفريق التحقيق فيما إذا كان الحوثيون يستخدمون العنف الجنسي كأداة استراتيجية للحرب ضد المنشقين.

148 - وتشير المعلومات التي حصل عليها الفريق إلى أن المحكمة الجزائية المتخصصة التابعة للحوثيين تمارس التمييز ضد الأفراد على أساس الميل الجنسي والهوية الجنسية. فعلى سبيل المثال، في 23 حزيران/يونيه 2024، في صنعاء، حكم الحوثيون على تسعة رجال بالإعدام رمياً بالحجارة وصلباً، وعلى 23 رجلاً بالسجن لمدة تصل إلى 10 سنوات بتهمة ممارسة علاقات جنسية مثلية. وحُكم على ثلاثة رجال بالجلد العلني. وتفيد التقارير أن الضحايا تعرضوا لمحاكمة جماعية، وحُرموا من ضمانات الإجراءات القانونية الواجبة⁽⁵⁵⁾. وفي شباط/فبراير 2024، في محافظة إب، حُكم على 13 رجلاً بالإعدام، وثلاثة آخرين

(53) انظر أيضاً: https://x.com/mashhadyemeni/status/1757656074801332480?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwterm%5Escreen-name%3Amashhadyemeni%7Ctwcon%5Esl.

(54) الزبنيات هنّ الجناح الأمني النسائي للحوثيين. وتشمل أدوارهن جمع المعلومات الاستخباراتية، والمشاركة في القتال، وتطبيق تفسير الحوثيين للشريعة الإسلامية (على سبيل المثال فيما يتعلق بقواعد اللباس والسلوكيات الاجتماعية المقبولة).

(55) انظر: <https://x.com/mashhadyemeni/status/1749604938630521164>.

بالسجن، واحتُجز 35 رجلاً بتهم تتعلق بالمثلثية الجنسية. ووصمة العار المرتبطة بمثل هذه التهم، حتى لو كانت ملفقة، تضرُّ بالمجتمع اليمني بشكل كبير. وغالباً ما تهرب عائلات المتهمين من مسقط رأسها.

دال - انتهاكات حقوق الأطفال

149 - تكشف المعلومات التي تلقاها الفريق عن انتهاكات مستمرة لحقوق الطفل. وقد اعتمد الحوثيون تدابير تقوُّص الحق في التعليم، بما في ذلك تغيير المناهج الدراسية (S/2023/833، المرفق 85)، وفرض الفصل بين الجنسين، وتجميد رواتب المعلمين، وفرض ضرائب على إدارة التعليم لتمويل الأغراض العسكرية (انظر الفقرة 106). وتم تدمير المدارس أو إلحاق الضرر بها أو احتلالها. وتم احتجاز المعلمين وخبراء التعليم تعسفاً. ومن خلال ما يُسمَّى بالمخيمات الصيفية، يواصل الحوثيون الترويج للكرهية والعنف والتمييز، مما يعرض مستقبل المجتمع اليمني وآفاق السلام والأمن الدوليين للخطر (S/2023/833، المرفق 86). وذكرت بعض المصادر أن مستشارين من حزب الله يساعدون الحوثيين في مراجعة المناهج الدراسية وإدارة المخيمات الصيفية (انظر المرفق 193).

تجنيد الأطفال واستخدامهم

150 - بحسب ما ورد، فقد ازداد تجنيد الأطفال واستخدامهم من قبل الحوثيين بعد اندلاع حرب غزة والغارات التي شنتها الولايات المتحدة والمملكة المتحدة في اليمن. وقد استُخدمت هذه الأحداث، وخاصةً الأولى، لتعزيز سياسات التجنيد. واستخدم الحوثيون الخطاب الديني المتطرف عبر وسائل الإعلام وفي المساجد والمحافل العامة الأخرى (انظر المرفق 194). وأفادت التقارير بأن الحوثيين قاموا، في استغلال لمعدلات الأمية المرتفعة، لا سيما في المناطق القبلية، بتعبئة الأولاد الذين لا تتجاوز أعمارهم 10 أو 11 عاماً، على الرغم من معارضة الوالدين في كثير من الأحيان. ويُزعم أن خطب التجنيد والدروس الأسبوعية عن الجهاد تُلقى في المدارس.

151 - ويلتحق بعض الأطفال بالمخيمات الصيفية للحصول على مزايا مالية أو حصص غذائية موعودة وهي مغرية للغاية في أوقات الفقر المدقع. ويتعرض آخرون للاختطاف أو التهديد أو الإكراه. وبحسب الروايات، ففي المخيمات الصيفية "المغلقة"، يتم عزل الأطفال عن عائلاتهم والعالم الخارجي لمدة أسبوعين. ويتم تلقينهم أيديولوجية الجهاد وتدريبهم على المهارات القتالية. وهناك تقارير عن تعرُّص الأطفال لإطلاق النار من قبل قوات الحوثيين في المخيمات الصيفية أو بالقرب منها، وحوادث عنف جنسي، بما في ذلك الاغتصاب، ضد الأطفال في هذه المخيمات. وبحسب التقارير الواردة، يتم تحفيز زواج الأطفال والزواج المبكر والزواج القسري لضمان الولاء لقضية الحوثيين. وأبلغت حكومة اليمن الفريق أن سلطات الحوثيين في محافظة عمران أصدرت، في 4 نيسان/أبريل 2024، توجيهاً إلى جميع إدارات التعليم يقضي بسرعة إنشاء مخيمات صيفية إضافية. وبحسب التقارير، بحلول حزيران/يونيه 2024، كان في هذه المحافظة ما لا يقلُّ عن 696 مخيماً صيفياً مفتوحاً وخمسة مخيمات مغلقة في هذه المحافظة، حيث بلغ عدد الطلاب المسجلين فيها 15 000.

152 - وأبلغت مصادر سرية عن زيادة في تجنيد الفتيات من قبل الزينبيات وإدماجهن في صفوفهن، وغالباً ما يتم ذلك عن طريق الاختطاف والتهديد. وتفيد التقارير أن بعض المختطفات يتم استغلالهن في العمل المنزلي القسري، بينما تقع أخريات ضحايا للعنف الجنسي.

153 - وأبلغت حكومة اليمن عن ورود 3 298 من التقارير عن تجنيد الأطفال من قبل الحوثيين في النصف الأول من عام 2024. وبحسب ما ورد، تم استخدامهم كدروع بشرية، وجواسيس، ولزرع الألغام الأرضية وغيرها من العبوات الناسفة، والاستطلاع، والطبخ، والقتال. وبالنسبة للفترة من 15 أيلول/سبتمبر 2023 إلى 31 تموز/يوليه 2024، أبلغت مصادر سرية عن (أ) 142 حالة تجنيد واستخدام أطفال تم التحقق منها؛ (ب) مقتل 75 من الأطفال الذين تمت تعبتهم وإصابة طفل واحد.

هاء - عرقلة وصول المساعدات الإنسانية وإيصالها وتوزيعها

154 - لا يزال الوضع الإنساني في اليمن يبعث على القلق الشديد، مع وجود عدة عوامل تقوض وصول المساعدات الإنسانية وتوزيعها.

155 - وهناك مخاوف من انتهاك السلامة الجسدية للعاملين في المجال الإنساني في كل من مناطق سيطرة الحكومة والحوثيين. ففي المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحكومة، تخلق عمليات الاختطاف التي تقوم بها الجماعات المسلحة والسيطرة المجزأة على استخدام القوة حالة من عدم اليقين والخوف، مما يؤثر على الخدمات الإنسانية.

156 - وأدى ما يتعرض له العاملون في المجال الإنساني من عمليات احتجاز تعسفي واختفاء قسري على يد الحوثيين (انظر الفقرة 142) إلى تقويض الخدمات الإنسانية. وأبلغ مقدمو الخدمات الإنسانية الفريق أن بعض العاملين في المجال الإنساني يتجنبون المناطق التي يسيطر عليها الحوثيون بسبب مخاوف تتعلق بالسلامة. ويُزعم أن الحوثيين قد أجبروا بعض موظفي الإغاثة الإنسانية المحتجزين على "اعترافات" تدين زملاءهم. كما أُجبر التهديد بأحكام الإعدام وتجميد الحسابات المصرفية العاملين في المجال الإنساني على المغادرة. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك سيطر الحوثيون، في أوائل آب/أغسطس 2024، على مكتب مفوضية حقوق الإنسان في صنعاء واستولوا على ممتلكاته، بما في ذلك الوثائق. واستهداف موظفي الأمم المتحدة وممتلكاتها يعرض للخطر قدرتها على الوفاء بولاياتها الإنسانية. كما أنه يقوّض الجهود السياسية التي تبذلها المنظمة من أجل تحقيق السلام والأمن الدوليين. وفي 17 تموز/يوليه 2024، ألزم الحوثيون المنظمات الدولية بالحصول على الموافقة قبل تعيين موظفين وتقديم هيكل تنظيمي مفصل يضم المسميات الوظيفية للموظفين (انظر المرفق 195). وبهذا الإجراء، يمكن للحوثيين أن يمارسوا سيطرة أكبر على الجهات الفاعلة في المجال الإنساني، بما في ذلك ما يتعلق بالمستفيدين من المساعدات الإنسانية.

157 - ووفقاً لمقدّمي الخدمات الإنسانية، وقعت 260 حادثة أثرت على وصول المساعدات الإنسانية وإيصالها في الربع الثاني من عام 2024، مقارنة بـ 140 حادثة في الربع الأول. وهي تشمل تأخيرات إدارية في الموافقة على اتفاقيات تشغيل المنظمات غير الحكومية. ولا تزال عملية الموافقة المطولة تشكل مصدر قلق كبير في جميع أنحاء اليمن⁽⁵⁶⁾ بسبب الدور الحاسم للمنظمات غير الحكومية في تحسين الوضع الإنساني. وغالباً ما تعارض السلطات أنشطة جمع البيانات، مثل التقييمات والمسوحات، لا سيما في المناطق التي يسيطر عليها الحوثيون، وغالباً ما يتم استهداف المهنيين المشاركين فيها. وتقيد التقارير أن ما يرد من معلومات مضللة حول عمل الأمم المتحدة والمنظمات غير الحكومية، إلى جانب ما يُعتقد أنه

(56) في الربع الأول من عام 2024، تمت الموافقة على 42 اتفاقاً للمنظمات غير الحكومية من قبل الحكومة اليمنية والسلطات المعيّنة من قبل الحوثيين، مقارنة بـ 19 اتفاقاً تمت الموافقة عليها في الربع الثاني.

عدم كفاءة في عملية تقديم المساعدات، يعزز الشكوك بين السلطات والجمهور. وتخلق القيود التي يفرضها الحوثيون على حرية تنقل المرأة عوائق محددة فيما يتعلق بالخدمات التي لا يمكن للرجال عادة القيام بها مثل رعاية ما قبل الولادة. وأفادت التقارير أن العائلات في المجال الإنساني قد قللت من عملياتهن الميدانية. ويثير الوضع في صنعاء القلق بشكل خاص عند مقارنته بمناطق أخرى، مثل محافظة إب.

158 - وأبلغت مصادر الفريق أن قصف إسرائيل لصهاريج تخزين النفط ومحطة كهرباء بالقرب من ميناء الحديدية في تموز/يوليه 2024 دمر إمدادات الوقود للجهات الفاعلة في المجال الإنساني، والتي كان جزء منها مخصصاً للمرافق الطبية. ولا تزال تقييمات تأثير الهجوم مستمرة. ولاستمرار تشغيل ميناء الحديدية أهمية بالغة لمنع المزيد من التدهور في الوضع الإنساني، لا سيما في المناطق التي يسيطر عليها الحوثيون.

159 - وأدت هجمات الحوثيين على السفن التجارية في البحر الأحمر (انظر الفقرة 43)، إلى زيادة أسعار السلع والتأخير في إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية.

160 - وأدت هجمات الحوثيين على خطوط النقل الأساسية إلى زيادة إعاقة وصول المساعدات الإنسانية إلى اليمنيين (انظر الفقرة 136، والمرفق 189، الفقرة 4).

استخدام الحوثيين لمنصات التواصل الاجتماعي

161 - لاحظ الفريق أيضاً أن الحوثيين يستخدمون منصات التواصل الاجتماعي، في انتهاك لنظام الجزاءات المفروضة بموجب القرار 2140 (2140)، لبيع الأسلحة، والتماس الدعم المالي والأيدولوجي، والدعوة إلى الكراهية القومية أو العرقية أو الدينية التي تشكل تحريضاً على التمييز أو العداوة أو العنف (انظر الفقرات 13 و 90 و 112 والمرفقات 194 و 196-201).

سابعاً - التوصيات

162 - يوصي الفريق بأن يقوم مجلس الأمن بما يلي:

(أ) إدانة استخدام الحوثيين لمنصات وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي في انتهاكات نظام الجزاءات المفروضة بموجب القرار 2140 (2014) (انظر الفقرتين 150 و 161)؛

(ب) دعوة كيانات وسائل التواصل الاجتماعي ذات الصلة إلى اتخاذ تدابير عاجلة ومناسبة لضمان عدم استخدام منصاتهما من قبل أي فرد أو كيان ينتهك نظام الجزاءات (انظر الفقرتين 150 و 161)؛

(ج) دعوة الحوثيين إلى الامتناع عن تجميد ومصادرة ممتلكات الأفراد والكيانات بشكل تعسفي وباستخدام القوة، وإلى الإفراج، دون مزيد من التأخير، عن الممتلكات المستولى عليها أو المصادرة وتعويض المالكين الشرعيين عن الخسائر، إن وجدت (انظر الفقرتين 114 و 137)؛

(د) دعوة الجماعات المسلحة الإقليمية إلى الامتناع عن تقديم المساعدة العسكرية والمالية للحوثيين في انتهاك لنظام العقوبات، والإعراب عن اعتزامه فرض جزاءات على من يقوم بمثل هذه الأعمال (انظر الفقرات 11-22)؛

- (هـ) النظر في توسيع فريق الخبراء المعني باليمن عبر تعزيزه بخبير إضافي لمراقبة الأنشطة البحرية، بما في ذلك التهريب، التي تهدد السلام والأمن في اليمن؛
- (و) دعوة جميع الدول الأعضاء إلى توفير الموارد الكافية لتعزيز قدرة آلية الأمم المتحدة للتحقق والتفتيش، مما سيساعد في تيسير تخليص الشحنات التجارية ورصد الانتهاكات المحتملة للحظر المفروض على الأسلحة وتدابير الجزاءات المالية (انظر الفقرة 97)؛
- (ز) حثُّ جميع الدول الأعضاء على توفير الموارد الكافية لتعزيز قدرة حكومة اليمن على منع الانسكابات النفطية المحتملة في البحر الأحمر والاستجابة لها (انظر الفقرة 57)؛
- (ح) تشجيع الدول الأعضاء على دعم التعاون الدولي لتعزيز الجهود المبذولة في مجال الإجراءات المتعلقة بالألغام في اليمن وتقديم الدعم المالي المستدام للمنظمات غير الحكومية العاملة في مجال إزالة الألغام (انظر الفقرة 134)؛
- (ط) تشجيع الدول الأعضاء والمنظمات الدولية والإقليمية ودون الإقليمية على تعزيز الجهود التعاونية المبذولة لمكافحة الاتجاهات المتزايدة لتجنيد الأطفال واستخدامهم في المناطق التي يسيطر عليها الحوثيون (انظر الفقرات 150-153)، لا سيما من خلال ما يلي:
- 1' تعزيز التدخلات المجتمعية التي تركز على العواقب المتوسطة والطويلة الأجل لمشاركة الأطفال في النزاعات المسلحة، وبالتالي تعزيز التغيير الاجتماعي الذي يقوده المجتمع المحلي؛
- 2' تطوير استراتيجيات مستدامة لتوليد الإيرادات لأسر الأطفال المعرضين للخطر بشكل خاص؛
- 3' تنفيذ استراتيجيات فعالة لإعادة إدماج الأطفال المسرَّحين، مع التركيز على منع إعادة تسريحهم.
- (ي) حث المجتمع الدولي على مساعدة السلطات اليمنية، حسب الاقتضاء (انظر الفقرة 144)، على القيام بما يلي:
- 1' تكثيف أنشطة الرصد والتحقيق لضمان إجراء فحص وتوثيق شاملين للانتهاكات الحق في المحاكمة العادلة في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحوثيين، والتي غالبًا ما تصل إلى أحكام بالإعدام؛
- 2' تعزيز بنيتها التحتية التحقيقية والقضائية ومواردها البشرية والمادية.
- 163 - ويوصي الفريق بأن تنتظر اللجنة في إصدار بيان صحفي يدين استخدام المعلومات المضللة والدعاية لتمكين انتهاكات القانون الدولي الإنساني وقانون حقوق الإنسان في اليمن، بما في ذلك الاحتجاز التعسفي للعاملين في المجال الإنساني والمعارضين السياسيين، ويحث جميع أصحاب المصلحة على المشاركة بنشاط في جهود مكافحة المعلومات المضللة ودعم هذه الجهود (انظر الفقرتين 142 و 150).

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pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014)**

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Annex 1: Methodology

1. The Panel uses satellite imagery of Yemen procured by the United Nations from private providers to support investigations. It also uses commercial databases recording maritime and aviation data and mobile phone records. Public statements by officials through their official media channels are accepted as factual unless contrary facts are established. While it has been as transparent as possible, in situations in which identifying sources would expose these sources or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel does not include identifying information.
2. The Panel reviews social media, but no information gathered is used as evidence unless it could be corroborated using multiple independent or technical sources, including eyewitnesses, to appropriately meet the highest achievable standard of proof.
3. The spelling of toponyms within Yemen often depends on the ethnicity of the source or the quality of transliteration. The Panel has adopted a consistent approach in the present update.
4. The Panel places importance on the rule of consensus among the Panel members and agrees that, if differences and/or reservations arise during the development of reports, it would only adopt the text, conclusions, and recommendations by a majority of the members. In the event of a recommendation for designation of an individual or a group, such recommendation would be done based on unanimity.
5. The Panel has offered the opportunity to reply to Member States, entities and individuals involved in most incidents that are covered in this report. Their response has been taken into consideration in the Panel's findings. The methodology for this is provided in appendix A.

Appendix A ‘The opportunity to reply’ methodology used by the Panel

1. Although sanctions are meant to be preventative not punitive, it should be recognized that the mere naming of an individual or entity⁵⁷ in a Panel’s public report, could have adverse effects on the individual. As such, where possible, individuals concerned should be provided with an opportunity to provide their account of events and to provide concrete and specific information/material in support. Through this interaction, the individual is given the opportunity to demonstrate that their alleged conduct does not fall within the relevant listing criteria. This is called the ‘opportunity to reply’.
2. The Panel’s methodology on the opportunity to reply is as follows:
 - (a) Providing an individual with an ‘opportunity to reply’ should be the norm;
 - (b) The Panel may decide not to offer an opportunity of reply if there is credible evidence that it would unduly prejudice its investigations, including if it would:
 - (i) Result in the individual moving assets if they get warning of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - (ii) Restrict further access of the Panel to vital sources;
 - (iii) Endanger Panel sources or their relatives or Panel members;
 - (iv) Adversely and gravely impact humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field;
 - (v) For any other reason that can be clearly demonstrated as reasonable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances.
3. If the circumstances set forth in 2 (b) do not apply, then the Panel should be able to provide an individual an opportunity to reply.
4. The individual should be able to communicate directly with the Panel to convey their personal determination as to the level and nature of their interaction with the Panel.
5. Interactions between the Panel and the individual should be direct, unless in exceptional circumstances.
6. In no circumstances the third parties, without the knowledge of the individual, can determine for the individual its level of interaction with the Panel.
7. The individuals, on the other hand, in making their determination of the level and nature of interaction with the Panel, may consult third parties or allow third parties (for example, legal representative or their government) to communicate on their behalf on subsequent interactions with the Panel.

⁵⁷ Hereinafter, the term individual will be used to reflect both individuals and entities.


Appendix B: Investigations methodology on violations relating to IHL, IHRL, and acts that constitute human rights abuses

1. The Panel adopts the following stringent methodology to ensure that its investigations meet the highest possible evidentiary standards, despite it being prevented from visiting places in Yemen. In doing so it pays particular attention to the “Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions Reports”, (S/2006/997), on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23, as per paragraph 14 of resolution 2564 (2021).
2. The Panel’s methodology, in relation to its investigations concerning alleged IHL, IHRL and human rights abuses, is as set out below:
 - (a) All Panel investigations are initiated based on verifiable information being made available to the Panel, either directly from sources or from media reports.
 - (b) In carrying out its investigations on the use of explosive ordnance, the Panel relies on at least three or more of the following sources of information:
 - (i) At least two eyewitnesses or victims;
 - (ii) At least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
 - (iii) If there are casualties associated with the incident, and if the casualties are less than ten in number, the Panel will endeavour to obtain copies of death certificates and medical certificates. In incidents relating to mass casualties, the Panel relies on published information from the United Nations and other organizations;
 - (iv) Technical evidence, which includes imagery of the impact damage, blast effects, and recovered fragmentation. In all cases, the Panel collects imagery from at least two different and unrelated sources. In the rare cases where the Panel has had to rely on open source imagery, the Panel verifies that imagery by referring it to eyewitnesses or by checking for pixilation distortion:
 - a. In relation to air strikes, the Panel often identifies the responsible party through crater analysis or by the identification of components from imagery of fragmentation; and
 - b. The Panel also analyses imagery of the ground splatter pattern at the point of impact from mortar, artillery, or free flight rocket fire to identify the direction from which the incoming ordnance originated. This is one indicator to assist in the identification of the perpetrator for ground fire when combined with other sources of information.
 - (v) The utilization of open source or purchased satellite imagery, wherever possible, to identify the exact location of an incident, and to support analysis of the type and extent of destruction. Such imagery may also assist in the confirmation of timelines of the incident;
 - (vi) Access to investigation reports and other documentation of local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
 - (vii) Other documentation that supports the narrative of sources, for example, factory manuals that may prove that the said factory is technically incapable of producing weapons of the type it is alleged to have produced;
 - (viii) In rare instances where the Panel has doubt as to the veracity of available facts from other sources, local sources are relied on to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, if the Panel wished to confirm the presence of an armed group in a particular area;
 - (ix) Statements issued by or on behalf of a party to the conflict responsible for the incident;
 - (x) Open source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel’s findings.

- (c) In carrying out its investigations on deprivation of liberty and associated violations, the Panel relies on the following sources of information:
- (i) The victims, where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where medical and security conditions are conducive to such an interview;
 - (ii) The relatives of victims and others who had access to the victims while in custody. This is particularly relevant in instances where the victim dies in custody;
 - (iii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
 - (iv) Medical documentation and, where applicable, death certificates;
 - (v) Documentation issued by prison authorities;
 - (vi) Interviews with medical personnel who treated the victim, wherever possible;
 - (vii) Investigation and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident. The Panel may also seek access to court documents if the detainee is on trial or other documentation that proves or disproves the narrative of the victim;
 - (viii) Where relevant, the Panel uses local sources to collect specific and verifiable information from the ground, for example, medical certificates;
 - (ix) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;
 - (x) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings;
 - (xi) Detainees do not have always access to medical care, nor is it always possible to obtain medical reports, especially in cases of prolonged detention. Therefore, the Panel accepts testimonies received from detainees alleging that violence was used against them during detention by the detaining parties as prima facie evidence of torture;
 - (xii) For the same reasons, medical and police reports are not required by the Panel to conclude that rape or sexual violence took place.
- (d) In carrying out its investigations on other violations, including forced displacement human rights violations and abuses against migrants, or threats against medical workers, the Panel relies on information that includes:
- (i) Interviews with victims, eyewitnesses, and direct reports where they are able and willing to speak to the Panel, and where conditions are conducive to such an interview;
 - (ii) Interviews with at least one individual or organization (either local or international) that has also independently investigated the incident;
 - (iii) Documentation relevant to verify information obtained;
 - (iv) Statements issued by the party to the conflict responsible for the incident;
 - (v) Open-source information to identify other collaborative or contradictory information regarding the Panel's findings.
- (e) In carrying out its investigation in respect to the recruitment of children by parties to the conflict, the Panel is particularly mindful of the risk posed by its investigations for the children and their family. The Panel also refrains from interviewing directly the victim, unless it is sure that this will not have a negative impact on them. Therefore, the Panel often relies on sources such as:
- (i) Investigations and other documentation from local and international organizations that have independently investigated the incident;
 - (ii) Interviews with people and organizations providing assistance to these children;
 - (iii) Interviews with other people with knowledge of the violations such as family members, community leaders, teachers, and social workers.

- (f) The standard of proof is met when the Panel has reasonable grounds to believe that the incidents had occurred as described and, based on multiple corroboratory sources, that the responsibility for the incident lies with the identified perpetrator. The standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt”.
 - (g) Upon completion of its investigation, wherever possible, the Panel provides those responsible with an opportunity to respond to the Panel’s findings in so far as it relates to the attribution of responsibility. This is undertaken in accordance with the Panel’s standard methodology on the opportunity to reply. Generally, the Panel would provide detailed information in any opportunity to respond, including geo-locations. However, detailed information on incidents are not provided when there is a credible threat that it would threaten Panel’s sources, for example, in violations related to deprivation of liberty, violations associated with ground strikes on a civilian home, or in violations associated with children.
 - (h) If a party does not provide the Panel with the information requested, the Panel will consider whether this is of sufficient gravity to be considered as non-compliance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2624 (2022) and thus consideration for reporting to the Committee.
3. The Panel does not include information in its reports that may identify or endanger its sources. Where it is necessary to bring such information to the attention of the Council or the Committee, the Panel deposits such information in the custody of the Secretariat for viewing by members of the Committee.
 4. The Panel does not divulge any information that may lead to the identification of victims, witnesses, and other particularly vulnerable sources, except: 1) with the specific permission of the sources; and 2) where the Panel is, based on its own assessment, certain that these individuals would not suffer any danger as a result of such disclosure of information. The Panel stands ready to provide the Council or the Committee, on request, with any additional imagery and documentation to support the Panel’s findings beyond that included in its reports. Appropriate precautions will, however, be taken to protect the anonymity of its sources.

Annex 2: UN Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Map



Annex 3: Summary of Panel correspondence (up to 15 August 2024)

Table 3.1

Correspondence with Member States

| Member states | Number of letters sent by the Panel | Number of unanswered letters by Member State | Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2024 |
|------------------|-------------------------------------|--|--|
| Austria | 2 | 2 | |
| Barbados | 1 | 1 | |
| Belize | 2 | | |
| Brazil | 1 | | |
| Bulgaria | 1 | 1 | |
| China | 12 | 11 | |
| Comoros | 6 | 6 | |
| Czechia | 5 | 1 | |
| Djibouti | 6 | 2 | |
| France | 3 | 1 | |
| Germany | 2 | | |
| Greece | 1 | 1 | |
| Guinea Bissau | 1 | 1 | |
| Hungary | 1 | | |
| India | 1 | 1 | |
| Indonesia | 1 | 1 | |
| Iraq | 1 | 1 | |
| Iran | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| Israel | 2 | 2 | |
| Jordan | 1 | 1 | |
| Lebanon | 1 | 1 | |
| Liberia | 2 | 2 | |
| Lithuania | 1 | | |
| Marshall Islands | 3 | 3 | |
| KSA | 8 | 6 | |
| Oman | 2 | 1 | |
| Palau | 6 | 3 | |
| Panama | 18 | 18 | |
| Poland | 2 | 2 | |
| Portugal | 2 | 2 | |
| Romania | 2 | | |
| Russia | 11 | | |
| Serbia | 2 | 1 | |
| Singapore | 6 | 3 | |
| Slovak Republic | 1 | | |
| Somalia | 2 | 1 | |
| Spain | 2 | 2 | |
| Sri Lanka | 2 | 1 | |
| Syria | 2 | 2 | |
| Tanzania | 2 | 2 | |
| The Sudan | 3 | 3 | |
| Togo | 1 | 1 | |
| UAE | 4 | 4 | |
| UK | 3 | 2 | |
| USA | 8 | 4 | |
| Yemen | 11 | 7 | |
| Total | 161 | 104 | 1 |

Table 3.2

Correspondence with armed groups and other non-governmental entities

| <i>Commercial Company/Government Entity</i> | Number of letters sent by the Panel | Number of unanswered letters by Government Entity | Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2024 |
|---|--|--|---|
| Sana'a-based Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 2 | 2 | |
| Total | 2 | 2 | |

Table 3.3

Correspondence with commercial companies/governmental entities

| <i>Commercial Company/Government Entity</i> | Number of letters sent by the Panel | Number of unanswered letters by Commercial Company | Number of letters where the deadline is after 15 August 2024 |
|---|--|---|---|
| Adler Firearms | 1 | 1 | |
| AHSS | 1 | | |
| AirTronic USA | 1 | 1 | |
| Barrett Firearms Mfg | 1 | | |
| Beretta USA Corporation | 1 | 1 | |
| Canik Arms | 1 | | |
| Caracal International LLC | 1 | 1 | |
| Česká zbrojovka a.s. | 1 | | |
| Colt's Manufacturing Company | 1 | 1 | |
| DPMS Panther Arms | 1 | 1 | |
| Girsan Firearms | 1 | | |
| European Union | 3 | 1 | |
| FN America LLC | 1 | 1 | |
| Glock USA Inc | 1 | 1 | |
| Grand Power Ltd. | 1 | 1 | |
| IMO | 1 | | |
| Kahr Firearms Group | 1 | 1 | |
| Lipsley Guns.Com | 1 | 1 | |
| Lloyd's | 1 | | |
| LWRC International LLC | 1 | 1 | |
| North Sylva sports | 1 | 1 | |
| ParkWest Arms | 1 | | |
| Remington Arms Co. LLC | 1 | 1 | |
| RM Equipment Inc. | 1 | | |
| Safir Arms Industrial | 1 | | |
| Sarsilmaz | 1 | | |
| Shadow System LLC | 1 | 1 | |
| Sig Sauer USA | 1 | 1 | |
| Smith & Wesson Brands Inc. | 1 | 1 | |
| Stamco Ship Management Co Ltd | 1 | | |
| Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc | 1 | 1 | |

| | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Springfield Armory | 1 | 1 |
| System Defence Fi- rearms | 1 | 1 |
| Taurus Armas S.A. | 1 | |
| Tisaş Trabzon Silah Sanayi | 1 | |
| Zaffiri Precision | 1 | |
| Zastava Arms | 1 | 1 |
| Total | 41 | 21 |

Annex 4: the Houthi threats to KSA

On 7 July 2024, the Houthis released video footage showing Aramco oil facilities located in Jizan, KSA. The content of the message accompanying these videos is unambiguously a threat to these installations (“*The coordinates are ready, the missile force, and the unmanned air force are ready to deliver a fatal blow to the Saudi enemy*”).

Figure 4.1

Houthis affiliated media threatening to target Saudi refineries in Jizan



Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

On 25 March 2024, in an interview with the Houthi-run Al-Masirah television channel, ahead of the ninth anniversary of the Saudi-led military campaign against Yemen, Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, a member of the group’s Supreme Political Council warned KSA that the country “*would be a target for us if they provided aid and support to the US-British aggression against Yemen*”.⁵⁸

Following the Houthi leader's threats to escalate military action against KSA, the Houthi-affiliated Yemeni military media has started posting posters of key Saudi sea and airports with a hashtag “Try it”.

Following the Houthi leader's threats to escalate military action against KSA, the Houthi-affiliated Yemeni military media has started posting posters of key Saudi sea and airports with a hashtag “Try it”.

⁵⁸ <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/houthis-warn-saudi-arabia-would-be-target-if-it-backs-us-uk-strikes#ixzz8fMB8s8Ep>

Figure 4.2:

Photos of vital Saudi installations



Source: <https://x.com/zy08fv82LGn4dH3/status/1810016373877494252>

Saudi Aramco installations have already been targeted by the Houthis in June 2021 (S/2022/50, paras. 47, 59, and annex 16), in September 2019 (S/2020/326, para. 54., and annex 14), and in December 2015 (S/2018/193, table 42.1). In the immediate aftermath of the September 2019 attack, Saudi Aramco’s daily oil production fell from 9.8 million barrels to about 4.1 million barrels, which is a production loss of almost 60 percent overnight. This reduction represents about five percent of global oil production.

**Annex 5: Article published on 24 May 2024 by Al-Mayadeen on the Houthi coordination with Kata'ib Hezbollah
Al-Houthi, al-Hamidawi stress coordination between 'Axis of Resistance'**

24 May 2024

Houthi leader and Kata'ib Hezbollah chief discuss during a phone call on the 'Axis of Resistance' operations in support of Gaza.



The leader of the Yemeni Ansar Allah movement in Yemen, Sayyed Abdul Malik al-Houthi, emphasized on Friday that **coordination among members of the 'Axis of Resistance' in the region will increase the impact of their operations against the Israeli occupation entity.**

His remarks came during a phone call with the Secretary-General of the Islamic Resistance, Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq, Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi.

For his part, al-Hamidawi praised the military operations of the Yemeni forces, which "have significantly contributed to imposing a blockade on Israeli maritime navigation." He also stressed the need to maintain high readiness and coordination among the Axis of Resistance forces, especially between Iraq and Yemen, to support the Palestinian people.

Since the Israeli genocidal war on Gaza began last October, the Axis of Resistance factions initiated support fronts against the occupation entity, which included over 1,500 operations combined.

Source: https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/al-houthi--al-hamidawi-stress-coordination-between-axis-of-r?utm_source=mango-searchx&utm_medium=exact_title&utm_campaign=houthi

Annex 6: Kata'ib Hizballah Press Release on the phone call between its Secretary General and the Houthi leader

Iraq's Kata'ib Hizballah vows resolute support for Yemen after US-British aggression

Press TV (Iran), Saturday, 01 June 2024 4:02 PM

Iraq's anti-terror group Kata'ib Hizballah has assured Yemeni people and fellow Ansarullah resistance movement that it will continue to give its unwavering support for the Arab nation in the struggle against the US-British maritime coalition.

In a statement, the group highlighted the failure of colonial powers in preventing Yemeni strikes from continuing military operations against Israeli-owned merchant vessels or commercial ships affiliated to the Tel Aviv regime in support of Palestine.

“The latest US-British aggression against the Yemeni nation came in light of the arrogant powers’ disappointment at breaking the maritime blockade of Israel [in the Red Sea and the Arab Sea].

“We reiterate that enemies will receive many blows from us. We will not hesitate to give unwavering support to our Yemeni brethren in the battle between the truth and falsehood,” Kata'ib Hezbollah pointed out.

The spokesman for the Yemeni Armed Forces announced on Friday that the country’s naval units had launched a missile attack on a United States aircraft carrier in the Red Sea in response to deadly US and British strikes on Yemen.

Brigadier General Yahya Sarea said in a statement that the attack was “in response to last night's multiple airstrikes launched by the US-British coalition” against positions in the Yemeni Red Sea port city of Hudaydah, the capital Sana'a, and the southwestern province of Ta'izz.

He added that Yemeni forces “will not hesitate to respond directly and immediately to every new aggression on Yemeni territory by targeting all sources of threat and all hostile American and British targets in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea.”

Source: <https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2024/06/01/726656/Iraq's-Kata'ib-Hezbollah-vows-resolute-support-for-Yemen-af-ter-US-British-aggression>

Annex 7: Fund-raising by the PMF to support the Houthis

Figure 7.1

Abu Ali Alaskari, Kata'ib Hizballah, launches fundraising campaign for Houthis



Appendix A

Unofficial translation for Abu Ali Alaskari's Tweet

Abu Ali Al-Askari

In His name Almighty

The victories achieved by the axis of goodness and faith over the axis of evil and tyranny, especially over the rivals of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, is a matter of pride and pride. As we see the cracking of these evil states, and the clear signs of their imminent disintegration and collapse, we must be fully prepared in anticipation of any emergency or surprise in the region, and from here we emphasize the following:

First: The policy of mixing the cards adopted by the election riggers and the corrupt will not work, the latest of which is targeting Baghdad Airport with missiles, which requires the loyal leaders of the security services, and the security services of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Reveal these mercenaries and who standing behind them.

Second: The hostile actions that have begun to be repeated in the western provinces, and which target most of the Iraqi security services, are behind senior leaders in the current government, and the loyal ones must expose them to public opinion and bring them to justice.

Third: In fulfilment of the legitimate duty and in support of the oppressed, the Islamic Resistance/Hezbollah Brigades donated an amount of one billion Iraqi dinars in support of the "Your Money" campaign, marches against Al Zayed and Al Salul, which is led by a group of zealous Iraqi youth. An invitation to all honorable people to contribute by donating to this blessed campaign in order to clear their conscience and support the oppressed Yemeni people.

t.me/abualaskary

28 January 2022

Source: <https://justpaste.it/b11p9>

Article published on 1 February 2022 by the Washington Institute stating that Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH) launched a fundraising campaign purporting to help the Yemeni Houthi movement acquire more drones

The Iran-backed militia tried to make its solo effort to boost the Houthi drone arsenal look like a widely coordinated and highly popular campaign, whereas it was anything but

On January 23, **Kataib Hezbollah (KH) launched a fundraising campaign purporting to help the Yemeni Houthi movement acquire more drones** intended for attacks against the United Arab Emirates. The campaign was advertised as a "grass-roots" initiative and named hamlat shabab al-Iraq (Iraqi youth campaign). But clear and convincing evidence suggests it was in fact a KH-organized initiative and not that successful.

The campaign was launched by Amir al-Musawi, the spokesman for Sharia Youth Gathering (Tajamma Shabab al-Sharia, or TSS), an umbrella organization controlled by KH. In a video clip circulated on Iraqi muqawama (resistance) social media, Musawi stated: "After a series of continuous assaults by those who made the Zionist dream come true [referring to the Emiratis] against the oppressed and victorious Yemeni people, the honorable sons of Iraq had to...support their Yemeni brothers. Therefore, we will launch a big campaign under the slogan amwalokum mosayarat [your money will turn to drones]...to gather money for the Yemeni people to buy drones—drones that will be Ababil and whips to punish...al-Salul and the House of Zayed [the UAE ruling family]." ("Al-Salul" is a derogatory term used to describe the rulers of Saudi Arabia. "Ababil" refers to the miraculous flock of birds described in the Quran as protecting the Kaaba by dropping stones on an army invading Mecca. The Musawi clip was posted with two mobile numbers for people to donate money.

Source: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/kataib-hezbollah-behind-grassroots-iraqi-fundraising-yemen>

Figure 7.2

Musawi announcing the launch of the campaign, on 23 January 2022 channel promoting fundraising



#Iraq_Youth_Campaign

#Your_money_marches

Source: <https://t.me/qodsana/6201>

Although TSS social media accounts did not post the clip itself, the organization's Telegram channel was the most active in the campaign. TSS also produced video clips showing young men erecting stands in the street with boxes for people to donate (Figure 7.3).

Figure 7.3
TSS video clips promoting the fundraising campaign, 27 January 2022



Other KH social media channels actively advertised the campaign as well. Tahalof Thawrat al-Ishrin al-Thaniyah (Alliance of the Second Revolt of 1920) — a tribal group that appears to be tied to KH based on the content of its material) — was among the small number of Telegram channels posting video clips promoting the fundraising campaign. Some of these clips were reposted by TSS (Figure 7.4).

Figure 7.4
TSS reposts Tahalof Thorat al-Ishrin al-Thaniya video clip, 30 January 2022



Source: <https://t.me/sayhgg/228>

Additionally, some of the graphics used in the campaign clearly indicate that KH was the organizer. Mido, the tag name for one of the main *muqawama* graphic designers, posted an image featuring a fighter wearing a uniform that resembles KH's signature attire: a boonie hat and a military chest name tape showing the "313" nomenclature, a practice that is closely and almost exclusively associated with KH personnel (Figure 7.5).

Figure 7.5

Mido's graphic featuring a KH fighter next to a Houthi fighter, 31 January 2022



Source: <https://t.me/Alimido13/687>

Figures 7.6 (up), 7.7 (middle), and 7.8 (down)
Fund raising to support the purchase of UAVs for the Houthis (visible on figure 7.8)




Source: <https://t.me/Alimido13/695>

Annex 8: List of Houthis combatants who were killed in the US airstrike in Iraq

An Iraqi journalist revealed a list of 11 dead people who were killed in the US raid that targeted a building in the Jurf al-Sakhr area south of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad.

Figure 8.1 (left), and 8.2 (right)

List of names of Houthi soldiers who were allegedly killed in the US airstrike



The list published by Iraqi journalist Othman al-Mukhtar includes the names of four of the dead who are Iraqi nationals, while seven are members of the Houthi militia who were sent to Iraq as militia delegates in the joint operations room between the Shiite militias affiliated with Iran.

While sources had revealed a few days ago the killing of the Houthi leader (Brigadier General) Hussein Abdullah Mastour al-Shaabal, the list includes six other militia members alongside him.

According to the Iraqi journalist "al-Mukhtar", who is interested in tracking the movements of the armed Shiite militias, the seven Houthi members "died with the Hezbollah Brigades militia affiliated with Iran, which occupies Jurf al-Sakhr and displaced about 200,000 Sunni Iraqis from its people."

Al-Mukhtar quoted his sources as saying that the dead were buried in the "Wadi al-Salam" cemetery in Najaf the day before yesterday, Monday. Most of the Houthi dead are from Saada Governorate/Haydan District. He pointed out that the dead were in the coordination room between several Iraqi militias, most notably "Kata'ib Hezbollah", "Al-Nujaba", and "Ansar Allah Al-Awfiya", and the Houthi militia.

In more details he mentioned about the nature of the group that the Houthi militia delegated to Iraq, he stated that the Houthi group that was killed in the American strike works in the field of fixed-wing suicide drones (operation and location determination) GPS.

He pointed out that they do not reside in the targeted location, but in the Al-Jadriya neighborhood, but the strike was timed shortly after they arrived at the building. The names of the Houthi militia members who were killed in the "Jurf Al-Sakhr" raid according to the document published by Othman Al-Mukhtar, which is a handwritten list:

Hussein Abdullah Mastour Al-Shaabal
 Ahmed Bashir Kazem Al-Shaabal
 Ali Al-Muathra Al-Houthi
 Hassan Mohsen Al-Youssef
 Ali Sayyah Alaa Al-Din
 Abdullah Hussein Al-Astar
 Abdulmalik Ismail

Source: https://almasdaronline.com/articles/299764?fbclid=IwY2xjawEgZENleHRuA2FibQIx-MAABHYT74SkS__zIdhLIHTiw6iYW1v3wPxgdkTeuu2Qetv2eqBib01Eh5xheOA_aem_zFNJaXvNIF-NBt1wW4UCaUQ

The Iranian Tasnim News Agency confirmed that Houthi commander (Brigadier general) Hussein Mastoor was killed while on a mission outside Yemen. The agency reported that Mastoor died during the recent U.S. airstrikes in Iraq. He was initially announced killed while fighting alongside Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.

Martyr Brigadier General Abu Jihad Hussein Abdullah Mastur Al-Shaabal
Martyrdom of a Yemeni commander
Yemeni sources of the martyrdom of one of the commanders of Ansarullah named "Hussein Abdullah Mastoor al-Shabal" in the mission reported outside Yemen.
This Yemeni commander in the recent US attack on Iraq has been martyred.
@TasnimNews

Source: https://x.com/Alsakaniali/status/1820040251005706352?fbclid=IwY2xjawEckApleH-RuA2FlbQIxMAABHWMmZJBFJPIO8LJHrsM-dSDrF-XMJIF819Yopu-nbmyXvjZ0nwp09oPaxg_aem_vcdhE1rOtmR9URGYcxGIFQ

Source: <https://x.com/Osint613/status/1819895986774282372>

Martyr Mujahid

Abu Jihad

Hussein Abdullah Mastur Al-Shaabal

Saada Governorate - Haidan District

The battle of the promised friendship and the holy jihad

Death to America, death to Israel, curse on the Jews, victory for Islam

Source: <https://x.com/BabakTaghvaeel/status/1820007354055680006/photo/2>

Source: <https://x.com/YemAware/status/1820524174328410422>

Annex 9: Issuance of passports by the Houthis

The Panel's investigations revealed that the Houthis issue counterfeit⁵⁹ passports to people who act on their behalf, for their support or under their control. These people are tasked with the procurement and/or transfer of illicit goods or weapons or they travel abroad to participate in military training (para. 103 and para. 111). Foreign trainers and advisors travelling to Yemen are purportedly also provided with Yemeni passports (para. 14).


According to GoY sources, the opening of the Sana'a airport in connection with Houthis' issuing of passports is a factor aggravating the security situation in Yemen. According to GoY sources, the passports issued by the Houthis are not printed in accordance with standards adopted by the GoY.

The Panel received information from relevant GoY sources that ten Yemeni nationals allegedly belonging to the Houthis were arrested on 3 August 2023 at Shehen border post. According to confidential sources, these detainees are on the list of Houthis' prisoners list, and negotiations on a possible prisoner swap are underway. The verification of the passports, in connection with investigations carried out by the relevant GoY authorities, indicates that the passports were issued by the Houthis in Sana'a, and fake identities were mentioned in the passports. According to the analysis carried out by the Panel from the passports and visa stamps, they travelled purportedly from Yemen to Jordan, then to Oman, from where they returned and then were arrested by the GoY border authorities on 3 August 2023.

However, Yemeni authorities consider that these individuals received military trainings in Iran. The detainees, however, stated that the purpose of their travel to Iran was to receive a 40-day long training on aviation safety and regulations, such as passengers and inspection procedures, while admitting to travelling with fake, Houthi-issued passports. Notably, two passports seized from two detained persons also had visa stamps indicating their travel to Syria, and surprisingly, both had the same visa number. Further, there were entry and exit stamps of Omani and Jordanian authorities. The Panel sent a letter to the Syrian Arab Republic, requesting verification of the discrepancies noticed by the Panel, including the authenticity of the visas, and related travel dates.

Figures 9.1 (upper-left), 9.2 (lower-left), 9.3 (upper-right), and 9.4 (lower-right)

Analysis of the passports of two individuals arrested by GoY on their way back from Syria




Source: Panel

⁵⁹ The Panel reported on the printing of passports (S/2023/833, para. 175) and on allegations concerning printing of passports in Indonesia (para. 103).

Annex 10: Military cooperation between the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Figure 10.1

Statement posted on 22 June 2024 in which the Houthi military spokesperson claims that the attacks on Haifa, Israel, resulted from cooperation with the Iraqi Islamic Resistance.



Yemeni Armed Forces
2024
22 June

Triumphing for the oppression of the Palestinian people and in response to the crimes committed against our brothers in the Gaza Strip.

The Yemeni Armed Forces, alongside the Iraqi Islamic Resistance, carried out two joint military operations as follows:


- ▶ **The first operation targeted four ships in the port of Haifa, in which two of them are cement tanker ships, and the other two were general cargo ships that belong to companies violated the ban decision of entry to the ports of occupied Palestine, using a number of drones.**
- ▶ **The other operation targeted the (Shorthorn Express) ship in the Mediterranean Sea while was on its way to the port of Haifa, using a number of drones.**

- Both operations have achieved their objectives successfully, and the strikes were accurate and direct.
- The Yemeni Armed Forces will continue to carry out their joint military operations with the Iraqi Islamic Resistance in support and solidarity with the Palestinian people until the aggression stops and the siege on the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip is lifted.

WWW.SABA.YE
وكالة الأنباء اليمنية سبأ

Source: <https://x.com/army21ye/status/1804630348481118300/photo/2>

Figure 10.2
IRI statement on 12 June 2024 claiming two joint attacks with the Houthis



Source: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/aljmaat-alaqyt-walhwthywn-fy-alymn-ylnwn-mswwlythm-n-almzyd-mn-alhjmat-almshtrkt>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the IRI statement on 12 June 2024 claiming two joint attacks with the Houthis

Islamic resistance in Iraq

2024-6-12

In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful

[Indeed, God loves those who fight in His cause in array, as if they were a solid building.]

In continuation of our approach to resisting the occupation and supporting our people in Palestine, and in response to the massacres committed by the usurping entity against civilians, including children, women and the elderly, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq carried out two joint military operations with the Yemeni armed forces. The first targeted a vital target in the city of Ashdod with missiles, and the second targeted an important

target in the city of Haifa by drone. The Islamic Resistance confirms that operations are continuing to destroy enemy strongholds at an increasing pace.

(And victory is only from God. Indeed, God is Mighty, All-Wise)

Islamic resistance in Iraq

Wednesday 5 - Dhu al-Hijja - 1445 AH

Source : <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iraqi-groups-and-yemens-houthis-claim-more-joint-attacks-israel>

Annex 11: The Houthis' Al Masirah TV on 13 June 2024 quoting the movement's leader talking about collaboration with the IRI to attack Israel from Golan Heights



Source: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/aljmaat-alraqyt-walhwthywn-fy-alymn-ylnwn-mswwlythm-n-almzyd-mn-alhjmatalmshtarkt>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the Houthis' Al Masirah TV on 13 June 2024 quoting the movement's leader talking about collaboration with the IRI to attack Israel from Golan Heights

Al-Masdarah

Al Masirah Channel

Mr. Commander Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi: In Golan Heights there is also the important track that is within the framework of the fourth stage of escalation, which is joint operations between our dear brothers, the Mujahideen in the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Yemeni army.

Mr. Commander Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi

07- Dhul-Hijjah - 1445 AH

almasirah.net.ye

Source: <https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1801246804995936458>

Annex 12: The Houthi representative in Iraq

Figure: 12.1

Abu Idris al-Sharafi (2nd from left) is a close associate of Mohammed Ali al-Houthi. In Iraq, he is reportedly building up the Houthi network: finance, procurement, etc.



12:57 AM · Jan 30, 2024 · 2,846 Views

Source: <https://x.com/ariheist/status/1752118718073802962>

Annex 13: The Houthi representative's activities in Iraq

Figure 13.1:

Meeting held on 17 May 2023 with the Secretary-General of the Sayyid Martyrs Brigades (PMF), Hajj Abu Alaa al-Wala'i, the envoy of Mr. Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi and the representative of the Houthis in Iraq, Mr. Ahmed al-Sharafi.




Al-Sharafi conveyed the greetings of the Commander-in-Chief of the Yemeni Ansar Allah movement, Mr. Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi, and expressed his interest in the issues in the region, and the two parties discussed the latest developments related to the Syrian and Sudanese events. Iraqis on social media welcomed Al-Sharafi's visit to Iraq, and the importance of strengthening ties between the parties of the axis of resistance in the region and the world.

Source: <https://www.infoplusnetwork.com/news/ادر-أبو-اليمن-غرب-شمال-في-الله-أنصار-قائد-بزيارة-عراقي-ترحيب>

Figure 13.2

Al-Sharafi visit on 7 July 2024 visits a tribe in Dhi Qar Governorate, Iraq



Source: <https://www.newarab.com/news/yemens-houthis-open-office-baghdad-amid-regional-tensions>

Figure 13.3

Article by Mandab press dated 9 July 2024 on Al-Sharafi visiting a PMF headquarters north of Baghdad



Source: <https://mandabpress.com/news68145.html>

Annex 14: Al-Sharafi in Iraq meets high ranking officials

Figure: 14.1

Ahmed Al-Sharafi meets the Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassim Al-Araji



Source: <https://www.ajnet.me/politics/2024/7/13>

Annex 15: Training provided to the Houthis in southern Lebanon by Hezbollah

Confidential sources also informed the Panel about military training provided to the Houthi combatants by Hezbollah in their training ground located in Qalaat Jabour, southern Lebanon. The Panel notes that on 21 May 2023, three Houthi journalists, allegedly working with the Houthi media *Al-Masirah*, were present during the demonstration of an exercise simulating an attack against an Israeli settlement conducted by the Hezbollah. The Panel notes that Houthi combatants often conduct similar trainings.

Trainings, as well as other support provided by the Hezbollah, are supervised by the Houthis' liaison office, located in Beirut. Ammar al-Hamzi, who is the general manager of the Beirut-based Houthi media *al-Masirah* and who works as the Houthi representative in Lebanon. He is reportedly in direct contact with Hezbollah's political and military leadership.

Figure 15.1

Presence of three Houthi representatives in December 2023 during a military demonstration held in southern Lebanon by Hezbollah



Source: Confidential

The link below illustrates the military exercise held in December 2023 in southern Lebanon where the three Houthi representatives were present as observers

Source: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/22/hezbollah-conducts-wargames-near-lebanons-border-with-israel>

Figures 15.2 (left) 15.3 (middle), 15.4 (right)
Live-firing exercises conducted in January 2024 by the Houthis



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mxyZKIAfmkw>

Figures 15.5 (left), and 15.6 (right)
Live-firing exercises conducted in March 2024 by the Houthis



Figures 15.7 (left), and 15.8 (right)



Figures 15.9 (left), and 15.10 (right)



Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2QDWa-_zak0

Annex 16: Houthi cooperation with Hezbollah

Figure 16.1

A confidential Hezbollah document indicates its involvement in the fighting with the Houthis



Source: <https://al-omana.net/news163996.html>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the confidential Hezbollah document indicating its involvement in the fighting with the Houthis

Hezbollah - General Secretariat

In the name of God the most Merciful, the most Compassionate

Subject / Suspension of the memorial of the martyrs

Mr. Media Relations Manager

Mr. Director of the Martyrs' Families Affairs

According to the directives of His Eminence the Secretary-General, Mr. Hassan Nasrallah, may God protect him.

We inform you that the memorial service for the martyrs who were martyred in Yemen has been suspended. The ceremony is limited to holding a funeral for relatives of the first and second degree only without clarifying the place of martyrdom. These directives shall be effective until further notice is received.

Annex 17: Video released by the “Axis of Resistance” military media, on 13 April 2023, showing representatives from all the members of the Axis in the joint situation room



13/04/2023

بالفيديو: من غرفة عمليات محور المقاومة.. جاهزون

فاصل من إنتاج الإعلام الحربي في محور المقاومة بعنوان "جاهزون"، يحاكي جوهزية المحور، بكل فصائله، للدفاع عن القدس وفلسطين، حتى بلوغ اليوم الموعود لتحرير فلسطين.

Source: <https://www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=52859&cid=141>

Figures 17.1-17.6
Screenshots of the video illustrating the joint situation room



Screenshots of armed groups' arm patches visible in the video



Figures 17.7 (left), and 17.8 (right)
Houthis, Yemen



Figure 17.9
IRGC, Iran



Figure 17.10
Hamas, Gaza strip, Palestinian occupied territory, Lebanon



Figure 17.11
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Gaza strip, Palestinian occupied territory, Lebanon



Figure 17.12
Abi Ali Mustapha Brigades, Palestinian occupied territories, Lebanon



Figure 17.13
Hezbollah, Lebanon and Syria




Figure 17.14
Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq



Figure 17.15
Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq



Figure 17.16
Asa'ib Hal Al Haq, Iraq



Figure 17.17
Liwa Zainebeyoun, Syria



Figure 17.18
Liwa Fatmiyoun, Syria

Annex 18: Article published on 9 June 2024 by the Iranian media Mehr News Agency, in which the Houthi Brigadier-General Hamid Abdul Qader Antar, advisor to the Houthi Prime Minister, mentions about the coordination with the 'Axis of Resistance'

الرئيسية / غرب آسيا / دول الجوار

الاقليمية / غرب آسيا

العميد اليمني حميد عبد القادر عنتر لوكالة مهر:

لا تستطيع اي قوة في العالم ان تكسر شوكة اليمن... نُنسّق مع محور المقاومة و تم تغيير قواعد الاشتباك



أكد مستشار رئاسة الوزراء، العميد اليمني حميد عبد القادر عنتر " أنه هناك تنسيق بين اليمن ودول المحور وتم تشكيل غرف عمليات مشتركة من اجل ان تكون الضربات العسكرية في وقت واحد للكيان الصهيوني، مما يجبره على وقف العدوان على غزة، وتم تغيير قواعد الاشتباك من اجل فرض واقع جديد ومعادله عسكرية جديدة".

وكالة مهر للأخبار وردة سعد: يواجه اليمن معارك مستمرة مع قوى الاستكبار العالمي، ضمن اطار المساندة للمقاومة الفلسطينية ودعمها لاهالي غزة، فحقق اليمن انتاجات وبطولات ادهشت العالم بالتنسيق مع محور المقاومة، والملفت في الأونة الأخيرة تنفيذ عملية مشتركة مع المقاومة العراقية ضد اهداف في كيان العدو.

حول هذه العناوين، أجرت مراسلة وكالة مهر للأخبار، الأستاذة وردة سعد، حواراً صحفياً مع مستشار رئاسة الوزراء ورئيس الحملة الدولية لكسر الحصار عن مطار صنعاء الدولي العميد "حميد عبد القادر عنتر"، وجاء نص الحوار على النحو التالي:

منذ أشهر عديدة يواصل الجيش اليمني عمليات الاسناد للمقاومة الفلسطينية واهالي غزة بالضغط على الاحتلال ومحاصرته اقتصادياً.. ولا يزال الجدل قائماً حول الاثر الفعلي لهذا الجهد العسكري المميز.. فبتقديركم كيف اثرت هذه العمليات ضد السفن المتجهة لموانئ الاحتلال على الكيان الاسرائيلي ؟

اليمن أعلن التدخل العسكري مناصرة واسناد لعملية طوفان الاقصى، فمنذ اندلاع معركة طوفان الاقصى تم التدخل عسكرياً مع فلسطين وتم اطلاق عدد من الصواريخ الباليستية والمسيرات الى فلسطين المحتلة وفرض الجيش اليمني والقوه الصاروخية حصار خانق على الكيان الصهيوني في البحر الاحمر والبحر العربي والمحيط الهندي وتوسعت خارطة بنك الاهداف الى البحر الابيض المتوسط وتم استهداف السفن الصهيونية والأمريكية والبريطانية في البحر الاحمر والمحيط الهندي المساندة للكيان اللقيط ومن خلال الحصار الخانق في البحر الاحمر تم افراغ السفن في ميناء ابلات وتم محاصرة الكيان اقتصادياً.

الى جانب القرار اليمني بمنع مرور السفن المتوجهة الى موانئ الاحتلال ردا على العدوان الوحشي على غزة، يواصل الشعب اليمني مظاهراته الملونة، لإبداء الدعم والتأييد والتضامن مع الشعب الفلسطيني، كيف نفهم هذا الحراك الذي ليس له مثيل عند الشعوب العربية الأخرى؟ ولماذا الشعب اليمني تحديداً؟

بالاضافة الى التدخل العسكري من خلال جبهة الاسناد في اليمن لفلسطين المحتلة هناك حراك سياسي وجماهيري يخرج ابناء الشعب اليمني ملايين في كل جمعه في كافة المحافظات رافعين اعلام فلسطين وشعار الصرخه في وجه قوى الاستكبار هذا الحراك الجماهيري اعطى زخم ثوري لشعوب واحرار العالم وانتفض الملايين في كافة شعوب واحرار العالم لمناصرة فلسطين الذين اتخذوا من اليمن مصدر الهام.

في خطوة جريئة اضافية اعلنت القيادة اليمنية الشجاعة عن توسيع مدى عملياتها لحصار الموانئ الصهيونية الى البحر المتوسط.. بينما يفتح بعض العرب والمسلمين الابواب الخلفية للتعويض على الاحتلال وتزويده بحاجاته الاقتصادية.. هل وصلت الامة الى هذا الحد من الانقسام؟ ولماذا برأيكم ؟

نعم اليمن وسع من خارطة بنك الاهداف من خلال عمليات العسكرية في البحر الاحمر والمحيط الهندي والبحر الابيض المتوسط واعلن حرب كبرى شاملة على الكيان الصهيوني وقوى الاستكبار حتى يتم وقف العدوان على غزة ودخول المساعدات الى قطاع غزة، هذا التحرك الكبير لليمن هو من واجب وطني واخلاقي وقومي وديني لمناصرة فلسطين خصوصا عندما نشاهد الجرائم الذي يرتكبها الكيان بحق المدنيين والاطفال والنساء وهدم المنازل على ساكنيها وتدمير البنية التحتية في ظل صمت عربي ودولي واممي مطبق من المجتمع الدولي والعالم فكان من واجب اليمن التحرك واسناد ومناصرة شعب فلسطين.

في اخر انجازاته الثورية والعملية لتشديد الخناق على كيان الاحتلال اعلن اليمن عن عمليات مشتركة مع المقاومة العراقية لضرب مواقع داخل كيان الاحتلال.. كيف تنظرون الى هذه الخطوة المتقدمة من التنسيق بين قوى محور المقاومة؟ وكيف يمكن ان تؤثر هذه الخطوة على كيان الاحتلال؟

نعم هناك تنسيق بين اليمن ودول المحور وتم تشكيل غرف عمليات مشتركة من اجل ان تكون الضربات العسكرية في وقت واحد للكيان الصهيوني تسبب له شلل وارباك وهذا يشكل ضغط على الكيان الصهيوني مما يجبره على وقف العدوان على غزة وتم تغيير قواعد الاشتباك من اجل فرض واقع جديد ومعادله عسكرية جديدة.

بعض اليمنيين في المناطق المحتلة والخاضعين لادارة المخابرات الاجنبية، يخرجون بين الحين والآخر للتشويش على ما يقوم به الجيش اليمني والموقف القومي والاسلامي المتقدم لقيادة السيد عبد الملك الحكيم.. كيف تنظرون الى استجابة الشعب اليمني في كل المناطق لمواقف صنعاء؟ وما الذي يخشاه اولئك المعارضون من نصرة شعب فلسطين؟

بالنسبة للمرتزقة هم ادوات لصالح قوى العدوان واتخذت منهم دول العدوان مطية من اجل شرعته واحتلال اليمن وكي لا تتم ملاحقه قوى العدوان واعتبارهم مجرمي حرب امام المحاكم الدولية ، كذلك دول العدوان هم ادوات لقوى الاستكبار وهم من ينفذ المشاريع الامريكية في دول المنطقة، لذلك ليس غريب عليهم التشويش والتقليل من القدرات العسكرية اليمنية التي فرضت واقع جديد ومعادله عسكرية جديدة سببت للعدو شلل وارباك.

اليمن بمواقفه المتقدمة لنصرة الشعب الفلسطيني ومساندة مقاومته، يضع نفسه في مواجهة القوة البحرية الاميركية وحلفائها الغربيين، فهل تعتقدون ان الامر قد يعرض اليمن وشعبه لمخاطر اضافية؟ وهل يمكن للجيش اليمني وانصار الله ان يواجهوا قوة بحجم القوة الاميركية ؟

اليمن يواجه معركة عسكرية مباشرة مع قوى الاستكبار العالمي، لكن اليمن استطاع ان يكسر شوكة قوى الاستكبار في البحر الاحمر والمحيط الهندي والبحر المتوسط وكسر هيمنة وغطرسة قوى الاستكبار، لا تستطيع اي قوة في العالم ان تكسر شوكة اليمن او تلي ذراعه لان ثورة اليمن هي امتداد لثورة ابا الاحرار ابي عبد الله الحسين الذي قاد اعظم ثورة في تاريخ الحياة البشرية واسقط عروش الطغاة والظالمين والمستبدين والمستكبرين وانتصر الدم على السيف من اليمن سيتم تغير وجه المنطقة والعالم، ومن اليمن ستخرج راية اليماني، ومن يتخذ من الامام الحسين عليه السلام مصدر الهام لايعرف الهزيمة اطلاقاً.

Source: <https://ar.mehrnews.com/news/194527>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the article published on 9 June 2024 by the Iranian media Mehr News Agency, in which the Houthi Brigadier-General Hamid Abdul Qader Antar, advisor to the Houthi Prime Minister, mentions about the coordination with the 'Axis of Resistance'

Yemeni Brigadier-General Hamid Abdul Qader Antar told, "No force in the world can break the power of Yemen... we coordinate with the axis of resistance and the rules of engagement have been changed"



The advisor to the Prime Minister, Yemeni Brigadier General Hamid Abdul Qadir Antar, confirmed that "there is coordination between Yemen and the Axis countries and joint operations rooms have been formed in order for military strikes to be carried out simultaneously against the Zionist entity, forcing it to stop the aggression against Gaza, and the rules of engagement have been changed." In order to impose a new reality and a new military equation."

Mehr News Agency - Warda Saad: Yemen faces ongoing battles with the forces of global arrogance, within the framework of support for the Palestinian resistance and in support of the people of Gaza. Yemen achieved achievements and heroism that astonished the world in coordination with the axis of resistance, and what is striking recently is the implementation of a joint operation with the Iraqi resistance against targets in the enemy entity. .

Regarding these headlines, Mehr News Agency correspondent, Ms. Warda Saad, conducted a press interview with the advisor to the Prime Minister and head of the international campaign to break the siege of Sana'a International Airport, Brigadier General Hamid Abdul Qadir Antar. The text of the interview was as follows:

For many months, the Yemeni army has continued its support operations for the Palestinian resistance and the people of Gaza by pressuring the occupation and besieging it economically. Controversy still exists about the actual impact of this distinguished military effort. In your estimation, how did these operations against ships heading to the occupation's ports affect the Israeli entity?

Yemen announced military intervention in support of and support for the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation. Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Flood Battle, there has been military intervention with Palestine, and a number of ballistic missiles and marches were launched into occupied Palestine. The Yemeni army and missile force imposed a stifling siege on the Zionist entity in the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean, and the bank's map expanded. The targets reached the Mediterranean Sea, and Zionist, American, and British ships were targeted in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, which supported the bastard entity. Through the stifling siege in the Red Sea, the ships were emptied in the port of Eilat, and the entity was besieged economically.

In addition to the Yemeni decision to prevent the passage of ships heading to the occupation ports in response to the brutal aggression against Gaza, the Yemeni people continue their million-man demonstrations, to express support, support and solidarity with the Palestinian people. How do we understand this movement that has no parallel among other Arab peoples? Why the Yemeni people specifically?

In addition to the military intervention through the Support Front in Yemen for occupied Palestine, there is a political and mass movement that brings out millions of Yemeni people every Friday in all governorates, raising the flags of Palestine and the slogan of screaming in the face of the forces of arrogance. This mass movement gave revolutionary momentum to the peoples and free people of the world, and millions rose up in all peoples. And the free people of the world to support Palestine, who took Yemen as a source of inspiration.

In an additional bold step, the courageous Yemeni leadership announced the expansion of the scope of its operations to blockade Zionist ports to the Mediterranean. While some Arabs and Muslims are opening the back doors to compensate the occupation and provide it with its economic needs. Has the nation reached this point of division? Why do you think?

Yes, Yemen has expanded its map of the target bank through military operations in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea, and has declared a major comprehensive war against the Zionist entity and the forces of arrogance until the aggression against Gaza is stopped and aid enters the Gaza Strip. This major move by Yemen is a national, moral, and national duty. My religion is to support Palestine, especially when we see the crimes committed by the entity against civilians, children, and women, the demolition of homes for their residents, and the destruction of infrastructure, in light of the deafening Arab, international, and international silence of the international community and the world. It was Yemen's duty to move, support, and advocate for the people of Palestine.

In its latest revolutionary and practical achievements to tighten the noose on the occupying entity, Yemen announced joint operations with the Iraqi resistance to strike sites within the occupying entity. How do you view this advanced step of coordination between the forces of the axis of resistance? How might this step affect the occupation entity?

Yes, there is coordination between Yemen and the Axis countries, and joint operations rooms were formed in order for simultaneous military strikes on the Zionist entity to cause it paralysis and confusion. This puts pressure on the Zionist entity, forcing it to stop the aggression against Gaza, and the rules of engagement were changed in order to impose a new reality and its equation. New military.

Some Yemenis in the occupied areas, who are under the administration of foreign intelligence, come out from time to time to confuse what the Yemeni army is doing and the advanced national and Islamic position of the wise leadership of Mr. Abdul Malik. How do you view the response of the Yemeni people in all regions to Sana'a's positions? What do those who oppose supporting the people of Palestine fear?

As for the mercenaries, they are tools for the forces of aggression, and the aggression countries took them as a vehicle in order to legitimize and occupy Yemen, so that the forces of aggression would not be pursued and considered war criminals before international courts. Likewise, the aggression countries are tools for the forces of arrogance, and they are the ones who implement American projects in the countries of the region, so it is not strange for them to cause confusion. Reducing the Yemeni military capabilities imposed a new reality and a new military equation that caused the enemy paralysis and confusion.

Yemen, with its advanced positions to support the Palestinian people and support their resistance, is putting itself in the face of the American naval force and its Western allies. Do you think that the matter might expose Yemen and its people to additional risks? Can the Yemeni army and Ansar Allah confront a force the size of the American force?

Yemen is facing a direct military battle with the forces of global arrogance, but Yemen was able to break the strength of the forces of arrogance in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and break the dominance and arrogance of the forces of arrogance. No force in the world can break the strength of Yemen or bend its arm because the Yemen revolution is an extension of the revolution. The father of the free, Abu Abdullah Al-Hussein, who led the greatest revolution in the history of human life and brought down the thrones of tyrants, oppressors, tyrants and arrogant people, and blood triumphed over the sword. From Yemen, the face of the region and the world will be changed, and from Yemen the banner of Yamani will emerge, and whoever takes Imam Hussein, peace be upon him, as a source of inspiration will never know defeat. .

The Yemeni flag is the foundation for the establishment of a state of divine justice under which the world will enjoy peace.

Annex 19: Interview conducted on 20 June 2024 by Al Mayadeen with Muhammad Abdulsalam, official spokesman for the Houthis, during which he acknowledged operational coordination with the Iraqi factions, Hezbollah and other parties



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jBjWmJ79yxo>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of a segment of the interview

Presenter: Also, there is a new topic brother Mohamed about the joint operations between the Yemeni Armed Forces and the Islamic resistance in Iraq. Two statements were issued about joint operations. What is the goal of this statements and will be there any horizon for this cooperation? Shall we see any joint operation between the Yemeni Armed Forces and Hizbullah or with Alqassam Brigades? Will these operations have a goal and what is the aim? Why do you have operation on two frontlines at the same time?

Mohamed Abdul Salam: The joint operations are already taking place as you mentioned between the Yemeni Armed Forces and Iraqi factions and other groups. The main aim of these operations is to cooperate in righteousness and piety and in that right and just project that is important to all. The enemy is making this kind of alliances and cooperation. The US, the UK, Germany, and France are cooperating to target Yemen. Also, the US, Israel, the UK, France, and some regional countries cooperated to obstruct the drones and the missiles launched from Iran. They are allying and cooperating... isn't it more important for us to cooperate and we believe that we defend our cause, aggrievance, children and women. The aim of this cooperation is to exert more pressure on the Israeli entity. First because of the geographical nature in Iraq and the proximity to the Israeli entity and to cause more disturbance and distraction to Israel so as not to know from where the strikes will come. It is not excluded that there will be joint operations and today we have already a joint situation room that is coordinating the operation coming from Iraq, Lebanon. It is true that each party in the 'Axis of Resistance' has its own conditions, nature and assessments as a result of its conditions and capabilities but overall, there arrangements that could be done directly as happened with Iraqis or in indirect way that harmonizes with the general spirit with which the Axis is acting today, and the Axis started to shape in a more powerful and tough manner. We think the Axis today, despite all the challenges, is in a more developed and shaped stage which will make it a strong and effective Axis. We think that these operations are honorable and do not target any regional countries or any Arab or Islamic countries, but it targets the Israeli entity only. So, it is likely yes that this situation room might coordinate joint operations with Hizbullah and Iraqi brothers and with all liberals and in the fore with our brothers in Palestine including Alqassam Brigades, Saraya Alquds and all other Palestinian factions.

Annex 20: Article published on 29 October 2024 in the Iranian media ABNA news, in which Mahdi Al-Mashat, President of the Houthis' Supreme Political Council, was quoted discussing about the "joint operations rooms"

ABNA
وكالة أهل البيت (ع) للأخبار

العربية - المرجعية الدينية الحج والعمرة - كلام القائد - المجمع العالمي لأهل البيت (ع) - الوسائط المتعددة - أقسام أخرى - إينا بلس - ملفات خاصة

19 أكتوبر 2023
1405447

**صنعاء: لدينا غرف عمليات مشتركة
وسنواجه أي حماقة إسرائيلية باقتحام غزة**

التشبيّة والاستنفار
استناداً للشعب الفلسطيني وللجهاد



قال رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، مهدي المشاط، إنّ "الطرف الأميركي يهدد بعودة الحرب في اليمن، لمنع الشعب اليمني من القيام بمسؤولياته تجاه شعب فلسطيني".

وفقاً لما أفادته وكالة أبناء أهل البيت (ع) الدولية - أبنا - رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، مهدي المشاط يكشف أنّ هناك غرف عمليات تراقب عن كثب في حال ارتكبت "إسرائيل" حماقة واقتحمت غزة برياً.

قال رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، مهدي المشاط، إنّ "الطرف الأميركي يهدد بعودة الحرب في اليمن، لمنع الشعب اليمني من القيام بمسؤولياته تجاه شعب فلسطيني".

وأكد المشاط أنّ موقف الجمهورية اليمنية واضح وهو إقامة الدولة الفلسطينية كاملة السيادة، على كامل التراب الوطني الفلسطيني، مشيراً إلى أنه "لا يوجد لدينا شيء اسمه أراضي 48 أو 67".

وكشف أنّ "هناك غرف عمليات مشتركة وجهوداً تراقب وتعمل لمواجهة أي حماقة صهيونية إذا اقتحمت برياً غزة، ونحن نراقب الوضع عن كثب".

وأشار إلى أنّ "ما يقوم به الشعب اليمني هو أقل واجب إيماني وديني وأخلاقي وإنساني"، مشدداً على أنّ "المسؤولية الدينية والأخلاقية والإنسانية تحتم على الجميع التحرك".

وأكد المشاط أنّ "الحرب في فلسطين أصبحت حرباً على الإسلام، يتحسّد فيها الغرب والولايات المتحدة إلى جانب العدو الصهيوني"، مستهجنًا في الوقت نفسه "من بقاء الموقف العربي والإسلامي دون المستوى المطلوب في هذه المواجهة والهجمة الشرسة".

وقال إنّ "معركة طوفان الأقصى انطلقت وستدمر كل ما بنته قوى الاحتلال والإمبريالية العالمية"، مشدداً على أنه "لا يوجد في المنطقة العربية شيء اسمه إسرائيل".

وتوجّه المشاط إلى الفلسطينيين قائلاً: "الكل معكم، الشعوب وحركات المقاومة معكم، حتى تنهزم هذه الهجمة الشرسة"، مشيراً إلى أنّ "رفع العدو لسفوفه مجرد عتريات فارغة".

وأشار رئيس المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن إلى أنّ "الغرب هرب من مشاكله وحروبهم بتصدير اليهود إلى الوطن العربي، وأوجد كياناً لهم خارج طبروغرافيا المنطقة".

ويواصل اليمنيون التظاهرات المؤيدة لفلسطين. وشاركت أمس الجمعة، حشود يمنية في "جمعة الفضب" في ميدان السبعين في صنعاء، وفي المحافظات تضامناً مع فلسطين وتنديداً بالمجازر الإسرائيلية في غزة.

وقبل أيام أكد المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، في بيان، أنّ "صنعاء تراقب الوضع عن كثب، ولن تقف مكتوفة الأيدي تجاه حرب الإبادة الجماعية ضد أهلنا في غزة"، مشدداً على أنّ "تجاوز الخطوط الحمر يحتم على صنعاء القيام بواجبها الديني والمبدئي تجاه ذلك".

وقال عضو المجلس السياسي الأعلى في اليمن، محمد علي الحوثي، إنّ "المعركة ضد العدو الإسرائيلي قائمة"، مؤكداً أنّ حركة "أنصار الله" على تنسيق دائم مع كل جهات محور المقاومة.

وكانت وسائل إعلام إسرائيلية، تحدثت عن صواريخ برؤوس حربية تنز ما "مجموعه 1.6 طن" أطلقتها حركة "أنصار الله" على ما يبدو نحو منطقة الفنادق في "إيلات".

وقبل أيام، أفاد مسؤول عسكري أميركي، لشبكة "سي أن أن"، بأنّ السفينة البحرية الأميركية "يو أس أس كارني"، اعترضت 4 صواريخ "كروز" و15 طائرة مسيرة، قبالة سواحل اليمن، مضيفاً أنّ عملية الاعتراض هذه استغرقت 9 ساعات.

وكان رئيس الوزراء في حكومة تصريف الأعمال في صنعاء، عبد العزيز بن حبتور، قد هدّد، بأنّ سفن الاحتلال ستتعرّض للاستهداف في البحر الأحمر في حال استمرّ العدوان الإسرائيلي على غزة.

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انتهى/185

Source: <https://ar.abna24.com/story/1406447>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the article published on 29 October 2024 by the Iranian media ABNA news, in which Mahdi Al-Mashat, President of the Houthis' Supreme Political Council, was quoted discussing about the "joint operations rooms"



Sanaa: We have joint operations rooms and we will confront any Israeli foolishness by storming Gaza



The head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Mahdi Al-Mashat, said, "The American side threatens the return of war in Yemen, to prevent the Yemeni people from carrying out their responsibilities towards the Palestinian people."

According to what was reported by Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon him) International News Agency - ABNNA - the head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Mahdi Al-Mashat, reveals that there are operations rooms that are closely monitored in case "Israel" commits foolishness and storms Gaza by land.

The head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Mahdi Al-Mashat, said, "The American side threatens the return of war in Yemen, to prevent the Yemeni people from carrying out their responsibilities towards the Palestinian people."

Al-Mashat stressed that the position of the Republic of Yemen is clear, which is to establish a Palestinian state with full sovereignty, over the entire Palestinian national territory, noting that "we do not have such a thing as the lands of 48 or 67." He revealed, "There are joint operations rooms and efforts that monitor and work to confront any Zionist foolishness if it invades Gaza by land, and we are monitoring the situation closely."

He pointed out that "what the Yemeni people are doing is the minimum duty of faith, religion, morals and humanity," stressing that "religious, moral and humanitarian responsibility requires everyone to take action."

Al-Mashat stressed that "the war in Palestine has become a war against Islam, in which the West and the United States are mobilizing alongside the Zionist enemy," deploring at the same time "that the Arab and Islamic position remains below the required level in this confrontation and fierce attack."

He said, "The Battle of Al-Aqsa Flood has begun and will destroy everything that the occupation forces and global imperialism have built," stressing that "there is no such thing in the Arab region as Israel."

Al-Mashat addressed the Palestinians, saying: "Everyone is with you...the peoples and the resistance movements are with you...until this fierce attack is defeated," noting that "the enemy raising its roofs is just empty ramblings."

The head of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen pointed out that "the West escaped from its problems and wars by exporting the Jews to the Arab world, and created an entity for them outside the topography of the region."

Yemenis continue demonstrations in support of Palestine. Yesterday, Friday, Yemeni crowds participated in the “Friday of Anger” in Sabeen Square in Sanaa, and in the governorates, in solidarity with Palestine and denouncing the Israeli massacres in Gaza.

A few days ago, the Supreme Political Council in Yemen confirmed, in a statement, that “Sanaa is closely monitoring the situation, and will not stand idly by in the genocidal war against our people in Gaza,” stressing that “crossing the red lines requires Sanaa to carry out its religious and principled duty regarding this matter.”

A member of the Supreme Political Council in Yemen, Muhammad Ali Al-Houthi, said, “The battle against the Israeli enemy is ongoing,” stressing that the “Ansar Allah” movement is in constant coordination with all sides of the axis of resistance.

Israeli media reported about missiles with warheads weighing “a total of 1.6 tons,” apparently launched by the “Ansar Allah” movement towards the hotel area in “Eilat.”

A few days ago, an American military official told CNN that the US Navy ship USS Carney intercepted 4 cruise missiles and 15 drones off the coast of Yemen, adding that this interception took 9 hours.

The Prime Minister of the caretaker government in Sanaa, Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor, had threatened that the occupation ships would be targeted in the Red Sea if the Israeli aggression against Gaza continued.

Annex 21: Article published on 9 November 2023 by the Iranian media PressTV in which Abdulaziz bin Habtour, Houthi Prime Minister is quoted as saying that “It is one axis and there is coordination taking place, a joint operations room, and a joint command for all these operations”



Yemen’s Ansarullah resistance movement has vowed to continue operations in support of the innocent people of the Gaza Strip until Israel ends its bloody onslaught on the besieged Palestinian territory.

Ansarullah spokesman Mohammed Abdul-Salam made the pledge in a post shared on social media on Wednesday, after Yemen’s Armed Forces shot down an American MQ-9 Reaper drone which was conducting a “hostile espionage” operation in support of the Israeli regime.

“The downing of the American drone shows that our armed forces will continue their operations in support of Gaza until the Israeli acts of aggression stop,” he said.

Abdul-Salam also noted that the Yemeni armed forces had reaffirmed their readiness to counter all hostile manoeuvres against Yemen’s national sovereignty by bringing down the American UAV over the country’s territorial waters.

Over the past month, the Yemeni Army has carried out several missile and drone strikes against Israeli targets in response to the occupying regime’s war crimes in Gaza.

The prime minister of Yemen’s National Salvation Government announced recently that Ansarullah fighters are “part of the Axis of Resistance” against Israel.

“It is one axis and there is coordination taking place, a joint operations room, and a joint command for all these operations,” Abdulaziz bin Habtour said. “We cannot allow this arrogant Zionist enemy to kill our people.”

Israel waged the war on Gaza on October 7 after the Palestinian Hamas resistance group conducted Operation Al-Aqsa Storm against the occupying entity in retaliation for its intensified atrocities against the Palestinian people.

Since the start of the aggression, the Tel Aviv regime has killed at least 10,569 Palestinians, mostly women and children, and injured 26,475 others.

It has also imposed a “complete siege” on the coastal sliver, cutting off fuel, electricity, food and water to the more than two million Palestinians living there.

Yemen prioritizes confronting Israel over peace talks: PM

In an interview with Iran’s Arabic-language news channel Al-Alam on Wednesday, bin Habtour said that confronting the Israeli aggression is a major issue for Yemen even if it causes a setback in the peace process with the Saudi-led coalition.

“This is a sacred duty for us and all Muslims and Arabs. However, it is primarily the task of the Arab countries,” he added.

The Yemeni premier further said that millions of Yemenis participated in nationwide rallies in a show of solidarity with Ansarullah leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi who called for using all capabilities to counter the Israeli regime.

Source: <https://www.presstv.ir/doc/Detail/2023/11/09/714284/Yemen-vows-keep-up-operations-until-Israel-ends-Gaza-war>

Annex 22: Interview conducted on 1 March 2024 by the Qatari media Al Jazeera of Abdulmalik al-Ajri, member of the Houthi political council, during which he acknowledged the existence of a coordination mechanism between the armed groups comprising the ‘Axis of Resistance’



Figure 22.1



Figure 22.2



Figure 22.3



Figure 22.4



Figure 22.5



Figure 22.6



Figure 22.7



Figure 22.8



Figure 22.9



Figure 22.10



Figure 22.11



Figure 22.12



Figure 22.13



Figure 22.14



Figure 22.15



Figure 22.16



Figure 22.17



Figure 22.18



Figure 22.19



Figure 22.20



Figure 22.21



Figure 22.22



Figure 22.23

Source: <https://youtu.be/c63OAX6pAIY?si=-Yh7nYjdQ7P-0NZH>

Annex 23: Press article dated 11 November 2020 from the Houthi media reporting that Abdullah Sabri was appointed by decree as the Ambassador to the Arab Republic of Syria



The screenshot shows the website interface for 'www.ansarollah.com.ye'. The header includes the site's logo and navigation menu with categories like 'Home', 'Yemen', 'Arab And International', 'Reports And Interviews', 'Aggression Crimes', 'Videos', 'Crimes Map', and 'عربي'. The article title is 'Republican Decision To Appoint Abdullah Sabri As Yemen's Ambassador To Syria', published on Nov 11, 2020. The text of the article states: 'A decree No. (62) for 2020 appointing a new ambassador of Yemen to Syria was issued by the President of the Supreme Political Council, Madi al-Mashat on Wednesday . He appointed Abdullah Ali Saleh Sabri as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Yemen to Arab Republic of Syria. Y.A'

Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com.ye/archives/387108>

Annexes 24: Press article dated 18 October 2021 in the Syrian media North Press Agency, related to a meeting between Colonel Sharaf al-Mawri, Houthi military attaché at the Yemeni “embassy” in Damascus, Syria, and the head of the Military Intelligence Division of the Syrian Ministry of Defence



Oct 18, 2021

The military attaché of the Houthis meets head of the Syrian Military Intelligence in Damascus.

QAMISHLI, Syria (North Press) – Military attaché of Houthi Movement in Damascus, met with the head of the Military Intelligence Division of the Syrian Ministry of Defense, embassy of the Movement in Damascus said on Monday.



“During the meeting that brought together Colonel Sharaf al-Mawri and Major-General Kifah al-Milhem, they discussed cooperation with Syria in relevant fields,” Embassy of the Houthi Movement said in a statement.

“Colonel Sharaf al-Mawri conveyed greetings of the head of the Yemeni Military Intelligence Authority (affiliated with the Houthis), Major General Abdullah al-Hakim to his Syrian counterpart, military commands, and all officials of the Ministry of Defense,” the statement added.

The meeting “addressed the latest field development and military confrontations in Yemen,” according to the same sources.

Major-General Milhem stressed, “the importance of cooperation between Yemen and Syria in fighting organizations (al-Qaeda and ISIS) and exchanging information and experiences that can reduce the practices of Takfiri groups in the two countries.”

In 2016, Houthis appointed the leader of National Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party – Yemen Region, the Syrian wing, Nayef Ahmed al-Qans, as their ambassador to Damascus.

Source: <https://npasyria.com/en/66309/>

Annex 25: Houthi military escalation

Table 25.1:

Ceasefire Violations/Fire Incidents from January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024:

| Region | Ceasefire / Truce Violations | | | | | |
|--------|------------------------------|---------|-----------|----------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| | Infiltrations | Attacks | Artillery | Missiles | Drones | |
| | | | | | Reconnaissance + Combat | Shot Down by Our Forces |
| Total | 1019 | 48 | 3566 | 232 | 4527 | 15 |

Table 25.2

Statistical Report of Human Losses from 1 Jan. 2024 to 30 Jun. 2024:

| Cases | Martyrs | Injured | Total |
|-------|---------|---------|-------|
| Total | 329 | 883 | 1212 |

Table 25.3:


Statistical Report of Material Losses for Government Forces and Allied Formations from 1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024:

| Category | Total Destruction | Partial Destruction |
|------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Equipment and Vehicles | 15 | 18 |
| Cars and Trucks | 33 | 103 |
| Weapons | 21 | 38 |
| Weapon Accessories | 5 | |
| Communication Accessories | 13 | |
| Communication Equipment | | 8 |
| Technical and Administrative | | 13 |

Source: Panel

Figure 25.1

One of the new roads being constructed by the Houthi terrorist militias on the Shaqab - Hayfan - Taiz front



Source: Panel

Figure 25.2

Circular from the GoY asking the armed forces to be prepared for a potential Houthi attack on several fronts

إلى / العموم

١. تفيد المعلومات الواردة إلينا من مصادر شبه مؤكدة عن نية مليشيات الحوثيين الإرهابية إسقاط جبهة كرش في م/لحج والسيطرة على خط الضباب الأحوم جبل حبشي والتوجه إلى الساحل الغربي، كما أفادت المصادر أن المليشيات تخطط لهجوم مباغت وغادر في أي لحظة على محافظتي مأرب وتعز، وعليه:


عليكم أخذ الحيطة والحذر واليقظة العالية والتصدي لأي أعمال عدائية قد تقوم بها المليشيات الحوثية الإرهابية في أي وقت.

٢. مرسل للتنفيذ،،،

Source: Confidential

Annex 26: Large-scale Recruitment and Training Conducted by the Houthis

Figure 26.1
Graduation ceremony in February 2024 held in Hudaydah



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKootz_/status/1759604731331203177/photo/1

Figure 26.2
Graduation ceremony held in February 2024 in Arhab, Sana'a



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKootz_/status/1754176438750568927

Figure 26.3
Graduation ceremony held in February 2024 in Dawran Anss, Dhamar Governorate



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1754181369066856575

Figure 26.4
Graduation ceremony held in February 2024 in Jahran, Dhamar Governorate



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1755398350105440549

Figures 26.5 (up), 26.6 (middle), and 26.7 (down)
Graduation ceremony held in January 2024 in Manakhah, Sana'a

The following SALWs are displayed: AK-47/Type 56 assault rifles, PKM/M80 LMG, M240 LMG, M249 LMG, RPG-7/Type 59-1 rocket launcher, AM-50 AMR, and a 9M133 "Konkurs" ATGM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1754268618785685609

Annex 27: Statement released on 23 March 2024 by AQAP

Figure 27.1

Statement released on 23 March 2024 by AQAP

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

قَاعَةُ الْجِهَادِ

فِي جَزِيرَةِ الْعَرَبِ

.....

(بَيَانٌ بِشَأْنِ تَفْجِيرِ الْخَوَاتِمِ لِأَمْثَالِ الْمُسْلِمِينَ فِي رَدَاعٍ - الْبَيْضَاءِ)

الحمد لله رب العالمين، ولا عدوان إلا على الظالمين، والصلاة والسلام على إمام المجاهدين وقائد الغر المحجلين، صل الله عليه وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين، أما بعد:

في ذات الوقت الذي يستمر فيه العدو الصهيوني في عمليات التنكيل بالمسلمين في فلسطين المحتلة، يستمر أيضاً العدو الرافضي في التنكيل بالمسلمين في اليمن؛ في جريمة جديدة ارتكبتها جماعة الحوثي -مليشيا إيران الرافضية- في اليمن، وذلك بتفجير عدد من المنازل الأهلّة بالسكان في حي الحفرة بمدينة رداغ، مما أدى لمقتل وإصابة أكثر من (٢٥) من عوام المسلمين، في استهتار صارخ في سفك دماء المسلمين، وظهور سافر لحقد الرافضة الدفين على أهل الإسلام، من خلال تكرار مثل هذه الجرائم البشعة، في الوقت الذي تدعي فيه تلك المليشيا نصرته للمسلمين في غزة، الأمر الذي يدل دلالة واضحة أن استخدام الحوثي للقضية الفلسطينية ليس إلا لحشد أكبر عدد من المقاتلين في صفوفهم لبيسط نفوذهم في اليمن، وإلا فما هو الفرق بين دم المسلم في اليمن، ودم المسلم في غزة؟

بل إن الجريمة الوثوية هي أمرٌ من جرائم اليهود في فلسطين؛ فاليهودي يُفجر بيوت المسلمين في غزة باسم اليهودية، أما الحوثي فإنه يفجر بيوت المسلمين باسم الإسلام، وحسبنا الله ونعم الوكيل.

وتأتي هذه العملية الإجرامية ضمن سلسلة جرائم الحوثي بحق الشعب اليمني المسلم، فمن قبل فُجر الحوثي منزل الخبيثي بأطفاله ونسائه في صعدة، وتوالت التفجيرات للمنازل والمساجد ودور القرآن ولا يزال الحوثي يمارس إلى اليوم جرائمه البشعة المشابهة لجرائم الصهاينة، وما هذه الجريمة التكرار التي لم يراع فيها دماء المسلمين الصائمين في شهر رمضان المبارك إلا واحدة من بين عدة جرائم ارتكبتها في عدة مناطق باليمن، وربما يوصلها بغيرها من الجرائم البشعة، ثم يقف مضطراً على بعض طوامه التي عجزت أساطين دجله ونفاقه عن ترقيعها ليدعي خبثاً ومكراً وفجوراً بأنها أعمال فردية حتى يصدقه السذج من الناس.

وأخراً دعوانا أن الحمد لله رب العالمين



تنظيم قاعدة الجهاد في جزيرة العرب
12 رمضان 1445 هـ الموافق 23 مارس 2024 م

Source: <https://twitter.com/G88Daniele/status/1771542623209115966>


Annex 28: Rivalry between central banks: Economic stability under threat**Punitive measures taken by CBY, Aden, against banks and exchange companies.**

The Panel was informed by its sources that some of the leading banks were under pressure by the Houthis not to comply with the instructions of CBY, Aden, and out of fear of reprisal, many of them did not comply. Getting irked by this non-compliance, CBY, Aden, tightened its grip on violating banks and issued a circular Ref. No 159/CBY/2024 dated 19 March 2024 addressed to all banks, exchange companies and facilities, and remittance agents, informing them of suspension of dealings with the following banks that violated its instructions:


- i. Tadamon Bank
- ii. Bank of Yemen and Kuwait
- iii. Al-Amal Microfinance Bank
- iv. Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrain
- v. Al-Kuraimi Islamic Microfinance Bank

Figure 28.1
Circular Ref. No 159/CBY/2024 dated 19 March 2024 issued by CBY, Aden

Republic Of Yemen
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office Aden
Ref: 159/CBY/2024
Date 19/3/2024



الجمهورية اليمنية
البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي/ عدن



تعميم موجه الى كافة شركات ومنشآت الصرافة ووكلاء الحوالات

الاحوة/ شركات ومنشآت الصرافة ووكلاء الحوالات
المحترمون


تحية طيبة وبعد،

الموضوع/ إيقاف التعامل مع البنوك المخالفة لتعليمات البنك المركزي

بالإشارة للموضوع أعلاه، يتم إيقاف التعامل الكامل مع البنوك المدرجة أدناه بما في ذلك الشبكات التابعة لها:

1. بنك التضامن
2. بنك اليمن والكويت
3. بنك الامل للتمويل الأصغر
4. مصرف اليمن والبحرين الشامل
5. بنك الكريمي للتمويل الأصغر الإسلامي

وذلك لمخالفاتها التعليمات الصادرة عن البنك المركزي اليمني وسيتم إتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة حيال المخالفين لهذا التعميم.


أحمد أحمد علي
المحافظ

www.cby-ye.com | governor.office@cby-ye.com | 02 264401 | 02 264450 | المركز الرئيسي - عدن - الجمهورية اليمنية

Source: CBY, Aden

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the Circular Ref. No 159/CBY/2024 dated 19 March 2024 issued by CBY, Aden

Republic of Yemen

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN

Head Office, Aden

Ref. No 159/CBY/2024

Date: 19 March 2024

A circular addressed to all exchange companies, establishments, and remittance agents

Brothers/companies, exchange facilities and remittance agents, best regards

Subject: Stop dealing with banks that violate the instructions of the Central Bank

With reference to the above topic, all dealings with the banks listed below, including their affiliated networks, are suspended:

- 1 Tadamon Bank
- 2 Bank of Yemen and Kuwait
- 3 Al-Amal Microfinance Bank
- 4 Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrain
- 5 Al-Kuraimi Islamic Microfinance Bank

This is due to their violations of the instructions issued by the Central Bank of Yemen, and deterrent measures will be taken regarding those who violate this circular.

Governor

However, on 26 March 2024, CBY, Sana'a issued the Circular No. 14 resuming dealings with the following two exchange companies, which were banned earlier vide Circular No. 13 dated 14 March 2024:

- i. Al-Qutaybi Exchange Company
- ii. Al-Bassiri Exchange Company

In response to this, on the very next day on 27 March 2024, CBY, Aden issued another Circular Ref. No. 179/CBY/2024 lifting the ban imposed on 19 March 2024, and resuming dealings with the aforesaid five banks.

The CBY, Aden also issued directions to stop dealings with 13 exchange companies in the Ma'rib Governorate for violating its instructions. The CBY, Aden informed the Panel that it will conduct intensive inspection campaigns to ensure compliance, and penal measures would be taken against those who violated the provisions of its circulars.

During the period from January to December 2023 and from January to February 2024, CBY, Aden took punitive measures against 156 and 29 exchange companies and institutions respectively. These measures were taken for not providing the required data or for violating its instructions and included imposition of financial penalties, temporary suspension of licenses, and freezing of assets.

The table 2 below shows the total amount of fines and penalties imposed by CBY, Aden on banks and money exchange companies during the period from January to December 2023 and from January to February 2024.

Table 1
Fines and penalties imposed by CBY, Aden

| Period | Total amount of Fines imposed on banks (in YR) | Total amount of Fines imposed on exchange companies (in YR) |
|-------------------------|---|--|
| January – December 2023 | 337,386,000 | 921,000,000 |
| January – June 2024 | 294,093,125 | 174,940,000 |

Such actions of the central banks underscore the politically driven and volatile regulatory policies in Yemen, highlighting how banking institutions have become casualties in this rivalry. By instructing banking and financial institutions not to comply with directives of the central bank operating in GoY-controlled areas, the Houthis impede the effectiveness of monetary and banking regulatory policies aimed at stabilizing Yemen's economy. Such interference undermines investor confidence, leading to economic instability.

Circular Ref. No 159/CBY/2024 dated 19 March 2024 issued by CBY, Aden

Control over financial transfers mechanism

The confrontation to exercise control over the financial transactions between the GoY-controlled areas and the Houthi-controlled areas reached a critical juncture when CBY, Aden established a unified network for such transfers. The Unified Money Network (UMN) is a closed joint stock company, established in 2021 with 47 shareholder members, who represent exchange companies licensed by the CBY, Aden. The network obtained the final license from the CBY, Aden in January 2024 as a payment service provider and operator. UMN obliges the exchange companies to stop transfers through other companies, and transfer only through this network. The aim of the UMN is to merge the internal transfer networks owned by exchange companies, which number more than 40, into one network.

In response, based on directives from CBY, Sana'a, the Yemeni Exchange Association, affiliated with the Houthis, issued a circular on 4 March 2024 prohibiting the exchange companies and local financial transfer networks, from dealing with:

- i. The UMN set up by CBY, Aden,
- ii. The Al Basiri Exchange Company,
- iii. The Al Qutaibi Exchange Company, and
- iv. any banks not licensed by the CBY, Sana'a.

The CBY, Sana'a issued an order disallowing the acceptance of external transfers in USDs or YRs.

Banking sources reveal that customers encounter significant challenges in sending remittances to areas under Houthi control, or receiving remittances sent from those regions to areas governed by the GoY. These measures have already exacerbated the severity of the financial divide enforced by the Houthis in 2021, when they banned the circulation of the new edition of the currency notes issued by CBY, Aden, and imposed hefty fees on transfers from GoY-controlled regions to other areas.

Circular No 14 dated 26 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

Figure 28.2

Circular No 14 dated 26 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

| | | |
|---|--|--|
| <p>CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN HEAD OFFICE Sana'a</p> <p>Date: 26/ 03/ 2024 NO:</p> |  <p>قطاع الرقابة على البنوك الإدارة العامة للرقابة على البنوك</p> | <p>البنك المركزي اليمني المركز الرئيسي صنعاء</p> <p>التاريخ: 16 / 09 / 1445 هـ الرقم القياسي: (٥٢٠٠)</p> |
| <p>تعميم رقم (14) موجه إلى كافة البنوك العاملة في الجمهورية اليمنية</p> | | |
| <p>الأخ/ مدير عام/ المدير الاقليمي/ لبنك ... المحترم</p> <p>تحية طيبة وبعد،،،</p> <p>بالإشارة إلى التعميم رقم (13) بتاريخ 4 رمضان 1445 هـ الموافق 14 مارس 2024 م، وبناءً على توجيهات الأخ المحافظ، يتم إعادة التعامل مع شركات الصرافة التالية:</p> <p>1. شركة القطبي للصرافة. 2. شركة البسميري للصرافة.</p> <p>وتقبلوا تحياتنا،،،</p> | | |
|  <p>فواز قاسم البناء وكيل قطاع الرقابة على البنوك 26 MARCH 2024</p> | <p>نسخة مع التحية:</p> <p>- للأخ/ المحافظ - للأخ/ نائب المحافظ</p> <p>المحترم المحترم</p> | |

Source: Panel

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the circular dated 26 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
HEAD OFFICE
Sana'a
Date: 26/03/2024
NO:

Central Bank of Yemen, head office
Sana'a
09/16/1445/ date
Number: Qur'an (520)

CBY - Banking Supervision Sector, General Administration of Banking Supervision

Circular No. (14) addressed to all banks operating in the Republic of Yemen

Respected

Brother / General Manager / Regional Director / Bank....

After Greetings...

With reference to Circular No. (13) dated 4 Ramadan 1445 AH corresponding to 14 March 2024 AD, and based on the directives of the Governor, dealing with the following exchange companies will be resumed:

1 Al-Qutaybi Exchange Company.

2 Al-Bassiri Exchange Company.

Please accept our regards....

|

For the Governor

Circular Ref. No. 179/CBY/2024 dated 27 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

Figure 28.3

Copy of the Circular Ref. No. 179/CBY/2024 dated 27 March 2024 issued by CBY, Sana'a

Republic Of Yemen
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office Aden

Ref: 179/CBY/2024
Date: 27/3/2024

الجمهورية اليمنية
البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي / عدن

الإخوة/ المدير العام/المدير الإقليمي لبنك المحترمون
تحية طيبة وبعد،

الموضوع/استئناف التعامل مع البنوك الموقفة

إشارة الى الموضوع اعلاه، والى التعميم الصادر بتاريخ 2024 /3/19 م برقم (160 / CBY / 2024) بشأن إيقاف التعامل مع عدد من البنوك لمخالفتهم لتعليمات البنك المركزي. ونظراً لزوال المخالفة والتعهد بالالتزام بعدم تكرارها، فقد تقرر رفع الحظر واستئناف التعامل مع البنوك التالية:

1. بنك التضامن
2. بنك اليمن والكويت
3. بنك الامل للتمويل الاصغر
4. مصرف اليمن والبحرين الشامل
5. بنك الكريمي للتمويل الاصغر الإسلامي

مرسل للتنفيذ إعتباراً من تاريخ اليوم الموافق 2024/3/27.

المحافظ
احمد احمد غالب

Source: Panel

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the circular dated 27 March 2024 issued by CBY, Aden

Republic Of Yemen
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office Aden

Ref: 179/CBY/2024

Date: 27/3/2024

Brothers/General Manager/Regional Manager of the Bank.
After Greetings

Topic: Resuming dealings with suspended banks

Respected people

A reference to the above topic, and to the circular issued on 3/19/2024 No. (2024 C160 C) regarding stopping dealings with a number of banks due to their violation of the instructions of the Central Bank. Given the disappearance of the violation and the pledge not to repeat it, it was decided to lift the ban and resume dealing With the following banks:

- 1 ~~Tadhamon~~ Bank
- 2 Bank of Yemen and Kuwait
- 3 Al-Amal Microfinance Bank
- 4 Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrain
- 5 Al-Kuraimi Islamic Microfinance Bank

Sent for implementation as of today, 3/27/2024.

Governor

Annex 29: Recent conflict between the CBY, Aden and the Houthis

So far, the conflict involving the control over the banking system in Yemen was witnessed between the two central banks - CBY, Sana' a, and CBY, Aden. However, the developments in the last two months not only shook the entire banking sector in Yemen, but it escalated the conflict to a different level. It became a war between the CBY, Aden and the Houthis.

On 30 May 2024, the CBY, Aden issued its circular no. 20 threatening to stop dealings with the following six banks for not complying with its instructions:

- 1- Tadamon Bank
- 2- International Bank of Yemen
- 3- Yemen and Kuwait Bank
- 4- Shamil Bank of Yemen and Bahrain
- 5- AlAmal Microfinance Bank
- 6- Alkuraimi Islamic Microfinance Bank

Figure 29:1

Circular No. 20 dated 30 May 2024 of CBY, Aden

Republic Of Yemen
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN
Head Office Aden
Ref: 294/CBY/2024
Date: 30/5/2024

البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي / عدن

**قرار محافظ البنك المركزي رقم (20) لسنة 2024م
بشأن إيقاف التعامل مع عدد من البنوك والمصارف**

محافظ البنك المركزي
بعد الإطلاع على القانون رقم (14) لسنة 2000م، بشأن البنك المركزي اليمني وتعديلاته، وعلى القانون رقم (38) لسنة 1998م، بشأن البنوك، وعلى القانون رقم (21) لسنة 1996م بشأن المصارف الإسلامية وتعديلاته، وعلى القانون رقم (15) لسنة 2009م بشأن بنوك التمويل الأصغر، وعلى القانون رقم (1) لسنة 2010م، بشأن مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب والمعدل بالقانون رقم (17) لسنة 2013م، ولائحته التنفيذية وتعديلاتها، وعلى القرار الجمهوري رقم (119) لسنة 2016م بشأن نقل المقر الرئيسي للبنك المركزي اليمني إلى العاصمة المؤقتة عدن، وعلى قرار محافظ البنك المركزي اليمني رقم (17) لسنة 2024م بشأن نقل المراكز الرئيسية للبنوك التجارية والمصارف الإسلامية وبنوك التمويل الأصغر إلى العاصمة المؤقتة عدن، ونظراً لفشل البنوك المشار إليها أدناه في الالتزام بأحكام القانون وتعليمات البنك المركزي وعدم الإمتثال لمخططات مكافحة غسل الأموال وتمويل الإرهاب، وإستمرارها في التعامل مع جماعة جبهة إرهابية وتنفيذ تعليماتها بالمخالفة لقواعد العمل المصرفي وأحكام القانون وتعليمات البنك المركزي، بالأمر الذي يتطلب التدخل ووضع القيود اللازمة على أنشطة البنوك المخالفة لإجبارها على الإمتثال لأحكام لقانون وحرصاً على سلامة القطاع المصرفي، ولما تقتضيه المصلحة العامة

www.cby.ye 02 264401 02 264450 - من - الجمهورية اليمنية - المركز الرئيسي - عدن

المادة (1): على كافة البنوك والمصارف وشركات ومنشآت الصرافة ووكلاء الحوالات العاملة في الجمهورية وقف التعامل مع البنوك والمصارف المدرجة أدناه:

- 1- بنك التضامن
- 2- بنك اليمن والتكوين
- 3- مصرف اليمن والبحرين الشامل
- 4- بنك الأمل للتمويل الأصغر
- 5- بنك الكريمة للتمويل الأصغر الإسلامي
- 6- بنك اليمن الدولي

المادة (2): على البنوك والمصارف المذكورة الإستمرار بتقديم خدماتها المصرفية لتجمهر والوفاء بالتزاماتها تجاه عملائها حتى إشعار آخر.

المادة (3): يعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ 2024/6/2م وعلى جميع الجهات المعنية العمل بموجبه ويبلغ به من بلام محلياً ودولياً.

صدر بالمركز الرئيسي - عدن
22 ذو الحجة 1445هـ
الموافق: 30 مايو 2024م

أحمد محمد
المحافظ

Source: Panel

However, since, these banks did not comply with the directions of the CBY, Aden, the bank issued circular no.30, on 8 July 2024, communicating its intention to revoke the licenses of the above-mentioned six banks. The CBY, Aden also decided to get these six banks delinked from the society for worldwide interbank financial telecommunications (SWIFT) system. SWIFT is an international messaging network used by the financial institutions to quickly, accurately, and securely send and receive information, such as money transfer instructions.

Since the aforesaid six banks are the leading banks in Yemen and engage in significant amount of international funds transfers, including for the Houthi-controlled entities, cancellation of the SWIFT facility would have seriously impacted the interests of the Houthis and also of the banking system in the Houthi-controlled areas. Taking this action of the CBY, Aden as an act of economic war launched by the GoY against it, the Houthis threatened to attack the assets in the KSA and to return to war, if the CBY, Aden did not revoke its decision. The house of the Governor of the CBY, Aden in Sana'a was allegedly attacked by the Houthis and they have seized the house.

Figure 29.2

House of the Governor of the CBY, Aden, in Sana'a which has been seized by the Houthis. The writings on the boundary wall of the house says, "The house is seized by the court".



Source: Panel

This led to serious mediation efforts by the stakeholders to de-escalate the situation. Consequently, the CBY, Aden issued circular no. 35 dated 22 July 2024, cancelling the circular nos. 20 and 30, withdrawing the revocation orders against the aforesaid six banks. Although, the conflict was deescalated, and the war averted, it left the CBY management, the GoY, and the STC highly dissatisfied with the developments. The Governor and the Deputy Governor of the CBY, Aden reportedly sent their letters of resignation to the GoY.

This incident highlights how an economic issue could spiral into a full-blown war, underlining importance and urgency of addressing the long-standing economic challenges that threaten Yemen's peace, security, and stability.

Annex 30: Information on Houthi attacks and suspicious activities towards merchant and military vessels from 19 November 2023 to 1 August 2024

| Nature/impact | Number |
|--------------------------------|--------|
| Attack on merchant vessels | 118 |
| Attack on military vessels | 16 |
| Attack on oil/chemical tankers | 31 |
| Vessels hit | 30 |
| Tankers hit | 7 |
| Vessels abandoned | 3 |
| Vessels sunken | 3 |
| Seafarer killed | 4 |

| Reported date of attack | Targeted merchant and military vessel | Information on the attack | Gulf of Aden |
|-------------------------|---|---|--------------|
| | | | Red sea |
| | | | Indian ocean |
| 20/07/24 | <i>MV Pumba</i> , container ship with Liberia flag | UAV attack followed by USV attack, minor damages reported. Later, the explosion of a missile at close vicinity of the vessel was reported | |
| 19/07/24 | <i>Lobivia</i> , container ship with Singapore flag | Direct hit by unidentified projectile | |
| 15/07/24 | <i>MT Chios Lion</i> , oil tanker with Liberia flag | Attack by USV, damage reported | |
| 15/07/24 | <i>MT Bentley</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag | Attack with two small boats and one USV followed by three ASBMs | |
| 11/07/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO | Two explosions at close vicinity of the vessel | |
| 10/07/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO | Explosion at close vicinity of the vessel | |
| 09/07/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO | Explosion at close vicinity of the vessel | |
| 30/06/24 | <i>Summer Lady</i> , bulk carrier with Marshal Islands flag | Suspicious approach by 12 crafts, included some uncrewed. | |
| 28/06/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO (probably <i>Delonix</i> , chemical tanker with Liberia flag) | Five missiles hit the water near the vessel | |
| 27/06/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO (probably <i>Seajoy</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag) | Attack with WBIED | |
| 26/06/24 | <i>MSC Sarah V</i> , container ship with Liberia flag | A missile hit the water near the vessel | |
| 25/06/24 | <i>Lila Lisbon</i> , bulk carrier with Kitts and Navis flag | A missile hit the water near the vessel | |
| 23/06/24 | <i>MV Transworld Navigator</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag | Direct hit by OWA-UAV. Vessel suffered minor damage. Several seafarers suffered minor injuries. | |
| 23/06/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO | Hit by OWA-UAV. Vessel suffered flooding that could not be contained, and vessel was abandoned | |
| 21/06/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO (probably <i>MV Transworld Navigator</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag which has been attacked twice) | Explosions at the vicinity of the vessel | |
| 16/06/24 | <i>Captain Paris</i> , oil tanker with Malta flag | Two explosions in close proximity of the vessel | |
| 13/06/24 | <i>MV Verbena</i> , general cargo ship with Palau flag | Targeted with three ASCMs, fire on board. One seafarer heavily wounded. | |
| 13/06/24 | <i>MV Seaguardian</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag | Explosion at close vicinity of the vessel, no damage | |

| | | |
|----------|---|--|
| 12/06/24 | <i>MV Tutor</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag | Targeted by one WBIED impact under the stern. Later in the day, the vessel was hit by an OWA-UAV. One seafarer killed. Vessel was abandoned by the crew, and sunk on 18/06/24. |
| 09/06/24 | <i>MV Tavvishi</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag | Targeted by one ASBM and one ASCM, one direct hit |
| 08/06/24 | <i>MV Norderney</i> , bulk carrier with Antigua and Barbados flag | Targeted by two ASBMs, one direct hit, one intercepted |
| 06/06/24 | <i>AAL Genoa</i> , bulk carrier with Cyprus flag | Two explosions at close distance of the vessel |
| 01/06/24 | US Navy <i>USS Gravely</i> (DDG107) | Targeted by one ASBM, intercepted by US Navy |
| 01/06/24 | <i>Al Salam</i> , LNG tanker with Liberia flag | Explosion at distance from the vessel |
| 28/05/24 | <i>MV Laax</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag | Targeted by five ASBMs, one direct hit |
| 23/05/24 | <i>MV Yannis</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag | Impact of a missile at close vicinity, no damage |
| 17/05/24 | <i>Wind</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag | Targeted with one ASBM, one direct hit |
| 07/05/24 | <i>MSC Gina</i> , container ship, with Panama flag | Two explosions at close vicinity of the vessels, no damage |
| 07/05/24 | <i>MSC Diego</i> , container ship with Panama flag | |
| 29/04/24 | <i>Cyclades</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag | Targeted with three ASBMs and three OWA-UAVs, minor damage reported |
| 29/04/24 | US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG58) or <i>USS Philippine sea</i> (CG58) | Targeted with one OWA-UAV, intercepted by US Navy |
| 26/04/24 | <i>MV Maisha</i> , oil tanker with Antigua and Barbuda flag | No precision |
| 26/04/24 | <i>MV Andromeda Star</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag | Targeted with three ASBMs, minor damage reported |
| 24/04/24 | <i>MSC Darwin VI</i> , container ship with Liberia flag | One explosion ahead of the vessel, no damage |
| 24/04/24 | <i>MV Yorktown</i> , container ship with US flag | Targeted by one ASBM, intercepted by US Navy |
| 09/04/24 | <i>MV Yorktown</i> , container ship with US flag | Targeted by one missile, intercepted by US Navy |
| 07/04/24 | <i>Hope Island</i> , container ship with Marshall Islands flag | Targeted by one missile, no direct hit |
| 06/04/24 | <i>Hope Island</i> , container ship with Marshall Islands flag | Targeted by two missiles. The first was intercepted by the coalition and the second hit the water |
| 03/04/24 | US Navy <i>USS Gravely</i> (DDG 107) | Targeted by one ASBM and two UWA-OAVs, no direct hit |
| 01/04/24 | <i>Crystal Symphony</i> , cruise ship with Bahamas flag | Suspicious approach followed by gun shots |
| 28/03/24 | Names of the targeted US and Coalition warships not mentioned by CENTCOM | Targeted by four OWA-UAVs, no direct hit |
| 27/03/24 | Name of the targeted US warship not mentioned by CENTCOM | Targeted by four OWA-UAVs, no direct hit |
| 23/03/24 | <i>MV Huang Pu</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag | Targeted by five ASBMs, one direct hit |
| 17/03/24 | <i>MV Mado</i> , LPG tanker with Marshall Islands flag | Targeted by a missile, no direct hit |
| 15/03/24 | <i>MV Mado</i> , LPG tanker with Marshall Islands flag | One explosion ahead of the vessel, no damage |
| 15/03/24 | <i>Pacific-01</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag | Targeted by a missile, no direct hit |
| 14/03/24 | <i>Fuxing V</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag | Targeted by two missiles, no direct hit |
| 12/03/24 | US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG58) | Targeted by one SRBM, no direct hit |

| | | |
|----------|--|---|
| 10/03/24 | <i>Pinocchio</i> , container ship with Liberian flag | Targeted by two ASBMs, no direct hit |
| 08/03/24 | <i>MV Propel Fortune</i> , ship carrier with Singapore flag | Targeted by two ASBMs, no direct hit |
| 06/03/24 | <i>True Confidence</i> , bulk carrier with Barbados flag | Targeted by one ASBM, one direct hit Three fatalities, at least four injuries, of which three are in critical condition, and significant damage to the ship |
| 05/03/24 | US Navy <i>USS Carney</i> (DDG64) | Targeted by one ASBM and three OWA-UAVs. Missile and OWA-UAVs intercepted |
| 04/03/24 | <i>MSC SKY II</i> , container ship with Liberian flag | Targeted by two missiles. One direct hit |
| 27/02/24 | <i>Jolly Vanadio</i> , container ship with Marshall Islands flag | Attack by two UAVs |
| 27/02/24 | <i>Lady Youmna</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Panama flag | Targeted by a missile, no direct hit |
| 24/02/24 | <i>MV Torm Thor</i> , oil/chemical tanker with US flag | Targeted by one ASBM. Missile intercepted |
| 22/02/24 | <i>MV Islander</i> , cargo with Palau flag | Targeted by two missiles, fire onboard |
| 20/02/24 | US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG58) | Targeted by one ASCM. Missile intercepted |
| 19/02/24 | <i>Navis Fortuna</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag | Hit by missile |
| 19/02/24 | <i>Sea Champion</i> , grain carrier with Greek flag | Targeted by one OWA-UAV, one direct hit , minor damage |
| 18/02/24 | <i>Rubymar</i> , bulk carrier with Belize flag | Targeted by two ASBM, one direct hit , crew abandoned the vessel. The vessel sunk. |
| 17/02/24 | <i>MT Pollux</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag | Targeted by three ASBMs, one direct hit |
| 15/02/24 | <i>MV Lycavitos</i> , bulk carrier with Barbados flag | Targeted by one ASBM, one direct hit |
| 12/02/24 | <i>MV Star Iris</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag | Targeted by two missiles |
| 06/02/24 | <i>MV Star Nasia</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag | Targeted by three ASBMs, no direct hit, minor damage. One ASBM intercepted by US Navy |
| 06/02/24 | <i>MV Morning Star</i> , cargo ship with undetermined flag | Targeted by three ASBMs, no direct hit |
| 06/02/24 | <i>Morning Tide</i> , cargo ship with Barbados flag | Explosion in close vicinity of a merchant vessel, no damage |
| 06/02/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO | Rounds fired from a small craft, slight damage on the merchant vessel |
| 02/02/24 | <i>Daffodil</i> , oil tanker with Saudi Arabia flag | UAV attack, no direct hit |
| 02/02/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM | Seven suspicious UAVs intercepted by US Navy |
| 01/02/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM | One suspicious UAV intercepted by US Navy |
| 01/02/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM | One suspicious USV intercepted by US Navy |
| 01/02/24 | <i>MV Koi</i> , cargo ship with Liberia flag | Targeted by two ASBMs, no direct hit. ASBMs intercepted by US Navy |
| 01/02/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO | Explosion at distance of a merchant vessel, no damage |
| 31/01/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM | One ASBM intercepted by US Navy |
| 31/01/24 | US Navy <i>USS Carney</i> (DDG64) | Three UAVs intercepted by US Navy |
| 30/01/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM | One ASBM intercepted by US Navy |
| 30/01/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM | Approached by three small crafts, one of these crafts has a front mounted weapon |

| | | |
|----------|---|--|
| 27/01/24 | Royal British Navy <i>HMS Diamond</i> | One UAV intercepted |
| 26/01/24 | <i>Marlin Luanda</i> , oil tanker with Marshall Islands flag | One ASBM, direct hit |
| 26/01/24 | <i>Achilles</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag | Explosion at close vicinity |
| 26/01/24 | US Navy <i>USS Carney</i> (DDG64) | One ASBM intercepted by US Navy |
| 24/01/24 | <i>Maersk Chesapeake</i> , container ship with USA flag | Two ASBMs intercepted by US Navy, one impacted the sea |
| 24/01/24 | <i>Maersk Detroit</i> , container ship with USA flag | Missile attack, no direct hit |
| 24/01/24 | <i>Tomahawk</i> , bulk carrier with Liberia flag | UAV attack, no direct hit |
| 18/01/24 | <i>Chem Ranger</i> , chemical tanker with Marshall Islands flag | Two ASBMs impacted the sea near the ship |
| 17/01/24 | <i>MV Genco Picardy</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag | One UAV, direct hit |
| 16/01/24 | <i>MV Zografia</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag | One ASBM, direct hit |
| 16/01/24 | <i>Panda</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag | Suspicious approach |
| 15/01/24 | <i>MV Gibraltar Eagle</i> , bulk carrier with | Possible missile attack |
| 14/01/24 | US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG 58) | One ASBM intercepted by US Navy |
| 14/01/24 | <i>Khalissa</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag | One ASBM, impacted the sea |
| 14/01/24 | <i>Orchid Rising</i> , bulk carrier with Panama flag | Suspicious approach |
| 12/01/24 | <i>Khalissa</i> , oil tanker with Panama flag | Kinetic attack, vector not identified |
| 11/01/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by CENTCOM | One ASBM, impacted the sea |
| 09/01/24 | <i>Federal Masamune</i> , bulk carrier with Singapore flag | Approached by three small crafts which opened fire with two missiles |
| 09/01/24 | <i>Caravos Harmony</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag | Two UAVs dropped each one bomb, impacted the sea |
| 06/01/24 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO | Six small crafts approached a merchant vessel |
| 06/01/24 | US Navy <i>USS Laboon</i> (DDG 58) | One UAV intercepted |
| 02/01/24 | <i>CMA CGM Tage</i> , container ship with Malta flag | Two ASBMs, impacted the sea |
| 01/01/24 | <i>Advantage Life</i> , oil tanker with Marshall Islands flag | Threat over radio |
| 31/12/23 | <i>Maersk Hangzhou</i> , container ship with Singapore flag | Boarding attempt by four small crafts. Attack repelled by US Navy |
| 31/12/23 | <i>Maersk Hangzhou</i> , container ship with Singapore flag | Three ASBMs, one direct hit and two intercepted by US Navy |
| 25/12/23 | <i>MSC United VIII</i> , container ship with Liberian flag | One way attack UAV, attack missed |
| 25/12/23 | <i>Navig8 Montel</i> , oil tanker with Liberian flag | One way attack UAV, attack missed |
| 25/12/23 | <i>MV Mariona</i> , livestock carrier with Tanzanian flag | Threat over radio |
| 23/12/23 | <i>Sai Baba</i> , oil tanker with Gabonese flag | One way attack UAV, one direct hit |
| 23/12/23 | <i>Blaamanen</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Norwegian flag | One way attack UAV, attack missed |
| 23/12/23 | <i>Fassa</i> , bulk carrier with Cayman Islands flag | One way attack UAV attack missed |

| | | |
|----------|---|---|
| 18/12/23 | <i>MSC Clara</i> , container ship with Panama flag | One way attack UAV, attack missed |
| 18/12/23 | <i>Swan Atlantic</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Cayman Islands flag | One way attack UAV, one direct hit |
| 18/12/23 | <i>Magic Vela</i> , bulk carrier with Marshall Islands flag | Attempted hijack |
| 18/12/23 | <i>Green Trader</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Marshall Islands flag | Suspicious approach |
| 15/12/23 | <i>Palatium III</i> , container ship with Liberia flag | Explosion onboard |
| 15/12/23 | <i>Al Jasrah</i> , container ship with Liberia flag | Direct hit |
| 15/12/23 | <i>MSC Alanya</i> , container ship with Liberian flag | Threat over radio |
| 14/12/23 | <i>Maersk Gibraltar</i> , container ship with Hong Kong flag | Targeted by ASBM |
| 13/12/23 | <i>Lady Tramp</i> , bulk carrier with Malta flag | Suspicious approach |
| 13/12/23 | US Navy <i>USS Mason</i> (DDG 87) | UAV attack |
| 12/12/23 | <i>Ardmore Encounter</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Marshall Islands flag | Boarding attempt |
| 11/12/23 | <i>Strinda</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Norwegian flag | Missile attack, one direct hit |
| 11/12/23 | <i>Icarius</i> , cargo ship with Vanuatu flag | UAV attack |
| 10/12/23 | <i>Centaurus Leader</i> , vehicle carrier with Singapore flag | Two missed UAV attacks |
| 09/12/23 | Name of the targeted vessel not mentioned by UKMTO | Threat over radio |
| 06/12/23 | <i>Dianella</i> , oil/chemical tanker with Liberian flag | UAV incident |
| 03/12/23 | <i>AOM Sophie II</i> , bulk carrier with Panama flag | Missile attack, one direct hit |
| 03/12/23 | <i>Number 9</i> , container ship with Panama flag | Threat over radio |
| 03/12/23 | <i>Unity Explorer</i> , bulk carrier with Bahamas flag | Missile attack, one direct hit |
| 03/12/23 | <i>CGenuine</i> , oil tanker with Liberian flag | Missed UAV attack |
| 27/11/23 | US Navy <i>USS Mason</i> (DDG 87) | Two ASBMs intercepted |
| 29/11/23 | US Navy <i>USS Carney</i> (DDG 64) | UAV intercepted |
| 26/11/23 | <i>MV Central Park</i> , chemical tanker with Liberian flag | Boarding attempt |
| 19/11/23 | <i>Galaxy Leader</i> , vehicle carrier with Bahamas flag | Attackers used a helicopter to hijack the vessel |

Source: CENTCOM and UKMTO

Annex 31: Hijacking by the Houthis of the *Galaxy Leader* on 19 November 2023

Video of the attack presented by the Houthis: <https://gcaptain.com/watch-houthis-release-video-of-galaxy-leader-seizure/>

On 19 November 2023 Houthi commandos were dropped by a Mi-171Sh helicopter onto the deck of the *Galaxy Leader*, a vehicle carrier with Bahamas flag sailing in the Red Sea.

An analysis of the weaponry carried by some commandos dropped on the ship shows that they were armed with AK-103 assault rifles, observed for the first time in 2022 with Houthi marine commandos, alongside at least one anti-material rifle (AMR) and a Glock pistol.⁶⁰ Similar pistols have been documented as presented for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas.

Figures 31.1 (up) and 31.2 (below)

Mi-171Sh armed with two UBM-57 pods (each with 32 x 57mm rockets)

Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1726641438279315476

⁶⁰ Glock pistols have also been observed in the hands of high-ranking Houthi officers.

Figures 31.3 (up), 31.4 (middle), and 31.5 (below)

Malah & Aseef-1 Fast attack boats as part of the operation

These boats are generally armed with 14.5mm or 12.7mm Heavy Machine Gun (HMG) and 7.62mm LMG.



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1726643889615040591

Figures 31.6 (left) and 31.7 (right)

Houthi boarding team members mainly armed with AK-103, calibre 7.62x39mm



Figure 31.8

Houthi naval commando unit with AK-103, a standard weaponry used by them



Source: <https://www.memri.org/tv/houthis-release-music-video-commando-operation-uae-ship-rawabee-captured-kill-jews-flood>

Figure 31.9

Houthi naval commando unit members equipped with AK-103. Picture taken during the 21 September 2022 military parade held in Sana'a



Source: <https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2022/09/30/ansar-allah-are-switching-to-the-ak-103/>

Figure 31.10

One of the boarding team members was equipped with a 12.7mm *Khatef* Anti Materiel Rifle (AMR)



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1726648786876043496

Figure 31.11

Khatef AMR in the hands of a Houthi fighter



Source: <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1482848987531169797>

Figure 31.12

Member of the boarding team equipped with a Glock pistol

Figures 31.13 (left) and 31.14 (right)

Glock pistol presented for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas

Glock pistols have been largely documented by the Panel as presented for sale on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=810754580785830&set=pb.100055538851439.-2207520000>

Annex 32: Interview conducted on 20 November 2023 by the Qatari media al Araby al-Jadeed with Hazam al-Assad, member of the Houthis political council



قال عضو المكتب السياسي لجماعة الحوثيين (أنصار الله) حزام الأسد، في تصريحات لبرنامج "مواكبة" على "العربي الجديد - بودكاست"، إن السفينة الإسرائيلية، التي أعلنت الجماعة، أمس الأحد، احتجازها في البحر الأحمر قرب اليمن: "ليست إلا باكورة لعمليات بحرية قادمة سواء في استهداف القطع البحرية والبوارج الإسرائيلية أو السفن التجارية"، لافتاً إلى أن المواجهة مع إسرائيل "لم تؤثر على مجريات المحادثات

Source: al Araby al-Jadeed

Appendix A

Summary of the interview

Hazam al-Assad, a member of the Houthi political council, responding to accusations of Iranian involvement in the hijacking of the ship, said the 'Axis of Resistance' had coordinated with and been guided by Iran, but that the decision to attack had been made by the Houthi forces. He also stated that it was just the beginning of their naval operations.

Annex 33: Houthi missiles, UAVs, USVs, UUVs, SAMs, and other weapon systems destroyed during strikes conducted by the coalition, or intercepted on the way

| Materiel | Destroyed during strikes | Intercepted on the way | Total |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|
| SRMB/MRBM/LACM | 15 | | 15 |
| ASCM/ASBM | 172 | 66 | 238 |
| Missile launcher (without precision) | 15 | | 15 |
| OWA-UAV/UAV | 382 | 35 | 417 |
| Unidentified weapon system | | 20 | 20 |
| Patrol boat | 6 | | 6 |
| USV | 66 | 5 | 71 |
| UUV | 2 | | 2 |
| SAM | 8 | | 8 |
| Radar and air defense sensor | 22 | | 22 |
| Command post and ground control | 7 | | 7 |
| Ammunition storage | 10 | | 10 |
| Helicopter | 2 | | 2 |
| Total | 707 | 126 | 833 |

Source: CENTCOM

Annex 34: Threatening messages sent on 25 April 2024 by HOCC (Houthis) to the bulk carrier Cyclades, sailing under Liberia flag

From: Director@hocc.gov.ye <Director@hocc.gov.ye>

Sent: Friday, April 26, 2024 1:30 AM To: Emergency Responce <ert@eastmed.gr>; media <media@eastmed.gr>; Chartering Dept - Dry Cargo Division - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <drychartering@eastmed.gr>; Contchartering - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <Contchartering@eastmed.gr>; ops-dry <ops-dry@eastmed.gr>; ops-containers <ops-containers@eastmed.gr>; Technical Dept - Dry Cargo Division - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <tech-dry@eastmed.gr>; Insurance & Claims Dept - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <insur-claim@eastmed.gr>; Office Administration - Eastern Mediterranean Athens <admin@eastmed.gr>

Cc: operations@hocc.gov.ye

Subject: IAA-1C2CF6 Violation of the ship CYCLADES of the ships ban criteria – URGENT.

Importance: High

Subject: Violation of the ship CYCLADES of the ships ban criteria – URGENT. To: EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME, ARMAR SHIPPING LTD

Sent: 25/04/2024.

Importance: High.

Good day, This email is sent to you from the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) which is located in the Republic of Yemen - Sana'a. It is a center affiliated to the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Yemen, which was established with the aim of alleviating the humanitarian effects and repercussions in the theater of military operations, by neutralizing civilians and civilian objects and other humanitarian aspects.

According to the information, we would like to inform you that the ship CYCLADES IMO: 9799616, which is considered to be owned/managed/operated by your company, violated the ships ban criteria: (C) Ships heading to Israel ports. By arriving at the port of Eilat, Israel in 21 Apr. 2024.

Therefore, the mentioned ship will be included in the list of ships that are banned from crossing the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, unless you respond to this email.

Therefore, as a part of the safety of ships and their crews, the Yemeni Armed Forces warn the ship owned/managed/operated by your company of continuing to violate the ships ban criteria (C) again.

We will consider stopping your ships' voyages to Israeli ports as the first step in your cooperation, and this is a serious matter that requires your immediate attention. If you do not comply and respond, we confirm that you will bear full responsibility.

We strongly urge you to respond to this email without delay.

Best Regards.

Director of HOCC

Source: Confidential

Annex 35: Threatening messages sent on 22 May 2024 by HOCC (Houthis) to the bulk carrier Alexandria, sailing under Liberia flag

Urgent: Inclusion of the vessel ALEXANDRIA IMO (9448889) in the ban list.

To: Island Oil Holdings Ltd, Petronav Ship Management Ltd,

Sending Date: 22/05/2024. Importance: High

This email is sent to you from the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) which is located in the Republic of Yemen - Sana'a.

It is a center affiliated to the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Yemen, which was established with the aim of alleviating the humanitarian effects and repercussions in the theater of military operations, by neutralizing civilians, civilian objects and other humanitarian aspects.

As the vessel ALEXANDRIA IMO:9448889 which is considered to be owned, managed and operated by your company, has violated the ban criteria: (C) Vessels heading to the usurping Israeli entity ports, and entered the port of Haifa on 5/21/2024.

Therefore, we inform you that the vessel ALEXANDRIA has been included in the ban list within "Sanctions program linked to vessels entering the usurping Israeli entity ports", starting from the date of 03/05/2024.

As a result, the vessel is prohibited from transiting the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, and will be directly targeted by the Yemeni Armed Forces in any area they deem appropriate.


The targeting of Israeli vessels by the Yemeni Armed Forces and preventing the entry of other vessels into the ports of the usurping Israeli entity is based on the religious, humanitarian and moral responsibility towards the oppressed Palestinian people and the unjust siege and the continuation of horrific and heinous massacres by the usurping Israeli entity, and within the framework of the sanctions imposed on it as a result of its aggression, siege, and starvation of the Gaza Strip, the crimes of genocide against the Palestinian people, the killing of children and women, and the prevention of medicine and food entry for more than 8 months.

Therefore, you bear the responsibility and consequences of including the vessel in the ban list, and if your vessels continue to violate the ban criteria and enter the ports of the usurping Israeli entity, sanctions will be imposed on your company and the entire fleet of vessels associated with it.

HOCC Director

Source: Confidential

Annex 36: Decree issued on 17 February 2024 by Mahdi al-Mashat, President of the Houthi supreme political council establishing the HOCC



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About President



[President of Political Council issues decree to establish HOCC](#)

President of Political Council issues decree to establish HOCC

[17/February/2024]

SANA'A February 17. 2024 (Saba) - Decree No. (95) of the year 1445 AH was issued today, Saturday, by the President of the Supreme Political Council establishing the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC).

The decree included four articles. The first article stipulated the establishment of a center called the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC), affiliated with the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, subject to his supervision, and enjoying legal personality, with its main center in the capital, Sana'a.

The second article stipulates that "the Center contributes to mitigating the humanitarian effects and repercussions (on civilians and civilian objects) in the theater of military operations (land, sea and air) through adherence to Islamic teachings , compliance with international humanitarian law , other relevant international laws and conventions in a manner that does not conflict with the interests of the Republic." Yemen or harm it.

Article Three stipulates that the Center has the right to carry out its tasks:

- A- Communication and coordination internally and externally with all parties, governmental and non-governmental agencies and relevant international organizations.
- B- Including representatives from the relevant competent authorities as needed.

Article Four stipulates that this decision shall be effective from the date of its issuance and shall be published in the Official Gazette.

J.A

resource : SABA

Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3305712.htm>

Annex 37: Components of weapons systems and various materiel, which have been intercepted, and documented in previous reports of the Panel

Figure 37.1

MRBMs, LACMs, ASCMs, SAMs, OWA-UAVs, UAVs, DPVs, and UUVs

| Materiel | Qty | Reference |
|--|----------|---|
| MRBM Borkan inertial system | 1 | S/2023/833 , paras. 74-75 |
| MRBM Borkan nose cone | 6 | S/2023/833 , paras. 74-75 |
| MRBM Borkan jet vane | 16 | S/2023/833 , paras. 74-75 |
| MRBM (without precision) engine | 5 | Para. 81 and annexes 107-109 of this report |
| Quds-1 LACM components | 1 | S/2021/79 , table 2 |
| “358” SAM components | 10 | S/2023/130 , paras. 50-53 |
| “358” SAM | 3 | S/2021/79 , table 2 |
| “358” SAM | 2 | S/2021/79 , table 2 |
| DLE-170 drone engine | 100 | S/2023/833 , paras. 91-93 |
| Matrice 300 RTK drone | 1 | S/2023/130 , para. 52 |
| Surveillance drone (without precision) | 200 | S/2023/833 , para. 96 |
| DPV Bonex Constellation | 2 | S/2023/833 , paras. 87-89 |
| UUV components | Multiple | Para. 83 and annex 111 of this report |

Figure 37.2

Electronic materiel or component

| Materiel | Qty | Reference |
|----------------|-----|---------------------------------------|
| EOSS | 1 | S/2023/833 , para. 74 |
| EOSS component | 2 | Para. 83 and annex 111 of this report |

Figure 37.3

SALWs, ammunition and related materiel

| Materiel | Qty | Reference |
|--|-------|---------------------------------------|
| Type 56-1 assault rifle | 1,406 | S/2023/130 , para. 42 |
| Type 56-1 assault rifle | 3,752 | S/2022/50 , para. 62 |
| Type 56-1 assault rifle | 1,918 | S/2023/833 , para. 68 |
| Type 56-1 assault rifle | 2,999 | S/2023/833 , para. 69 |
| Type 56-1 assault rifle | 2,556 | S/2022/50 , para. 65 |
| Type 56-1 assault rifle | 4,300 | S/2021/79 , para. 86 |
| Type 56-1 assault rifle | 2,522 | S/2019/83 , para. 95 |
| AKS20U compact assault rifle | 198 | S/2023/833 , para. 68 |
| AKS20U compact assault rifle | 100 | S/2023/833 , para. 69 |
| AKSU | 35 | S/2022/50 , para. 65 |
| Type 85 sniper rifle | 100 | S/2022/50 , para. 65 |
| Hoshdar-M sniper rifle | 64 | S/2018/193 , table 2 |
| AM-50 Sayyad AMR | 50 | S/2022/50 , para. 62 |
| AM-50 Sayyad AMR | 52 | S/2022/50 , para. 65 |
| AM-50 Sayyad AMR | 59 | S/2021/79 , para. 85 |
| RG 004-A1 optical sight for AM-50 | 50 | S/2022/50 , para. 62 |
| PSOP optical sight for sniper rifle | 35 | S/2021/79 , para. 88 |
| Ghadir II optical sight for sniper rifle | 37 | S/2022/50 , para. 88 |
| Optical sight for sniper rifle | +50 | Para. 86 and annex 118 of this report |
| RU-90/120G thermal sight | 56 | S/2022/50 , para. 88 |

| | | |
|---|--------------|----------------------------|
| RU-100LH laser telemeter | 3 | S/2022/50, annex 14 |
| PKM LMG | 50 | S/2023/833, para. 69 |
| PKM LMG | 198 | S/2022/50, para. 62 |
| PKM LMG | 192 | S/2022/50, para. 65 |
| PKM LMG | 434 | S/2021/79, para. 84 |
| DSHK HMG components | 82 | S/2022/50, para. 62 |
| DSHK HMG Barrel | 60 | S/2021/79, annex 14 |
| RPG-7 | 90 | S/2022/50, para. 62 |
| RPG-7 | 194 | S/2022/50, para. 65 |
| RPG-7 | 200 | S/2021/79, para. 85 |
| RPG-7 | 23 | S/2020/326, para. 61 |
| PGO7-V3 sight for RPG-7 | 45 | S/2020/326, para. 61 |
| RPG-29 | 5 | S/2020/326, annex 14 |
| Dehlavieh ATGM | 23 | S/2023/833, para. 69 |
| Dehlavieh ATGM | 7 | S/2023/833, para. 74 |
| Dehlavieh ATGM | 52 | S/2023/130, para. 56 |
| Dehlavieh ATGM | 191 | S/2021/79, para. 84 |
| Dehlavieh ATGM | 21 | S/2020/326, para. 52 |
| Dehlavieh ATGM | 28 | S/2018/594, paras. 115-116 |
| ATGM launching post (without precision) | 4 | S/2023/833, para. 96 |
| ATGM launching post (without precision) | 15 | S/2023/833, para. 96 |
| 9M111/9M113 ATGM | 50 | S/2022/50, para. 65 |
| 9M113 ATGM | 19 | S/2018/192, annex 12 |
| Toophan ATGM launching post | 3 | S/2018/192, annex 13 |
| Toophan ATGM | 56 | S/2018/192, annex 13 |
| 7.62x54Rmm ammunition | 1,080,000 | S/2023/833, para. 67 |
| 7.62x54Rmm ammunition | 578,400 | S/2023/833, para. 69 |
| 7.62x54Rmm ammunition | 220,000 | S/2023/130, para. 42 |
| 7.62x54Rmm ammunition | 2,640 | S/2023/130, para. 42 |
| 7.62x54Rmm ammunition | 476,000 | S/2021/79, para. 75 |
| 12.7x99mm ammunition for AMR | 25,000 | S/2023/833, para. 67 |
| Fuzes for 122mm rocket for BM-21 MRL | 6,960 | S/2023/833, para. 67 |
| PG-7 strip propellants | 870 boxes | S/2023/833, para. 67 |

Figure 37.4

Others

| Matériel | Qty | Reference |
|-------------------------------------|----------|--------------------------|
| Electric detonator | 40,000 | S/2023/833, paras. 77-78 |
| Reel of detonating cord | 100 | S/2023/833, paras. 77-78 |
| Explosive precursors | 5 tons | S/2023/833, paras. 85-86 |
| Explosive precursors | 40 tons | S/2023/130, paras. 44-47 |
| Explosive precursors | 170 tons | S/2023/130, para. 48 |
| Explosive precursors | 697 bags | S/2021/79, para.75 |
| Cylinder for scuba diving equipment | 200 | S/2023/130, para. 96 |

Annex 38: Article published on 29 May 2024 by the Iranian media Tasnim News stating that the achievement of Shahid Tehrani Moghadam is today in the hands of the Yemeni Mujahideen as an anti-ship weapon

29 May 2024 by Tasnim News (Iranian media)

Modeling Yemeni fighters from Iran's missile technology

Iran's first maritime ballistic missile named "Qadr" was built by Shahid Hassan Tehrani Moghadam, and now, after several years, the same technology is available to the Yemeni Mujahideen.

Defense Group of Tasnim News Agency Seyed Mohammad Taheri: Without a doubt, the missile capability of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force is one of the most important aspects of the Islamic Republic of Iran's deterrence capability, and the achievement of this capability is due to the efforts and efforts of unknown generals and scientists, among them the martyred general Hassan Tehrani Moghadam Nakhshi. It has played an irreplaceable role.

Many of the country's defense products and achievements in the field of missiles were founded by this honorable martyr and today it has become a powerful tool for defense against any threat.

But in the meantime, the achievement of anti-ship ballistic missile technology can be considered a turning point in the country's missile capabilities, which was followed from idea to product by Shahid Tehrani Moghadam.

The sensitive and strategic area of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, together with the Oman Sea, all of whose northern shores are part of our country's territory, is one of the most important economic bottlenecks in the world, especially in the field of energy, which has caused all the powers of the world to have a desire for many years. With the presence of the military in this region, they use their power to secure their sometimes-illegitimate interests. On the other hand, the economic beating heart of our country is also located in this region.

These features have caused extra-regional forces to always threaten the Islamic Republic of Iran with the presence of their military fleet in this region, so that they can impose their policies on Iran and the countries of the region.

The easy movement of extra-regional military vessels in the Persian Gulf continued until our country did not have a suitable weapon to deal with American vessels to drive them away from its shores. The attack of the American forces on Afghanistan and Iraq also caused an increase in the presence of the American fleet and extra-regional forces in the Persian Gulf, and this led to a struggle at the level of senior commanders to obtain a weapon that could keep the American forces away from the shores of Iran.

At this time, Shahid Tehrani Moghadam comes into action without having direct responsibility in the field of naval weapons. Shahid Tehrani Moghadam's idea was to build a naval ballistic missile, even though there was no such weapon in the country's armed forces until then.



Thunder 69

At that time, the IRGC's most accurate operational missile was the Thunder 69 missile. Thunder 69 was actually the Chinese B610 missile that was purchased by the IRGC from China in 1369 (1990). The Chinese missile was actually a surface-to-surface SAM-2 air defense missile and had a range of 150 km.

Shahid Tehrani Moghadam's idea was based on this axis to design an anti-ship ballistic missile by changing the use of Thunder 69 missile. Based on this, a project named "Qadr" is keyed in the self-sufficiency jihad of the IRGC Air Force.

But this project has faced many issues. Anti-ship missiles in that period were mainly cruise missiles that have a straight trajectory, but the ground-to-ground ballistic missile has a curved trajectory and is designed to target fixed targets, and building a ballistic missile that can target moving targets is difficult. It was very difficult. At the same time, the specialists of the Ministry of Defense had also started the construction of the anti-ship cruise missile in the form of the "Yaali" project.

Finally, with the support of Sardar Shahid Ahmed Kazemi, who was in command of the IRGC Air Force at that time, the Tander surface-to-surface missile became an anti-floating missile.

A lot of tests are done for the Qadr anti-submarine missile to be operational, but the final test is done when Shahid Tehrani Moghadam is no longer responsible for the air force's jihad, but he will be present at Lake Urmia for the final test.

On the day of the missile test, the weather in Lake Urmia will be cloudy, and this makes the success of the work doubtful. But by the grace of God, an opening is opened in the clouds and the order to fire is issued. The missile is fired and by passing through the opening between the clouds and locking onto the predetermined target, it hits and destroys it precisely. Later, the achievements of this missile will be used in the design and construction of "Persian Gulf" and "Hormoz" missiles.

In this way, the "Qadr" missile becomes the first Iranian anti-ship ballistic missile. Now years have passed since then, and the achievement of Shahid Tehrani Moghadam is today in the hands of the Yemeni Mujahideen as an anti-ship weapon.

The "Environment" missile of the Yemeni armed forces is actually designed with the exact model of the Iranian Qadr anti-ship missile. The Yemeni army also had a significant number of SAM-2 defense missiles for years. With the start of the Saudi invasion of Yemen, these defense missiles became Qahir 2 and Qahir 2 ground-to-ground missiles, which carried out successful operations against the Saudi army and its allies.

However, during the parade of Ansar Allah's forces, the anti-submarine model of Qahir missiles, which was now equipped with an optical seeker to target enemy ships, like the Iranian Qadr, was displayed under the name "Environment".

This issue indicates that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been able to pursue the level of support for the resistance front higher than before in recent years, and in addition to all-round support for this front, it has put the transfer of technology in order to make the resistance groups more powerful. An issue that has led to the formation of an integrated command and control network in the region, especially in the fields of drones and missiles.

Now, the missile that was once able to keep the Americans away from Iran's shores has turned into a weapon that has been able to face serious challenges to the interests of the United States and its main ally in the region, the Zionist regime.

Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/03/09/3094099/> قدر-اولین-موشک-بالستیک-ضدکشتی-ایران-در-اختیار-انصارالله-یمن

Annex 39: Article published on 29 May 2024 by the Iranian media Tasnim News stating that Iranian naval ballistic missile's technology is at disposal of Yemen

29 May 2024 by Tasnim News (Iranian media)

Inspired by Iran, the Yemeni military forces have obtained the technology to manufacture anti-ship ballistic missiles.

Iran's first homegrown naval ballistic missile, called 'Qadr', was developed by late Iranian commander Brigadier General Hassan Tehrani-Moqaddam more than a decade ago.

Iran's technical know-how to produce such anti-ship missiles is now at the disposal of the Yemeni military forces.

Patterned after the Iranian missile, Yemen's 'Muhit' (Ocean) missile is capable of detonating naval targets.

The Yemeni Army has been in possession of surface-to-air missiles for many years. After the invasion of Yemen by a Saudi-led coalition in March 2015, the Yemeni forces converted the SAMs into surface-to-surface missiles, known as Qaher-2 and Qaher-2M, which carried out many successful operations against hostile targets.

Source: https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2024/05/29/3094955/iranian-naval-ballistic-missile-s-technology-at-disposal-of-yemen?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTA-AAR2s06j6TwTDIi61e7PsDFzEdejmcJfM1Byl7jlWBkAQxZhne4IgVzN01gE_aem_Acim3z2OWs-fiVweSvZuT6ff_dTRhbY3u9Jvx_d0SjamS8YmxuF8TIpOvmTuzea7WyLUrib0-n21ZsjTDO05sOwvJ

Annex 40: Table illustrating materiel with similar characteristics documented in the hands of the Houthis, in Iran, and in the hands of several armed groups belonging to the ‘Axis of Resistance’


| Documented with the Houthis | Designation by Iran | Documented with an AG | Annex |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|-------|
| SRBM | | | |
| Borkan-2H | Qiam | | 41 |
| Borkan-3 | Revzan | | 42 |
| Falaq | Qiam | | 43 |
| Qarar | Zolfagar | Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq | 44 |
| Tankil | Raad 500 | | 45 |
| Hatem | Khaybar Shekan | | 46 |
| Palestine | Khaybar Shekan | | 47 |
| Qaher-1 | Tondar-69 | | 48 |
| Qaher-M2 | | | 49 |
| MRBM | | | |
| Toofan | Shahab-3 | | 50 |
| Aqeel | Qiam family | | 51 |
| LACM | | | |
| Quds-1 | Similarities with Soumar | Islamic Resistance in Iraq | 52 |
| Quds-2 | | PMF, Iraq | 53 |
| Quds-3 | | | 54 |
| Quds-4 | | Islamic Resistance in Iraq | 55 |
| ASCM | | | |
| C-802 | C-802 | Hezbollah, Lebanon | 56 |
| Al Mandab-1 | Similarities with 351 | | 57 |
| Al Mandab-2 | Ghadir/Noor | | 58 |
| ASBM | | | |
| Faleq-1 | Fajr-4CL | | 59 |
| Long range guided rocket | | | |
| Badr-2 | Fajr-5 | | 60 |
| UAV | | | |
| Mersad-2 | Chamrosh-4 | | 61 |
| Waeed-1 | Shahed-131 | | 62 |
| Waeed-2 | Shahed-136 | | 63 |
| Rased | Chamrosh | Hezbollah, Lebanon, and PMF, Iraq | 64 |
| Qasef-2K | Ababil | Hezbollah, Lebanon, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, Liwa al-Ghaliboun, Iraq, and Islamic Resistance in Iraq | 65 |
| Samad-1 | Sayyad | Lebanon and Iraq | 66 |
| Samad-2 | | PMF, Iraq, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and Al-Ashtar, Bahrain | |
| Samad-3 | | Hezbollah, Lebanon | |
| Khatif-2 | Shahed 101 | Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, Saraya Aba-beel, Iraq, and Islamic Resistance in Iraq | 67 |
| Rujum | Observed Denomination unknown | | 68 |
| SAM | | | |
| Saqr-1 | SAM-358 | Hezbollah, Lebanon, and unidentified AG, Iraq | 69 |
| Barq-2 | Taer-2B/Khordad-3 | | 70 |
| MANPADS | | | |
| Documented with Houthis | Misagh-2 | Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq | 71 |
| ATGM | | | |
| Documented with Houthis | Saegheh-2 | Hezbollah, Lebanon, and PMF, Iraq | 72 |
| Documented with Houthis | Toophan | Hezbollah, Lebanon, PMF, Iraq, and Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq | 73 |
| Documented with Houthis | Dehlavieh | Hezbollah, Lebanon, Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, PMF, Iraq | 74 |
| EOSS | | | |
| Sadiq | IRSS-I-3 Saadad | PMF, Iraq | 75.1 |

| | | | |
|-------------------------|------------------|--|------|
| Shafak | EOSS I-103 | | 75.2 |
| Ofok | EOSS I-103 | | 75.3 |
| SALW | | | |
| Documented with Houthis | KL assault rifle | Somalia | 144 |
| Documented with Houthis | M80 LMG | Al-Shabaab, Somalia | 142 |
| Documented with Houthis | AM-50 AMR | Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, Hezbollah, Lebanon, Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq, Saraya al-Salam, Iraq, Sinjar Resistance Units, Iraq, Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq, and Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Iraq | 76 |
| Documented with Houthis | Qader 40mm | | 77 |
| Documented with Houthis | RPG Saegheh | Hezbollah, Lebanon, PMF, Iraq | 80 |
| Mortar | | | |
| Rujoom 120mm | HM-16 | Al-Quds brigades, occupied Palestinian territory, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory | 78 |
| Rujoom 60mm | HM-12 or HM-14 | Al-Quds brigades, occupied Palestinian territory, Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, and Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory | 79 |
| Thermal sight | | | |
| Documented with Houthis | RU-60G | PMF, Iraq, Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq, and PKK, Iraq | 81 |
| Land mine | | | |
| Documented with Houthis | M18A2 | Recovered in Syria | 82 |
| Sea mine | | | |
| Thaqib (MTA) | Limpet mine | | 83 |

Annex 41: Comparison between *Borkhan-2H* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Qiam* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 41.1

Borkhan-2H SRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://weaponsreputation.com/weapons/burkan-2h.php>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, Annexes 32-33, 36, S/2018/594, paras. 80–91, S/2019/83, para. 89, S/2018/594, table 34.4, annex 36

Figure 41.2

Qiam SRBM produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2010/08/iran-test-fires-new-qiam-1-ballistic.html>

Annex 42: Comparison between *Borkhan-3* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Revzan* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 42.1

***Borkhan-3* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/1

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, Annex 30, figure 56.2

Figure 42.2

***Revzan* SRBM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/476984/Iran-discloses-surface-to-surface-ballistic-missile-with-1400-km>

Annex 43: Comparison between *Falaq* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Qiam* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 43.1
Falaq SRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018084874956885/photo/4>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 56, S/2023/130, figure 10.9

Figure 43.2
Qiam SRBM produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2010/08/iran-test-fires-new-qiam-1-ballistic.html>

Annex 44: Comparison between *Qarar* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, *Fateh-110* / *Zolfagar* SRBM produced by Iran, *Aqsa-1* SRBM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, and *Jamal-69* SRBM operated by Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq

Figure 44.1
***Qarar* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704893550586991094

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 56.5

Figure 44.2
***Zolfagar* SRBM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/09/25/1195645/iran-releases-video-of-launch-of-new-ballistic-missile> <https://www.flickr.com/photos/theisraelproject/11406979775/>

Figure 44.3
Aqsa-1 SRBM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://theaviationist.com/2023/11/14/new-al-aqsa-1-ballistic-missile/>

Figure 44.4
Jamal-69 SRBM operated by Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq



Source: <https://www.taghribnews.com/fa/news/548016/>

Annex 45: Comparison between *Tankil* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Raad 500* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 45.1

***Tankil* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**

Source: https://twitter.com/iranianmil_ar/status/1704996859742408765/photo/1

Figure 45.2

***Raad 500* SRBM produced by Iran**

Source: <https://en.irna.ir/news/83667792/Iran-unveils-Raad-500-missile>

Annex 46: Comparison between *Hatem* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Khaybar Shekan* SRBM produced by Iran


Figure 46.1
***Hatem* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704891978243088890/photo/1

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 56.4

Figures 46.2 (left) and 46.3 (right)
***Khaybar Shekan* SRBM produced by Iran**




Source figure 46.2: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/186257/Iran-s-latest-ballistic-missiles-unveiled-on-Quds-Day>

Source figure 46.3: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1806261755821121812/photo/2

:


Annex 47: Comparison between *Palestine* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Khaybar Shekan* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 47.1
Palestine SRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://x.com/AmirIGM/status/1798447207080702086/photo/1>

Figures 47.2 (left) and 47.3 (right)
Khaybar Shekan SRBM produced by Iran



Source figure 47.2: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/186257/Iran-s-latest-ballistic-missiles-unveiled-on-Quds-Day>

Source figure 47.3: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1806261755821121812/photo/2

Annex 48: Comparison between *Qaher-1* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Tondar-69* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 48.1

Qaher-1 SRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: https://x.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704917288334328131/photo/1

References in previous reports: S/2018/594, table 34.4, S/2018/193, annex 42, table 42.2

Figure 48.2

Tondar-69 SRBM produced by Iran



Source: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1360741334739537921/photo/1

Annex 49: Comparison between *Qaher-M2* SRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Tondar-69* SRBM produced by Iran

Figure 49.1

***Qaher-M2* SRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/2

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 56.7

Figure 49.2

***Tondar-69* SRBM produced by Iran**



Source: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1360741334739537921/photo/1


Annex 50: Comparison between *Toofan* MRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Shahab-3* MRBM produced by Iran

Figure 50.1
Toofan MRBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1704915482535440407/photo/1


Figure 50.2
Shahab-3 MRBM produced by Iran



Source: <https://nuke.fas.org/guide/iran/missile/shahab-3.htm>

Annex 51: Comparison between *Aqeel* MRBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Qiam* MRBM produced by Iran

Figure 51.1
***Aqeel* MRBM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1704918186443833561/photo/1

Figure 51.2
MRBM *Qiam* produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/qiam-1-mod-tasnim-2020-01-03.jpg>

Annex 52: Comparison between *Quds-1* LACM displayed by the Houthis, *Soumar* LACM produced by Iran, and a LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Figure 52.1
***Quds-1* LACM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1208062/meet-the-quds-1/>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, Annex 61.1, S/2021/79, para.79, and S/2020/326, paras. 13, 16, 58–60, figures 5, 14.7-14.8, 20.10, annex 16

Figure 52.2
***Soumar* LACM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/03/iran-publicly-unveils-soumar-land.html>

Figure 52.3
LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://twitter.com/mhmiranusa/status/177753023784623328/photo/1>

Annex 53: Comparison between *Quds-2* LACM displayed by the Houthis, *Soumar* LACM produced by Iran, and a LACM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq

Figure 53.1
Quds-2 LACM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGfJgU>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, Annex 51-5, figure 61.2, S/2023/130, figures 5.11-5.19, S/2022/50, annex 16, and S/2020/326, footnote 47 of the para. 57

Figure 53.2
***Soumar* LACM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/03/iran-publicly-unveils-soumar-land.html>

Figures 53.3 (left), and 53.4 (right)
LACM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq



Source (left): <https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq/iraqi-police-discover-iranian-cruise-missile-failed-to-launch/>

Source (right): <https://english.almanar.com.lb/2111540>

Annex 54: Comparison between *Quds-3* LACM displayed by the Houthis, and *Soumar* LACM produced by Iran

Figure 54.1

Quds-3 LACM displayed by the Houthis



صواريخ اليمن في عرض العيد الثامن للثورة الـ21 من سبتمبر "اليد الطولى في ردع الأعداء"

Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1woQtGJfJgU>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 61.3

Figure 54.2

Soumar LACM produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/03/iran-publicly-unveils-soumar-land.html>

Annex 55: Comparison between *Quds-4* LACM displayed by the Houthis, *Paveh-04* LACM produced by Iran, and a LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Figure 55.1
***Quds-4* LACM displayed by the Houthis**




Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3266848.htm>

Figure 55.2
***Paveh-04* LACM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1705231960598069648/photo/1>

Figure 55.3
LACM operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1720295088083943843/photo/1>

Annex 56: C-802 ASCM operated by the Houthis, the C-802 / Noor ASCM operated by Iran, and C-802 ASCM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon

Figure 56.1

C-802 ASCM operated by the Houthis



Source: Panel

References in previous reports: [S/2020/326](#), para. 52, and annex 20, and [S/2019/83](#), paras. 80-82, annex 11, figure 11.7

Figure 56.2


C-802 / Noor ASCM operated by Iran



Source: <https://asian-defence-news.blogspot.com/2015/11/iranian-mi17-with-c-802-version-of.html>

Figures 56.3 (left) and 56.4 (right)

C-802 ASCM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source figure 56.3: <https://iranpress.com/hezbollah-s-c-802-anti-ship-cruise-missiles>

Source figure 56.4: <https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2019/09/16/hezbollah-se-jacto-de-un-nuevo-misil-capaz-de-destruir-cualquier-buque-de-guerra-y-matar-a-todos-a-bordo/>

Annex 57: Comparison between *Al-Mandab-1* ASCM displayed by the Houthis, and *Ghadir/Noor* ASCM produced by Iran

Figure 57.1
Al-Mandab-1 ASCM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://youtu.be/igDWAJ-QoDA>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 71.1, S/2023/130, figure 10.2, and S/2019/83, para. 81, annex 1

Figure 57.2
Ghadir/Noor ASCM produced by Iran



Source: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/112393/Navy-equipped-with-long-range-cruise-missile-Ghadir>

Annex 58: Comparison between *Mandab-2* ASCM displayed by the Houthis, and *Ghadir/Noor* ASCM produced by Iran

Figure 58.1

***Mandab-2* ASCM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://youtu.be/igDWAJ-QoDA>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 71.2, S/2023/130, figures 10.5-10.6, and S/2019/83, para. 81

Figure 58.2

***Ghadir/Noor* ASCM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/112393/Navy-equipped-with-long-range-cruise-missile-Ghadir>

Annex 59: Comparison between *Faleq-1* ASBM displayed by the Houthis, and *Fajr-4CL* ASBM produced by Iran

Figure 59.1
Faleq-1 ASBM displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018166399602805/photo/2>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 71.3, and S/2023/130, annex 10

Figure 59.2
Fajr-4CL ASBM produced by Iran



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranMilitaryNet/status/1635764125287477256/photo/1>

Annex 60: Comparison between *Badr-2* Long-range guided rocket displayed by the Houthis, and *Fajr-5* Long-range guided rocket produced by Iran

Figure 60.1
***Badr-2* Long-range guided rocket displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/550566>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 57.3

Figure 60.2
***Fajr-5* Long-range guided rocket produced by Iran**



Source: <https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2017/iran-unveils-new-fajr-5-300mm-mlrs-multiple-launch-rocket-system-using-guided-rockets-10702171>

Annex 61: Comparison between Mersad-2 UAV displayed by the Houthis, and Chamrosh-4 UAV produced by Iran

Figure 61.1

Mersad-2 UAV displayed by the Houthis

Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/550566>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.2

Figure 61.2

Chamrosh-4 UAV produced by Iran

Source: https://x.com/nasir_military/status/1705189224805462455/photo/3

Annex 62: Comparison between *Waeed-1* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Shahed 131* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, and OWA-UAV similar to *Shahed 131* reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)

Figure 62.1

***Waeed-1* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704953936484970662

Figures 62.2 (left) and 62.3 (right)

***Shahed 131* OWA-UAV produced by Iran**



Source figure 62.2: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2024/02/20/3042241/irgc-ground-force-equipped-with-suicide-combat-drones>

Source figure 62.3: <https://www.shutterstock.com/fr/editorial/image-editorial/veiled-iranian-schoolgirls-stand-front-iran%27s-shahed-131-141468061>

Figures 62.4 (left) and 62.5 (right)

OWA-UAV similar to *Shahed 131* reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/06/the-islamic-resistance-in-iraq-increases-its-drone-attacks-on-israel.php>

Annex 63: Comparison between *Waeed-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Shahed 136* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, and OWA-UAV similar to *Shahed 136* operated by the PMF, Iraq

Figure 63.1

***Waeed-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/550566>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.4, S/2023/130, para. 57, S/2022/50, para. 60, and S/2020/326, paras. 51 and 52

Figures 63.2 (left) and 63.3 (right)

***Shahed 136* OWA-UAV produced by Iran**



Source figure 63.2: <https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2023/11/25/the-drone-index-aio-hesa-shahed-136/>

Source figure 63.3: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/12/iran-unveils-new-karrar-drones-upgraded-air-air-missiles>

Figure 63.4

OWA-UAV similar to *Shahed 136* operated by the PMF, Iraq



Source: <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/iraqi-resistance-attacks-a-vital-israeli-site-in-eilat>

Annex 64: Comparison between *Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Chamrosh* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, *Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by the Hezbollah, Lebanon, and *Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by PMF, Iraq

Figure 64.1

***Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://postimg.cc/ZWvdByVF>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.3, and S/2019/83, para. 83, and S/2018/594, para.102, annex 39

Figures 64.2 (left) and 64.3 (right)

***Chamrosh* OWA-UAV operated by Iran**



Source figure 64.2: <https://sg.news.yahoo.com/finance/news/south-korean-tanker-boarded-armed-052526366.html>

Source figure 64.3: <https://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/8553112/مراسم-رژه-نیروهای-مسلح-به-مناسبت-آغاز-هفته-دفاع-مقدس-استان-ها>

Figures 64.4 (left) and 64.5 (right)

***Rased* OWA-UAV displayed by the Hezbollah, Lebanon**



Source: <https://www.militantwire.com/p/weapons-used-by-hezbollah-during>

Figures 64.6 (left) and 64.7 (right)
Rased OWA-UAV displayed by PMF, Iraq



Source figure 64.6: <https://x.com/JasonMBrodsky/status/1408766077396570114/photo/2>

Source figure 64.7: <https://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/25062021>

Annex 65: Comparison between *Qasef-2K* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Ababil-2* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, *Mirsad-1* OWA-UAV operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon, *Shebab* OWA-UAV operated by Hamas, Palestinian occupied territory, OWA-UAV similar to *Ababil-2* operated by Liwa al-Ghaliboun, Iraq, and OWA-UAV similar to *Ababil-2* operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)

Figure 65.1
Qasef-2K OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://i.postimg.cc/rsxzSj8H/D-4-LBO2-VUAAAn-LNl.jpg>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.7

Figure 65.2
Ababil-2 OWA-UAV produced by Iran



Source: <https://en.topwar.ru/213983-mnogocelevoj-bpla-ababil-2-iran.html>

Figures 65.3 (left) and 65.4 (right)
Mirsad-1 OWA-UAV operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source figure 65.3: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1800986950356045889/photo/2

Source figure 65.4: <https://x.com/JoeTruzman/status/1806322092788592679>

Figures 65.5 (left) and 65.6 (right)
Shebab OWA-UAV operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source figure 65.5: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-rockets-palestinian-groups>

Source figure 65.6: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/hamas-bets-locally-made-drones-next-confrontation-israel>

Figure 65.7
OWA-UAV similar to Ababil-2 operated by Liwa al-Ghaliboun, Iraq



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1640345398521786368/photo/1>

Figure 65.8
OWA-UAV similar to Ababil-2 operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://x.com/azelin/status/1744506225008464267/photo/1>

Annex 66: Comparison between *Samad-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Sayyad* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Al-Ashtar, a Bahraini Shia militant group

Figure 66.1
***Samad-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://twitter.com/IbnSiqilli/status/1574590410894151682/photo/3>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.8, S/2020/326, para. 56, and S/2019/83, paras. 84-85, 87, annex 12

Figures 66.2 (left) and 66.3 (right)
***Sayyad* OWA-UAV produced by Iran**



Source figure 66.2: <https://twitter.com/mhmiranusa/status/1638145845106278400>

Source figure 66.3: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1705232648791052295/photo/4>

Figures 66.4 (left) and 66.5 (right)
OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq



Source figure 66.4: <https://x.com/JasonMBrotsky/status/1408766077396570114/photo/1>

Source figure 66.5: <https://t.me/Alimido13/886>

[https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/Sahab drone at Camp Ashraf%2C June 26%2C 2021.jpg](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/Sahab%20drone%20at%20Camp%20Ashraf%20June%2026%202021.jpg)

Figure 66.6
OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian occupied territory



Source: https://x.com/imp_navigator/status/1711308309871943714/photo/2

Figure 66.7
OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source: https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/1744708216989061132/photo/1 https://x.com/imp_navigator/status/1711308309871943714/photo/2

Figures 66.8 (left) and 66.9 (right)
OWA-UAV similar to *Sayyad* reportedly operated by Al-Ashtar, a Bahraini Shia militant group



Figures 66.10 and 66.11
Close-up on the “QC” sticker, similar to those already documented on materiel with similar characteristics to those manufactured in Iran



Source: https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1786082957502841143

Annex 67: Comparison between *Khatif-2* OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis, *Shahed 101* OWA-UAV produced by Iran, *Jenin* OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, *Murad-5* OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Saraya Ababeel, Iraq, and *Murad-5* OWA-UAV reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq

Figure 67.1
Khatif-2 OWA-UAV displayed by the Houthis



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705030787123323174

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 59.11

Figures 67.2 (left), and 67.3 (right)
Shahed 101 OWA-UAV produced by Iran



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1645062026123681795/photo/2>

Figure 67.4
Jenin OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: <https://thecradle.co/articles-id/3960>

Figure 67.5
Murad-5 OWA-UAV reportedly operated by Saraya Ababeel, Iraq



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3310954.htm>

Figure 67.6
Murad-5 OWA-UAV reportedly operated by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq



Source: <https://en.irna.ir/news/85504960/Iraqi-resistance-launches-drone-attack-against-Israeli-base>

Annex 68: Comparison between *Rujum* UAV displayed by the Houthis, and UAV displayed by the Iranian armed forces

Figure 68.1
***Rujum* UAV displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://x.com/VleckieHond/status/1557346455316271104/photo/1>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figures 59.12, 60.3, and 60.5, S/2022/50, figure 18.4

Figures 68.2 (left) and 68.3 (right)
UAV displayed by the Islamic Republic of Iran armed forces (IRIAF)



Source figure 68.2: <https://english.iswnews.com/27708/iran-army-ground-forces-receive-military-equipment/>

Source figure 68.3: <https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/iran-reveals-upgraded-multi-rotor-smart-bomber-drone-in-recent-military-drills-2023-10-31-0/>

Annex 69: Comparison between *Saqr-1* SAM displayed by the Houthis, “358” SAM produced by Iran, “358” SAM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon, and “358” SAM observed in Iraq

Figure 69.1
***Saqr-1* SAM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202302010186>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 62.1, S/2023/130, paras. 51, 53, figures 18.10-18.18, S/2022/50, para. 61, S/2021/79, table 2, figure 13.7, annexes 19-20, and S/2020/326, para. 52, figures 20.4-20.8

Figure 69.2
“358” SAM produced by Iran



Source: <https://x.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1704477188328665175/photo/2>

Figures 69.3 (left) and 69.4 (right)
“358” SAM operated by the Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source: <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2023-11-29/ty-article/saqr-358-iran-hezbollah-loitering-missile-israel-us-uavs-yemen-houthis/0000018c-1ac5-d3b6-adeb-bbfd2efd0000>

Figure 69.5
“358” SAM documented in Iraq (near a US base)



Source: <https://x.com/JosephHDempsey/status/1451577368410214408/photo/3>

Annex 70: Similarities of the characteristics of the *Barq-2* SAM operated by the Houthis and the *Khordad-3* SAM produced by Iran

Figure 70.1

***Barq-2* SAM operated by the Houthis**



Source: <https://twitter.com/mamashami/status/1704881294335734060/photo/2>

Figure 70.2

***Khordad-3* SAM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1705234591496167672/photo/1>

Annex 71: *Misgah-2* Manpads displayed by the Houthis, -2 Manpads produced by Iran, and *Misgah-2* Manpads reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq

Figure 71.1
***Misgah-2* Manpads displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://postimg.cc/8JKf3gYY>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 62.4

Figure 71.2
***Misgah-2* Manpads produced by Iran**



Source: <https://en.topwar.ru/116150-pvo-islamskoy-respubliki-iran-chast-3.html>

Figure 71.3
***Misgah-2* Manpads reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq**



Source: https://x.com/green_lemonnn/status/610173400376569858

Annex 72: Saegheh-2 ATGM displayed by the Houthis, Saegheh-2 ATGM produced by Iran, Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by PMF, Iraq

Figures 72.1 (left), and 72.2 (right)

Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by the Houthis



Source figure 72.1: <https://x.com/Mansourtalk/status/897833730508763136/photo/1>

Source figure 72.2: https://x.com/Harry_Boone/status/837943165235695617/photo/1

Figures 72.3 (left), and 72.4 (right)

Saegheh-2 ATGM displayed by Iran



Source figure 72.3: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2008/05/iranian-anti-tank-guided-missiles.html>

Source figure 72.4: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2010/08/irgc-video-documentary-farsi.html>

Figure 72.5

Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1725592679323426980/photo/1>

Figure 72.6
Saegheh-2 ATGM operated by PMF, Iraq



Source: <https://x.com/klkamashiq/status/881446623095685120/photo/3>

Annex 73: *Toophan* ATGM displayed by the Houthis, *Toophan* ATGM produced by Iran, *Toophan* ATGM reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, *Toophan* ATGM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, and *Toophan* ATGM reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq

Figure 73.1
***Toophan* ATGM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://i.postimg.cc/5yNPY8pF/image.jpg>

References in previous reports: S/2018/192, para. 82, annex 12

Figures 73.2 (left) and 73.3 (right)
***Toophan* ATGM produced by Iran**



Source figure 73.2: <https://english.iswnews.com/29718/military-knowledge-toophan-anti-tank-missiles/>

Source figure 73.3: https://www.reddit.com/r/awesometechnicals/comments/jtwthy/iranian_safir_jeeps_with_toophan_atgms/

Figure 73.4
Toophan ATGM reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source: https://x.com/green_lemonnn/status/682496740143042560

Figure 73.5
Toophan ATGM reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq



Source: <https://x.com/IraqiSecurity/status/717053810854793216/photo/1>

Figure 73.6
Toophan ATGM reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/11/soleimani-among-iran-equipped-iraqi.html>

Annex 74: *Dehlavieh* ATGM displayed by the Houthis, *Dehlavieh* ATGM produced by Iran, *Dehlavieh* ATGM displayed by Hezbollah, Lebanon, *Dehlavieh* ATGM displayed by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, and *Dehlavieh* ATGM displayed by the PMF, Iraq

Figure 74.1

***Dehlavieh* ATGM displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://debrief.net/en/news-30800.html>

References in previous reports: S/2023/833, paras. 69 and 74, S/2023/130, para. 56, S/2021/79, para. 84 and annex 13, S/2020/326, para. 52, annex 20, S/2018/193, figure 35.12, figures 37.5-37.6, S/2018/594, paras. 115-116, figures 42.1-42.3, and S/2017/91, table 4

Figure 74.2

***Dehlavieh* ATGM produced by Iran**



Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/media/2015/09/26/871344/photos-iran-s-army-ground-force-receives-new-home-grown-equipment-photo=12>

Figures 74.3 (left) and 73.4 (right)
Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source figure 74.3: <https://www.militantwire.com/p/weapons-used-by-hezbollah-during>

Source figure 74.4: <https://www.islamtimes.org/en/news/1137037/when-sayyed-raisi-met-hezbollah-fighters-prayed-for-its-leadership>

Figure 74.5
Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2014/12/izz-ad-din-al-qassam-brigades-parade-at.html>

Figure 74.6
Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by the PMF, Iraq



Source: <https://english.iswnews.com/24403/the-pmu-commemorate-its-8th-anniversary-unveiling-new-weaponry/>

Annex 75.1: Comparison between *Sadiq* EOSS displayed by the Houthis, and *IRSS-I-3 Saadad* EOSS produced by Iran

Figure 75.1.1
Sadiq EOSS displayed by the Houthis



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alidarawani/status/1704866265569882588/photo/4>


References in previous reports: S/2023/833, figure 63.1

Figure 75.1.2
IRSS-I-3 Saadad EOSS produced by Iran



Source: <https://www.mindexcenter.ir/node/1015>

Figure 75.1.3
IRSS-I-3 Saadad EOSS reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq



كما شارك في العرض عدة أنواع من عائلة صدد (Stopper) الإيرانية المركبة على المركبات لأنظمة المراقبة الكهروضوئية ، لتشمل طرازتي Sadad-103 و -202 ، وبعضها مجهز بـ RU-1000 يوم / كاميرا حرارية مبردة ليلاً مستخدمة على نطاق واسع من قبل فيلق الحرس الثوري الإسلامي (IRGC) جنباً إلى جنب مع أنظمة الدفاع الجوي على ارتفاعات منخفضة. يتم تسويق هذه الأنظمة البصرية على أنها قادرة على اكتشاف البشر من مسافة تصل إلى 10 كم والمركبات من مسافة تزيد عن 20 كم أثناء النهار أو الليل

Unofficial translation:

Several variants of Iran's vehicle-mounted *Sadad* (Stopper) family of electro-optical surveillance systems also participated in the display, to include the *Sadad*-103 and -202 models, some of which are equipped with the RU-1000 day/night-cooled thermal camera widely used by the IRG combined with low-altitude air defence systems. These optical systems are marketed as being able to detect humans from up to 10 km away and vehicles from over 20 km away during the day or night.

Source: <https://ida2at.org/article/19939>

Annex 75.2: Comparison between *Shafak* EOSS displayed by the Houthis, and *EOSS I-103*, produced by Iran

Figure 75.2.1
***Shafak* EOSS displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleekieHond/status/1705240052878520524/photo/3>

Figure 75.2.2
***I-103* EOSS produced by Iran**



EOSS-I-103
Passive Electro Optical Surveillance System



The EOSS-I 103 is an ideal system for long range surveillance, observation and monitoring of land, air and sea related operations. The system is designed in a modular construction for conversion and adapting system performance to mission parameters. A variety of sensors and control equipment have been integrated, including precise high speed payload, infrared and visible cameras with variable focal length lenses and a laser range finder.

Source: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Annex 75.3: Comparison between *Ofok* EOSS displayed by the Houthis, and *I-103* EOSS produced by Iran

Figure 75.3.1
***Ofok* EOSS displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1705240052878520524>

Figure 75.3.2
***I-103* EOSS produced by Iran**



Source: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Annex 76: *AM-50 “Sayyad”* AMR displayed by the Houthis, *AM-50* AMR produced by Iran, *Ghoul* AMR reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Kata’ib Hizballah, Iraq, *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Saraya al-Salam, Iraq, *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Sinjar Resistance Units, Iraq, *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah Al-Nujaba, Iraq, and *AM-50* AMR reportedly operated by Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Iraq

Figure 76.1
***AM-50 “Sayyad”* AMR displayed by the Houthis**



Source: <https://medium.com/@jmkoon2/geolocating-an-iranian-am-50-sayyad-sniper-rifle-in-majaza-battlefront-baqim-district-saada-98bc4bec2c59>

References in previous reports: S/2022/50, paras. 62 and 64, figures 20.19-20.22, S/2021/79, para. 85, table 2, figures 14.10-14.11, and S/2018/193, figures 38.3-38.4

Figures 76.2 (left) and 76.3 (right)
***AM-50* AMR produced by Iran**



Source figure 76.2: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/03/16/1029798/iran-s-army-snipers-equipped-with-home-grown-rifle>

Source figure 76.3: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1705237075081994491/photo/1>

Figures (left) 76.4, and 76.5 (right)
***Ghoul* AMR reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory**



Source figure 76.4: <https://jcpa.org/iran-admits-a-revolutionary-guard-commander-killed-in-an-israeli-attack-in-iraq-on-july-19/>

Source figure 76.5: <https://inf.news/en/military/ec6dd2595eb6cfbc12fcafc1be7bd034.html>

Figure 76.6

AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/resistance-forces-confront-israeli-forces-near-al-shifa-hosp>

Figure 76.7

AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon (picture reportedly taken in Syria)



Source: <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/07/hezbollah-issues-ultimatum-to-militants-in-arsal-battle.php>

Figure 76.8

AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1420059140618178560/photo/2

Figure 76.9
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Saraya al-Salam, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1564547684844933120

Figure 76.10
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Sinjar Resistance Units, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1567919660703617025/photo/1

Figure 76.11
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1778878987269271806/photo/2

Figure 76.12
AM-50 AMR reportedly operated by Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, Iraq



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2015/11/soleimani-among-iran-equipped-iraqi.html>

Annex 77: *Qader* 40mm grenade launcher presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and *Qader* 40mm grenade launcher, produced by Iran

Figure 77.1

***Qader* 40mm grenade launcher presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas**



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1603087005398835200>

Figure 77.2

***Qader* 40mm grenade launcher produced by Iran**




Source: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1574787070991687681/photo/3>

Annex 78: Comparison between *Rujoom 120mm mortar* displayed by the Houthis, *HM-16, 120mm mortar* produced by Iran, and *HM-16, 120mm mortar* reportedly operated by Al-Quds brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, *HM-16, 120mm mortar* reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory, and *HM-16, 120mm mortar* reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory

Figures 78.1 (left), and 78.2 (right)

***Rujoom 120mm mortar* displayed by the Houthis**



Source 78.1: <https://postimg.cc/WhNBG3MD>

Source 78.2: <https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1370073166861758474/photo/2>

Figure 78.3

***HM-16, 120mm mortar* produced by Iran**



Source: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Figure 78.4

***HM-16, 120mm mortar* reportedly operated by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, occupied Palestinian territory**



Source: <https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1393226932683251713/photo/1>

Figure 78.5

HM-16, 120mm mortar reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1397922160312602624/photo/4

Annex 79: Comparison between *Rujoom 60mm mortar* displayed by the Houthis, *HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* produced by Iran, *HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* reportedly operated by Al-Quds brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, *HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* reportedly operated by Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory, and *HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory

Figures 79.1 (left) and 79.2 (right)

***Rujoom 60mm mortar* displayed by the Houthis**



Source figure 79.1: <https://postimg.cc/XBBCbJ94>

Source figure 79.2: <https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1370073166861758474/photo/1>

Figure 79.3

***HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* produced by Iran**

www.dio.ir | 60 mm STANDARD MORTAR LAUNCHER | HM 14

□ **General Specifications:**

This mortar launcher is a kind of smooth-bore and base-loading weapon and has a high elevation angle with a 360° firing field. It is usually operated by two crews, but it can be operated by one crew in emergency. Its sight device is simple and accurate and remains in a steady state during firing. This mortar launcher is able to fire with high accuracy.

□ **Technical Specifications:**

| DESCRIPTION | DATA |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| Model | HM 14 |
| Caliber | 60 mm |
| Length of barrel and base | 720 mm |
| Max. range with M60 mortar model M 1 | 2050 m |
| Min. range with M60 mortar model M 1 | 250 m |
| Max. elevation angle | 60°-80° |
| Rate of fire | 25 in the first minute then 7 continues |
| Weight in firing position | 17.5 kg |

Source: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Figure 79.4

***HM-12/14, 60mm mortar* reportedly operated by Al-Quds brigade, occupied Palestinian territory**



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1825168518876131578

Figure 79.5

HM-12/14, 60mm mortar reportedly operated by Al-Mujahideen brigade, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: <https://en.ypagency.net/313414>

Figure 79.6

HM-12/14, 60mm mortar reportedly operated by Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory



Source: https://x.com/war_noir/status/1325510346472349698/photo/1

Annex 80: Saegheh rocket launcher displayed by the Houthis, Saegheh rocket launcher produced by Iran, Saegheh rocket launcher reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon, Saegheh rocket launcher reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, and Saegheh rocket launcher reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq

Figure 80.1

Saegheh rocket launcher displayed by the Houthis




Source: <https://news.sky.com/story/yemen-civil-war-rebel-houthi-fighters-start-to-leave-hodeidah-saleef-and-ras-isa-under-peace-plan-11716868>

References in previous reports: S/2022/50, para. 62, figures 20.17-20.18, S/2021/79, para. 85, annex 14, S/2020/326, para. 61, figures 19.4-19.5, and S/2018/193, tables 2-3, figure 35.5

Figures 80.2 (left) and 80.3 (right)

Saegheh rocket launcher produced by Iran



Source figure 80.2: Defence Industries Organization (DIO), Iran

Source figure 80.3: <https://x.com/IranDefense/status/1728394779740827954/photo/3>

Figure 80.4

Saegheh rocket launcher reportedly operated by Hezbollah, Lebanon



Source: <https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/estimate-hezbollahs-fatalities-syrian-civil-war-conclusions-arising-analysis-identity/>

Figure 80.5
***Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq**



Source: https://diyaruna.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_di/features/2020/08/12/feature-01

Figure 80.6
***Saegheh* rocket launcher reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq**



Source: <https://www.arabnews.com/node/2308961>

Annex 81: *RU-60G* thermal sight displayed by the Houthis, *RU-60G* thermal sight operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces, *RU-60G* thermal sight reportedly operated by PMF, Iraq, *RU-60G* thermal sight reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq, and *RU-60G* thermal sight reportedly recovered on Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Iraq

Figure 81.1
RU-60G thermal sight captured on Houthi forces



Source: <https://x.com/LostWeapons/status/978652589456736256/photo/1>

References in previous reports: S/2020/326, figure 20.14


Figures 81.2 (left), and 81.3 (right)
RU-60G thermal sight operated by Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces



Source figure 81.2: https://x.com/green_lemomn/status/617263464466223105/photo/2

Source figure 81.3: <https://armamentresearch.com/arms-diversion-in-iraq-iranian-ru60g-thermal-weapon-sight/>

Figure 81.4
RU-60G thermal sight reportedly diverted from PMF, Iraq




Source: <https://x.com/CalibreObscura/status/1146178495241998336/photo/2>

Figure 81.5
RU-60G thermal sight reportedly operated by Kata'ib Hizballah, Iraq



Source: https://x.com/green_lemonn/status/667430482523607040/photo/1

Figure 81.6
RU-60G thermal sight reportedly recovered from PKK, Iraq



Source: <https://x.com/Acema171/status/885070737303904256/photo/3>

Annex 82: M18A2 horizontal effect land mine documented as used by the Houthis, M18A2 horizontal effect land mine produced by Iran, and M18A2 horizontal effect land mine reportedly recovered in Syria

Figure 82.1
M18A2 horizontal effect land mine documented as used by the Houthis



Source: <https://iedawareness.com/2018/04/12/houthi-directional-mines-captured-in-midi-yemen/>

Figure 82.2
M18A2 horizontal effect land mine produced by Iran



Source: <https://armamentresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/32.jpg>

Figure 82.3
M18A2 horizontal effect land mine reportedly recovered in Syria



Source: <https://armamentresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/25-e1467199584968.jpg>

Annex 83: *Thaqib* (MTA) sea mine displayed by the Houthis, and limpet mine produced by Iran

Figures 83.1 (up), 83.2 (down left), and 83.3 (down right)
***Thaqib* (MTA) sea mine displayed by the Houthis**




Source: <https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/03/houthi-rebels-unveil-host-of-weaponry.html>



Source: *Terrogence*

References in previous reports: [S/2023/833](#), figure 74.3, and [S/2018/594](#), para. 111

Figures 83.4 (left) and 83.5 (right)
Limpet mine produced by Iran



Source: *Terrogence*

Annex 84: Large-scale military display on 21 of September of materiel by the Houthis held in Sana'a

Figure 84.1
Description made by the Houthis of the materiel displayed



Source: <https://twitter.com/ainalaqoran2/status/1702481027522822180/photo/1>

Figures 84.2 (left) and 84.3 (right)
Mahdi al-Mashat, President of the Supreme Political Council and military leader from the Houthi movement on 21 September 2023 at the large-scale military display held in Sana'a



Source: https://twitter.com/Presidency_Ye/status/1704869203663110537/photo/2

Figures 84.4 (up), 84.5 (middle), and 84.6 (below)

Large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023



Source: <https://twitter.com/RiyadhAldubai/status/1704824351315366055/photo/1>



Source: <https://twitter.com/mamashami/status/1704881294335734060/photo/4>

Annex 85: MRBMs and SRBMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 85.1 (up), 85.2 (middle), and 85.3 (down)

Toofan MRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/s_m_marandi/status/1704818695623573684/video/2



Source: https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1704915482535440407/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/fab_hinz/status/1704819625727267199/photo/2

Figures 85.4 (up), and 85.5 (down)
Aqeel MRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/status/1704918186443833561/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/s_m_marandi/status/1704818695623573684/video/2

Figures 85.6 (up), and 85.7 (down)
Borkhan-3 SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/1



Source: <https://twitter.com/Sanaa12023/status/1704802768584581210>

Figure 85.8
Falaq MRBM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018084874956885/photo/4>

Figure 85.9
Hatem SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704891978243088890/photo/1

Figure 85.10
Fateh-11 SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704893550586991094

Figures 85.11 (up), and 85.12 (down)
Tankil SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/iranianmil_ar/status/1704996859742408765/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704891978243088890/photo/3

Figure 85.13
Qaher M2 SRBM



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/2

Figures 85.14 (up), and 85.15 (down)
SS-21 “Tochka” SRBM



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1704890941167804820>

Annex 86: Long-distance guided rockets presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display pf materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 86.1

***Badr-1* Long-distance guided rocket**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704901189039489243/photo/2

Figure 86.2

***Badr-P* Long-distance guided rocket**



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704899823239831704/photo/2

Figure 86.3
Badr-3 Long-distance guided rocket



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKootz_/status/1704958894806589657/photo/1

Figure 86.4
Badr-4 Long-distance guided rocket



Source: <https://twitter.com/timand2037/status/1705056532679794821/photo/1>

Figure 86.5
Saeer, Long-distance guided rocket



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704947846196166710/photo/1

Figure 86.6
Qasim, Long-distance guided rocket



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017924455403578/photo/4>

Annex 87: LACMs and ASCMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 87.1
Quds-2 LACM



Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1707674493559173185/photo/4>

Figures 87.2 (up), and 87.3 (down)
Quds-3 LACM



Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1707674493559173185/photo/3>




Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018143045783735>

Figure 87.4
Quds-4 LACM



Source: https://twitter.com/iranianmil_ar/status/1704967065260437708/photo/1

Figure 87.5
Announcement of 2,000 kilometre-range *Quds-4* LACM



Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1704874454000570707>

Figures 87.6 (up), and 87.7 (below)
Quds-Z0 ASCM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017842456793113/photo/1>



Source: https://twitter.com/fab_hinz/status/1704838068589478383/photo/2

Figures 87.8 (up), and 87.9 (down)
Sayyad ASCM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018158321430703/photo/4>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Figures 87.10 (up), and 87.11 (below)
Sajil ASCM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018114205798882/photo/1>

21
سبتمبر

الطول الكلي: 3.60 م

سجيك

وزن الرأس الحربي: 100 كجم

سجيك المجنح صاروخ ارض بحر

المميزات

- دقته العالية في إصابة الاهداف
- لا تستطيع الرادارات إكتشافه
- يمكن خربه من أي نقطة في الأراضي اليمنية إلى أي نقطة في البحر الأحمر

المواصفات

- صاروخ كروز مجنح
- يصل مداه إلى 180 كم
- يعمل بالوقود الصلب والسائل

WWW.MMY.YE

صنع في
اليمن

Source: <https://twitter.com/Pataramesh/status/1705492666769691128/photo/1>

Annex 88: ASBMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 88.1
Mayun ASBM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKootz_/status/1704874118535872639/photo/4

Figure 88.2
Faleq ASBM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018166399602805/photo/2>

Figure 88.3
Al-Bahr Al-Ahmar ASBM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704958894806589657/photo/2

Figure 88.4
Tankil ASBM



Source: <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3266848.htm>

Figure 88.5
Aasif ASBM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705018101702484071/photo/4>

Annex 89: SAMs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 89.1 (up), and 89.2 (below)

Sagr-1 SAM



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017858877485340/photo/1>



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alidarawani/status/1704866265569882588/photo/1>

Figure 89.3
Barq-2 SAM



Source: <https://twitter.com/mamashami/status/1704881294335734060/photo/2>

Figure 89.4
Mi-raj SAM



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705024889269170673/photo/2

Annex 90: UAVs and OWA-UAVs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 90.1
***Rujum* UAV (new variant)**



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1704894030910284111/photo/1>

Figures 90.2 (up) and 90.3 (down)
Waeed-1 OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKooantz_/status/1704953936484970662

Figures 90.4 (up) and 90.5 (below)
Waeed-2 OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017895137251819/photo/1>

Figures 90.6 (up), and 90.7 (down)
Rased OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282218304655532/photo/3



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787

Figures 90.8 (up), and 90.9 (down)
Khatif-2 (new variant) OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705030787123323174



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705375424229085542/photo/1

Figures 90.10 (up), and 90.11 (below)
Shibab OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705027741349761476



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1704891807274881074/photo/1>

Figures 90.12 (up), and 90.13 (down)
Samad-1 OWA-UAV



Source: <https://twitter.com/IranDefense/status/1705017895137251819/photo/3>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787

Figure 90.14
Samad-2



Source: <https://twitter.com/fj048189/status/1704829978301366539>

Figures 90.15 (up), and 90.16 (down)
Qasef-2K OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKooantz_/status/1704898202451726409



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787

Figure 90.17
Mersad-1 OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282452736913787

Figure 90.18
Raqeb OWA-UAV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705396398106030484/photo/3

Annex 91: Armoured vehicles presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 91.1 (up), and 91.2 (down)

Hani 4x4 armoured vehicle



Source: https://twitter.com/Elias_the_Zeus/status/1704893232151224592/photo/4



Source: <https://twitter.com/AlMayadeenNews/status/1704797009952088369>

Figures 91.3 (up), and 91.4 (down)

Unknown make of 4X4 armoured vehicle



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704952787392487682/photo/1



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alkhanadeq2023/status/1704788669226168403>

Annex 92: EOSSs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 92.1 (up), and 92.2 (down)
Shafak EOSS



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1705240052878520524/photo/3>

Figure 92.3
Sadiq EOSS



Source: <https://twitter.com/Alidarawani/status/1704866265569882588/photo/4>

Figures 92.4 (up), and 92.5 (down)
Ofok EOSS



Source: <https://twitter.com/VleckieHond/status/1705240052878520524>



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1704961058689957980/photo/2

Annex 93: Fast attack boats and WBIEDs presented by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figures 93.1 (up), and 93.2 (down)

Aasef Fast attack boat



Source: <https://twitter.com/mikaelsyrian/status/1704842128151458125>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705281850732609764/photo/4

Figures 93.3 (up), and 93.4 (down)
Aasef-2 Fast attack boat




Source: <https://twitter.com/mikaelsyrian/status/1704842128151458125>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Figures 93.5 (up), and 93.6 (down)
Malah Fast attack boat



Source: <https://twitter.com/mikaelsyrian/status/1704842128151458125>



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Figures 93.7 (up), and 93.8 (down)
Nazeer Fast attack boat



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705281850732609764/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKooantz_/status/1704946001646162015/photo/1

Figure 93.9
Tawfan-1 USV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705281850732609764/photo/2

Figures 93.10 (up), and 93.11 (down)
Tawfan-2 USV



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705281850732609764/photo/3



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Figures 93.12 (up), and 93.13 (down)
Tawfan-3 USV



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKooantz_/status/1704899823239831704/photo/1



Source: https://twitter.com/amr_alzahry/status/1705282575818805432

Annex 94: Helicopters and fighter jet displayed by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023

Figure 94.1

Mi-8, Mi-17 and Mi-171Sh helicopters displayed by the Houthis during the large-scale military display of materiel held in Sana'a on 21 September 2023



Source: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-flex-military-muscle-parade-riyadh-seeks-ceasefire-2023-09-21/>

Figure 94.2

Mi-171sh, Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters (from the left to the right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/MuradAbdo22/status/1704921947975397755/photo/1>

Figures 94.3 (up), 94.4 (middle), and 94.5 (down)
F5 fighter jet



Source: <https://twitter.com/MuradAbdo22/status/1704921947975397755/photo/3>



Source: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-houthis-flex-military-muscle-parade-riyadh-seeks-ceasefire-2023-09-21/>



Source: https://twitter.com/JoshuaKoontz_/status/1705656085686726784

Annex 95: Interview of General Rostam Ghasemi, Assistant Commander of the IRGC-QF, by the Russian media Russia Today and released on 21 April 2021 by Memri TV, where he announces the presence of military advisors in Yemen and the supply of weapons manufacturing technology.

Quds Force Official Rostam Ghasemi: Iran's Friends In The Region Have Retaliated Against Israel And Will Continue To Do So; We Have A Few Military Advisors In Yemen And Have Provided Weapon-Manufacturing Technology To The Yemenis



Source: Russia Today TV (Russia)

*Former Iranian Minister of Oil General Rostam Ghasemi, Assistant Commander of the IRGC-QF said that Israel is behind every sabotage operation around the world and in Iran and that Israel's actions will not go unanswered. He made these remarks in an interview with Russia Today TV that aired on April 21, 2021. General Ghasemi said that while Iran has "espoused a policy of patience and restraint," it has retaliated against Israel with the help of its "many friends in the region" and it will continue to do so. **He added that the Yemenis participated in retaliation against Israeli ships.** General Ghasemi continued to say that "all the weapons the Yemenis possess are a result of our aid." For more information about General Ghasemi, see MEMRI TV clip no. 7080.*

Rostam Ghasemi: "We believe that Israel plays a role in every sabotage operation around the world, and in Iran as well. The Zionist entity plays a role in every act of sabotage that is carried out in Iran. The Israelis know, as well they should, that any act will be met with retaliation. So far, Iran has espoused a policy of patience and restraint. Nevertheless, Iran has retaliated, and Israel will be met with more responses. If this entity carries out any action against Iran anywhere in the world, it will be met with retaliation at the appropriate time, and in a manner that will make it regret what it did. Israel should not think that we are necessarily the ones attacking its ships. We have many friends in the region, and they are the ones retaliating against Israel. They retaliated for those attacks. We have many friends in the region. They will not allow the Israeli actions to go unanswered."

Interviewer: "Are they retaliating on behalf of Iran?"

Ghasemi: "We have many friends in the region and the world. Israel knows, as well it should, that its actions will not go unanswered."

Interviewer: "Have the Yemenis retaliated on behalf of Iran in the Gulf of Oman, for example?"

Ghasemi: "The Yemenis are our friends, and they can easily retaliate, and this is what they are doing."

Interviewer: "Have they retaliated so far? And where?"

**Ghasemi: "Yes, they have retaliated, and some of it was published in the media.
[...]"**

"We are providing advisory aid to the Yemenis on a very small scale."

Interviewer: "Military advice?"

Ghasemi: "Limited military advice. All the weapons that the Yemenis possess are the result of our aid. We helped them with weapon-manufacturing technology, but the actual production of the weapons is done in Yemen. They produce the weapons themselves. These drones and missiles are made in Yemen."

Interviewer: "Are there military advisors in Yemen now?"

Ghasemi: "There is a small number. You can count them on the fingers of one hand."

Interviewer: "What is their mission?"

Ghasemi: "To give advice."

Interviewer: "Are you sending weapons to Yemen now?"

Ghasemi: "There is no need to send weapons.

[...]

"We do not feel threatened by some countries' normalization of relations with Israel. We are a strong country with enormous defensive capabilities. Therefore, this does not pose a direct threat to Iran. But we ask these Muslim and other countries to honour the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people. The Palestinians are still suffering from the Israeli persecution and occupation, and they are not happy about this normalization."

Sources:

مساعدة قائد فيلق القدس لـRT: الشعب اليمني يُقتل بأكثر الأسلحة تطورا على يد السعودية

<https://www.memri.org/tv/iran-gen-rostam-ghasemi-israel-knows-actions-not-unanswered-friends-retaliation-weapons-yemen>

Appendix A

Screen shots extracted from the interview of General Rostam Ghasemi, Assistant Commander of the IRGC-QF, by Russia Today









Annex 96: Statement by the Iranian forces' spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji published by the Iranian media Noor News on 22 September 2020 announcing the transfer of experiences in technology in the defence sphere, and sharing their experience and knowledge with the people of Yemen

Iran Has Supplied Yemen with Defence Knowhow

Publication Date: 9/22/2020 9:32:20 PM



NOURNEWS - A senior spokesman for the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces said the Islamic Republic has provided Yemenis with the experience and know-how in the defense sector.

Speaking at a televised program on Tuesday, Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi dismissed the claims that Iran has supplied missiles to Yemen.

“We provided them (Yemenis) with the experiences in technology in the defense sphere, as they have learned how to produce missiles, drones and weapons in Yemen by themselves,” he underlined. **“We have shared our experience and knowledge with the people of Yemen,”** the general added.

Unlike what the enemy is trying to portray, the people of Yemen are smart and sophisticated, as they have managed to manufacture missiles and advanced drones and make great headways in the electronic warfare, Shekarchi noted. The spokesman reiterated that Iran’s assistance for the regional countries is restricted to “spiritual presence and advisory help”.

“The resistance front countries have armies and forces themselves. **We provide them with advisory help. In order to share our experiences with the people of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, our experienced forces go there and give them intellectual assistance,** but this is the people and armies of those countries who stand against the enemies in practice,” he noted. The general finally emphasized that Iran would provide whatever help it can for any country standing against the Zionist regime and the US.

Due to the economic problems, Iran would not give anything to the others for free, he noted, saying the foreigners would make purchases.

In comments in October 2019, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri had underlined that Iran’s military officers only offer advisory assistance to popular forces in Yemen, rejecting reports that Tehran has supplied missiles to the impoverished Arab country.

Source: <https://nournews.ir/en/news/54058/Iran-Has-Supplied-Yemen-with-Defense-Know-How>

Annex 97: Statement by the Iranian forces' spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji published by the Russian media Russia Today on 22 September 2020 announcing the transfer of military technology to Yemen to make missiles and drones



إيران تعلن عن نقل تكنولوجيا عسكرية إلى اليمن لصناعة الصواريخ والطائرات المسيّرة

تاريخ النشر: 22.09.2020 | GMT 09:44 | آخر تحديث: 22.09.2020 | GMT 10:00 | أخبار العالم



77919 [انسخ الرابط](#)



تابعوا RT على [Google News](#)

قال المتحدث باسم القوات الإيرانية، أبو الفضل شكارجي، إن إيران نقلت تجربتها التكنولوجية في المجال الدفاعي إلى اليمن ليتمكن اليمنيون من صناعة الصواريخ والطائرات المسيّرة بأنفسهم.

وأكد المتحدث باسم القوات الإيرانية: "نحن لا نرسل الصواريخ إلى اليمن لكنهم باتوا يصنعونها بأنفسهم ليطلقوها على رؤوس أعدائهم".

وأضاف أن إيران تدعم الشعب اليمني والشعب الفلسطيني وكل من يصطف في مواجهة أمريكا وإسرائيل.

وأوضح أن الأوضاع الاقتصادية لا تسمح لنا بمنح كل شيء لحلفائنا مجاناً وهم يشترون منا بعض الأشياء أحياناً، مشيراً إلى أن "الشعب اليمني ذكي ويمتلك خبراء كبار تمكنوا من صناعة طائرات مسيّرة متطورة في زمن قياسي ولم تتمكن جبهة الاستكبار من إخماد صوته".

المصدر: RT

تابعوا RT على [Google News](#)

Source: <https://arabic.rt.com/world/1156338-المسيّرة-الطائرات-الصواريخ-والتكنولوجيا-إلى-اليمن-لتمكينهم-من-صناعة-الصواريخ-والطائرات-المسيّرة>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the statement by the Iranian forces' spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji published by the Russian media Russia Today on 22 September 2020 announcing the transfer of military technology to Yemen to make missiles and drones

Iran announces transfer of military technology to Yemen to make missiles and drones

Russia Today

22 September 2020

Iran has transferred its technological experience in the defense field to Yemen so that Yemenis can make their own missiles and drones, said Iranian forces spokesman Abolfazl Shakarji.

"We do not send missiles to Yemen, but they are now making them themselves to launch them on the heads of their enemies," the Iranian forces spokesman emphasized.

He added that Iran supports the Yemeni people, the Palestinian people and all those who stand against America and Israel.

"The economic situation does not allow us to give everything to our allies for free and they buy some things from us sometimes," he said, noting that "the Yemeni people are smart and have great experts who were able to make advanced drones in record time and the front of the oppression has not been able to silence their voice.

Annex 98: Statement by the Iranian Chief of Staff General Mohammad Bagheri published by the Tehran office of the Qatari media Al Jazeera on 2 October 2019 announcing the advisory support of Iran to the Houthis

أخبار الآن ▾ أفريقيا اقتصاد ثقافة رياضة مقالات صحة فيديو المزيد ▾

سياسة | أسلحة ومعدات حربية | إيران

إيران تقر لأول مرة بدعم الحوثيين



اللواء باقرى يتوعد كل من ينوي تهديد أمن المنطقة (وكالات-أرشيف)

2/10/2019 |

احفظ المقالات لقراءتها لاحقاً وانشئ قائمة قراءتك

Source: <https://www.ajnet.me/politics/2019/10/2/إيران-تقر-لأول-مرة-بعدم-الحوثيين>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of the statement by the Iranian Chief of Staff General Mohammad Bagheri published by the Tehran office of the Qatari media Al Jazeera on 2 October 2019 announcing the advisory support of Iran to the Houthis

Iran admits for the first time to supporting the Houthis

General Bagheri threatens those who intend to threaten the security of the region (Agencies-Archive)

2/10/2019 by Al Jazeera Net-Tehran

For the first time since the outbreak of the war on Yemen in 2015, Iran has acknowledged that its Revolutionary Guards have provided "advisory and intellectual support" to its Houthi ally.

Iranian Chief of Staff General Mohammad Bagheri revealed his country's support for the Houthis in an interview with the Chinese TV station Phoenix, which was reported by the Iranian press. He emphasized that the situation in Yemen is somewhat different from the Iraqi and Syrian arenas.

"We went to Iraq and Syria at the request of their governments, and we provided advisory support, weapons and equipment, and the Revolutionary Guards were of course responsible for that mission," Bagheri said. He made no secret of the Iranian military's assistance to IRGC forces there.

Bagheri explained that Yemen today is under a blockade and all of its ports are closed, and that for some time there has been no possibility of even sending medicine to the country. He denied that his country had sent missiles to Yemen, asking, "How can large, meter-long missiles be sent to Yemen when medicine cannot be sent to Yemen?"

He emphasized that Iran's assistance to the Houthis is limited to advisory and intellectual aspects, revealing for the first time that the Revolutionary Guards have taken on this task, and stressed that the Islamic Republic will stand by the Yemeni people until they are able to remove this aggression from their country.

Tehran has always denied arming the Houthi group in Yemen, but the United States and Saudi Arabia accuse it of providing military support to the group, which General Bagheri has denied.

Ready for war

Asked about recent developments in Gulf waters and the possibility of a war in the region, the Iranian military commander said that Tehran has not and will not want to start wars in the region, and that it seeks more than others for peace and stability in the region.

He added that the Islamic Republic has not started a war for the past 300 years, and the Iranian people have not attacked any other country. He added that his country's interests in the Gulf region and the Strait of Hormuz are closely linked to the region's security, describing Iran as the most important and strongest country responsible for providing security in the region.

Bagheri said that his country wants security in the Gulf waters more than any other regional country, and that it does not want to participate in any war, but at the same time it will stand strong against anyone who intends to threaten the security of the region, stressing that Iran's enemies will not dare to launch a war against it because they know very well that their losses will outweigh the benefits, he said.

In another matter, the general stressed that his country's military relations with China are developing after the implementation of "strategic consensus" between them, revealing Tehran's intention to hold joint naval military exercises with Russia and China in the northern Indian Ocean and the southern Sea of Oman in December.

Last month, Bagheri paid an official visit to the Chinese capital Beijing at the head of a high-level military delegation at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart, which Iran announced at the time that his visit "comes within the framework of the strategy of defense and military diplomacy, to provide a platform to open a new page in cooperation and relations between the two countries."

Annex 99: Statement of the Houthis' military spokesman issued on 31 October 2023 claiming the attacks on Israel



**Spokesman of Yemeni armed forces
Yahya Sare'e**

Statement of Yemeni armed forces

With the help of God Almighty, our armed forces launched a large number of ballistic and winged missiles, as well as drones at various targets of the #Israeli enemy in the occupied territories.

2-The Yemeni Armed Forces confirm that this is the third operation in support of our oppressed brothers in #Palestine, and that the armed Forces will continue to carry out more qualitative missile and drone attacks until #Israel ceases its aggression.

3-The Yemeni Armed Forces confirm that this is the third operation in support of our oppressed brothers in #Palestine, and that the armed Forces will continue to carry out more qualitative missile and drone attacks until #Israel ceases its aggression.

4-We affirm that our Yemeni people's attitude on the Palestinian issue is firm and ethical, and that the #Palestinian people have the full right to self-defense and legitimate rights.

5-The #Zionist enemy entity's ongoing execution of crimes and killings against the people of #Gaza Strip and all of occupied Palestine destabilizes the region and extends the circle of conflict.

"The victory comes only from Allah"

Tuesday
16 Rabi' al-Thani 1445 AH
October 31, 2023 AD
Issued by the Yemeni Armed Forces

Source: « X » (previously Twitter) page of Yahya Saree, Houthi military spokesman https://twitter.com/yahya_saree/status/1719356913740095608?s=46&t=DZ_VIGN4tnVNjoReUJutuQ&fbclid=IwAR3xawFqoQRpTY_T7BaNdyeVEPMN1PIWk4LT_vIwlIqMrspilD6vvVuIcnk

Annex 100: Media reports/Messages by the Houthis preventing ships linked to, or heading to Israel from crossing the Indian Ocean

Figure 100.1

“X” message: Preventing ships linked to Israel from crossing the Indian Ocean

بيان صادر عن القوات المسلحة اليمنية
رسائل 19645 بحرية
19 مارس 2024 م

قال تعالى: (إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتُونَ فِي سَبِيلِهِ صَفًا كَأَنَّهُمْ بِنَيْنٍ مُرْضُوعُونَ) صدق الله العظيم

انتصاراً لمظلومية الشعب الفلسطيني وضمن الرد على العدوان الأمريكي البريطاني على بلدنا

نفذت القوات البحرية في القوات المسلحة اليمنية بعون الله تعالى عملية استهداف السفينة (Pacific 01) الإسرائيلية في البحر الأحمر وذلك بعدد من الصواريخ البحرية المناسبة.

فيما نفذ سلاح الجو الممسوح عملية استهداف لمحمرة أمريكية في البحر الأحمر وذلك بعدد من الطائرات المسيرة وقد حققت العملية أهدافها بنجاح بفضل الله.

وتفيداً لتوجيهات السيد القائد عبدالملك بدر الدين الحوثي "يحفظه الله" في الانتصار لمظلومية الشعب الفلسطيني الذي يتعرض للعدوان والحصار في قطاع غزة، واستجابة لنداءات أبناء الشعب اليمني وكل أحرار الأمة

بدأت القوات المسلحة اليمنية وبعون الله تعالى في توسيع نطاق عملياتها ضد السفن الإسرائيلية أو المرتبطة بالاسرائيلي أو المتجهة إلى موانئ فلسطين المحتلة لتشمل المحيط الهندي طريق رأس الرجاء الصالح.

وعليه.. إن القوات المسلحة اليمنية تحذر كافة السفن الإسرائيلية أو المتجهة إلى موانئ فلسطين المحتلة أو القادمة منها بعدم المرور من طريق رأس الرجاء الصالح، ما لم فإنها ستكون هدفاً مشروعاً لقواتنا المسلحة.

إن القوات المسلحة اليمنية وفي إطار تنفيذ هذه التوجيهات انتصاراً للشعب الفلسطيني في غزة نفذت بعون الله تعالى ثلاث عمليات ضد ثلاث سفن إسرائيلية وأمريكية في المحيط الهندي وذلك بعدد من الصواريخ البحرية المناسبة والطائرات المسيرة وقد حققت العمليات الثلاث أهدافها بنجاح.

إن القوات المسلحة اليمنية تؤكد أنها لن تتوقف عن منع الملاحة الإسرائيلية أو المتجهة إلى موانئ فلسطين المحتلة في البحرين الأحمر والهندي وكذلك المحيط الهندي إلا عند إيقاف العدوان ورفع الحصار عن إخواننا في قطاع غزة.

والله حسبنا ونعم الوكيل، نعم المولى ونعم النصير

WWW.SABAYE

God Almighty said: (Indeed, God loves those who are killed in His cause in rows, as if they were children closely packed together) God Almighty has spoken the truth.

A victory for the oppression of the Palestinian people and a response to the American-British aggression against our country

The naval forces of the Yemeni Armed Forces, with the help of God Almighty, carried out an operation to target the Israeli ship (Pacific-01) in the Red Sea with a number of suitable naval missiles.

Meanwhile, the Air Force carried out an operation to target an American destroyer in the Red Sea with a number of drones, and the operation successfully achieved its goals, thanks to God.

In implementation of the directives of Commander Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, “may God protect him,” to triumph over the oppression of the Palestinian people who are subjected to aggression and siege in the Gaza Strip, and in response to the calls of the people of the Yemeni people and all the free people of the nation.

The Yemeni Armed Forces, with the help of God Almighty, have begun to expand the scope of their operations against Israeli ships, those linked to Israel, or those heading to the ports of occupied Palestine, to include the Indian Ocean Cape of Good Hope Road.

Accordingly, the Yemeni armed forces warn all Israeli ships heading to or coming from the ports of occupied Palestine not to pass through the Cape of Good Hope, unless they will be a target.

A project for our armed forces.

The Yemeni Armed Forces, within the framework of implementing these directives to achieve victory for the Palestinian people in Gaza, carried out, with the help of God Almighty, three operations against three Israeli and American ships in the Indian Ocean, using a number of suitable naval missiles and drones.

The three operations successfully achieved their goals. The Yemeni armed forces confirm that they will not stop preventing navigation Israeli or destined for the ports of occupied Palestine in the Red and Arab Seas, as well as the Indian Ocean, except when the aggression is stopped, and the siege imposed on our brothers in the Gaza Strip.

God is sufficient for us, and He is the best disposer of affairs, the best protector, and the best helper

Source: <https://twitter.com/aminhayyan/status/1768615485011042357>

Figure 100.2

Media report: Preventing ships linked to Israel from crossing the Indian Ocean**Yemen imposes new equation by escalating its operations against enemy ships in Indian Ocean**

[17/March/2024]

SANA'A March 17 2024 (Saba) - With the announcement by the leader of the nation and the man of words and deeds, al-Sayeed Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi, preventing ships linked to the Zionist enemy from crossing the Indian Ocean, in the direction adjacent to South Africa and the Good Hope Road, Yemen enters a new phase of confrontation with the American-British-Zionist enemy, which has

crossed all borders with what it is committing of horrific crimes against the Palestinian people.

Yemen's entry into the battle of the "Al-Aqsa Flood", since its launch last October, was not a luxury or absurdity, but imposed by the current stage in order to support and assist the Palestinian people, which subjected to an unprecedented war of annihilation in contemporary history by the forces of hegemony and arrogance led by America, Britain and the Zionist entity.

The Yemeni escalation of preventing the passage of ships linked to the Zionist enemy, even through the Indian Ocean, was previously prefaced by the Commander a few days ago when he affirmed that "there are surprises and the expansion of the circle of operations in places that the enemies do not expect, in an effective manner," and here the surprises being realized today and being translated into In fact, through the operations announced by the armed forces regarding targeting enemy ships in the Indian Ocean.

Based on the religious, moral and humanitarian principle of the Yemeni people, to come to the rescue of the oppressed and to support the nation's issues, foremost among which is the Palestinian issue, it necessary for Yemen to fight the battle of "the promised conquest and holy jihad" launched by the Leader through a progressive strategy to deter the arrogance of the American-British-Zionist enemy and its persistence in committing bloody massacres in Gaza.

As long as the Zionist enemy continues to unjustly shed the blood of children, women and civilians in Gaza, the Yemenis will be more enthusiastic and jealous in revenge and victory for the blood of the Palestinians, which what the leader of the revolution confirmed in his speech on Thursday evening by saying: "Our human conscience, our religion, our morals, our dignity, our pride." Our affiliation to Islam prohibits us from watching the oppression of Palestine or remaining silent about it, the siege and starvation of the people of Gaza must be stopped, and the tragedy of children dying of starvation in the Strip must be stopped."

Al-Sayeed Commander sent clear messages and warnings to the American and British enemy that "Washington and London have no choice but to stop their support for the Zionist entity, end the aggression and starvation of the people of Gaza, and bring medicine and food to the residents of the Gaza Strip, who have been dying of murder and starvation for 160 days."

With the honorable and supportive Yemeni position for the Palestinian people and their just cause, Yemen charts a new history for the region away from guardianship, subordination, and dependence on the forces of hegemony and global arrogance, marking the beginning of a new era in which Yemen becomes an effective regional force on the international scene, unlike what it in previous stages.

M.M

----- SABA

Source: Houthi affiliated media <https://www.saba.ye/en/news3313771.htm>

Annex 101: Article published on 14 April 2024 by the Iranian media Tasnim News stating that the 13 April 2024 attack on Israel was conducted from Iran, Yemen, Hezbollah, and the Iraqi resistance



حمله چهاروجهی و پیچیده ایران به اسرائیل

۲۶ فروردین ۱۴۰۳ - ۰۲:۱۷ | اخبار سیاسی | اخبار نظامی | دفاعی | امنیتی

- Ti +



عملیات گسترده سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی علیه اسرائیل پاسخی پیچیده چندوجهی و هوشمندانه به جنایات اخیر اسرائیل است.

به گزارش گروه سیاسی خبرگزاری تسنیم، حمله امروز به اسرائیل که در پاسخ به تجاوز این رژیم به سوریه و شهادت چندتن از فرماندهان نظامی ایرانی انجام شده، در نوع خود بسیار پیچیده است.

در این حمله از ترکیبی از صدها پهپاد و تعداد زیادی از موشک از انواع مختلف استفاده شده است، مهمتر اینکه این حمله فقط از ایران صورت نگرفته است و از چهار جهت این رژیم درحال تنبیه است.

بیشتر بخوانید

- اصابت دهها فروند موشک سپاه به اهدافی در سرزمین‌های اشغالی
- شاهد ۱۳۶ پهپاد انتحاری سپاه علیه اسرائیل را بشناسید

غیر از ایران، یمن از جنوب، حزب‌الله لبنان از شمال و مقاومت عراق از شرق سرزمین‌های اشغالی نیز ترکیبی از ابزارهای جنگی خود را به سمت سرزمین‌های اشغالی شلیک کرده‌اند.

رسانه‌های غربی ادعان دارند که سامانه‌های پدافندی رژیم صهیونیستی قادر به خنثی‌کردن این حمله پیچیده نیستند. تنبیه متجاوز در جریان است و در صورتی که اسرائیل حرکت نامعقولی انجام دهد تنبیه تشدید می‌شود.

انتهای پیام/+

Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/01/26/3067881>

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

*Appendix A***Iran's four-pronged and complex attack on Israel (Iranian media Tasnim news, 14 April 2024)**

The extensive operation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps against Israel is a complex, multifaceted and intelligent response to Israel's recent crimes.

According to the political group of Tasnim News Agency, today's attack on Israel, which was carried out in response to the aggression of this regime in Syria and the martyrdom of several Iranian military commanders, is very complicated in its kind.

In this attack, a combination of hundreds of UAVs and a large number of missiles of various types were used, more importantly, this attack was not carried out only from Iran, and this regime is being punished from four directions.


Apart from Iran, Yemen from the south, Hezbollah of Lebanon from the north and the Iraqi resistance from the east of the occupied territories have also fired a combination of their war tools towards the occupied territories.

Western media admit that the defense systems of the Zionist regime are not able to neutralize this complex attack. Punishment of the aggressor is ongoing, and if Israel makes an unreasonable move, the punishment will be intensified

Annex 102: Houthi MRBM “Palestine” launched on 3 June 2024 against Israel

Figures 102.1 (top), 102.2 (middle), and 102.3 (down)


Screenshots extracted from a video presented by the Houthis of the launch on 3 June 2024 of an MRBM called “Palestine” against Israel



Source: https://x.com/amirigm/status/1798447207080702086?s=46&t=DZ_VIGN4tnVNjo-ReUJutuQ&fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAAR10CHK5GluNAYWXP37msyOyDatZBnhAUydoh-dtvF1VPxVP_OLjUtzAGF0_aem_ATZdu8YyY_qv0JJcl_Lts83jIvj4Nr9o6WTDqscv1ImxobBCfNQ82UcLcQ-tuKPV6jOR6Bm7bPFqA5WVB-Kxt707J

Figure 102.4

3 June 2024 attack against Israel claimed by the Houthis on their military media “MMY.YE”




MMY.YE

Source: https://x.com/amirigm/status/1798447207080702086?s=46&t=DZ_VIGN4tnVNjo-ReUJutuQ&fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR10CHK5GluNAYWXP37msyOyDatZBnhAUydoh-dtvF1VPxVP_OLjUtzAGF0_aem_ATZdu8YyY_qv0JJcl_Lts83jIvj4Nr9o6WTDqscv1ImxobBCfN82UcLcQ-tuKPV6jOR6Bm7bPFqA5WVB-Kxt707J

Appendix A


Unofficial translation



Annex 103: Houthi OWA-UAV “Jaffa” launched on 19 July 2024 against Israel

Figures 103.1 (top), and 103.2 (down)

Display of the OWA-UAV “Jaffa” by the Houthis



Source: <https://english.iswnews.com/35712/yemeni-armed-forces-release-images-of-jaffa-suicide-drone/>


Figure 103.3

Debris of a wing of the OWA-UAV lying on the street of Tel Aviv, Israel



Source: <https://x.com/Mdais/status/1814137740646035588/photo/1>

Figure 103.4
MADO MD275 engine recovered from the impact site



Source: https://x.com/fab_hinz/status/1814226067818717563/photo/1

Figure 103.5
Amateur picture of a MADO MD275 engine taken during the fifth Iranian National Aerospace Exhibition held in October 2014 at Mehrabad International Airport, Tehran



Source: <https://www.uskowioniran.com/2014/11/>

Annex 104: Scenes of the launching of a Hatem 2 hypersonic ballistic missile allegedly targeting the Israeli ship MSC Sarah V presented on “X” by the Houthi military media “MMY.YE”

Figure X.1

Presentation of the *Hatem 2* by the Houthis



Hatem 2 ballistic missile
Intelligent control system
Manoeuvrability
Hypersonic speed
The fuel type is solid
It has several generations with different ranges
Made in Yemen MIC

Figures 104.2 (left), 104.3 (center), 104.4 (right), and 104.5 (below)
Sequence of the launching and close-up of the military warhead



Source: <https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1806038330993226140>

Annex 105: Press article dated 19 November 2019 from the Yemeni pro-Houthi media YPA highlighting Ibrahim Al-Dailami's presentation of the credentials as Houthi-affiliated Ambassador to the Iranian President



Yemeni ambassador in Tehran delivers credentials to Iranian President

Last updated Nov 19, 2019 5:49 PM



TEHRAN, Nov. 19 (YPA) – Yemeni Ambassador to Tehran Ibrahim Mohammed al-Dailami on Tuesday delivered his credentials to President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Hassan Rouhani.

At the delivery of credentials, al-Dailami conveyed greetings of President of the Supreme Political Council Mahdi al-Mashat to President Rouhani.

President Rouhani reaffirmed, during the meeting, his country's unwavering stance in support of Yemen and its support for a political solution.

Source: <https://en.yagency.net/142948>

Annex 106: Press article dated 22 December 2019 from the Iranian media Al-Alam regarding a meeting between Ibrahim Al-Dailami, as Houthis-affiliated Ambassador in Iran, and Brigadier-General Amir Hatami, Iranian Defence Minister

فارسى كيف تشاهد العالم قناة العالم الرئيسية آخر الأخبار طوفان الأقصى العالم العربي إيران العالم فيديو مقالات

سفير اليمن بطهران يلتقي وزير الدفاع الإيراني



الادد ٢٢ ديسمبر ٢٠١٩ - ٨:٢٣ - بتوقيت غرينتش

بحث سفير اليمن لدى طهران إبراهيم الديلمي اليوم مع وزير الدفاع الإيراني العميد أمير حاتمي، سبل تعزيز التعاون المشترك بين البلدين في المجالات العسكرية.

العالم - اليمن

وفي اللقاء نقل سفير اليمن، تحيات وزير الدفاع اللواء الركن محمد العاطفي ورئيس هيئة الأركان اللواء الركن محمد الغماري لوزير الدفاع الإيراني.. مشيداً بعلاقات التعاون التي تربط البلدين على مختلف الأصعدة والموقف الإيراني تجاه العدوان على اليمن.

بدوره حمل العميد حاتمي، السفير الديلمي نقل تحياته لوزير الدفاع ورئيس هيئة الأركان العامة.. مشيراً إلى ضرورة تعزيز وتمتين العلاقة بين الجيشين الإيراني واليمني.

وأكد وزير الدفاع الإيراني، دعم إيران للحل السياسي في اليمن وأن يترك لليمنيين تحديد مستقبل بلادهم.

Source: <https://www.alalam.ir/news/4629456>

Appendix A

Unofficial translation

Today, the Yemeni Ambassador to Tehran, Ibrahim Al-Dailami, discussed with the Iranian Minister of Defence, Brigadier-General Amir Hatami, ways to enhance joint cooperation between the two countries in the military fields.

In the meeting, the Yemeni ambassador conveyed the greetings of the Minister of Defense, Major General Mohammed Al-Atefi and the Chief of Staff, Major General Mohammed Al-Ghamari, to the Iranian Minister of Defense, praising the cooperation relations that bind the two countries at various levels and the Iranian position towards the aggression against Yemen.

In turn, Brigadier General Hatami asked Ambassador Al-Dailami to convey his greetings to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, pointing out the necessity of strengthening the relationship between the Iranian and Yemeni armies.

The Iranian Defense Minister affirmed Iran's support for a political solution in Yemen and that it would be left to the Yemenis to determine the future of their country.

Annex 107: Maritime smuggling of missile components


Figure 107.1

Dhow intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 107.2

Intercepted material



Source: <https://twitter.com/CENTCOM/status/1747214405291716688>

Inventory of the materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024

| Type of materiel intercepted | Quantity |
|------------------------------|----------|
| ASCM air intake cabine | 1 |
| ASCM engine | 1 |
| ASCM fin | 2 |
| ASCM warhead | 1 |
| LACM jet engine | 1 |
| SRBM engine | 5 |
| SRBM turbo pump assemblies | 4 |
| SRBM sets | 2 |
| SRBM missile parts | 1 |
| Radar antenna assembly | 2 |
| Surveillance thermal camera | 14 |

Source: US

Figure 107.3

Air intake cabin, *Ghadir* ASCM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figures 107.4 (left), and 107.5 (right)



Figures 107.6 (left), and 107.7 (right)





Figure 107.8

Close-up on the sticker



Source: US

Figure 107.9
Booster, *Ghadir* ASCM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 107.10



Figures 107.11 (left), and 107.12 (right)
Markings and sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.13 (left), and 107.14 (right)
Fins, Ghadir LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024





Figure 107.15



Figure 107.16
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.17 (up), 107.18 (middle), and 107.19 (down)
Warhead, Ghadir LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024






Figure 107.20
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.21 (up), and 107.22 (down)
Toloue 10 jet engine of « 351 » LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 107.23
Rating plate



Model T10-S
S/N: 10278
Manufacturing date: 2022.08 (August 2022)
Take-off power: 110

Figure 107.24
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.25 (up), and 107.26 (down)
Exciter unit of a “351” LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024





Figure 107.27
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.28 (left), and 107.29 (right)
Engines, *Qiam-2* SRBM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figures 107.30 (left), and 107.31 (right)



Figure 107.32
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 107.33 (left), 107.34 (right), and 107.35 (down)
Turbopump assembly, *Qiam-2* SRBM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024




Figure 107.36
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 107.37

Radar of unidentified model intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figures 107.38 (left), and 107.39 (right)

Close up on the sticker and barcode



Source: US

Figures 107.40 (up), 107.41 (middle), and 107.42 (down)
Radar of unidentified model intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024





Figure 107.43
Marking on the materiel



P.N: PEP.10.06.1
S.N:01040107

Figure 107.44
Sticker on the materiel




Source: US

Annex 108: Dahua DH-TPC-PT8620A-B thermal vision devices intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024

Quantity documented: 14

Figure 108.1



Figures 108.2 (left), and 108.3 (right)



Figure 108.4



Figure 108.5
Factory markings and barcode present on the materiel



Figure 108.6



P/N: 1.0.01.34.11061/0016
 MAC: 08 ED ED 2
 S/N:
 MADE IN CHINA Date: 2019-12
 ZHEJIANG DAHUA VISION TECHNOLOGY CO.
 LTD

Figure 108.7
Close up of the packaging



Source: US

Figure 108.8
Commercial presentation of the materiel

Ultra Series| DH-TPC-PT8620A-B



DH-TPC-PT8620A-B

Thermal Network Hybrid Pan & Tilt Camera



- 640x512 VOx uncooled thermal sensor technology
- Athermalized Lens(thermal), Focus-free
- 1/1.9" 2Megapixel progressive scan Sony CMOS
- Powerful 30x optical zoom
- Support fire detection & alarm
- Max 160°/s pan speed, 360° endless pan rotation
- Up to 300 presets, 5 auto scan, 8 tour, 5 pattern
- 7/2 alarm in/out
- Micro SD memory, IP67



Source: https://www.cctvdahua.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/DH-TPC-PT8620A-B_Datasheet_20180508.pdf

Annex 109: Black plastic tubular container used to hide materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024 by US

Figure 109.1

Black plastic tubular container used to hide materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024 by the US



Source: US


Annex 110: Similarities of the materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024 with materiel produced by Iran

Figure 110.1
Air intake cabin, *Ghadir* ASCM



Source: US

Figure 110.2
Air intake cabin, *Ghadir* ASCM of Iranian production



Source: <https://english.iswnews.com/13279/military-knowledge-ghadir-cruise-missile-images/>

Figure 110.3
Stabilizer, *Ghadir* ASCM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024




Source: US

Figure 110.4
Stabilizer, *Ghadir* ASCM of Iranian production



Source: <https://english.iswnews.com/13279/military-knowledge-ghadir-cruise-missile-images/>

Figure 110.5
War head, *Ghadir* ASCM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 110.6
War head, *Ghadir* ASCM of Iranian production



Source: <https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1401/01/27/2696464>

Figure 110.7

Rating plate of the *Toloue 10* LACM Jet engine intercepted by US on 11 January 2024



Model T10-S
S/N: 10278
Manufacturing date: 2022.08 (August 2022)
Take-off power: 110

Source: US

Figure 110.8

Rating plate of the *Toloue 10* LACM Jet engine intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran ([S/2023/833](#), paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37)




Model T10-S
S/N: 10192
Manufacturing date: 2021.11 (November 2021)
Take-off power: 110

Source: UK

Figures 110.9 (up), and 110.10 (down)

Exciter unit of “351” LACM intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 110.11

Exciter unit of a “351” LACM intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37)



Source: UK

Figure 110.12

Barcode sticker “MMG 10550”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on materiel intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 110.13

Barcode sticker “MMG 10906”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on a satellite antenna intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran ([S/2023/833](#), paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37)



Source: UK

Figure 110.14
Black plastic tubular container intercepted by the US on 11 January 2024



Figure 110.15
Black plastic tubular container used to hide 9M133 ATGM missiles. These missiles were documented on a dhow interdicted on 6 May 2021 (S/2022/50, paras. 64-66, and figures XII, and 20.30)



The Panel notes that among the materiel intercepted, the presence of AM-50 anti-material rifles and the RPG-7 launchers have technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and POSP sights produced in Belarus. Belarus informed the Panel that they had been exported to the Islamic Republic of Iran between June 2016 and April 2018 and that that country had provided an end-user certificate stating that they would be used exclusively for the needs of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics.

Source: US

Annex 111: Maritime smuggling of lethal material and surveillance equipment

Figure 111.1

Dhow intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.2

Intercepted material



Source: <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/IMAGERY/igphoto/2003394784/>


Inventory of the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024

| Type of materiel intercepted | Quantity |
|---|----------|
| UUV nose cone | 1 |
| UUV propeller | 1 |
| UUV fins | 4 |
| UUV part with wiring harness | 1 |
| UUV components | 2 |
| UUV housing cover | 1 |
| UUV plastic components | 1 |
| UUV battery | 7 |
| UUV various cables | 7 |
| UUV extender | 1 |
| UUV connecting arms | 82 |
| UUV hardware | 1 |
| UUV lead weight | 12 |
| UUV mounting bracket | 2 |
| Gold small bracket | 20 |
| Tube with mounting bracket | 4 |
| Cables | 3 |
| Camera | 3 |
| Drone DJI Air 2S | 1 |
| Three port black connector box | 3 |
| Seven connector black box | 21 |
| Electrical connector | 104 |
| Back connector wire with magnet | 100 |
| White box PN: ADC-PLS-002 | 24 |
| White plastic wire connector box small | 240 |
| White box with 4 connector ports | 1 |
| White metal box with connector ports and cooling fans | 1 |
| Black box PN: SSG 2918 | 60 |
| Black Levin box | 80 |
| Black exciter box | 3 |
| Black IMU Connector box | 2 |
| Black connector box with wire | 1 |
| Black box with low pressure hose | 1 |
| Green and white electric box | 14 |
| Green connector cylinder APSIN-5 | 12 |
| Green electric box | 2 |
| Green box HP line | 8 |
| Large green box with connector ports | 2 |
| Silver electric box | 4 |
| Apex APhone 6M | 80 |
| Satphone | 76 |
| GPS box (with 6 components bags in each) | 82 |
| Navico Lowrance Broadband radio | 14 |
| Electric motor | 1 |
| Electric squib | 80 |
| Non-electric primer | 90 |
| Power station | 2 |
| Ground power supply | 1 |
| Lithium Ultra cap charging bank black | 15 |
| Three stage battery charger | 32 |
| HDC 130P charge bank with Laptop | 1 |
| S&A tester | 8 |
| Black battery unit | 20 |
| Zixel charger | 218 |
| PTP 50650 integrated ODU | 3 |
| Gas transfer tubing | 4 |
| Cables | 3 |
| Electrical connector | 2 |
| Large electrical connector | 117 |
| Various connector | 85 |
| Pile of various cable | 1 |
| Circuit board | 2 |
| Hard drive | 7 |
| Network box | 2 |

| | |
|--|----|
| Small electric box | 2 |
| Multi connector with HP line | 2 |
| Computer server tray | 2 |
| Masterview Max computer | 1 |
| Green rackmount computer | 1 |
| Portable computer with screen | 1 |
| Lenovo ThinkPad laptop | 1 |
| Machined rings | 3 |
| Machining parts of various size | 11 |
| 120mm machining parts | 6 |
| 81mm machining parts | 6 |
| SPG machining parts | 6 |
| Rail mount | 7 |
| Explosive packaging | 11 |
| Dehlavieh ATGM Safe and fire mount | 17 |
| Dehlavieh ATGM Sight | 17 |
| Dehlavieh ATGM Bracket | 17 |
| Dehlavieh ATGM Mount | 17 |
| Dehlavieh ATGM Stand legs | 51 |
| Metal pipe with connector cable | 13 |
| Motor assembly with bake light | 13 |
| Steel components | 3 |
| Steel plate with electrical boxes attached | 1 |
| Alternator | 1 |
| Flange assembly | 1 |
| Flange assembly steel and plastic | 1 |
| Metal assembly with gear | 1 |

Source: US

Figures 111.3 (left), and 111.4 (right)
Components of Dehlahvieh launching post (ATGM) intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.5 (left), and 111.6 (right)



Figures 111.7 (left), and 111.8 (right)



Figure 111.9
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.10
SPG machining part intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.11 (left), and 111.12 (right)
120mm mortar machining part intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.13
81 mm mortar machining part intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 111.14 (left), 111.15 (right), and 111.16 (down)
23mm machining part intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 111.17
Power bank intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.18 (left), and 111.19 (right)
Stickers on the materiel





Source: US

Figures 111.20 (up), and 111.21 (down)
UUV component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.22 (left), and 111.23 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.24 (up), and 111.25 (down)
UUV component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.26 (left), 111.27 (middle), and 111.28 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.29 (up), and 111.30 (down)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.31
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.32 (up), and 111.33 (down)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024





Figure 111.34
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.35 (up), and 111.36 (down)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024





Figure 111.37
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.38 (up), and 111.39 (down)
UUV components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figure 111.40
Sticker on the materiel




Source: US

Figure 111.48
SRBM pressure switches intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.49 (left), and 111.50 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.51 (up), and 111.52 (down)
SRBM guidance & control related component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.53
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.54
SRBM actuator intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figure 111.55
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.56 (up), 111.57 (middle), and 111.58 (down)
SRBM jet vane control system intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024





Figure 111.59
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.60
SRBM jet vane control system component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024





Figure 111.61
Sticker apposed on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.62
SRBM Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.63 (left), and 111.64 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.65 (up), and 111.66 (down)
Unidentified materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.67 (left), and 111.68 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figure 111.69
Wooden crate containing GPS antennas intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.70 (left), and 111.71 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.72 (left), and 111.73 (right)
GPS antennas intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.74 (left), and 111.75 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Figures 111.76 (left), 111.77 (center), and 111.78 (right)



Figures 111.79 (left), 111.80 (middle), and 111.81 (right)
Stickers on the materiel




Source: US


Figures 111.82 (left),and 111.83 (right)
GPS antennas intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.84 (left),and 11.85 (right)



Figures 111.86 (left), 111.87 (middle), and 111.88 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.89 (left), and 111.90 (right)
Levin connector intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.91 (left), and 111.92 (right)




Figure 111.93
Sticker on the materiel




Source: US


Figures 111.94 (left), and 111.95 (right)
Unidentified materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.96
Marking on the materiel



Figures 111.97 (left), 111.98 (middle), 111.99 (right), and 111.100 (down)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.101
SRBM battery intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.102 (left), and 111.103 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.104
SRBM batteries intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.105
Markings on the materiel




Figure 111.106
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.107
SRBM guidance and control related components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.108 (left), and 111.109 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.110 (up), and 111.111 (down)

Component of SRBM jet vane control system intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.112 (left), and 111.113 (right)



Figures 111.114 (left), and 111.115 (right)

Stickers on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.116 (up), 111.117 (middle), and 111.118 (down)
Computer intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.119
Sticker on the materiel




Source: US

Figures 111.120 (up), and 111.121 (down)
S&A tester intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figures 111.122 (left), and 111.123 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.124 (up), 111.125 (middle), and 111.126 (down)
EOSS component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figures 111.127 (left), and 111.128 (right)
Stickers on the materiel



Source: US

Figure 111.129
EOSS component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.130
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.131 (up), and 111.132 (down)
Unidentified materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.133
Marking on the materiel



Figure 111.134
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.135 (up), and 111.136 (down)
USB sampler module intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.137
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.138 (up), and 111.139 (down)
Telephone station intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Figure 111.140
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Figures 111.141 (up), and 111.142 (down)

Lowrance maritime radar intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 111.143 (up), and 111.144 (down)
DJI Air 2 drone intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 111.145 (up), and 111.146 (down)
Bags containing explosive intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 111.147
Sticker on the materiel



Source: US

Annex 112: Stickers documented on the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024

Most of the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024 is covered by a sticker containing two lines of information, established on similar mode of sequence.



Figure 112.1: Dehlavieh ATGM



Figure 112.2: S&A tester




Figure 112.3: Component of SRBM




Figure 112.4: SRBM GPS antenna




Figure 112.5: Component of a UUV



Figure 112.6: Explosive



Figure 112.7: Power bank



Figure 112.8: Telephone station

Source: US

Annex 113: Quality control (QC) stickers of four different models observed by the Panel

The stickers presented on figures 113.1, 113.2 and 113.3, have already been documented on materiel previously intercepted.

Figure 113.1
QC model 1




Figure 113.2
QC model 2



Figure 113.3
QC model 3



Figure 113.4
QC model 4




Source: US

Annex 114: Similarities of the materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024 with materiel produced by Iran

Figure 114.1

Camouflage cover of the localisator of one of the Dehlavieh ATGM intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024*Source: US*

Figure 114.2

Camouflage cover with similar pattern on the localisator of a Dehlavieh ATGM displayed by Iran

Source: <https://en.topwar.ru/225366-ot-kopirovanija-do-samostojatelnoj-razrabotki-inostrannye-korni-iranskih-ptrk.html> (extracted from the Iranian News Agency Mizan)

Figure 114.3

Camouflage cover with similar pattern on the localisator of a Dehlavieh ATGM operated by Hezbollah

Source: <https://en.mehmnews.com/news/209264/Hezbollah-strikes-various-Israeli-bases-on-Lebanese-borders> (Iranian News Agency « Mehr News)

Figure 114.4
SRBM pressure switches intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024 (respectively marked “TGU.D036”, JAU.D535”, JAU.D540”, “JAU.D546”, “JAU.D549”, and LOU.D520”)



Source: US

Figure 114.5
Similar markings observed on the pressure switches documented on *Borkan-3* debris from attack on 7 Mar 2021 on Damman, KSA (marked “PDU.L068”)




Source: Confidential

Figure 114.6
Similar pressure switches documented on an Iranian *Qiam-2* debris from the attack on 8 January 2020 on a US base in Erbil, Iraq (respectively marked “GNU.D047” and “GNU.D048”) (S/2018/594, para. 90)




Source: Confidential

Figures 114.7 (left), and 114.8 (right)
“Q.A Passed” sticker apposed on component of SRBM jet vane control system (left) and guidance and control system component (right) intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 114.9 (left), and 114.10 (right)
“Q.A Passed” sticker apposed on SRBM components (left), and IMU (right) intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Source: US

Figure 114.11
Similar “Q.A Passed” sticker on a component of the Iranian *Qiam* SRBM intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37).



Source: UK

Figures 114.12 (left) and 114.13 (right)
SRBM actuators of jet vane control system component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024




Source: US

Figure 114.14
SRBM actuators of jet vane control system at the inauguration of the Permanent Exhibition of Achievements and Capabilities of the IRGC's Aerospace Division, Tehran, Iran, on 27 September 2020




Source: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:National_Aerospace_Park_opening_ceremony_\(059\).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:National_Aerospace_Park_opening_ceremony_(059).jpg) (Extracted from the Iranian news agency “Fars”)

Figure 114.15
 SRBM guidance and control related components intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.16
 SRBM guidance and control related components-of an Iranian *Qiam-2* debris from the attack on 8 January 2020 on a US base in Erbil, Iraq



Source: Confidential

Figure 114.17
SRBM guidance & control related component intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Figure 114.18
SRBM guidance and control related component-of an Iranian *Qiam-2* debris from the attack on 8 January 2020 on a US base in Erbil, Iraq



Source: US

Figure 114.19

Barcode sticker “MMG 10942” observed on the component of an EOSS intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.20

Barcode sticker “MMG 10943”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.21


Barcode sticker “MMG 10978”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on materiel intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figure 114.22


Barcode sticker “MMG 10906”, and green sticker with a serial number starting with the sequence “PD01” observed on a satellite antenna intercepted by the UK on 25 February 2023 from a smuggling vessel coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/2023/833, paras. 74-76, and annex 30-37)



Source: Panel

Figure 114.23 (left), and 114.24 (right)

Nose cone of an UUV intercepted by the US on 28 January 2024



Source: US

Figures 114.25 (up), and 114.26 (down)
UUVs with similar nose cone displayed early 2022 by the IRGC Navy



Source: <https://en.mehrnews.com/photo/184946/IRGC-naval-forces-receive-new-defensive-equipment>

Annex 115: Material seized since 12 March 2023 by the GoY Customs

Figure 115.1

29 drones jamming devices seized at Shahan border post on 1 January 2024




Figure 115.2

Four Starlink satellite dishes and associate material seized at Shahan border post in December 2023



Source: GoY customs

Figure 115.3
1,560 Kalashnikov spare-parts seized in Aden free zone custom port on 23 November 2023



Figure 115.4
Two Yamaha motors for boat seized at Al-Wadeeah Customs port on 26 November 2023



Source: GoY customs

Figure 115.5
 20 anti-drone jammers seized at Shahren border post on 22 October 2023





Figure 115.6
 12 military walkie-talkies and 6 cartons of cables and antennas seized at Shahren border post on 12 August 2023



Source: GoY customs

Figure 115.7
Communication devices and tools seized at Shahan border post on 17 July 2023



Figure 115.8
4,956 laser devices to be adapted on SALWs seized at Shahan border post on 25 June 2023



Source: GoY customs

Figure 115.9
5,175 pistol holsters and 498 binoculars seized at Aden Free zone customs port on 21 May 2023




Figure 115.10
54 drones seized at Aden Free zone customs port on 12 March 2023



Source: GoY customs

Annex 116: Components of AK-47 and G3 or MP5 intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 116.1 (left) and 116.2 (right)
AK-47 assault rifle parts





Figure 116.3
G3 rifle parts




Source: Panel

Annex 117: Tactical rails and equipment for SALW intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 117.1 (left) and 117.2 (right)
Tactical rails for AK-47 assault rifle



Figures 117.3 (left) and 117.4 (right)
Tactical rails for SALW



Figures 117.5 (left) and 117.6 (right)
Glock pistol customized parts



Source: Panel

Annex 118: Sniper scopes intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023


Figures 118.1 (up), 118.2 (middle), and 118.3 (down)
CODL 3-9x42 sniper scopes concealed in a metal box



Source: Panel

Annex 119: Rifle scopes intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 119.1 (left), and 119.2 (right)
M9 LS3 3-10x42 Rifle scopes with laser sight



Figures 119.3 (up), and 119.4 (down)
M9 LS3 3-10x42 Rifle scopes with laser sight



Source: Panel

Annex 120: Red dot holographic sights intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figures 120.1 (left), 120.2 (right), and 120.3 (down)
Model 552 Red dot holographic sights



Source: Panel

Annex 121: Communication devices intercepted by GoY counter-terrorism unit in 2023

Figure 121.1
VHF radio Motorola K9



Source: Panel

Figures 121.2 (left) and 121.3 (right)
VHF radio Motorola MT777R



Source: Panel

Figure 121.4
VHF radio Motorola DP4800



Source: Panel

Figures 121.5 (up), and 121.6 (down)
VHF station Motorola DM4600e



Source: Panel

Figure 121.7
VHF station Hytera RD985



Source: Panel

Annex 122: Case study N° 1, “Glock store” armory located in Sana’a

Figure 122.1

Profile of the “Glock store” visible on “X”

جلوك ستور للمهمات العسكرية

@GlocStore

تعتبر شركة جلوك ستور متجر رائد في توفير الاسلحة الشخصية والفردية في الجمهورية اليمنية وهي شركة مرخصة بشكل رسمي كأول شركة متخصصة 777-754-232

Translated from Arabic by Google

Glock Store is a leading store in the provision of personal and individual weapons in the Republic of Yemen, and it is an officially licensed company as the first Specialized Inc. 232-754-777



جلوك ستور للمهمات العسكرية

@GlocStore

يعتبر السلاح في كثير من الدول خصوصاً بلادنا جزءاً لا يتجزأ من الثقافة والعادات والتقاليد اليمنية فهناك أنواع للسلاح أو ما يسمى بـ السلاح الأبيض و السلاح الشخصي والذي يرتبط بعراقة تاريخنا منذ القدم و الشخصية اليمنية

صور من معرض جلوك ستور اليمن صنعاء شارع الزبيري

Translated from Arabic by Google

Weapons are considered in many countries, especially our country, as an integral part of the Yemeni culture, customs and traditions. There are types of weapons or what is called white weapons and personal weapons, which are linked to the ancient history of our history and the Yemeni character.

Pictures from Glock Store, Yemen, Sana'a, Al-Zubairi Street

Video presenting the “Glock store” armory: <https://twitter.com/GlocStore/status/1629947785729417218>

Figures 122.2 (left) and 123.3 (right)

Some material presented for sale at “Glock store”



Figures 122.4 (left) and 122.5 (right)
Some material presented for sale at “Glock store”



Figures 122.6 (up) and 122.7 (down)
Some material presented for sale at “Glock store”



Source: <https://twitter.com/GlocStore/status/1594090810852925440/photo/1>

SALWs observed by the Panel as presented for sale by the “Glock store” armory in Sana’a⁶¹**Pistols**

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|---------------------|--|
| Glock 17 Gen 4 | US (under licence) |
| Glock 19 | Austria |
| Glock 19 Gen 4 | US (under licence) |
| Glock 19 Gen 5 | US (under licence) |
| Glock 19X | US (under licence) |
| Glock 21 Gen 4 | US (under licence) |
| Glock 26 | Austria |
| Glock 43X | US (under licence) |
| Beretta M9 | US (under licence) |
| Beretta M9A4 | US (under licence) |
| Beretta PX4 | Italy |
| Sig Sauer M17 | US (under licence) |
| Smith & Wesson M59 | US |
| Smith & Wesson SD9 | US |
| Smith & Wesson M&P9 | US |
| Ruger 5.7 | US |
| FN 509 | US (under licence) |
| FN GP | Belgium |
| CZ-75 Automatic | Czech Republic |
| Taurus G3c | Brazil |
| Caracal model F | UAE |
| CF-98 | China |
| Sarsilmaz SAR-9 | Turkiye |
| Canik TP-9 | Turkiye |
| Baikal 442 | Russian Federation |
| TT-33 Tokarev | Russian Federation and/or former Soviet Union |

Machine pistols

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|----------------|--|
| Tondar TK-9 | Islamic Republic of Iran |

Compact assault rifles

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|-----------------|--|
| AKSU | Russian Federation and/or former Soviet Union |
| M92 | Serbia |
| AR-SF | Bulgaria |
| M4 short barrel | US |
| M4 long barrel | US |
| HK416 | Germany |

Assault rifles

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|----------------|--|
| AK47 | Various origin |
| AK103 | Probably of local production |
| AK74 | Former Soviet Union |
| QLZ-97 | China |

⁶¹ Presented on Facebook and Twitter: <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100083088382935> and <https://twitter.com/GlocStore>

| | |
|-----------|---------|
| Steyr AUG | Austria |
| G3 | Germany |
| FAL | Belgium |
| SCAR HB | Belgium |

Under barrel grenade launchers (UBGL)

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|----------------|--|
| M203 | US |

Sniper rifles

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|-----------------|--|
| SVD-1 | Russian Federation or former Soviet Union |
| SVD-S | Russian Federation |
| Springfield M21 | US |

LMGs

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|----------------|--|
| M249/Minimi | Belgium or US |
| RPK | Not identified |

Rocket launchers

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|----------------|--|
| RPG-7 | Not identified |

Optics

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|----------------------------|--|
| AN/PVS7 NVG | US |
| EOTech day and night sight | US |
| 1P29 | Russian Federation |

Annex 123: Case study N° 2, Haider Tayef artisanal store in Sana'a

Figure 123.1
Profile of the Haider Tayef artisanal store visible on “X”




Figure 123.2
Some material presented for sale at Haider Tayef artisanal store



Source: <https://twitter.com/TayfAbn50085>

Figure 123.3 (left), 123.4 (down left), and 123.5 (down right)
Some material presented for sale at Haider Tayef artisanal store



Source: <https://twitter.com/TayfAbn50085>

Material observed by the Panel as presented for sale by the Haider Tayef artisanal store in Sana'a
Pistols

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|----------------|--|
| Glock 19 Gen 5 | US (under licence) |
| Glock 19X | US (under licence) |
| Sig Sauer M18 | US (under licence) |

| | |
|--------------------|---------------------|
| Smith & Wesson SD9 | US |
| Taurus G3c | Brazil |
| Sarsilmaz SAR-9 | Turkiye |
| AHSS FXS-9 | Turkiye |
| System Defence C9 | Turkiye |
| Baikal 442 | Russian Federation |
| TT-33 Tokarev | Former Soviet Union |
| TT-33 Tokarev | Bulgaria |
| Makarov | Former Soviet Union |

Compact assault rifles

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|----------------|--|
| AKSU | Russian Federation and/or former Soviet Union |
| M92 | Serbia |
| AR-SF | Bulgaria |
| AK-104 | Probably of local production |

Assault rifles

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|----------------|--|
| AK47 | Various origin |
| Type 56-1 | China |
| AMD-65 | Hungary |
| MiPKMS | Former East Germany |
| AK103 | Probably of local production |
| AK74 | Former Soviet Union |
| Steyr AUG | Austria |
| G3 | Germany |

Sniper rifle

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|----------------------|--|
| Tigr-1 ⁶² | Russian Federation |

⁶² Civilian version of the SVD-1

Annex 124: Case study N° 3, Abdul Khaleq Al-Masry artisanal store in Sana'a

Figures 124.1 (left) and 124.2 (right)

Profile of the Haider Tayef artisanal store visible on “X” and some material presented for sale in this store



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=863857151814094&set=a.103401481193002>

Material documented by the Panel as presented for sale by the Abdul Khaleq Al-Masry artisanal store in Sana'a

Pistols

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|----------------|--|
| Tokarev or TTC | Former Soviet Union or Poland |
| Baikal 442 | Russian Federation |
| NZ-75 | China |
| Colt Commander | USA |

Assault rifles

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|----------------|--|
| G3 | Germany, UK, Portugal, or Saudi Arabia |
| FAL | Belgium |
| AUG | Austria |
| AK-47 | Former Soviet Union or Russia |
| AK-63 | Hungary |
| AMD-65 | Hungary |
| Type 56-1 | China |
| Type 56-2 | China |
| MiPKMS | Former East Germany |
| VZ-58 | Former Czechoslovakia |
| AR-F | Bulgaria |

Compact assault rifles

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|-----------------------|---|
| M4 | USA |
| AKSU | Former Soviet Union or Russian Federation |
| AR-SF | Bulgaria |

Sub-machine gun

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|-----------------------|---|
| MP-5 or TK-9 | Germany, UK or Iran |

Sniper rifles

| Designation | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|--------------------|---|
| SVD-1 or Type 85 | Former Soviet Union, Russian Federation or China |

Machine-guns

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|-----------------------|---|
| SG-43 | Various origin |
| PKM | Various origin |

Rocket launchers

| Make and Model | Technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in |
|-----------------------|---|
| RPG-7 | Various origin |

Annex 125: Arms exhibition held in Sana'a in February 2024

Figure 125.1
Entrance of one display stand



Source: https://twitter.com/alhashar_mhmd/status/1762047504047120754/photo/1

Figures 125.2 (left), and 125.3 (right)
Military materiel on display



Source: https://twitter.com/alhashar_mhmd/status/1762533688133210339

Figures 125.4 (up), 125.5 (middle), and 125.6 (down)
Military materiel on display



Source: <https://twitter.com/4v4uHANec6Bv1yJ/status/1762476161374843170/photo/1>



Source: <https://twitter.com/Amjdhsh55Lby/status/1762155769149943911/photo/2>




Source: https://twitter.com/alhshar_mhmd/status/1761934151253414067/photo/1

Annex 126: Model 213 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 80

Figures 126.1 (left), and 126.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/TbyNasr/status/1666792974213079040>

Serial numbers

| | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 14027752 | 31009398 | 32012079 | 33022065 |
| 16034201 | 31011486 | 32012642 | 33023064 |
| 19001295 | 31012118 | 32013326 | 33025064 |
| 19007887 | 31012127 | 32013348 | 33026326 |
| 22010610 | 31014027 | 32013365 | 33026484 |
| 22016405 | 31014068 | 32013918 | 34002533 |
| 25036249 | 31018099 | 32015260 | 34003417 |
| 25045760 | 31018624 | 32113547 | 34003563 |
| 29022769 | 31019508 | 32313272 | 34004232 |
| 29027026 | 31022373 | 32616930 | 34004518 |
| 29031757 | 31023505 | 33001235 | 34005434 |
| 29034244 | 32000008 | 33002430 | 34006143 |
| 29043863 | 32000810 | 33004491 | 34085557 |
| 30005647 | 32002117 | 33004725 | 49000539 |
| 30009363 | 32002300 | 33006136 | 49001295 |
| 30011004 | 32004079 | 33007065 | 49001846 |
| 30316210 | 32004271 | 33008147 | 49002016 |
| 31008101 | 32006388 | 33021623 | 49006075 |
| 31009320 | 32006826 | 33021725 | 49006226 |
| 31009385 | 32006868 | 33022064 | 49007887 |

Model 213 pistol documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|----------|-------------------------------|
| 49002016 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
|----------|-------------------------------|

Reference in previous reports: [S/2019/858](#), annex 2.5

Annex 127: Type 54 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 39

Figure 127.1



Figure 127.2.

Comment made by the seller (Unofficial translation)



مستندات لكنا خط نعيم جندد زيروو
مع التواع ويسعر مناسب جداً
315000 الف يعني او 2250 ريال سعودي
سعر مؤقت
وين المشتري بالخاها فرصة وبئش من محلات حمد طائف
العنوان صنعاء جولة عمران نهايت الجسر بجاء عمران محلات حمد طائف والحواله
للتواصل والاستفسار على 773334779

Tata Pistols Namim Jadid Zeroo line
With accessories at a very, very favourable price 315000 Yemeni
Thousand or 2250 Saudi Riyals
Temporary price

Where is the buyer to take a chance and buy it from Hamad Tayef stores

Address Sana'a, Jawala Amran, the end of the bridge towards
Amran, the shops of Hamad Tayef and his brothers
For contact and inquiries at 773334779

Source: <https://twitter.com/k01mup442MDxa5H/status/1757425644416151630/photo/1>

Serial numbers

| | | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 60000736 | 61002024 | 61016551 | 69001147 | 69005418 |
| 60001479 | 61003501 | 61017517 | 69002330 | 69006007 |
| 60003378 | 61008297 | 61019655 | 69002398 | 69006148 |
| 60003465 | 61011211 | 61019678 | 69002813 | 69006909 |
| 60003507 | 61013083 | 61019842 | 69003180 | 69007831 |
| 60004130 | 61015775 | 61019928 | 69003194 | 69007945 |
| 60004285 | 61016104 | 61029520 | 69004905 | 69007952 |
| 61001319 | 61016495 | 69000125 | 69005100 | |

Type 54 pistols documented in Bahrain and Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|----------|---|
| 60002362 | Documented in Bahrain by Atlantic Council ⁶³ |
| 60002705 | Documented in Bahrain by Atlantic Council |
| 61004595 | Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC ⁶⁴ |

⁶³ <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/>

⁶⁴ Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)

61007768

Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC

Annex 128: Type 59 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 108

Figures 128.1 (left), and 128.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/yaser84779686/status/1234446969789124609>

Serial numbers

Model 1

| | | | |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 12A0029 | 12P2348 | 12P4355 | 12P7349 |
| 12A0224 | 12P2600 | 12P4406 | 12P7478 |
| 12P0804 | 12P2605 | 12P4672 | 12P7549 |
| 12P0813 | 12P2686 | 12P5254 | 12P7648 |
| 12P1018 | 12P2773 | 12P5743 | 12P7709 |
| 12P1323 | 12P2784 | 12P5587 | 12P7824 |
| 12P1413 | 12P2861 | 12P5892 | 12P7970 |
| 12P1472 | 12P2940 | 12P5963 | 12P8133 |
| 12P1484 | 12P3043 | 12P6092 | 12P8179 |
| 12P1723 | 12P3584 | 12P6118 | 12P8271 |
| 12P1728 | 12P3693 | 12P6249 | 12P8448 |
| 12P1734 | 12P3818 | 12P6493 | 12P8590 |
| 12P1784 | 12P3896 | 12P6777 | 12P8657 |
| 12P1819 | 12P3919 | 12P7107 | 12P9188 |
| 12P1851 | 12P3972 | 12P7182 | 12P9300 |
| 12P2147 | 12P4151 | 12P7217 | 12P9467 |
| 12P2204 | 12P4165 | 12P7250 | 12P9516 |

Model 2

| | | | |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| DO 0085 | DO 3406 | DI 1466 | EO 0531 |
| DO 0661 | DO 3431 | DI 2208 | EO 0931 |
| DO 1151 | DO 3710 | DI 3984 | EO 1205 |
| DO 1299 | DO 4246 | DI 5416 | EO 1620 |
| DO 1666 | DO 5298 | DI 5956 | EO 2105 |
| DO 1989 | DO 5863 | DI 6190 | EO 2114 |
| DO 2044 | DO 6940 | DI 6419 | EO 3312 |
| DO 2137 | DO 7209 | DI 6462 | |
| DO 2256 | DO 8054 | DI 6596 | |
| DO 2972 | DO 8562 | DI 7105 | |
| DO 3090 | DO 9466 | DI 8235 | |

Type 59 pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|---------|-------------------------------|
| DI 1243 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| EO 3056 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |

Reference in previous report: [S/2019/858](#), annex 2.5

Annex 129: CF-98 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 24

Figures 129.1 (left), and 129.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=207525905638549&set=pb.100091434221975.-2207520000&type=3>

Serial numbers

| | | | | |
|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| 15-CN 000548 | 15-CN 000618 | 15-CN 007633 | 15-CN 017542 | 15-CN 028834 |
| 15-CN 000618 | 15-CN 002914 | 15-CN 008461 | 15-CN 023096 | 15-CN 028943 |
| 15-CN 001200 | 15-CN 003259 | 15-CN 008772 | 15-CN 026530 | 15-CN 030084 |
| 15-CN 001694 | 15-CN 005594 | 15-CN 008795 | 15-CN 027724 | 15-CN 030179 |
| 15-CN 001954 | 15-CN 006313 | 15-CN 009248 | 15-CN 028081 | 15-CN 033211 |
| 15-CN 000548 | 15-CN 006718 | 15-CN 010840 | 15-CN 028754 | |

Reference in previous report: S/2023/833, annex 77

CF-98 pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|--------|--|
| 006331 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 025554 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 029336 | Documented in Somalia in open source ⁶⁵ |
| 030930 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |

Reference in previous report: S/2019/858, annex 2.5

⁶⁵ <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2019-01-21-three-more-dusit-terror-suspects-arrested/>

Annex 130: NP-34 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 30

Figures 130.1 (left) and 130.2 (right)



Source: https://twitter.com/ywsf_mnyf/status/1662110055787839489

Serial numbers

| | | | |
|----------|---------|----------|----------|
| 401109 | 0200173 | B013051 | B5000908 |
| 401289 | 0200178 | B013191 | B5000947 |
| 85000468 | 0200976 | B014696 | B5002799 |
| 86002705 | B010102 | B015374 | B6002290 |
| 0100372 | B011216 | B5000266 | B6002344 |
| 0101393 | B011697 | B5000619 | B8002300 |
| 0101793 | B011949 | B5000624 | |
| 0200125 | B012965 | B5000861 | |

NP-34 pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|----------|---|
| B011653 | Documented by the PoE Somalia as seized on ISIL |
| B6002488 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |

Reference in previous report: [S/2017/924](#), annex 2.1

Annex 131: NP-34 pistols with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those commercialized by Norconia GmbH presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the German authorities, conveying the comments of Norconia GmbH, the sole importer for Europe of Chinese arms manufacturer North Industries Corporation (Norinco), the documented NP-34 pistols are not counterfeits. After comparing with the files, Norconia GmbH informed that all of the 16 NP-34 pistols documented cannot be found in their weapons books and that they were not imported by them. They said, “The fact that the pistols still bear the ‘DE NORCONIA’ marking is due to the following fact: back in 2016, Norinco as a supplier pre-produced 200 NP-34 pistols with this marking. From that point until today, however, due to declining demand, Norconia GmbH has only ordered five NP-34 pistols, but marked with totally different serial numbers.” Norconia GmbH assumed that the 16 NP-34 pistols documented, which were originally intended for them, were exported directly from China via other channels.

Quantity documented: 16

Figures 131.1. (left) and 131.2 (right)



Figure 131.3 (left) 22-CN (2022 as the year of production)

Figure 131.4 (right) Norinco factory logo



Source: https://twitter.com/Hassan_Ghayeb2/status/1752692840495263875/photo/2

Serial numbers

| | | | |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| B026102 | B029607 | B030301 | B031640 |
| B027157 | B029615 | B030304 | B031653 |
| B029125 | B029892 | B030308 | B031723 |
| B029520 | B030028 | B030528 | B032596 |

Annex 132: NP-42 Mini pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 16

Figures 132.1 (left), and 132.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/lyrby44932777/status/1636067867882921986>

Serial numbers

| | | | |
|--------|--------|--------|---------------|
| 000648 | 002237 | 003427 | 009248 |
| 001439 | 003259 | 003485 | 010840 |
| 001525 | 003325 | 007985 | 028943 |
| 001954 | 003395 | 008086 | 011775-23-296 |

NP-42 Mini pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|--------|---------------------------------|
| 003629 | Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC |
|--------|---------------------------------|

Annex 133: FB-83 pistol with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Poland presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 43

Figures 133.1 (left), and 133.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKimmF0uL2/status/1745499029545369713>

Serial numbers

| | | | | |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| EF06193 | ZU08134 | NL00950 | NL03416 | SF03680 |
| EF07363 | ZU08204 | NL03355 | NL03418 | SF03742 |
| EF07426 | ZU09166 | NL00353 | NL03355 | SF03751 |
| EF07639 | ZU09547 | NL00771 | NL03524 | SF03755 |
| EF09041 | ZU09700 | NL00981 | NL03625 | SF03900 |
| EF09123 | ZU09767 | NL01808 | NL03846 | MW05959 |
| ZU07715 | ZU09806 | NL01811 | SF08680 | MW06124 |
| ZU07443 | NL00428 | NL02138 | SF03083 | |
| ZU07695 | NL00490 | NL03185 | SF03437 | |


FB-83 pistols documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|---------|---------------------------------|
| ZU08864 | Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC |
|---------|---------------------------------|

Annex 134: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 49

Figures 134.1 (left), and 134.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=479035194412543&set=pb.100069181991038.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

| | | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 25025413 | 26018338 | 26038410 | 27062180 | 28006408 |
| 25023361 | 26022476 | 26039556 | 27065419 | 28025788 |
| 25024585 | 26029253 | 26039773 | 27105554 | 28053494 |
| 25028608 | 26030746 | 26042878 | 27132734 | 28081544 |
| 25029722 | 26031111 | 26072964 | 27133794 | 28089548 |
| 26009277 | 26033093 | 26074596 | 27183082 | 28090227 |
| 26012778 | 26035831 | 26089548 | 27185674 | 28100274 |
| 26014718 | 26036101 | 26108201 | 27199193 | 28120521 |
| 26015736 | 26037377 | 26162017 | 27205103 | 28144117 |
| 26016445 | 26037512 | 26163316 | 28006802 | |

Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 26 documented in Bahrain, Iraq, KSA, Niger, Central Africa Republic and Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas


| | |
|----------|---|
| 27107135 | Documented in Syria |
| 27111509 | Documented in Bahrain by Atlantic Council |
| 27138062 | Documented in KSA by JSTOR |
| 27144983 | Documented in Iraq by JSTOR |
| 27151877 | Documented in Iraq by JSTOR |
| 27116626 | Documented in Niger by Conflict Armament Research (CAR) |
| 2717018? | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 28168193 | Documented in Central Africa Rep by the Panel of experts on RCA |
| 30005215 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11, and [S/2015/936](#), annex 1.13

Annex 135: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 17

Figures 135.1 (left), and 135.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/yaser84779686/status/1216947156009078784/photo/2>

Serial numbers

| | | |
|----------|----------|----------|
| 60001470 | 62042402 | 63042319 |
| 60025564 | 62069029 | 63052870 |
| 60035053 | 62117807 | 63084326 |
| 61036441 | 62146851 | 63243537 |
| 61063770 | 62161944 | 64013638 |
| 61131431 | 63042265 | |

Reference in previous reports: S/2023/833, paras. 70-71, 73, annexes 24-27, S/2022/754, para. 104, S/2022/50, paras. 62, 64, S/2021/79, para. 86, table 2, S/2020/326, para. 61, and S/2019/83, paras. 95-96

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 26, and production batches 15-CN, 16-CN, 17-CN, 18-CN, and 19-CN, intercepted between 2018 and 2023, which have also been documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Production batch 15-CN

| Serial numbers | Comment |
|----------------|--|
| 60000469 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 60001470 | Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas |
| 60006094 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 60003785 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 60006094 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 60006170 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 60009383 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 60012023 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 60012270 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (arms from Djibouti) |
| 60013158 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (arms from Djibouti) |
| 60013577 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 60014293 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 60014768 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 60015612 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 60053925 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 60060687 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |

Production batch 16-CN

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61001920 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61002030 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61002149 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61002515 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61003454 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61003463 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61003807 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61003990 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61004235 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61004373 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61004386 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61004407 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61004467 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61004586 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61004595 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61004620 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61004647 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61005463 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61005490 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61005520 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61005566 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61005588 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61005589 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61005696 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61006058 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61006237 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61016589 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61016600 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61006614 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61016742 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61016756 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61006787 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61006801 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61006814 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61006852 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61006859 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61006910 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61006912 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61007091 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61007494 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61007768 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61007852 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61008170 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61008338 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61008459 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61008749 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61008943 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61008996 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61022748 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61022845 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61022850 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61022854 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61022915 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61026550 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61026562 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen / |
| 61026571 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61026632 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61026638 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61026640 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61032723 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61032991 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61033164 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61037649 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61037796 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61037844 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61038157 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61038225 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61040633 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61040742 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61040869 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61041039 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61041125 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61041256 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61044069 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61044076 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61044080 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61044092 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61044113 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61048624 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61054712 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61055765 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61056959 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61057023 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|--------------------------|
| 61060000 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61060324 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61060355 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61060567 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61060593 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|---|
| 61063485 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61063496 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61063543 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61063573 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61063641 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61063681 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61063770 | Observed on the black market in Houthi controlled areas |
| 61063879 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61063916 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61069718 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61069749 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61079035 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61080895 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61080994 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61089851 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61089854 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61089885 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61089907 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61089919 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 61091409 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61091542 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61091546 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 61091556 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61091560 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 62096109 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62096303 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61096634 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62096647 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61096657 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62096675 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62096714 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62096761 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62096847 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61096927 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62096929 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62096941 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 62098152 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61098408 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62098719 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62098821 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61098882 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 62099197 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62099209 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62099322 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61099363 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62099367 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62099375 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|--|
| 61128703 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61129232 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61129414 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 61129726 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61129771 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|---|
| 61131425 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61131427 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61131431 | Observed on the black market in Houthi controlled areas |
| 61131439 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 61131467 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

Production batch 17-CN

| | |
|----------|-------------------------------------|
| 62012652 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
|----------|-------------------------------------|

| | |
|----------|-------------------------------------|
| 62028884 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62028927 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62029096 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62029309 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62029410 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62030167 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62035280 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62035357 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62035360 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 62035391 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62035512 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|--|
| 62042333 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62042402 | Observed on the black market in Houthi- controlled areas |
| 62042662 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 62043136 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 62045607 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62046363 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62046797 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62047578 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62047742 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62048096 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62048794 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62048834 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 62048904 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62048924 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62049153 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62049424 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62050684 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62050742 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62051887 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62051997 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62052003 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62052225 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62052287 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62052753 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62052790 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62053138 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62053233 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62054562 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62054614 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62056023 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62056447 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62056514 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62056601 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 62056918 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62057267 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|--|
| 62068569 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62069029 | Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled area |
| 62069345 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62069377 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|-------------------------------|
| 62103376 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62103380 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62103427 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62103507 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 62103651 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62103661 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|-------------------------------------|
| 62115236 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62115237 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62115254 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 62115261 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62115287 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|---|
| 62117491 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62117740 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62117807 | Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas |
| 62117821 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62117823 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|--------------------------|
| 62131730 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62131794 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|-------------------------------|
| 62131917 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 62131964 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62131981 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|---|
| 62135349 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62135350 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 62143358 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 62146851 | Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas |
| 62163358 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |

Production batch 18-CN

| | |
|----------|-------------------------------------|
| 63000597 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63000600 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63000617 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63000620 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63000639 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63000644 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63000765 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |

| | |
|----------|-------------------------------|
| 63001996 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63001998 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63002004 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63002010 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63002016 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63002018 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63002415 | Seized in Yemen by UAE forces |
| 63002455 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63002460 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 63004051 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63004061 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63004103 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63004132 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63004158 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|-------------------------------|
| 63006154 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63006152 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63006160 | Seized in Yemen by UAE forces |
| 63006178 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63006192 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|-------------------------------|
| 63008382 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63008401 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63008409 | Seized in Yemen by UAE forces |
| 63008411 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63008416 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|--------------------------|
| 63008541 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
|----------|--------------------------|

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 63008543 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63008553 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63008595 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63008612 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 63010580 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63010582 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63010595 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63010617 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63010627 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63010638 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 63012260 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63012265 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63012269 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63012280 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63012286 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|---------------------------------|
| 63014858 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63014863 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63014866 | Captured in Yemen by UAE forces |
| 63014880 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63014922 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|--|
| 63025370 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63025371 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 63039372 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63039391 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63039468 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63039476 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63039502 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|--|
| 63041883 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63041894 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 63041907 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63041909 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|---|
| 63042228 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63042247 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63042265 | Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas |
| 63042293 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63042298 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63042315 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63042318 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63042319 | Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas |
| 63042330 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|--------------------------|
| 63042811 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
|----------|--------------------------|

| | |
|----------|---------------------------------|
| 63044680 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63044684 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63044712 | Captured in Yemen by UAE forces |
| 63044713 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63044715 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 63045538 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63045545 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63045561 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63045562 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63045567 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|---|
| 63050942 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63052870 | Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas |
| 63056702 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63057434 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |

| | |
|----------|--|
| 63006160 | Seized in Yemen by UAE forces |
| 63061631 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 63062977 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63069739 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63071650 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 63072304 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63084645 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63088360 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 63090647 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 63098435 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|----------|---|
| 63243537 | Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas |
|----------|---|

Production batch 19-CN

| | |
|----------|--|
| 640??253 | Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas |
| 64030876 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 6408??66 | Observed on the black market in Houthi-controlled areas |

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

Annex 136: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 and with serial numbers consistent with the batches of those operated by the GoY, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 8

Figures 136.1 (left), and 136.2 (right)



Figure 136.3

GoY markings



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=321850557236163&set=pb.100082336645878.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

| | |
|----------|----------|
| 66037518 | 66042206 |
| 66037550 | 66043417 |
| 66037647 | 66043447 |
| 66039126 | 66044685 |

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 26 and production batch 21-CN, documented in Somalia, consistent with those operated by the GoY


| | |
|----------|--|
| 66769998 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
|----------|--|

Reference in previous report: [S/2022/754](#), annex 7

Annex 137: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 26 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 2

Figures 137.1 (left), and 137.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/AlshwhtyAhmd/status/1667216435871924232>

Serial numbers

| |
|----------|
| 36000181 |
| 36009444 |

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 56 documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|----------|--|
| 36008966 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 36038858 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

Annex 138: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 66 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 11

Figures 138.1 (left), and 138.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/AhmedAh11388275/status/1565673900524068867>

Serial numbers

| | | | | |
|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 2016660 | 3004215 | 15121613 | 17214317 | 18117943 |
| 2036211 | 15197294 | 16152478 | 17249009 | 18143325 |
| 2036419 | | | | |

Type 56-1 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 66 documented in Bahrain, Somalia, and Niger, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|----------|---|
| 2039297 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 12094597 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 14067873 | Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015 ⁶⁶ |
| 14079784 | Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015 |
| 14095934 | Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015 |
| 15005828 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 15041479 | Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015 |
| 15066207 | Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015 |
| 15075848 | Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015 |
| 17189034 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
| 18120250 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabab) |
| 18210072 | Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015 |
| 18217170 | Documented in Niger by CAR |
| 18227023 | Seized on sea by Bahraini authorities in 2015 |
| 20039297 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |


Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

⁶⁶ <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/A-Guide-to-Illicit-Iranian-Weapon-Transfers-in-the-Gulf.pdf>

Annex 139: Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 313 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 27

Figures 139.1 (left), and 139.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKimmF0uL2/status/1654572263516041224>

Serial numbers

| | | | | |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 4608015 | 4912327 | 5147373 | 5220591 | 5566615 |
| 4815123 | 4913503 | 5215004 | 5220935 | 5609746 |
| 4862927 | 4919362 | 5215084 | 5240041 | 5648055 |
| 4866277 | 5003018 | 5216401 | 5311772 | 5648442 |
| 4904199 | 5007172 | 5220271 | 5524400 | 5650567 |
| 4901928 | 5012862 | | | |

Reference in previous reports: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11, and [S/2016/254](#), paras. 39-41, and annex 13a

Type 56-1 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 313 documented in Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, and Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|---------|--|
| 4811827 | Documented in Côte d'Ivoire by CAR |
| 4814753 | Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire |
| 4815339 | Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire |
| 4816062 | Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire |
| 4816250 | Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire |
| 4851763 | Documented by the GoE Côte d'Ivoire |
| 4852923 | Documented in Côte d'Ivoire by CAR |
| 5006693 | Documented in Niger by CAR |
| 5201355 | Documented in Niger by CAR |
| 5212128 | Documented in Niger by CAR |
| 5217326 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |

Reference in previous report: [S/2016/254](#), paras. 39-41, and annex 13a

Annex 140: Type 56-2 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 313 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 13

Figure 140.1 (left), and 140.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=227251913639959&set=pb.100090654554764.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

| | | | | |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 3303707 | 3507393 | 3511329 | 3516991 | 3530749 |
| 3311467 | 3507870 | 3512246 | 3524882 | 3535499 |
| 3322844 | 3510157 | 3516837 | | |

Type 56-2 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 313 documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|---------|--|
| 3503591 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabaab) |
|---------|--|

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

Annex 141: Type 56-2 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China by State Factory 386 presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 1

Figures 141.1 (left), and 141.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/c2sXAYxqmYMzhon/status/1722710128296644985/photo/1><https://twitter.com/8Sfn-PHKinmF0uL2/status/1654572263516041224/photo/2>

Serial number

2006211

Type 56-2 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings of State Factory 386 documented in Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|---------|------------------------------|
| 2000998 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 2002236 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 2008394 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 2008667 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 2009138 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |

Annex 142: M80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and which are consistent with the model and batch that those intercepted between 2020 and 2023

Quantity documented: 8

Figures 142.1 (left), and 142.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/ShakrTayf/status/1681052084005662720>

Serial numbers

Marking 1

| |
|--------|
| 288215 |
| 325240 |
| 322315 |
| 330517 |
| 330983 |
| 360585 |

Marking 2

| |
|-------------|
| 15-CN 07677 |
| 17-CN 10684 |

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/833](#), para. 69, annex 18, [S/2022/50](#), para. 64, and [S/2021/79](#), para. 86

M80 LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in China documented in Central Africa Republic, Mali, Somalia, and South Sudan, and which are also consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|--------|--|
| 268317 | Documented in South Sudan by Small Arms Survey ⁶⁷ |
| 272929 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabab) |
| 288215 | Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas |
| 324690 | Documented in Central Africa Republic by the PoE on RCA |
| 325240 | Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas |
| 330517 | Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas |
| 330983 | Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas |
| 400515 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 400805 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 401702 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 402185 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 402813 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |

| | |
|-------------|--|
| 15-CN 07677 | Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas |
|-------------|--|

| | |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|
| 16-CN 07403 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 16-CN 07478 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 16-CN 07737 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 16-CN 07969 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 16-CN 08057 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 16-CN 08198 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 16-CN 08311 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 16-CN 08384 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

| | |
|-------------|--|
| 17-CN 00734 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 17-CN 02301 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 17-CN 02415 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 17-CN 02569 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 17-CN 03482 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 17-CN 03564 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 17-CN 03579 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 17-CN 03741 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 17-CN 03786 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 17-CN 03805 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 17-CN 03996 | Documented in Mali by CAR |
| 17-CN 04591 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 17-CN 05029 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 17-CN 07055 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| 17-CN 10684 | Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas |
| 17-CN 24547 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |

Reference in previous report: S/2023/724, annex 11

⁶⁷ <https://smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/Weapons-seized-from-George-Athor-and-John-Duit-Dec-2012.pdf>

Annex 143: MPiKMS 72 assault rifles with technical characteristics and markings, similar to those manufactured in former East Germany, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented:

Figures 143.1 (left), and 143.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/m777344073/status/1644884973600530435>

Serial numbers

| | | | | |
|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 58 MX 2785 | 83 LH 1500 | 84 ML 5540 | 86 32 7517 | 86 36 4037 |
| 64 MN 2557 | 83 LH 2787 | 84 MN 2997 | 86 33 1745 | 86 36 4758 |
| 72 F 0385 | 83 LH 3383 | 84 MO 0099 | 86 33 2010 | 86 36 6059 |
| 73 MG 7787 | 83 LH 7508 | 84 MO 2284 | 86 33 2239 | 86 36 6163 |
| 77 FC 5467 | 83 LL 2478 | 84 MO 5910 | 86 33 7902 | 86 37 5773 |
| 80 IL 1212 | 83 LO 1919 | 84 MU 1272 | 86 34 5171 | 87 31 0299 |
| 81 JA 3553 | 83 LR 3923 | 84 MX 0613 | 86 34 6582 | 87 31 4717 |
| 81 JA 3945 | 83 LT 6716 | 84 MX 0639 | 86 35 2211 | 87 31 7668 |
| 81 JD 1129 | 83 XT 0164 | 84 MX 2788 | 86 35 2465 | |
| 82 XX 3081 | 83 XV 1443 | 85 LR 0893 | 86 35 3433 | |
| 83 LA 7175 | 83 XV 7903 | 85 NA 2661 | 86 35 4549 | |
| 83 LD 1919 | 84 MF 4875 | 86 32 7344 | 86 35 5076 | |

MPiKMS 72 assault rifles documented in Niger, and Somalia, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|------------|---|
| 73 BM 2790 | Documented by the PoE Somalia (Captured from Al-Shabab) |
| 83 LC 7406 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 86 35 3140 | Documented in Niger by CAR |
| 86 35 4295 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 86 36 2990 | Documented in Niger by CAR |

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/724](#), annex 11

Annex 144: KL serie assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings, similar to those manufactured in Iran, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

The Iranian authorities stated that none of the documented serial numbers correspond to Iranian products. They also stated that dozens of companies in different countries are manufacturing assault rifles of the type described by the Panel.

Quantity documented: 17

Figure 144.1. (Right view)



Figure 144.2. (Left view)



Figure 144.3. (Firing selector)



Figure 144.4. (Serial numbers)



Source: https://twitter.com/muafaq_tayif/status/1458141150154350595

Serial numbers

| | | | | |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 1801214 | 2304094 | 2305179 | 2329555 | 2609260 |
| 2003682 | 2304097 | 2305192 | 2415094 | |
| 2003996 | 2304902 | 2326449 | 2506339 | |
| 2107854 | 2305039 | 2327129 | 2506433 | |

KL series assault rifles documented in Bahrain, Iraq, KSA, Somalia, and Syria, consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|---------|---|
| 1603504 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
| 2003185 | Documented in Syria (Open sources) ⁶⁸ |
| 2102933 | Documented in Syria by WarNoir ⁶⁹ |
| 2200914 | Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC |
| 2204527 | Documented in Iraq by Calibra Obscura ⁷⁰ |
| 2304094 | Documented in Bahrain by JSTOR |
| 2304097 | Documented in Bahrain by JSTOR |
| 2304376 | Documented in Iraq by Calibre Obscura |
| 2304568 | Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC |
| 2305360 | Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC |
| 2306507 | Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC |
| 2315428 | Documented in Somalia by GI-TOC |

⁶⁸ <https://www.theakforum.net/threads/iranian-aks.112972/page-3#lg=thread-112972&slide=1>

⁶⁹ https://twitter.com/war_noir/status/1412555837814579200

⁷⁰ <https://twitter.com/CalibreObscura/status/1453273573477556237>

| | |
|---------|-------------------------------------|
| 2404106 | Documented in the KSA ⁷¹ |
|---------|-------------------------------------|

The following features are some of the characteristic of the KL assault rifles manufactured in Iran, and which are visible on those documented by the Panel:

- A seven-digit serial number on the left side of the weapon, usually just above the magazine well;
- “0” digit (often covered by a bar);
- Weapon selector markings are on the right side of the receiver to the right of the selector lever. Markings are as follows: « L » (full automatic fire) and « D » (semi-automatic fire);
- Pistol grip, hand guard, and stock made of red-brown plastic furniture;
- Absence of compensator on the muzzle;
- Enclosed front sight.

⁷¹ <https://twitter.com/thedixiemauser/status/1658239456053264386/photo/3>

Annex 145: TK-9 Tondar sub-machine gun (SMG) with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Iran, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

The Iranian authorities stated to the Panel that none of the documented serial numbers correspond to Iranian products. Iranian authorities also stated that at least similar SMGs manufactured in three countries are very similar to Iranian products.

Quantity documented: 12

Figure 145.1. (Right view)



Figure 145.2. (Left view)



Figure 145.3. (Factory markings)



Figure 145.4. (Serial numbers)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=844312487101894&set=pb.100045694508321.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

| | | | |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 7505450 | 7506514 | 7506699 | 7506995 |
| 7506097 | 7506627 | 7506850 | 7610389 |
| 7506299 | 7506697 | 7506856 | 9710110 |

On the figure 145.3, the marking of the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), Iran, is present.

Samples of DIO marking

Figure 145.5 (on a G3 rifle)



Figure 145.6 (on a TK-9 SMG)



Source: Conflict Armament Research (CAR)


Source: Armament Research Services (ARES)

Annex 146: FEG AMD-65 assault rifle with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Hungary presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the manufacturer, the AMD-65 assault rifle with serial numbers “DD8807” was exported on 7 October 2007 by MFS2000 Inc to the Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Quantity documented:

Figures 146.1 (up) and 146.2 (down)



Source: https://twitter.com/muafaq_tayif/status/1603798570385260547

Serial numbers

DD8807

End User Certificate (EUC) issued by the Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, dated 17 January 2007, covering the transfer of 10,000 AMD-65 assault rifles.

According to the Hungarian authorities, this EUC is covering the AMD-65 assault rifle bearing the serial numbers DD8807

B2-I-002

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 17 JAN 2007

END USER CERTIFICATE

The Ministry of Interior for Afghanistan certifies that the following items were ordered from Sweet Analysis Services, Inc. (SASI), under Research, Development and Engineering Command Acquisition Center Contract W91CRB-04-D-0024-0007 by the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) for the Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan. The items will be supplied by Fegarmy, Europe, Hungary, 1095 Budapest, Soroksari st 158. Under the Terms and Conditions of Foreign Military Sales Case B2-B-AAE, the Ministry of Interior for Afghanistan also assures that the items are for use in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan by the Afghanistan National Police and will NOT be sold or transferred to any other third party without consent of the exporter and the Government of Hungary.

| DESCRIPTION | QTY |
|---|--------|
| AMD-65 Rifle, short barrel, folding stock, To include: 7 magazines per weapon, 7,000 Magazines total. 1 Accessory kit per AMD-65. | 10,000 |

As a United States Foreign Military Sale, no import license is required.

The signature of the authorized senior Ministry of Interior official shown below serves to prove the authenticity of this End Use Certificate.

End Use Certificate is issued in the City of Kabul, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the 17th day of Jan 2007.

On behalf of the Ministry of Interior
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

ABDUL HADI KHALID
Deputy Minister
For Security
Afghanistan Ministry of Interior

Annex 147: HK G3-A3 rifle with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those manufactured under licence in the UK, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 26

Figure 147.1



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=188701320767070&set=pb.100088816089895.-2207520000&type=3>

Serial numbers

| | | | |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 6024446 | 6050901 | 6642494 | 6710115 |
| 6024950 | 6542591 | 6659193 | 6720468 |
| 6025355 | 6545317 | 6661940 | 6722225 |
| 6034862 | 6546226 | 6680996 | 6725929 |
| 6037329 | 6553634 | 6681927 | 6733841 |
| 6047789 | 6606289 | 6700730 | |
| 6047871 | 6628069 | 6703088 | |

HK G3-A3 rifle with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced under licence in the UK, documented in Somalia, and which is consistent with those observed as presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas


| | |
|---------|-------------------------------|
| 6050185 | Documented by the PoE Somalia |
|---------|-------------------------------|

Reference in previous report: [S/2022/754](#), annex 7

Annex 148: PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Romania presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and which are also consistent with the model and batch of those intercepted in 2023

Quantity documented: 4

Figures 148.1 (left), and 149.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=348554747899077&set=pcb.348554851232400>

Serial numbers

| |
|--------|
| V 1589 |
| V 2752 |
| V 3192 |
| V 4590 |

Reference in previous report: [S/2023/833](#), annex 20

PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Romania documented in Somalia, and which is consistent with those observed as presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|--------|------------------------------|
| V 2076 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
|--------|------------------------------|

Annex 150: PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Hungary, presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 4

Figure 150.1 (left), and 150.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=840413040825172&set=pb.100045694508321.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

| |
|--------|
| BA 224 |
| BA 233 |
| BA 305 |
| GN 973 |

PKM LMG with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Hungary documented in Somalia, and which are consistent with those observed as presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|--------|------------------------------|
| BA 064 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| BA 898 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |
| GM 941 | Documented in Somalia by CAR |

Annex 151: RPG-7 grenade launcher with technical characteristics and markings, consistent with those produced in Iran presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, and which are consistent with the model and batch of those intercepted between 2016 and 2021

Quantity documented: 2

Figure 151.1



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=134483812639506&set=pb.100082336645878.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

| |
|---------|
| Y 00010 |
| 9590085 |

Reference in previous reports: S/2023/833, annex 27, S/2022/50, para. 62, S/2021/79, annex 14, S/2020/326, para. 61, and S/2018/193, tables 2-3

RPG-7 grenade launcher with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Iran documented on their way to Somalia, or seized on the Houthis, and/or also consistent with those presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|---------|---|
| 9090074 | Documented as seized on its way to Somalia by CAR |
| 9190109 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 9290816 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 9390546 | Seized on the Houthis by KSA forces |
| 9490973 | Documented in Yemen by CAR |
| 9593295 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 9593325 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 9593466 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |
| 9594144 | Seized on sea, PoE Yemen |

Annex 152: Pulsar Trail XQ50 thermal sight with technical characteristics and markings presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas, consistent with those produced in Lithuania

Quantity documented: 1

Figure 152.1



Source: <https://twitter.com/fighterxwar/status/1705911557228572794>

Serial number

| |
|---------|
| 9037521 |
|---------|

Pulsar Trail XQ50 thermal sight with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Lithuania documented in Afghanistan consistent with the one presented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | |
|---------|--|
| 9007698 | Documented in Afghanistan by CAR |
| 9012188 | Documented in Afghanistan by CAR |
| 9013831 | Documented in Afghanistan by CAR |
| 9025451 | Documented in Afghanistan by CAR |
| 9025621 | Documented in Afghanistan by CAR |
| 9032474 | Documented in Afghanistan by CAR |
| 9037521 | Observed on the black market in Houthis controlled areas |

Annex 153: Taurus G3 pistols manufactured in Brazil, which have been legally transferred between 2021 and 2023 to KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 12

Figure 153.1



Source: <https://twitter.com/yhyyr522/status/1704553568303300684/photo/1>

Serial numbers of Taurus G3 pistols legally transferred to Rammai Najd Hunting Est, KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | | |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| AEB084847 | ADL869012 | ADL869200 |
| AEB084804 | ADL869014 | ADL869212 |
| AEB084897 | ADL869026 | ADL872648 |
| ACJ316834 | ADL869185 | ADL872677 |

Annex 154: Taurus G3XL pistol manufactured in Brazil, which has been legally transferred in 2022 to KSA, and which has been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 1

Figure 154.1



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=224402820314271&set=pb.100082336645878.-2207520000>

Serial number of Taurus G3XL pistol legally transferred to Rammai Najd Hunting Est, KSA, and which has been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| |
|-----------|
| ADL872535 |
|-----------|

Annex 155: Taurus TH-9 pistols manufactured in Brazil, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 3

Figure 155.1



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=303455182409034&set=pb.100082336645878.-2207520000>

Serial numbers of Taurus TH-9 pistols legally transferred to Rammai Najd Hunting Est, KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| |
|-----------|
| ADM978875 |
| ADM978876 |
| ADM978879 |

Appendix A

Document indicating the models, serial numbers, consignee in KSA, and date of sale of the Taurus pistols documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas



| | | | | | | |
|-----------|----|------------|--------|--|----------|------------|
| AEB084847 | G3 | 15/02/2023 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83525440 | 21/02/2023 |
| AEB084804 | G3 | 15/02/2023 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83525440 | 21/02/2023 |
| AEB084897 | G3 | 15/02/2023 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83525440 | 21/02/2023 |
| ACJ316834 | G3 | 25/08/2021 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 82967325 | 17/11/2021 |
| ADL869012 | G3 | 04/10/2022 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83397913 | 17/10/2022 |
| ADL869014 | G3 | 04/10/2022 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83397913 | 17/10/2022 |
| ADL869026 | G3 | 04/10/2022 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83397913 | 17/10/2022 |
| ADL869185 | G3 | 04/10/2022 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83397913 | 17/10/2022 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------|----|------------|--------|--|----------|------------|
| ADL869200 | G3 | 04/10/2022 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83397913 | 17/10/2022 |
| ADL869212 | G3 | 04/10/2022 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83397913 | 17/10/2022 |
| ADL872648 | G3 | 05/10/2022 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83397913 | 17/10/2022 |
| ADL872677 | G3 | 05/10/2022 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83397913 | 17/10/2022 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------|------|------------|--------|--|----------|------------|
| ADL872535 | G3XL | 05/10/2022 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83397913 | 17/10/2022 |
|-----------|------|------------|--------|--|----------|------------|

| | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----|------------|--------|--|----------|------------|
| ADM978875 | TH9 | 05/11/2022 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83442104 | 21/11/2022 |
| ADM978876 | TH9 | 05/11/2022 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83442104 | 21/11/2022 |
| ADM978879 | TH9 | 05/11/2022 | Brazil | Rammai Najd Hunting Est (Contact: Mamdoh Alharbi / rammainajd@alrammai.com / +966560455968) | 83442104 | 21/11/2022 |

Source: Confidential

Appendix B

End-User certificate related to the Taurus pistols legally transferred in 2022 and 2023 to Rammai Najd Hunting Est, KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

وزارة الداخلية

رقم الصفا: ٢٠٣٣٢

تاريخ الصفا: ١٤٤٣/٠١/٢٣

تصاريح:





المملكة العربية السعودية

وزارة الداخلية

(٢٧٢)

The General
Department of Arms and Explosives

شهادة مستخدم نهائي

END USER CERTIFICATE

| Quantity | Description | الوصف | الكمية |
|----------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------|
| 2600 | Pistol cal.9mm semi auto | مسدس عيار ٩ ملم شبه أوتوماتيكي | ٢٦٠٠ |
| 400 | Pistol cal.22 LR semi auto | مسدس عيار ٢٢ آل آر شبه أوتوماتيكي | ٤٠٠ |

١. تشهد وزارة الداخلية بالمملكة العربية السعودية أن البضائع الموضحة وصفها أعلاه سيتم توريدها من شركة تورس بالبرازيل بواسطة مؤسسة رماي نجد للصيد سجل تجاري رقم (١٠١٠٦٠٧٨٢١) وعنوانها: المملكة العربية السعودية / الرياض.
٢. المواد المراد توريدها لصالح التاجر ولاغراض تجارية سيتم بيعها في المملكة العربية السعودية للمواطنين وتسجيلها عليهم تحت إشراف وزارة الداخلية.
٣. لن يعاد تصدير المواد لجهة أخرى غير مصدرها أو التخلص منها أو التفويض بالتصرف فيها خارج المملكة بدون أخذ الموافقة المسبقة من الجهة المعنية لدى حكومة المورد.
٤. هذه الشهادة أعطيت للحصول على شهادات التصدير الضرورية.

BRIG.GEN. ADEEB BIN SAUD BIN THINYAN AL SAUD



DIRECTOR GENERAL OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES
IN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Date: 31 AUGUST 2021



Source: Confidential

Annex 156: Taurus G3c pistols manufactured in Brazil, which have been legally transferred to Tanzania, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 37

Figure 156.1



Source:


<https://www.facebook.com/106950802358384/photos/pb.100091374281039.-2207520000./108029035583894/?type=3><https://twitter.com/DhialArms/status/1758124013597954169/photo/1>

Serial numbers of Taurus G3c pistols legally transferred to Boomslang Logistik East Africa Limited, Tanzania, which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | | | |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| ADG430680 | ADG500858 | ADG501445 | ADG506587 |
| ADG432528 | ADG500921 | ADG501739 | ADG506630 |
| ADG434270 | ADG500923 | ADG506087 | ADG506862 |
| ADG452187 | ADG500959 | ADG506163 | ADG513901 |
| ADG457983 | ADG501032 | ADG506255 | ADG513905 |
| ADG486791 | ADG501235 | ADG506261 | ADG514296 |
| ADG486856 | ADG501288 | ADG506311 | ADG514463 |
| ADG486882 | ADG501300 | ADG506367 | |
| ADG487279 | ADG501324 | ADG506505 | |
| ADG487285 | ADG501363 | ADG506562 | |

Appendix A


End-User certificate dated 18 December 2022 by the United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Home Affairs, Tanzania Police Force, related to the documented Taurus G3c pistols transferred to Boomslang Logistics East Africa Limited



4. Descriptions and quantities of the goods:

| PRODUCT(S) DESCRIPTION | QUANTITIES |
|--|------------|
| Taurus pistol model G3, 9mm caliber, 17 rounds capacity with two additional mags, cleaning kit and user manual. | 12,000 |
| Taurus pistol model G3c, 9mm caliber, 12 rounds capacity with two additional mags, cleaning kit and user manual. | 12,000 |
| Taurus pistol model TS9, 9mm caliber, 17 rounds capacity with two additional mags, cleaning kit and user manual. | 2000 |
| Taurus revolver model RT85s, 38 spl caliber, 5 shorts, 2" barrel length, cleaning kit and user manual. | 12,000 |
| Taurus revolver model RT856, 38spl caliber, 6 shorts, 2" barrel length, cleaning kit and user manual. | 12,000 |

- I. The certificate is used in Tanzania to be presented to the governmental authorities of the Republic of Brazil.
- II. The goods in this End user certificate will be for the exclusive use of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
- III. The final consumer guarantees, by the appropriate signature that the products mentioned in this End User Certificate will not be used for purpose other than for National Security and that it will not be neither sold, nor loaned, nor re-exported, to a third party without prior written agreement from the authorities or Government.

 - SP

For; DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
DAR ES SALAAM

For: DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT

Annex 157: Taurus 24/7 pistols produced in Brazil, which have been legally transferred to the Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 20

Figures 157.1 (left), and 157.2 (right)



Source: https://twitter.com/muafaq_tayif/status/1544746309642584064

Serial numbers of the Taurus 24/7 pistols legally sold to the National Security of Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

| | | | |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| TGZ50697 | TGZ51229 | TGZ51619 | TGZ52047 |
| TGZ50837 | TGZ51242 | TGZ51653 | TGZ52144 |
| TGZ50875 | TGZ51470 | TGZ51968 | TGZ52187 |
| TGZ51072 | TGZ51485 | TGZ52033 | TGZ52366 |
| TGZ51192 | TGZ51509 | TGZ52040 | TGZ52374 |

Appendix A

Document indicating the models, serial numbers, consignee, and date of sale of the pistols Taurus 24/7 sold to the Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas



production and sales details of the firearms. Furthermore, Taurus attaches hereto, in the following annexes, all documents in which data herein provided is substantiated as well as all the certificates and licenses the company was able to collect (all dates are in the "DD/MM/YYYY" standard):

| Serial Number | Model | Production date and local | Consignee | Sales Data | | |
|---------------|-------|---------------------------|-----------|--|--------------|------------|
| | | | | Invoice number | Date of Sale | |
| TGZ50697 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 124.808 | 11/03/2014 |
| TGZ50837 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 124.808 | 11/03/2014 |
| TGZ50875 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 124.808 | 11/03/2014 |
| TGZ51072 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 126.377 | 31/03/2014 |
| TGZ51192 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 126.377 | 31/03/2014 |
| TGZ51229 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 126.377 | 31/03/2014 |
| TGZ51242 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 126.377 | 31/03/2014 |
| TGZ51470 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 126.377 | 31/03/2014 |
| TGZ51485 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 126.377 | 31/03/2014 |
| TGZ51509 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 126.377 | 31/03/2014 |
| TGZ51619 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 126.377 | 31/03/2014 |






| | | | | | | |
|----------|------|----------|--------|--|---------|------------|
| TGZ51653 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 126.377 | 31/03/2014 |
| TGZ52144 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 122.247 | 31/01/2014 |
| TGZ51968 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 122.247 | 31/01/2014 |
| TGZ52033 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 122.247 | 31/01/2014 |
| TGZ52040 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 122.247 | 31/01/2014 |
| TGZ52047 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 122.247 | 31/01/2014 |
| TGZ52187 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 122.247 | 31/01/2014 |
| TGZ52366 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 122.247 | 31/01/2014 |
| TGZ52374 | 24/7 | Dec/2013 | Brazil | National Security Ministry of Defense – Djibouti | 122.247 | 31/01/2014 |

Source: Confidential

Appendix B

End User Certificate related to the pistols Taurus sold to the Ministry of Defence of Djibouti, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas



Source: Confidential

Annex 158: Canik TP9 Elite Combat pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2023 to KSA and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the manufacturer, the Canik TP9 Elite Combat pistol with serial numbers T6472-22 BN 08888, was transferred in January 2023 to Ben Humaid National Trading Co, Jeddah – KSA.

Quantity documented: 1

Figures 158.1. (left) and 158.2 (right)



Figure 158.3



Serial number

T6472-22 BN 08888

Source: <https://twitter.com/GlocStore/status/1690671378263920640/photo/1>

Appendix A

Customs declaration by the exporter associated to the transfer in KSA of the Canik TP9 Elite Combat pistol with serial numbers T6472-22 BN 08888

| T.C. GÜMRÜK BEYANNAMESİ | | Seri : GB | | 1 BEYAN | |
|-------------------------|--|---------------------|---|---|------------------------|
| 6 | 2 Dövizci / Recipient | 19 MAYIS 9870007612 | | EX | 1 |
| | 3 SAMSUN YURT SAVUNMA SANAYİ VE TİCARET A.Ş. ŞABANOĞLU OSB MAHALLESİ ULUBATLI CADDESİ NO:2B/B TEKKEKÖY SAMSUN SAMSUN Türkiye 052 | | | İSTANBUL HAVALİMANI GÜMRÜK MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ | |
| | 3 Parça | 4 Yık. İhtisali | 23341453EX00005088;09.01.2023 | | |
| | 5 Kalan sayı | 6 Kap sayı | 9 -0472-1629-0529 9760 2092195 | | |
| | 7 Alıcı | 8 Mal numara tip | | Zincirlikuyu 0920385704 | |
| | Ben Humaid National Trading Co. Al Hemdaniya Main Str. Jeddah 23761 SAUDI ARABIA Suudi Arabistan 632 | | | ARGUN YEMNLİ MALİ MÜŞAVRLİK VE DENETİM HİZMETLERİ A.Ş. | |
| | 10 Sun. bank | 11 Tutarı Ödenen | 12 Kıymetli Eşyanın Adı | | 13 TP |
| | 632 | 632 | | | |
| | 14 İhracat Ülkesi / Terim Ülkesi | | | 15 İhracat Ülkesi Kodu | 17 İhracat Ülkesi Kodu |
| | Boğaziçi Kurumlar 7730293569 SOLMAZ GÜMRÜK MÜŞAVİRLİĞİ A.Ş. Zincirlikuyu Esentepe Mah Kore Yüzbaşı Kaya Aldoğan No:9 3439 , Esentepe, İstanbul, Türkiye | | | Türkiye | 052 |
| 16 İhracat Ülkesi | | | 17 İhracat Ülkesi | | |
| << Çeşitli >> | | | Suudi Arabistan | | |
| 18 İhracat Ülkesi | | | Suudi Arabistan | | |
| 19 Ürün Kodu | | | CPT | | |
| 20 Ürün Kodu | | | S.ARABİSTAN | | |
| 21 Ürün Kodu | | | USD | | |
| 052 | | | 76,511.50 | | |
| 22 Ürün Kodu | | | 18.7498000 | | |
| 23 Ürün Kodu | | | 11 | | |
| 24 Ürün Kodu | | | İSTANBUL | | |
| 25 Ürün Kodu | | | 11 | | |
| 26 Ürün Kodu | | | AKBANK T.A.Ş.,İstanbul,BEYOĞLU/İSTANBUL | | |
| 27 Ürün Kodu | | | Peşin Ödeme | | |
| 28 Ürün Kodu | | | 93020000 | | |
| 29 Ürün Kodu | | | 00 | | |
| 30 Ürün Kodu | | | 00 | | |
| 31 Ürün Kodu | | | 052 | | |
| 32 Ürün Kodu | | | 17.78 | | |
| 33 Ürün Kodu | | | 10.00 | | |
| 34 Ürün Kodu | | | 17.78 | | |
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Annex 159 Canik TP9 Elite SF pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to USA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas


According to the manufacturer, the Canik TP9 Elite SF pistol with serial numbers T6472-22 AT 24009, was transferred in September 2022 to Century Arms Inc., Fairfax, USA.

Quantity documented: 1

Figures 159.1. (left) and 159.2 (right)



Figure 159.3



Serial number

T6472-22 AT 24009

Source: https://twitter.com/Ashraf_Muneef/status/1692436654168953146

Appendix A

Air Waybill associated to the transfer of the Canik TP9 SF pistol with serial number T6472-22 AT 24009

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------|---------------|--|----------------------------|----------------------|---|--|---|--|---|--|----------------------------|
| 235 | | IST 48992355 | | | | 235 48992355 | | | | | | |
| Shipper's Name and Address SAMSUN YURT SAVUNMA SANAYI VE TICARET A.S. ORGANIZE SANAYI BOLG. VALI ERDOGAN CEBECI BLV. NO:28 55300 TEKKEKOY-SAMSUN-TURKEY | | | | | | Not Negotiable Air Waybill Issued by | | TÜRK HAVA YOLLARI A.O. TÜRKISH AIRLINES INC. THY GENEL YONETIM BINASI, ATATURK HAVALIMANI 34149 YESILKOY-ISTANBUL-TURKEY | | | | |
| Copies 1,2 and 3 of this Air Waybill are originals and have the same validity. | | | | | | E - AWB | | | | | | |
| Consignee's Name and Address CENTURY ARMS INC 236 BRYCE BLVD. FAIRFAX, VT 05454 USA PHONE: 802 527 1258 FAX: 802 752 1260 05454 NEW YORK-NEW YORK-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Issuing Carrier's Agent Name and City SOLMAZ GUMRUK MUSAVIRLIGI A.S. ZINCIRLIKUYU ESENTEPE MAH. KORE SEHITLERI CAD. YUZBASI KAYA ALDOGAN NO:9 34394 SISLI-ISTANBUL- TURKEY | | | | | | Accounting Information FREIGHT PREPAID | | | | | | |
| Agent's IATA Code BB 4 727B 0012 | | | | | | Account No. | | | | | | |
| Airport of Departure (Addr. Of First Carrier) and Requested Routing ISTANBUL / ISTANBUL HAVALIMANI | | | | | | Reference Number | | Optional Shipping Information | | | | |
| To By First Carrier | | | | | | To By To By | | Currency | | Declared Value for Carriage | | Declared Value for Customs |
| JFK TÜRK HAVA YOLLARI A.O. | | | | | | USD | | NVD | | MCV | | |
| Airport of Destination NEW YORK UNITED STATES | | | | | | Requested Flight/Date TK 6363 19.09.2022 | | Amount of Insurance XXX | | INSURANCE - If Carrier offers insurance, and such insurance is required in accordance with the conditions thereof, indicate amount to be insured in figures in box marked 'Amount of Insurance' | | |
| Flight Information 64 PALLETS 12062 KG HBA | | | | | | SCT | | | | | | |
| No of Pieces 64 | Gross Weight 12062 | kg | Rate Class K Q | Chargeable Weight 12062 | Rate / Charge 5.3 | Total 63928.60 | | Nature and Quantity of Goods (incl. Dimensions or Volume) SEMI AUTOMATIC PISTOLS NOT RESTRICTED DIMS: 26/120X80X100 CM 32/120X80X80 CM 1/123X80X46 CM 2/123X80X55 CM 3/123X80X44 CM | | | | |
| 64 | 12062 | K Q | | | | | | | | | | |
| Prepaid | Weight Charge | Collect | Other Charges | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | AWA= 60 MOC: 60.- CGC: 3.00 FSC: 2412.40 | | | | | | | | | |
| | Valuation Charge | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Tax | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Total Other Charges Due Agent | | Shipper certifies that the particulars on the face | | | | | | | | | |
| 60.00 | | | SOLMAZ GUMRUK MUSAVIRLIGI AS AGENT OF CARRIER | | | | | | | | | |
| | Total Other Charges Due Carrier | | TÜRK HAVA YOLLARI A.O. | | | | | | | | | |
| | Total Prepaid | Total Collect | Signature of Shipper or its Agent 1. 17.09.2022 ISTANBUL / ISTANBUL HAVALIMANI D. LEK OKTAY | | | | | | | | | |
| Currency Conversion Rates | CC Charges in Dest. Currency | | Executed on (date) At (place) Signature of Issuing Carrier or its Agent | | | | | | | | | |
| For Carrier Use only at Destination | Charges at Destination | | Total collect Charges | | | | | | | | | |

Source: Confidential

Annex 160: AHSS FXS-9 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to the Sudan and to Czechia, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 46

Figures 160.1 (left) and 160.2 (right)



Source: <https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=106430429046706&set=pb.100090392468856.-2207520000>

Serial numbers

| | | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| TF674-22A01575 (B) | TF674-22A10232 (B) | TF674-22A11575 (C) | TF674-22A13565 (B) | TF674-22A14223 (B) |
| TF674-22A01981 (B) | TF674-22A10421 (B) | TF674-22A11585 (C) | TF674-22A13807 (B) | TF674-22A14228 (B) |
| TF674-22A04707 (A) | TF674-22A10558 (B) | TF674-22A11605 (C) | TF674-22A13597 (B) | TF674-22A44380 (A) |
| TF674-22A04822 (B) | TF674-22A10292 (B) | TF674-22A11723 (C) | TF674-22A13709 (B) | |
| TF674-22A04933 (A) | TF674-22A10691 (B) | TF674-22A11733 (A) | TF674-22A13781 (B) | |
| TF674-22A05250 (B) | TF674-22A10700 (A) | TF674-22A11774 (C) | TF674-22A13823 (B) | |
| TF674-22A08467 (C) | TF674-22A10726 (A) | TF674-22A11802 (C) | TF674-22A13856 (B) | |
| TF674-22A08518 (C) | TF674-22A10736 (B) | TF674-22A11830 (C) | TF674-22A13860 (B) | |
| TF674-22A08544 (A) | TF674-22A10740 (B) | TF674-22A12002 (C) | TF674-22A13864 (B) | |
| TF674-22A08974 (C) | TF674-22A10775 (B) | TF674-22A12503 (D) | TF674-22A13911 (B) | |
| TF674-22A08999 (C) | TF674-22A11537 (C) | TF674-22A13466 (B) | TF674-22A13956 (A) | |
| TF674-22A09024 (C) | TF674-22A11556 (C) | TF674-22A13532 (B) | TF674-22A14004 (B) | |
| TF674-22A10230 (B) | TF674-22A11567 (C) | TF674-22A13550 (B) | TF674-22A14179 (A) | |

- (A) Purchaser not identified
- (B) Moataz Abdelrahman weapons ammunition, Sudan
- (C) Albayarg for firearms, Sudan
- (D) Kozap S.R.O, Czechia

Appendix A

Document related to the legal transfer between February 2022 and December 2022 of 47 AHSS FXS-9 pistols into the Republic of Sudan and to Czechia

| SERIAL NUMBER | BRAND | MODEL | DELIVERY | EXPORT PERMISSION NO | PRODUCTION TIME | COUNTRY | COMPANY |
|----------------|-------|-------|----------|--------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|--|
| TF674-22A01575 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 11/02/22 | 06.01.2021 - 38100341-545.04-5626 | 10.02.2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A01981 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 11/02/22 | 06.01.2021 - 38100341-545.04-5626 | 10.02.2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A04822 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 15/04/22 | 06.01.2021 - 38100341-545.04-5626 | 07.04.2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A05250 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 15/04/22 | 06.01.2021 - 38100341-545.04-5626 | 12.04.2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A08467 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 28/06/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 28/06/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A08518 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 28/06/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 28/06/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A08974 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 13/07/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 07/07/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A08999 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 13/07/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 07/07/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A09024 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 13/07/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 07/07/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A10230 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A10232 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A10292 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A10421 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A10558 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A10691 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A10736 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A10740 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A10775 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A11537 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 14/09/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 13/09/22 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A11556 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 14/09/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 13/09/22 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A11567 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 14/09/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 13/09/22 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A11575 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 14/09/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 13/09/22 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A11585 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 14/09/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 13/09/22 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A11605 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 14/09/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 13/09/22 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A11723 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 14/09/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 13/09/22 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A11774 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 14/09/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 13/09/22 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A11802 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 14/09/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 13/09/22 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A11830 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 14/09/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 13/09/22 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A12002 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 14/09/22 | 01.06.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1311572 | 13/09/22 | Republic of the Sudan | ALBAYARG FOR FIREARMS |
| TF674-22A12503 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 30/09/22 | 22.07.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1457899 | 29/09/2022 | Czech Republic | KOZAP S.R.O |
| TF674-22A13466 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A13532 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A13550 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A13565 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A13597 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A13709 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A13781 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A13807 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A13823 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A13856 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A13860 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A13864 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A13911 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A14004 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A14223 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A14228 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |
| TF674-22A44380 | AHSS | FXS-9 | 6/12/22 | 08.09.2022 - 38100341-545.04-1587524 | 25/11/2022 | Republic of the Sudan | MOATAZ ABDELRAHMAN WEAPONS &AMMUNITION |

Source: Confidential

Annex 161: Sarsilmaz SAR-9 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to the Sudan, and in 2023 to KSA, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 175

Figures 161.1 (left), and 161.2 (right)



Serial numbers

| | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| T1102-22CM00027 (A) | T1102-22BV50524 (B) | T1102-22BV56000 (B) | T1102-22BV59643 (A) |
| T1102-22BV00592 (A) | T1102-22BV50532 (B) | T1102-22BV56663 (B) | T1102-22BV59650 (C) |
| T1102-22BV00603 (B) | T1102-22BV50556 (C) | T1102-22BV56718 (B) | T1102-22BV59698 (C) |
| T1102-22BV00925 (D) | T1102-22BV50557 (A) | T1102-22BV56728 (B) | T1102-22BV59737 (C) |
| T1102-22BV01329 (A) | T1102-22BV50605 (B) | T1102-22BV56776 (B) | T1102-22BV59749 (C) |
| T1102-22BV01494 (C) | T1102-22BV50627 (B) | T1102-22BV56797 (B) | T1102-22BV59753 (C) |
| T1102-22BV02138 (B) | T1102-22BV50642 (C) | T1102-22BV56805 (A) | T1102-22BV59775 (C) |
| T1102-22BV02973 (C) | T1102-22BV50665 (A) | T1102-22BV56979 (A) | T1102-22BV59880 (C) |
| T1102-22BV03576 (C) | T1102-22BV50669 (C) | T1102-22BV58171 (B) | T1102-22BV59894 (C) |
| T1102-22BV03775 (C) | T1102-22BV50702 (C) | T1102-22BV58235 (B) | T1102-22BV59919 (C) |
| T1102-22BV04258 (C) | T1102-22BV50717 (B) | T1102-22BV58244 (B) | T1102-22BV59977 (C) |
| T1102-22BV04332 (C) | T1102-22BV50789 (C) | T1102-22BV58259 (B) | T1102-22BV59994 (C) |
| T1102-22BV04823 (A) | T1102-22BV50827 (C) | T1102-22BV58266 (B) | T1102-22BV60012 (C) |
| T1102-22BV04833 (A) | T1102-22BV50860 (C) | T1102-22BV58401 (A) | T1102-22BV60013 (C) |
| T1102-22BV04904 (B) | T1102-22BV50877 (C) | T1102-22BV58413 (B) | T1102-22BV60067 (C) |
| T1102-22BV04948 (C) | T1102-22BV50882 (C) | T1102-22BV58577 (B) | T1102-22BV60236 (C) |
| T1102-22BV04975 (C) | T1102-22BV50893 (A) | T1102-22BV58600 (B) | T1102-22BV60339 (B) |
| T1102-22BV05018 (C) | T1102-22BV50894 (B) | T1102-22BV58606 (A) | T1102-22BV60340 (A) |
| T1102-22BV05021 (A) | T1102-22BV50921 (B) | T1102-22BV58633 (B) | T1102-22BV60395 (A) |
| T1102-22BV05043 (A) | T1102-22BV50925 (A) | T1102-22BV58651 (B) | T1102-22BV60427 (B) |
| T1102-22BV14329 (B) | T1102-22BV50928 (B) | T1102-22BV58763 (B) | T1102-22BV60435 (B) |
| T1102-22BV50171 (A) | T1102-22BV50939 (B) | T1102-22BV58827 (A) | T1102-22BV60454 (B) |
| T1102-22BV50173 (B) | T1102-22BV50980 (B) | T1102-22BV58828 (B) | T1102-22BV80288 (A) |
| T1102-22BV50185 (A) | T1102-22BV51017 (C) | T1102-22BV58908 (A) | T1102-23BV01025 (A) |
| T1102-22BV50186 (C) | T1102-22BV51049 (C) | T1102-22BV58912 (B) | T1102-23BV01041 (B) |
| T1102-22BV50211 (B) | T1102-22BV51052 (B) | T1102-22BV58934 (B) | T1102-23BV01082 (B) |
| T1102-22BV50212 (B) | T1102-22BV55750 (B) | T1102-22BV58942 (A) | T1102-23BV01105 (B) |
| T1102-22BV50232 (B) | T1102-22BV55763 (B) | T1102-22BV59328 (A) | T1102-23BV01107 (B) |
| T1102-22BV50242 (A) | T1102-22BV55768 (B) | T1102-22BV59329 (C) | T1102-23BV01121 (A) |
| T1102-22BV50263 (B) | T1102-22BV55782 (B) | T1102-22BV59342 (C) | T1102-23BV01190 (B) |
| T1102-22BV50311 (B) | T1102-22BV55790 (B) | T1102-22BV59404 (C) | T1102-23BV01222 (B) |
| T1102-22BV50328 (B) | T1102-22BV55850 (A) | T1102-22BV59412 (C) | T1102-23BV01233 (B) |
| T1102-22BV50335 (B) | T1102-22BV55851 (A) | T1102-22BV59440 (C) | T1102-23BV01249 (B) |
| T1102-22BV50360 (B) | T1102-22BV55852 (B) | T1102-22BV59453 (A) | T1102-23BV01274 (B) |
| T1102-22BV50365 (B) | T1102-22BV55884 (A) | T1102-22BV59473 (C) | T1102-23BV01276 (B) |
| T1102-22BV50444 (B) | T1102-22BV55893 (B) | T1102-22BV59504 (C) | T1102-23BV01282 (A) |
| T1102-22BV50457 (A) | T1102-22BV55894 (B) | T1102-22BV59566 (A) | T1102-23BV01285 (A) |
| T1102-22BV50480 (C) | T1102-22BV55912 (B) | T1102-22BV59591 (C) | T1102-23BV01294 (A) |
| T1102-22BV50487 (A) | T1102-22BV55929 (B) | T1102-22BV59621 (C) | T1102-23BV01346 (A) |
| T1102-22BV50495 (C) | T1102-22BV55932 (B) | T1102-22BV59622 (C) | T1102-23BV02346 (A) |
| T1102-22BV50496 (B) | T1102-22BV55993 (B) | T1102-22BV59630 (C) | T1102-23BV11762 (A) |
| T1102-22BV50498 (A) | T1102-22BV55997 (B) | T1102-22BV59642 (C) | |

- (A) Purchaser not identified
- (B) Khalid Maki Osman for arms and ammunition, Khartoum, Sudan
- (C) Al Rimala for arms and ammunition and trading, Khartoum, Sudan
- (D) Bin Humaid national trading, KSA

(E) **Annex 162: Sarsilmaz SAR-9 SP pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2022 to the Sudan, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas**

(F) **Quantity documented: 13**

(G) Figures 162.1 (left), and 162.2 (right)



(H)

(I) *Source:* <https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinmF0uL2/status/1690784112443867136/photo/2>

(J) **Serial numbers**

| |
|---------------------|
| T1102-23CM00131 (A) |
| T1102-23CM00177 (B) |
| T1102-23CM00179 (A) |
| T1102-23CM00180 (A) |
| T1102-23CM00223 (B) |
| T1102-23CM00232 (B) |
| T1102-23CM00234 (A) |
| T1102-23CM00460 (B) |
| T1102-23CM00462 (B) |
| T1102-23CM00469 (B) |
| T1102-23CM00474 (B) |
| T1102-23CM00484 (B) |
| T1102-23CM00504 (A) |

(K)

(L) (A) Purchaser not identified


(M) (B) Khalid Maki Osman for arms and ammunition, Khartoum, Sudan

(N)

Annex 163: Sarsilmaz B6 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2015 to Iraq, and in 2022 to the Sudan, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 17

Figures 163.1 (left), and 163.2 (right)



Source: https://twitter.com/ramzy_Awsah_/status/1640451562236436480/photo/2

Serial numbers

| |
|--------------------|
| T1102-13B00325 (A) |
| T1102-13E16246 (A) |

| |
|--------------------|
| T1102-14E00339 (C) |
| T1102-14E00914 (C) |
| T1102-14E01232 (A) |

| |
|--------------------|
| T1102-22E02300 (B) |
| T1102-22E03166 (B) |
| T1102-22E03170 (B) |
| T1102-22E03791 (B) |
| T1102-22E06124 (B) |
| T1102-22E52539 (A) |
| T1102-22E52581 (B) |
| T1102-22E52591 (B) |
| T1102-22E52582 (A) |
| T1102-22E52588 (A) |
| T1102-22E52581 (A) |
| T1102-22E52591 (A) |

- (A) Purchaser not identified
- (B) Khalid Maki Osman for arms and ammunition, Khartoum, Sudan
- (C) Office of the Prime minister, Iraq

Annex 164: Sarsilmaz Kilinç 2000 Mega pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Türkiye, which have been legally transferred in 2015 to Iraq, and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

Quantity documented: 2

Figures 164.1 (left), and 164.2 (right)



Source: <https://twitter.com/yhyyr522/status/1713906770391756920>

Serial numbers

| |
|--------------------|
| T1102-13B00323 (A) |
| T1102-15U07340 (B) |

- (A) Purchaser not identified
- (B) Office of the Prime minister, Iraq

Annex 165: CZ P-07 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Czech Republic, which have been legally transferred in 2023 to KSA and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to the manufacturer, the CZ P-07 pistol with serial numbers F374493, was transferred on 3 December 2021 to Ben Humaid National Trading Co, Exit 13/14, Eastern Ring Road, Riyadh – KSA, and the CZ P-07 pistol with serial numbers H011589, was transferred on 6 March 2023 to the same purchaser.

Quantity documented: 2

Figure 165.1



Figure 165.2



Figure 165.3



Source: <https://twitter.com/mdljbr201/status/1736762856048152873>

Serial numbers

| |
|---------|
| F374493 |
| H011589 |

Annex 166: X-Calibur Mk23 pistol with technical characteristics and markings consistent with those produced in Slovak Republic, which have been legally transferred to first Czechia and then to KSA and which have been documented for sale in Houthi-controlled areas

According to KalibrGun Valdy EU Ltd., Czechia, the X-Calibur Mk23 pistol with serial numbers K102358, was part of a sale agreement signed in January 2022 with Ben Humaid National Trading Co, Jeddah, KSA.

Quantity documented: 1

Figure 166.1



Source: https://twitter.com/Ashraf_Muneef/status/1720885902778515477

Serial number

K102358

Appendix A

Commercial agreement between KalibrGun Valdy EU Ltd., Czechia, and Bin Humaid National trading (Arabian Hunter), KSA

Arabian Hunter Est.
For Air Rifles and Hunting Tools
C.R 4030200680



مؤسسة الصياد العربي
للبنادق الهوائية وأدوات الصيد
س.ت 4030200680

Commercial Agreement

On this day 04/01/2022 in Prague City It was agreed between:

1- **KalibrGun Valdy EU LTD** His residence (or his headquarter): Czech Republic Holder of Commercial Register no. (VAT no. CZ24779636) City: Praha
www.kalibrgun.cz

Represented in this contract by :
Mr. Janousek Richard
His nationality: Czech , First Party.

2- **Bin Humaid National Trading (ARABIAN HUNTER)** , His Residence / Headquarter : Jeddah , Saudi Arabia Holder of Commercial Register No. 4030054282 City : Jeddah,

Represented in this contract by :
Mr. Nawaf Bandar Bin Humaid
(second party-Exclusive Agent)

Item (1): The two parties have agreed that the second party will import and sell products of the first party in Saudi Arabia. Second Party will sell these pistols in Firearms trade-fairs held in Saudi Arabia .
Terms of Payment: 50% Advance - 50% before Delivery

Item (2): The subject of this contract is the products and services provided by the first party as hereunder specified:

First supply :

Pistols **Grand Power Cal.9mm Model X-Caliber** at the price of (599) Quantity 200 manufactured by Grand Power / slovakia
Pistols **Grand Power Cal.22LR** at the price of (EUR310) quantity 20 pcs manufactured by Grand Power / slovakia
Pistols **Grand Power Cal.9mm Model Q1** at the price of (EUR 347)quantity 50 pcs manufactured by Grand Power / slovakia
Pistols **Grand Power Cal.9mm Model Q1S** at the price of (EUR 347)quantity 50 pcs manufactured by Grand Power / slovakia

Item (3): The geographic area for the validity of this exclusive agreement is determined by countries of Saudi Arabia

Item (4): The validity of this contract is (5) years starting from 01-11-2019 and ending by 31-10-2024

Item (5): The two parties shall execute the contract according to its provisions and in conformity with the rules of Czech law and in a manner that conforms to the requirements of goodwill.

Item (6): The first party guarantees to sell to the second party minimum quantity of (2100) pieces of firearms per annum in good quality of materials and products subject to this contract.

Item (7): This contract shall be governed by the rules of systems valid in the Czech Republic, ie. by the Laws of the Czech Republic.



Arabian Hunter Est.
For Air Rifles and Hunting Tools
C.R 4030200680



مؤسسة الصياد العربي
للبنادق الهوائية وأدوات الصيد
س.ت 4030200680

First Party

Name: Mr. Janousek Richard

Signature



Second Party

Name: Mr. Nawaf Bandar Ben Humaid

Signature



Scuclas s originale
Due: 14.12.2022
Ing. Richard Janousek
PROCURISTA



Source: Confidential

Annex 167: Presence of the aggregated carrier *Almas* at the Port of Saleef, Yemen in October 2023

**Table 1
Statute and change of flag**

| Owner & Registration | | | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|------------------|----------------|---------------------|
| Ownership | Ownership History | Registration | Flag | Tanzania (Zanzibar) |
| Port of Registry | Zanzibar | Flag | Sail Com ID | Tanzania (Zanzibar) |
| Official Number | 909204 | Sail Com ID | Fishing Number | |
| Sail Com Ams Black | | | | |
| Current P&I Club | Unknown | | | |
| P&I Club History | | | | |
| Date | | | | P&I Club |
| 2006-02-20 | | | | Unknown |
| Flag, Call Sign & MMSI History | | | | |
| Date | Flag | Port of Registry | Call Sign | MMSI |
| 2022-06 | Tanzania (Zanzibar) | Zanzibar | SIM207 | |
| 2022-05 | Unknown | Unknown | | |
| 2022-03 | Belize | Belize City | VJG23 | 312973000 |
| 2004-03 | Japan | W. Nagasaki | JM6170 | 431600007 |
| 1992-08 | Japan | Ishida, Nagasaki | | |

Source: Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite (MIRS)

**Figures 167.1
Almas to the Port of Hudaydah (around 18 October 2023)**

The *Almas* was visible on satellite imagery on 19, 20 and 21 October (the image of 18 October had 100 percent cloud cover) – it was not visible anymore on 22 October imagery, so *Almas* left Hudaydah on 21 or 22 October 2023.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

**Table 2
Almas to the Port of Hudaydah on 18 October 2023**

According to S&P Global MIRS, the position of the ship on 18 October was 14.91335 N / 42.887875 E, which is almost exactly the location of where the ship is docked, as visible on figure 167.2

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K |
|--|---------|-------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|-------|---------|------------|---|---------------------|
| Report produced by S&P Global on 20 May 2024 16:06 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mmsi | Imo | Name | LastUpdateReceived | Latitude | Longitude | Speed | Draught | AlsDraught | Narrative | Destination |
| 312973000 | 8864957 | ALMAS | 2023-10-13 04:48:51 | 12.995643 | 43.285073 | 8.5 | 3 | 4.1 | Port call possible during dark period\nfrom 13 Oct 2023\nto 18 Oct 2023 | NAN TONG SAI YANGCC |
| 0 | 8864957 | ALMAS | 2023-10-18 07:15:45 | 14.913355 | 42.887875 | 0 | 3 | 4.1 | Port call\nRas Alkatheeb\n18 Oct 2023 84 hours | |
| 312973000 | 8864957 | ALMAS | 2023-10-18 07:15:45 | 14.913355 | 42.887875 | 0 | 3 | 4.1 | Dark activity end of alert \n18 Oct 2023\nPort call possible during dark period | NAN TONG SAI YANGCC |
| 312973000 | 8864957 | ALMAS | 2023-10-23 20:05:07 | 14.057623 | 48.79288 | 7.4 | 3 | 4.1 | Port call possible during dark period\nfrom 23 Oct 2023\nto 26 Oct 2023 | NAN TONG SAI YANGCC |
| 312973000 | 8864957 | ALMAS | 2023-10-26 18:04:51 | 15.290595 | 51.738258 | 9 | 3 | 4.1 | Dark activity end of alert \n26 Oct 2023\nPort call possible during dark period | NAN TONG SAI YANGCC |

Source: MIRS

Table 3
Presence of *Almas* in the civilian port,⁷² near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbor, Iran, between 20-26 September 2023

| Vessel Name | Type | Arrival | Departure | Distance |
|---------------------------------|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------|
| Shahid Rajaei Eastern Anchorage | iran | 20 Sep 2023 16:42 | 03 Oct 2023 20:04 | 0 mi |
| Shahid Rajaei Eastern Anchorage | iran | 20 Sep 2023 00:55 | 27 Sep 2023 19:22 | 0 mi |
| Shahid Bahonar | iran | 21 Sep 2023 17:18 | 28 Sep 2023 00:55 | 0 mi |
| Shahid Bahonar | iran | 20 Sep 2023 19:55 | 20 Sep 2023 19:25 | 0 mi |
| Shahid Rajaei Eastern Anchorage | iran | 13 Sep 2023 00:54 | 19 Sep 2023 19:25 | 0 mi |

Source: MIRS

Based on Planet SkySat 0.5-meter resolution satellite imagery, it could be assessed that the *Almas* arrived in the Bandar Abbas Military Harbor (exact location from MIRS: 27.08.47N / 56.12.12E) on 19 or 20 September (not visible on 19 September image, but present on 20 September image) and left the Harbor on 25 or 26 September (still visible on 25 September image but gone on 26 September image).

Table 4
Presence of *Almas* near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbor, Iran, on 3 October 2023, before sailing directly to the Port of Hudaydah

| Vessel Name | Type | Arrival | Departure | Distance |
|---------------------------------|------|-------------------|-------------------|----------|
| Shahid Rajaei Eastern Anchorage | iran | 28 Sep 2023 16:42 | 03 Oct 2023 20:04 | 0 mi |
| Shahid Rajaei Eastern Anchorage | iran | 28 Sep 2023 00:55 | 27 Sep 2023 19:22 | 0 mi |
| Shahid Bahonar | iran | 21 Sep 2023 17:18 | 28 Sep 2023 00:55 | 0 mi |
| Shahid Bahonar | iran | 20 Sep 2023 19:55 | 20 Sep 2023 19:25 | 0 mi |
| Shahid Rajaei Eastern Anchorage | iran | 13 Sep 2023 00:54 | 19 Sep 2023 19:25 | 0 mi |

Source: MIRS

On 27 September, the *Almas* is visible on PlanetScope 3-meter resolution satellite imagery at the Shahid Rajaei Eastern Anchorage location (exact location from MIRS: 27.08.17N / 56.14.39E). The *Almas* is also visible on 29 September, 1 and 3 October but gone on 5 October. So, *Almas* left for Yemen on 3, 4 or 5 October 2023.

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

⁷² IRIN vessels have been observed anchored in the civilian part of this port, see <https://maphub.net/Cengiz/bandar-abbas-iran-navy-base>

Figure 167.2

Almas visible on 20 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.3

Almas visible on 21 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.4

Almas visible on 22 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.5

***Almas* visible on 23 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.6

***Almas* visible on 24 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)**

The image shows one ship docked in parallel to the *Almas* and activity visible on the dock. The Panel does not exclude that the loading of the *Almas* was taking place.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.7

***Almas* visible on 25 September 2023 in civilian port, near the Bandar Abbas Military Harbour (presented in the red box)**

Last image with *Almas* visible in the Bandar Abbas Harbour.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.8
***Almas* visible on 27 September 2023 at the Shahid Rajaei Anchorage (first image)**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Figure 167.9
***Almas* visible on 3 October 2023 at the Shahid Rajaei Anchorage (last image before *Almas* was sailing to the Port of Hudaydah)**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Annex 168: Presence in September and October 2023 of the general cargo ship *Kasra-3* at the Port of Saleef, Yemen

Table 1
Statute and change of flag

| Date | Significant Events |
|--------|---|
| 202402 | Flagged by Comoros, Operator Mohammadi M, Owner Mohammadi M, Ship Manager Mohammadi M |
| 202204 | Name changed to KASRA 3, Flagged by Tanzania (Zanzibar), Operator Rptd Sold Undisclosed Interest, Owner Rptd Sold Undisclosed Interest, Ship Manager Rptd Sold Undisclosed Interest |
| 200401 | Flagged by Japan |
| 199410 | Flagged by Japan, Status changed to In Service/Commission |
| 199409 | Status changed to Launched |
| 199408 | Status changed to Keel Laid |
| 199400 | Name changed to Eiju Maru No. 12, Status changed to On Order/Not Commenced, Operator Eiju Maru, Owner Eiju Maru, Ship Manager Eiju Maru |

Source: MIRS


Part 1: Whereabouts of *Kasra-3* in September/October 2023

The *Kasra-3* spends,

According to MIRS, the *Kasra-3* spent sometime in the Port of Shahid Rajae and then waited in the Shahid Rajae Eastern Anchorage for a while. The *Kasra-3* was visible on 24 September 2023 in the Shahid Rajae Eastern Anchorage. On the next available satellite imagery on 29 September, she had left.


Figures 168.1 (up), and 168.2 (down)

Kasra-3 at Shahid Rajae Eastern Anchorage on 24 September 2024



Source: MIRS

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Table 2
Kasra-3 possible dark activities

According to MIRS, there are possible suspicious activities until she shows up on 29 September 2023 near the coast of Oman (23.034483N / 59.58823E).

Report produced by S&P Global on 21 May 2024 17:53

| Mmsi | Imo | Name | LastUpdateReceived | Latitude | Longitude | Speed | Draught | AisDraught | Narrative | Destination |
|-----------|---------|---------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|-------|---------|------------|--|--------------|
| 677039500 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-06 00:45:31 | 26.982068 | 56.305763 | 6.8 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Dark activity end of alert \n06 Sep 2023\nNo AIS signal for extended period worldwide | |
| 620999432 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-06 05:18:11 | 26.532143 | 56.045997 | 7.2 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Transit\nTransit Straits of Hormuz W\n06 Sep 2023 | Bandar Abbas |
| 620999432 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-06 15:34:23 | 25.511865 | 55.400895 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Waiting at \nHamriyah C Anchorage\n06 Sep 2023 375 hours | Bandar Abbas |
| 677039500 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-08 17:24:32 | 25.511697 | 55.400928 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 No AIS signal for extended period worldwide\nfrom 08 Sep 2023\nto 22 Sep 2023 | Bandar Abbas |
| 677039500 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-22 06:28:13 | 27.108512 | 56.065292 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Dark activity end of alert \n22 Sep 2023\nNo AIS signal for extended period worldwide | |
| 677039500 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-22 06:28:13 | 27.108512 | 56.065292 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Berth call\n8, Bandar Abbas\n22 Sep 2023 | |
| 620999432 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-22 06:28:13 | 27.108512 | 56.065292 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Port call\nShahid Rajaei\n22 Sep 2023 39 hours | Bandar Abbas |
| 620999432 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-23 23:17:50 | 27.137633 | 56.257238 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Waiting at \nShahid Rajaei Eastern Anchorage\n23 Sep 2023 9 hours | Bandar Abbas |
| 620999432 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-24 11:35:37 | 27.138113 | 56.257842 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Waiting at \nShahid Rajaei Eastern Anchorage\n24 Sep 2023 69 hours | Bandar Abbas |
| 677039500 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-27 08:10:45 | 27.215957 | 56.378168 | 58.2 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Port call possible during dark period\nfrom 27 Sep 2023\nto 29 Sep 2023 | Bandar Abbas |
| 677039500 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-29 17:52:00 | 23.034483 | 59.58823 | 10 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Dark activity end of alert \n29 Sep 2023\nPort call possible during dark period | |
| 677039500 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-29 17:52:00 | 23.034483 | 59.58823 | 10 | 3 | 3 | 0 Destination Change To\nMASQAT \n29 Sep 2023 05:52 | MASQAT |
| 613516310 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-09-29 23:45:45 | 22.34409 | 59.998278 | 8.8 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Position anomalous for extended period in sensitive area\nfrom 29 Sep 2023\nto 01 Oct 2023 | MASQAT |
| 620999432 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-10-05 20:13:27 | 12.812777 | 43.281718 | 9.8 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Transit\nTransit Bab El Mandeb NW\n05 Oct 2023 | |
| 620999432 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-10-06 15:50:58 | 15.315775 | 42.669287 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Port call\nSaleef\n06 Oct 2023 236 hours | |
| 613516310 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-10-06 16:09:56 | 15.3157 | 42.669287 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Berth call\nGeneral Cargo Berth, Saleef\n06 Oct 2023 | |
| 620999432 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-10-16 17:52:24 | 14.00358 | 42.830675 | 8.5 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Destination Change To\nJebel Ali\n16 Oct 2023 05:52 | Jebel Ali |
| 620999432 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-10-17 03:11:30 | 12.81569 | 43.229825 | 7.8 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Transit\nTransit Bab El Mandeb SE\n17 Oct 2023 | Jebel Ali |
| 620999432 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-10-23 08:54:46 | 24.948057 | 57.593728 | 10.2 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Destination Change To\nBandar Abbas\n23 Oct 2023 08:54 | Bandar Abbas |
| 620999432 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-10-24 11:01:16 | 27.102805 | 56.196993 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Waiting at \nBandar Abbas Merchant Anchorage\n24 Oct 2023 0 hours | Bandar Abbas |
| 613516310 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-10-24 16:33:38 | 27.214282 | 56.377413 | 58.2 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 Dark for extended period in watched area\nfrom 24 Oct 2023 | Bandar Abbas |
| 613516310 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-10-24 16:33:38 | 27.214282 | 56.377413 | 58.2 | 3 | 3 | 4.372 No AIS signal for extended period worldwide\nfrom 24 Oct 2023\nto 08 Nov 2023 | Bandar Abbas |
| 613516310 | 9109184 | KASRA 3 | 2023-10-24 16:33:38 | 27.214282 | 56.377413 | 58.2 | 3 | 3 | 0 Destination Change To\nBandar Abbas\n24 Oct 2023 04:33 | Bandar Abbas |

Source: MIRS

According to the table above, the *Kasra-3* then sails to the Port of Saleef in Yemen, arriving there on 6 October at 15:50:58 hrs. On satellite imagery of 6 October 07.31 UTC, she is not visible, but she is visible on satellite imagery from 7 October 06:50 UTC and continues to be visible till 15 October 2023 07.49 UTC. On the next available satellite imagery (17 October 06.50 UTC) she is gone. According to MIRS, she went back to Iran.

Figure 168.4
Port of Saleef, Yemen – undated overview photo



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Figure 168.5
***Kasra-3* at the Port of Saleef on 11 October 2023**



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Part 2: Whereabouts of *Kasra-3* in October/November 2023


For a long period of time from the second half of October 2023 and the first half of November 2023, there is no AIS location data available for *Kasra-3*. According to MIRS, she was at the Bandar Abbas Merchant Anchorage on 24 October. On satellite imagery of this location on 24 October, *Kasra-3* is possibly visible. On the next available image of 25 October, she had left.

Figures 168.6 (up) and 168.7 (down)

***Kasra-3* at Bandar Abbas Merchant Anchorage on 24 October 2023**



Source: MIRS




Source: Planet satellite imagery

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

According to MIRS, *Kasra-3* arrives on 22 November at the Saleef anchorage point and stays there till 30 November.


Figures 168.8 (up), 168.9 (lower left), and 168.10 (lower right)
***Kasra-3* at Saleef anchorage, on 23 and 24 November 2023**



Source: MIRS

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


As per the satellite imagery of the Saleef anchorage point of 21 November *Kasra-3* is no visible but on 23 November she is present (NB: no imagery available for 22 November) and on 24 November she is also visible (even on 0.5-meter resolution image).



Source: Planet satellite imagery

On the next available satellite image (26 November 2023), it looks like *Kasra-3* was heading south. As per the satellite image of 27 November, there are some clouds, but it looks like a ship is docked in the Port of Saleef (same location where *Kasra-3* was docked in October 2023). It is hard to say whether the ship was there on 28 and 30 November, but on 1 December she had, most likely, gone. Although this hypothesis cannot be 100 percent confirmed, based on the available satellite imagery, it is the most likely analysis. It would be unrealistic to say that that *Kasra-3* would have sailed from Iran to the Saleef anchorage point and then would have sailed back without visiting a port in Yemen. There is also no evidence of ship-to-ship transfer.

Figure 168.11
Kasra-3 at Saleef anchorage, on 26 November 2023



Source: Planet satellite imagery


Figure 168.12
Kasra-3 at Port of Saleef, on 27 November 2023



Source: Planet satellite imagery

Annex 169: *Dubai-1* anchored on 23 March 2024 at Port Saleef

Figure 169.1
Port Saleef terminal



Source: MIRS

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Table 1
Suspicious maritime activities by *Dubai-1*.

In and out, suspicious movements between Somalia, Oman, Djibouti, Iran, and Yemen are highlighted

Repeatedly turning off and turning on the Automatic Identification System (AIS) of the aforementioned ship prevented it from being able to be followed accurately, and its sailing along the Yemeni coast raises suspicion of that ship. The above-mentioned activities may enhance the possibility of the ship transporting prohibited materiel for the Houthis, and the possibility of transferring materials from one ship to another is not excluded, as the ship's entry was monitored twice, and it docked in the port of Saleef.

| | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 29 March to 04 April 2024 | Yemen with its AIS switched off for 6 days |
| 22 to 27 March 2024 | Yemen with its AIS switched off for 5 days |
| 09 to 19 March 2024 | Djibouti with its AIS switched off for 10 days |
| 08 March 2024 | Yemen with its AIS switched off |
| 29 February to 08 March 2024 | Somalia with its AIS switched off for 8 days |
| 6 to 17 February 2024 | Yemen with its AIS switched off for 12 days |
| 5 February 2024 | Yemen with its AIS switched off for 16 hours |
| 14 January to 05 February 2024 | Yemen with its AIS switched off for 22 days (prior she was in Djibouti) |
| 17 December 2023 to 13 January 2024 | Djibouti with its AIS switched off for 26 days |
| 17 November to 9 December 2023 | Djibouti with its AIS switched off for 22 days |
| 9 December 2023 | Arrived in Hudaydah without UNVIM inspection |
| 9 to 16 November 2023 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 7 days Dark activities ended in Djibouti |

| | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| 5 to 17 October 2023 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 12 days |
| 18 June to 20 July 2023 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 32 days Prior she accosted UAE |
| 22 April to 18 June 2023 | UAE with its AIS switched off for 58 days |
| 31 March to 20 April 2023 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 20 days |
| 9 January to 16 February 2023 | UAE with its AIS switched off for 36 days |
| 19 December 2022 to 9 January 2023 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 20 days |
| 24 October to 11 November 2022 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 18 days |
| 16 September to 2 October 2022 | Iran with its AIS switched off for 16 days |
| 5 to 24 August 2022 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 19 days |
| 25 July to 5 August 2022 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 11 days |
| 24 May to 27 July 2022 | UAE with its AIS switched off for 62 days |
| 5 April to 23 May 2022 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 47 days |
| 3 to 15 March 2022 | Yemen with its AIS switched off for 12 days |
| 13 to 31 January 2022 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 18 days Prior she was in Iran for 4 hours (8 Jan 2022) |
| 16 November to 11 December 2021 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 24 days Prior she was in Iran for 2 days (15-16 Nov 21) |
| 25 to 29 October 2021 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 3 days Dark activities ended in Iran |
| 5 May to 24 October 2021 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 171 days |
| 27 September to 20 November 2020 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 54 days |
| 18 to 27 September 2020 | Oman with its AIS switched off for 8 days |

Annex 170: Copy of the letter from the Director-General of Passports




to whom it may concern

Based on the approach approved by the General Command to work on the principle of (self-sufficiency), We would like to inform you that Messrs. Company /Azal Tech. for Printing - One of our approved suppliers in the implementation and supply of security publications Therefore we ask the competent authorities to facilitate their tasks with regard to requesting and purchasing security papers and inks and their accessories from the raw materials related this aspect

Thank you for your cooperation

Director General of Passports
Major General/Ismael Al-Moaid



Source: Confidential

Annex 172: Issuance of YR100 coin by CBY, Sana'a

Figure 172.1

Press Release by CBY, Aden

البنك المركزي اليمني
CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN

بيان صحفي

تابع البنك المركزي اليمني إعلان مليشيا الحوثي الإرهابية المستولية على فرع البنك المركزي بصنعاء إعلانها صك عملة معدنية فئة مائة ريال وإعلان طرحها للتداول بدلاً من العملة القانونية فئة المائة ريال الورقية ، وان البنك المركزي اليمني إذ يرفض هذا الفعل التصعيدي الخطير وغير القانوني والذي لايأخذ بنظر الإعتبار بأي شكل من الأشكال مصالح المواطنين ، فإن البنك المركزي يؤكد على ماسبق وأن حذر منه بشكل واضح بمنع كل الجهات والمؤسسات والأفراد من قبول أو تداول أي عملة مزورة صادرة من كيان غير قانوني بالمخالفة لكل القوانين والأعراف المالية والمصرفية وانه يحتفظ بحقه القانوني في إتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية الإحترازية لحماية الأصول المالية للمواطنين والمؤسسات المالية والمصرفية .

وتتحمل المليشيات تبعات هذا التصعيد اللامسؤول وما يترتب عليه من تعقيد وإرباك في تعاملات المواطنين والمؤسسات المالية والمصرفية داخلياً وخارجياً.

صادر عن
البنك المركزي اليمني
المركز الرئيسي عدن

Source: CBY, Aden

*Appendix A***Unofficial translation of the Press Release by CBY, Aden****Press Release**

The Central Bank of Yemen followed up on the terrorist Houthi militia's announcement of responsibility on the branch of the Central Bank in Sana'a, announcing the issuance of a one-hundred- riyal coin and announcing that it would be put into circulation instead of the legal one-hundred- riyal paper currency. The Central Bank of Yemen rejects this dangerous and illegal escalatory act that does not take it into consideration. In any way, in the interests of citizens, the Central Bank affirms the above and clearly warned of it by preventing all parties, institutions and individuals from accepting or trading any counterfeit currency issued by an illegal entity in violation of all financial and banking laws and customs, and that it reserves its legal right to take precautionary legal measures. To protect the financial assets of citizens and financial and banking institutions.

The militias bear the consequences of this irresponsible escalation and the resulting complexity and confusion in the dealings of citizens and financial and banking institutions internally and externally.

Issued by

Central Bank of Yemen, Aden

Annex 173: Screenshots of messages for collection of funds for the UAV Force

Figure 173. 1
Screenshot of text messages for funds for the Air Force from the public



Source: Panel

Unofficial translation of the Screenshot of text messages for funds for the Air Force from the public

7:08 PM

Sunday, 24 December 2023

Support the Air Force
via the following accounts:
Central Bank No.
1128 - 10262 (riyals)
01-1019 - 10262 (dollars)

Figure 173.2
Screenshots of messages for collection of funds for the UAV Force



Source: Panel

Annex 174: Receipt of payment from schools for Drones (UAVs)

Figure 174.1

Copy of the Receipt of payment from schools for Drones (UAVs)

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
(يا أيها الذين آمنوا هل أدلكم على تجارة تصحون
من عذاب أليم . يؤمنون بالله ورسوله ويجاهدون في سبيل
الله بأموالكم وأنفسكم ذلكم خير لكم إن كنتم تعلمون)

قوافل وانفاق م / الأمانة

التاريخ: ١٩ / ٢ / ٢٠٢٥
الموافق: ٢٠ / ٢٤ / ١٤٤٦
سند رقم: 0161

سند توريد (قبض)

استلمت من الاخ اللادنه / أملت لتوريد شرح الاما ... العمل نماء لتوريد ...

| | | |
|------------|------------|--------|
| مبلغ وقدره | ٢٠,٩٥٦,٢٥٠ | كتابتا |
| دولار | | كتابتا |
| سعودي | | كتابتا |
| عمله اخرى | | كتابتا |

وذلك مقابل: ...

اسم المستلم / الجاهد محمد صالح
الجهة / الامانة
التوقيع

للاستفسار:
هاتف: ٧٣٦٨٧٥٨٤٩ - ٧٧٧٨٩٠٠٨٦

Source: Confidential

Appendix A

Unofficial Translation of the Receipt of payment from schools for Drones (UAVs)

Convoys and Expenditure m/ Secretariat (right)

In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful

“O you who have believed, shall I guide you to a trade that will save you from a painful punishment? That you believe in God and His Messenger and strive in the cause of God with your possessions and your lives. That is better for you, if you only knew.” (Among)

Date: 9/2/1445

Corresponding to: 12/3/2024

Document No.: 0161 (left)

Supply (receipt) bill

Document content:

I received from the Office of Education, the Secretariat branch, the handling the Director-General of the Office of Education, Abdul Qadir Al Mahdi

The amount is 20,956,250 twenty million nine hundred and fifty-six thousand two hundred and fifty riyals.

The purpose of this money is for the convoy provided by the schools of the capital secretariat in support of the drones.

Document footer:

Recipient's name: Abdul Karim Muhammad Fadael

The entity/secretariat

Signature 12/3/2024

For inquiries

Phone: 777890086 - 736875849

Annex 175: Houthi revenue from customs, taxes, fees, and other illegal fees

The Panel received information that the amount of revenue collected and controlled by the Houthis during 2023 was approximately YR3.392 trillion. By illegally collecting fees in the name of customs and other taxes from the traders sending their goods from the GoY area to the Houthi-controlled area, the Houthis have been treating the GoY area as a separate country. Panel's sources estimate the Houthis' revenues from these illegal land collection points to be approximately YR300 billion in 2023. Sources affirm that these illegal collections go to the top Houthi leaders and used for payment of salaries to its combatants and for other military purposes.

The Houthi-appointed authority in Sana'a, collects illegal fees from airlines flying over Yemen, estimated at approximately \$32,850,000. When contacted, some airlines officials informed the Panel of their reluctance to stop paying to the Houthis to avoid any possible attacks on their aircrafts.

'khums' tax

The revenue from the 'khums' tax ("one-fifth", or 20 percent), imposed a few years ago by the Houthis by a Decree signed by Mehdi al-Mashat, president of the Houthi-appointed Supreme Political Council (SPC), benefit the Al-Houthi family and a large number of Houthi loyalists. This tax, on natural resources and economic activities carried out in areas under the control of the Houthis, is estimated to be a few billion YRs, is a clear violation of the financial sanctions regime.

Collections from the merchants in Ibb in the name of those killed by the Houthis

The Panel was informed that the Houthis recently had imposed new levies by force on the merchants in the Ibb Governorate. The Panel interviewed a few of these merchants, who requested anonymity. Purportedly, these new levies are intended to assist families of individuals who have been killed by the Houthis, obligating merchants to contribute food baskets. Merchants were presented with the choice of providing specific quantities of food baskets or paying an equivalent amount of money for them, while threatening violators with penalties. These taxes are part of a larger set of levies imposed by the Houthis, taking advantage of the month of Ramadan as a significant period for tax collection by the Houthis

Water Tax

Recently, the Houthis resorted to another method of collecting money by levying water tax in the name of "Teacher support and education Fund". The Panel's sources in the education department, who requested to remain anonymous, informed that the Houthi authorities are collecting money in the name of education but the same is mostly used for their military purposes. The authorities are not paying any salaries to the teachers because of which the teachers association announced an open strike until payment of their salaries pending since 2016. On 8 October 2024, Houthis arrested Abu Zaid al-Kumaim, head of the Yemeni Teachers Club, for organizing protests demanding the payment of teachers' salaries.

Arbitrary cancellation and transfer of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)

To enhance their financial gains, the Houthis have adopted an arbitrary and illegal policy of withdrawing trademarks from legitimate commercial entities and transferring them to entities

under their control. There have been several reports concerning violations of IPRs, especially commercial trademarks of companies and merchants in Sana'a. The Panel has received information that several lawsuits have been filed in the Commercial Court of First Instance, Sana'a against the Houthi-appointed Ministry of Industry and Trade for alleged violations of IPRs and the revocation of trademarks registered under their names. There have been reports of cancellations of the registrations of specific commercial entities, some of which have been subsequently transferred to others, affiliated to the Houthis. The Panel is in possession of some documents and is investigating the matter.

Collection of illegal fees from civil aviation sector

Exploiting the ongoing presence of the air traffic control centre at Sana'a airport, the Houthi-appointed authority in Sana'a, collects illegal fees from airlines flying over Yemen. Following the relocation of the General Authority for Civil Aviation and Meteorology to Aden, several airlines were notified by the GoY to redirect their overflight fees to the authority in Aden. Panel's investigation revealed that approximately 150 aircrafts traverse Yemen's airspace daily, each paying approximately \$600 as an overflight fee. The annual collection of overflight fees by the Houthis, deemed unlawful by the GoY, is estimated at approximately \$32,850,000. When contacted, some airlines officials informed the Panel of their reluctance to stop paying to the Houthis to avoid any possible attacks on their aircrafts. In addition to overflight fees, the Houthi-appointed authority also collects various airport service charges, including those for landing and take-off, passenger fees, airfreight fees, ground services, and all other airport-related fees.

Annex 176: Financing the purchase of military materiel

1. The Panel is investigating a case involving procurement of weapons by the Houthis using a Yemeni businessman. For the sake of the safety of the concerned person and his family members, his name and other details are not being disclosed. He was in the profession of doing customs clearance work in Yemen for the importers/traders for over 10 years.
2. Investigations revealed that in the past he had travelled to various countries including China, Djibouti, India, Iran, Lebanon, Oman, Somalia, Syria, and the UAE. His last foreign visit was reportedly in March 2023, after a shipment of missile components, which he was trying to clear, was intercepted by the Yemeni customs. He had also reportedly met the officials of the Houthi-controlled telecom company 'Tele Yemen', some whose telecom consignments were allegedly seized by Yemeni customs a few years ago.
3. Confidential sources informed the Panel that he is being investigated by the authorities for his alleged role in procuring/clearing missiles and missile components, weapons and other military materiel, including dual-use items for the Houthis by smuggling these weapons into Houthi-controlled areas. One such consignment was seized by the Yemeni customs, in which the components of missiles were concealed inside commercial cargo. He allegedly received funds arranged by the Houthis, both by cash and through transfers from various exchange companies in Yemen and Djibouti. The authorities reportedly seized cash amounting to \$198,000 from him, when he was arrested in February 2024 in Djibouti.
4. The Panel learnt that after the seizure of the aforesaid consignment, on the instructions of Major-General Muhammad Ahmad Al-Talibi, a Yemeni national operating from Iran, he went to Djibouti in August 2023 to start a business of importing military materiel from Iran and other countries. He changed his name and got a new passport to avoid any identification as a Houthi. He also set up a company in Djibouti. (para. 77 and case study 6).
5. The Panel's sources informed that, while in Djibouti, he received payments from various sources, arranged by the Houthis, including from exchange companies in Yemen and made payments to various suppliers of military materiel procured through Djibouti, before transferring these materiel to Houthi-controlled areas.
6. Investigations by the Panel, including scrutiny of some of the documents made available, revealed that he maintained accounts in Sana'a, Yemen in:
 - Al-Radwan Exchange and Transfers Co. Sana'a, and
 - Al-Hazmi Exchange Co. Sa'ana, Yemen.
7. He also maintained accounts in Djibouti in:
 - Djibouti Exp. Exchange Co
 - Al-Khaleel Exchange Co
 - CAC Bank

The Panel's investigation relating to his accounts revealed the following:

1. Djibouti Express Exchange Co. Djibouti

| Sl. No | Date of transaction | Amount | Remarks |
|--------|---------------------|-----------|------------------|
| i | 26 September 2023 | \$ 6,490 | Amount deposited |
| ii | 8 October 2023 | \$ 27,300 | Amount deposited |
| iii | 8 October 2023 | \$33,000 | Amount deposited |
| iv | 11 October 2023 | \$50,000 | Amount deposited |
| v | 14 October 2023 | \$217,533 | Amount deposited |

| | | | |
|------|------------------|-----------|---|
| vi | 14 October 2023 | \$ 50,000 | Amount received from Al Dhya Co. |
| vii | 14 October 2023 | \$ 60,720 | Amount received from Nabil Ahmed Ali Ali |
| viii | 17 October 2023 | \$ 60,720 | Amount transferred to Mohammed bin Mohammed Abdo Hassan |
| ix | 19 October 2023 | \$2000 | deposited Djiboutian Franc 354,000 (DJF) and purchased \$2000 |
| x | 12 November 2023 | \$ 50,000 | deposited DJF 8,850,000 and purchased \$ 50,000 |
| xii | No date | \$ 28,259 | received from Radwan Co. |

2. Al Mohel Exchange Co. Hqrs in Demt in Yemen

- i. 16 October 2023 - \$30,431 received from Nabil Ahmed Ali Ali

3. Société Africaine Express Co.

- i. 19 November 2023 - transferred by Radwan Express Co. to Ahmed Mahmud Hazza Al Diya Co. - \$55,000

- Further, sources revealed that amount in DJF, equivalent to \$130,000, lying in his account in Al-Khaleel Exchange Co. in Djibouti was reportedly frozen by the authorities.

The matter is under investigation by the Panel.

Annex 177: Misappropriation of the assets of Amran cement factory

The Panel received information from sources indicating that the Houthis have taken control of the management and assets of the largest cement production company of Yemen, Amran. Abdul Fattah Ismail Al-Ashmouri, the newly appointed director of the factory, appointed by the Houthis, allegedly dismissed 30 employees from the factory in July 2023, and appointed Houthi loyalists. The Houthi leaders are accused of engaging in financial misconduct, obtaining large loans from banks in the company's name and embezzling substantial funds. Moreover, it is alleged that cement, disguised as humanitarian aid, was provided free of charge to the Ministry of Defence and other Houthi-affiliated entities for construction projects. Bricks were also reportedly taken by the Houthis in the name of initiatives undertaken by select charitable organizations. The company reportedly borrowed YR40 billion with high interest rate, leading to a debt exceeding YR60 billion and bankruptcy, halting production. These funds have been allegedly misappropriated by the Houthis. The Panel is investigating the matter.

Annex 178: Ministry of Endowment regarding threats from the Houthis not to deposit ticket amount for Haj pilgrims in other accounts

Date: 11/15/1445 AH
 corresponding to 23/5/2024
 AD Number: (p. 27 27)

I smell the limit now.



Republic of Yemen Ministry
 of Endowments and Guidance

Respected His Excellency Dr. Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, Prime Minister

Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings be upon you ..

Topic: This year's transfer of pilgrims from Sana'a International Airport and the abuse of the Houthi terrorist group

We offer you our best regards and wish you continued success in your duties.

With reference to the above topic, we would like to clarify that we have completed all necessary procedures to send pilgrims to the Holy House of God for this year 1445 AH from all of our country's international airports, including Sana'a International Airport, for the purpose of alleviating the burden of travel between Sana'a and other Yemeni international airports.

Accordingly, Hajj and Umrah agencies were notified to deposit the value of tickets for all pilgrims from all governorates of the Republic, without exception, into the company's accounts at the Qutaibi Bank or the Saudi Fransi Bank.

However, the Houthi rebel and terrorist group took arbitrary measures by preventing Hajj agencies

The decision to supply the value of tickets for pilgrims traveling by air through Sana'a International Airport to the bank accounts of the company, Yemen Airways, and this problem raised the concerns of the leadership of the Ministry of Endowments and Guidance and the Ministry of Transport in

The temporary capital, Aden, highlights the danger of these criminal practices by these rebel militias, which do not take into account any... Custom or system in all its actions and these

illegal procedures regarding Hajj agents who were arrested and threatened with imprisonment and confiscation of their money if they deposited the value of pilgrims' tickets in the company's account outside our country.

As a result, Yemeni pilgrims traveling through Sanaa International Airport, who number more than eight thousand pilgrims, are at risk of obstructing the performance of the religious obligation and losing their services for which they paid hundreds of millions in Saudi riyals.

You will forward this to your state, which will kindly inform you and provide guidance on what you deem appropriate to deal with this situation as it is a problem. It is an emergency that requires an urgent solution and cannot tolerate delay, especially since there are only 72 hours remaining until

the first of the pilgrims' flights by air. We are grateful for your continued follow-up and keenness to provide the best services and provide them to the Yemeni pilgrim with ease and ease.

Please accept my sincere greetings and appreciation.

Ya Shayban
 Muhammad bin
 Minister of Endowments and Guidance



To death
 Dr. Peacemaker Hamid Al-Ghafari
 Ministry of Point

Scanned longitudinally with CamScanner

Annex 179: Yemenia Chairman's letter to the PM regarding seizure of aircrafts

Yemenia Pulp
Chairman of the Board of Directors / Follow

Yemenia Yemeni
Yemen Airways Yemenia Airlines

(104) Issued by
Chairman's Office

Office of the President

Date: June 26, 2024 AD
24/104. Reference R.M.

Factor
Computer

Respected

Brother / His Excellency the
Minister of Transport, Dr. Abdul Salam

Prime Minister Chan's State Memorandum
specifies the detention of aircraft

“ Saleh Hamid, best regards

Topic: Reservation of Yemenia planes arriving from Jeddah to Sanaa

Yemen Airways extends its sincere greetings to you, wishing you continued success in all your practical work tasks

reference to the above topic, we inform you that Yemeni aircraft departing from Jeddah to With
Sanaa to transport pilgrims according to 20) the schedule and the commitment agreed upon with the Ministry of Endowments and the Saudi side, were detained
by the Houthi militias for three A320 aircraft in addition to the A330 aircraft, and we explain to you The flight schedule for the three aircraft is as follows:-


1. The first plane, Jeddah / Sana'a, A320-70, flight number IX5555, arriving at Sana'a Airport, time.
Local time: 22:30 pm, date 6/25/2024
- AD. 2 The second plane, Jeddah / Sana'a, A320-C-70FC, flight number IY5547, arrival at Sana'a Airport, local time,
23:00 pm, date 6/25/2024 AD.
- Third plane Jeddah / Sanaa A320-F-70FF Flight number IX5559 Arrival Sanaa Airport with time
Local 00:30 AM 6/26/2024 3
- 4 In addition to the Airbus A330-E-70AFE plane that has been reserved in Sanaa for a while and needs an engine change and has
so far refused to pay to buy the engine and maintain the plane, in addition to continuing to freeze its Yemeni
assets in Sanaa banks since March 8, 2023 AD.

This is what had to be raised to Your Excellency due to the necessity and importance of taking the necessary measures regarding the issue of the detention
of Yemeni aircraft at Sanaa Airport by the Houthi militias.

with all gratitude and appreciation

Cabin
From management

Member Of Int'l. Air Transport Association
Tel.: +967 2 234 045/125
P.O.BOX: 6006
Khormakser, Airport Street
Aden, Republic Of Yemen
Email: iy@yemenia.com
www.yemenia.com


IATA

Member of the International Aviation Organization (IATA)
+967 2 234 045/125 :تلفون
Yemen: ص.ب.
Khor Maksar - Airport Road
Aden - Republic of
6006 Sub iy@yemenia.com Email
www.yemenia.com

Source: Panel

Annex 180: Yemenia's excess war liability for flying in Houthi-areas

The Panel was informed that, on 23 January 2024, Yemenia received the notice of cancellation of coverage, from its insurance company in respect of excess war liability, 'Extended Coverage Endorsement (Aviation Liabilities - AVN52E' in relation to the geographical location of Yemen (only in respect of Houthi-occupied airports and Houthi-controlled airspace)).

This notice expired on 30 January 2024, after which excess war liability coverage of Yemenia in Houthi-occupied airports and Houthi-controlled airspace has reduced to 81.02581 percent. As a result, Yemenia is obligated to pay up 19 per cent of the compensation amount, which would be in the range of \$35-65 million, in the event their aircraft meets any accident within the Houthi-controlled area or airspace.

This had placed Yemenia in a challenging predicament. If the company complied with the directives, it would have severely impacted the air services in Yemen and invited the wrath of the Houthis. Since Yemenia continues to operate in Houthi-controlled airports and airspace, in the event of any untoward incident, it could incur hefty penalties, leading to significant financial strain, damage to its reputation, legal battles, and even potential closure or bankruptcy. This will also hinder the future plans of Yemenia to expand air services from Sana'a to other destinations, including for humanitarian purposes.

Annex 181: Freezing of the assets of pharmaceutical companies

According to the Panel's sources, armed forces, under the direction of the Houthi leader, Saleh Dabish, raided office and factory premises, kidnapped some employees, and confiscated the funds and assets of these companies and the personal accounts of their directors and employees, mostly in Al-Kuraimi Bank. They also took away, \$240,000, 13% of the company's total profits, in the name of two shareholders, who were subject to court rulings and made additional demands for others. Earlier, responding to the threats, CBY, Aden had issued a circular dated 7 April 2024 to all banks and financial institutions not to comply with the illegal order of the Houthis.

Figure 181.1

CBY, Aden circular dated 7 April 2024 prohibiting banks from seizing and disposing of bank balances of two pharma companies based on orders from the Houthis

| | | |
|---|--|---|
| CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN Head Office - Aden |  | البنك المركزي اليمني المركز الرئيسي - عدن |
| Date: 7/4/2024 No: CBY/I/ 289/2024 | قطاع الرقابة على البنوك Banking Supervision Sector مكتب الوكيل | التاريخ: الرقم: |
| تعمير موجه الى كافة البنوك والمصارف العاملة في الجمهورية | | |
| المحترم | الاخ/ المدير العام/ المدير الاقليمي بنك..... "السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته" | |
| الموضوع // الشركة الدوائية الحديثة والشركة العالمية لصناعة الادوية | | |
| بالإشارة الى الموضوع أعلاه، وإلى المذكرات المقدمة من الشركة الدوائية الحديثة والشركة العالمية لصناعة الادوية، بشأن الاستيلاء على مقرات الشركتين في صنعاء من قبل مليشيا الحوثي، وقيام المليشيا بتسمية اشخاص من قبلهم لانتحال صفة إدارة الشركتين بصورة غير قانونية، والسعي للاستحواذ على ارصدة واموال الشركتين، وعليه واستنادا الى القوانين والتعليمات التنظيمية النافذة، فإنه يتوجب عليكم الالتزام بالاتي: | | |
| (أ) يكون التعامل بشأن أي معاملات مالية ومصرفية تتعلق بالشركتين المشار اليها أعلاه، مع الإدارة القانونية للشركة المعنية، المخولة بذلك والمثلة في التالية أسمائهم: | | |
| 1- وليد محمد سعيد الشطفة - المدير العام 2- انور حميد عبد السلام - المدير المالي | | |
| (ب) عدم جواز الحجز على أي ارصدة او حسابات خاصة بالشركتين المذكورتين، أو التصرف بها بناء على أي أوامر او طلبات تصلكم من قبل أي جهة غير قانونية. | | |
| يتم الالتزام بما ورد أعلاه، وتحملون مسؤولية المخالفة. وتقبلوا تحياتنا، | | |
|  | | |
| الجمهورية اليمنية عدن، ص ب رقم 452، تلفون: 253225 - 02 - 256513 - 02، فاكس: 290252 - 02 Republic Of Yemen - Aden, P.O.BOX 452, TEL: 253225- 02 & 256513 - 02, FAX: 290252 - 02 | | |

Source: CBY, Aden

Appendix A

Unofficial translation of CBY, Aden circular dated 7 April 2024 prohibiting banks from seizing and disposing of bank balances of two pharma companies based on orders from the Houthis

CENTRAL BANK OF YEMEN Head Office-Aden

Date:7/4/2024, No: CBY/A/289/2024

Banking Supervision Sector Office

A circular addressed to all banks and banks operating in the Republic

Brother/General Manager/Regional Director of the Bank

Respected

May the peace, blessings, and mercy of God be upon you

Topic // The Modern Pharmaceutical Company and the International Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company

With reference to the above topic, and to the memorandums submitted by the Modern Pharmaceutical Company and the International Pharmaceutical Industry Company, regarding the seizure of the two companies' headquarters in Sana'a by the Al-Houthi militia, and the militia's naming of people by them to illegally impersonate the management of the two companies, and seeking to seize the assets and funds of the two companies, Accordingly, and based on the applicable laws and regulatory instructions.

You must commit to the following:

(1) Any financial and banking transactions related to the two companies referred to above shall be dealt with the legal department of the concerned company authorized to do so, represented by the following:

1 Walid Muhammad Saeed Al Shatfa - General Manager

2 Anwar Hamid Abdel Salam - Financial Director

(2) It is not permissible to seize or dispose of any account balances of the two aforementioned companies based on any orders or requests you receive from any illegal party.

The above will be adhered to, and you will bear responsibility for any violation.

Please accept our greeting

Figure 181.2

Copy of the Memorandum dated 10 June 2024 issued by the Specialized Criminal Prosecution of the Houthis in Sana'a regarding freezing of the assets of pharmaceutical companies

الرقم: ٢٢٤٢
التاريخ: ١٢/٣/١٤٤٥ هـ
المرفقات:

العدل أساس الحكم
الجمهورية اليمنية
النيابة العامة
لنيابة الجزائية المتخصصة

الأخ/ رئيس وحدة جمع المعلومات بالبنك المركزي
المصطفى

تعبير طيبة وبعد،،،

وبناء على مذكرة لجنة حصر واستلام مستندات القوت رقم (243/39838) وتاريخ 1445/12/3 هـ الموافق 2024/6/9م والمتضمن طلب حجز أرصدة وحسابات كلاً من:

| الصفة | الاسم | م |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|----|
| | الشركت الدوائري العديري | 1 |
| | الشركت العاليري لمتاعه الأديري | 2 |
| المدير العام للشركتين | وليد محمد سعيد الشقفت | 3 |
| مدير المدير للشؤون التجاريه | هيم فاسر عبد الله الطيدري | 4 |
| المدير المالي | أنور حميد عبد السلام محمد الاشموري | 5 |
| مدير الموارد | مختار علي احمد المخلافي | 6 |
| مدير البحث والتطوير | مستوان عبد الوارث سعيد الاشموري | 7 |
| مدير الحسابات | علي عبد الجليل عبد الوهاب علي | 8 |
| مدير المطابق | طله عبد الله محمد الطيدري | 9 |
| مدير المشتريات | فاطمه احمد حسن مقبل عيشان | 10 |
| رئيس قسم الحسابات | عبد الرقيب عبد الله محمد الهجري | 11 |
| أمين الصندوق | محمد احمد صالح هادي المعزري | 12 |

وعليه/

يتم التعمير على جميع البنوك وشركات المرافقة بحجز وتجميد كافة أرصدة وحسابات وحالات المذكورين أعلاه وموافقتنا بما تم وصورة عاجلة.

والله الموفق،

القصاصي / حصارم الدين مفضل
وكيل النيابة الجزائية المتخصصة بالأمانة

وحدة جمع المعلومات المالية
المسودة
10/6/24

Source: Confidential

*Appendix A***Unofficial translation of the memorandum dated 10 June 2024 issued by the Specialized Criminal Prosecution of the Houthis in Sana'a regarding freezing of the assets of pharmaceutical companies**

Based on a memorandum of the committee for inventorying and receiving traitors' property No. (243/39838) dated 9 June 2024, which includes a request to seize the balances and accounts of:

- 1- Modern Pharmaceutical Company
- 2- International Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company
- 3- Walid Muhammad Saeed Al-Shattafa - General Manager of the two companies
- 4- Fahim Qasim Abdullah Al-Khalidi - Deputy Director for Commercial Affairs
- 5- Anwar Hamid Abdel Salam Muhammad Al-Ashmouri - Financial Director
- 6- Mukhtar Ali Ahmed Al-Mekhlafi - Resources Director
- 7- Safwan Abdel-Wareth Saeed Al-Aghbry - Director of Research and Development
- 8- Ali Abdul Jalil Abdul Wahab Ali - Accounts Manager
- 9- Taha Abdullah Muhammad Al-Khalidi - Warehouse Manager
- 10- Fatima Ahmed Hassan Muqbil Aishan - Purchasing Manager
- 11- Abdulraqueeb Abdullah Muhammad Al-Hajri - Head of the Accounts Department
- 12- Muhammad Ahmed Saleh Hadi Al-Maamari - Treasurer

All banks and exchange companies are directed to seize and freeze all the balances, accounts and transfers of those mentioned above, and to inform us of what has been done urgently.

Judge: Sarem al-Din Mufaddal

Deputy Specialized Criminal Prosecutor

Annex 182: Smuggling of telecom equipment

The Houthis have been indulging in organised smuggling of various telecom items and the illegal sale proceeds of the same are utilised for its military purposes. The Houthi-controlled telecom companies have changed their procurement process by engaging suppliers to sale them equipment. These suppliers invariably smuggle the telecom equipment but in case of any seizure by the customs, the names of the telecom companies do not come out openly. Panel's sources have stated that the Ministry of Telecommunication of the GoY has prohibited imports of telecom equipment without its specific permission, and they have not issued any such permission to any Sana'a-based telecom companies to import the equipment. But the recent upgrade of telecom services to 4G and expansion of the subscriber base by these Houthi-controlled companies and the regular seizures by the Yemeni customs, clearly demonstrate that telecom equipment, including the dual-use items used for UAVs and other military and surveillance purposes are being smuggled into Houthi-controlled areas through an organised smuggling network operated by the Houthis.

Annex 183: Smuggling of prohibited pesticides

Several sources revealed that Houthis regularly facilitate smuggling of carcinogenic and toxic pesticides like 'mancozeb', 'methyl bromide', and 'dursan.' These are sold at high prices in their areas, especially in Saada Governorate, with proceeds used for military purposes.

Sources informed the Panel that a consignment of banned toxic pesticides (methyl bromide) was allegedly imported by Saba International Company, belonging to Abdul Azim Daghshan, without any permission from the Houthi-appointed Ministry of Agriculture. The consignment was loaded in two vehicles with license plate Nos. (6/23536) and No. (479609). However, on the night of 28 November 2023, two officers from the Battalion of the Rescue Forces, Abdullah Al-Barda and Nabil Lutfullah, acting under the rescue commander, Abu Badr Al-Marani, came in two vehicles, a Hilux bearing license plate No. 691 Police, a bus bearing license plate No. 5121 Police, along with a truck with armed personnel. They forcibly entered the customs area and took away the vehicles loaded with the pesticides, without payment of customs duty. The commander reportedly told the Director-General of Sana'a Customs Office and Control that they were acting under the directives from the top Houthi leaders. The Sana'a customs is reported to have lodged a complaint. The matter is under investigation by the Panel.

Annex 184: Smuggling of medicines

The Panel received information that similar syndicates, supported by the Houthis, involved in smuggling of medicines through the GoY ports and land borders and transporting the same to the Houthi-controlled areas. In one incident under investigation by the Panel, on 3 March 2024, several gunmen in military uniforms came in military vehicles, forcibly entered the office of the Supreme Medicines Authority in the city of Tai'zz and took away a consignment of smuggled medicines that the Al-Misrakh District police had seized on 23 February 2024 from one Hisham Ghazi Hassan Saif. The Panel's sources stated that the smuggled consignment, worth about YR180 million, was received in Aden and was on its way to Houthi-controlled areas, when the police intercepted it, and handed over to the office of the Supreme Authority for Medicines in Tai'zz. Investigations by the Panel revealed that medicines are regularly being smuggled into Aden and thereafter transported to "Al-Hawban" for further distribution in Houthi-controlled areas.

Figure 184.1

Letter from the Ministry of Health and Population




Source: Confidential

Annex 185: Seizure of cultural properties

The Panel received information from various sources that the Houthis have been indulging in smuggling and trafficking of antiques and antiquities, which form part of the cultural heritage of Yemen, and selling them abroad. The Panel's interview of a few experts on Yemeni cultural heritage, dealers in artefacts, intelligence and enforcement officials, customs clearance agents, and its confidential sources revealed the existence of a Houthi-backed organised network that smuggles these items from Yemen to different countries in the region and abroad and the sale proceeds are utilised for funding their war efforts in Yemen. The Panel is continuing to investigate these cases.

During the discussions with the Antiquities Authority officials of the GoY, the Panel was informed about the seizure of various such items by the authorities in Yemen and abroad, some of which are mentioned below. The Panel has not received any information linking these cases with the Houthis and is investigating these cases:

1. The authorities in the Sultanate of Oman seized 52 artefacts on 22 August 2017.




Source: GoY

2. The Department of Protection and Monitoring of Antiquities and Artifacts at the Heritage Authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia received 14 artefacts dating back to the Kingdom of Qataban (4th century BC) from a Yemeni resident in Jeddah in September 2022.





Source: GoY

3. The authorities in Spain informed the GoY on 24 June 2022 about five Yemeni artefacts being offered for sale in Madrid. A case of theft has been registered and referred to the court.



Source: GoY

4. About 16 Yemeni artefacts have been seized in France, which were exhibited alongside pieces from Syria, Iraq, and Libya. GoY representatives have reportedly provided the French authorities with precise information about the origin of these artefacts.













Source: GoY






5. In London, an Auction House had offered, from 20 November to December 2022, for sale many items from different countries including 40 ancient items from Yemen. The GoY representative objected to the sale of these Yemeni artefacts, supported by reports from experts on Yemeni artefacts. The British authorities stopped the display of the specified Yemeni items and handed over the matter to the Metropolitan Police. Although most of these items were reportedly taken out of Yemen prior to the current conflict, such large-scale seizure of items outside Yemen point towards the existence of an organised market for artefacts that provide significant amount of opportunity for money.






6. **Items Seized by Yemeni customs and Border Security:**




- a. **List of Seizures at Al-Mualla Port – Aden:** The items were seized on 9 August 2023 under case number (4) 2023 and the matter is with the Public Funds court.





| No. | Item Description: | Photos |
|-----|--|--|
| 1 | Decorated wooden panels (crafted) with window shapes |  |
| 2 | Large wooden box |  |
| 3 | Medium-sized wooden box |  |
| 4 | Small wooden boxes of various shapes |  |







| No. | Item Description: | Photos |
|-----|---|---|
| 5 | Small wooden box shaped like a cupboard with six compartments |  |
| 6 | Small rectangular wooden box with four compartments |  |
| 7 | Decorative wooden items (Zeenah) |  |
| 8 | Small wooden box with a specific shape |  |
| 9 | Decorative boxes with silver colouring in dome shapes |  |
| 10 | Various small wooden items (cigarette holders) |  |


| No. | Item Description: | Photos |
|-----|---|---|
| 11 | Small decorative boxes with drawings |  |
| 12 | Large rectangular boxes lined with red velvet (for swords) |  |
| 13 | Brass box with a velvet-lined interior |  |
| 14 | Medium-sized brass vessel with a lid shaped like a "mattock" and a handle |  |
| 15 | Decorative swords, three with gold inlays |  |

| No. | Item Description: | Photos |
|-----|--|---|
| 16 | Old swords with scabbards (one wooden) |  |
| 17 | Jambiyas with scabbards |  |
| 18 | Small jambiyas with scabbards and some with wooden scabbards (new) |  |
| 19 | Brass plates of various sizes with designs |  |
| 20 | Decorative mirror with a silver frame (one broken after sorting) |  |

| No. | Item Description: | Photos |
|-----|--|---|
| 21 | Old-style electric lantern with coloured glass |  |
| 22 | Coloured glassware (blue – green) with lids |  |
| 23 | Small orange glass bottle (for decoration) |  |

| No. | Item Description: | Photos |
|-----|---|---|
| 24 | Orange-coloured sprayer |  |
| 25 | Decorative items shaped like lamps, green glass with brass tops |  |
| 26 | Blue vase |  |
| 27 | Coloured glass jar for decoration |  |




| No. | Item Description: | Photos |
|-----|---|---|
| 28 | Oval-shaped brass item with an egg-shaped marble inside |  |
| 29 | Brass mortar or pestle |  |
| 30 | Bag containing chains, a necklace, and one earring |  |
| 31 | Bag with a collection of beads |  |
| 32 | Decorated coloured bead bracelets Wooden locks |  |
| 33 | Wooden board with a handle |  |


| No. | Item Description: | Photos |
|-----|---|---|
| 34 | Bag containing small white beads (Chinese type) |  |

Source: GoY

b. **List of artifacts seized by the Appeals Public Funds Prosecution:**

- **Case Number:** (10) 2023
- **Defendant:** Ahmed Ali Muthana Abdullah and others
- **Date of arrival of Memorandum from the Head of Appeals Prosecution:** 26 February 2024
- **Current Status:** The case is pending before the Appeals Court.

| No. | Description: | Photos |
|-----|---|---|
| 1 | <p>Upper half of a statue of a woman: The statue is broken with damaged arms, legs, and head. It features a necklace made of carved sandstone around the neck.</p> |  |
| 2 | <p>Limestone seal: This seal has a tapered handle.</p> |  |
| 3 | <p>Bronze horse statue: The statue is inscribed with Musnad script (horse of the Mukarreb).</p> |  |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 4 | Hollow bronze elephant: The elephant is hollow inside. |  |
|---|---|---|

Source: GoY

Annex 186: LPG Tankers

The Department of the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Palau-flagged LPG tanker *Raha Gas* (IMO: 8818219, MMSI 511101405), and its owner Arafat Shipping Company, set up on 19 January 2024, and registered in Marshall Islands (number 12831), for shipping millions of dollars of LPG falsely identified as having loaded in the UAE to Yemen on behalf of the al-Jamal network. Arif Ibrahim Khot, the captain of *Raha Gas* was also sanctioned for directing the LPG shipment to Yemen. OFAC also sanctioned the Palau-flagged LPG tanker *LPG OM* (IMO: 9160475, MMSI 511101151), and its owner and operator KDS Shipping Limited, set up on 27 Jun 2023, and registered in Marshall Islands (Number 120646) for carrying multiple shipments on behalf of Sa'id al-Jamal.

The Panel's investigations revealed that during the period from 1 January 2023 to July 2024, 44 requests for inspections of LPG vessels were received by the UNVIM from the vessels, out of which one request was rejected. Investigation further revealed that as per the UNVIM's records, for the shipment of 18 October 2023 of *LPG OM* and for the shipment of 8 June 2024 of *Raha Gas*, Mina Khalid port, UAE, was shown as the port of origin.


Annex 187: Landmines locally produced by the Houthis

1. The following figures display landmines produced locally by the Houthis, highlighting their specific features in terms of triggering mechanism and effects, e.g. bonding, horizontal effect.
2. According to a specialist, the Houthis' production of landmines is conducted in an artisanal manner, resulting in explosive contents that are less stable compared to those produced by specialized industries. This results in significant risks to both the local population residing near production and storage sites and to the EOD personnel tasked with clearing these areas.
3. The Panel notes that many of the anti-tank mines deployed by the Houthis are coupled with trigger mechanisms typically used for anti-personnel mines. Given the quantity of explosive contents, their explosion can have particularly severe consequences.
4. Additionally, the Houthis' failure to adhere to a mine-laying plan further complicates and increases the risks associated with the decontamination of affected areas, thereby exacerbating the dangers faced by both civilians and demining teams.

Antipersonnel mine of local production (Model 1)

Contains an average 450 g of TNT explosive

Figures 187.1 (up), and 187.2. (down)



Source: Project Masam

Antipersonnel mine of local production (Model 2)

Contains an average 550 g of TNT explosive and a maximum 700 g

Figures 187.3 (up), and 187.4 (down)



Source: [Project Masam](#)

Improvised bounding fragmentation device (regular model, 101mm diameter) of local production

Contains an estimated 300 g of TNT explosive

Figures 187.5



Source: Project Masam

Improvised bounding fragmentation device (medium model, 180mm diameter) of local production

Contains an estimated 1.75 kg of TNT explosive

Figure 187.6 (up) Figure 187.7 (down)



Source: Project Masam



المشاهد الكاملة للعرض العسكري "وعد الأخرة" - المنطقة الخامسة والوية النصر والقوات البحرية والجوية

Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>

Improvised bounding fragmentation device (large model, 325mm diameter) of local production

Contains an estimated 10 kg of TNT explosive

Figures 187.8



Source: Project Masam

Initiation systems associated with the improvised bounding fragmentation device

Figures 187.9 (left), and 187.10 (right)



Configured with an electric initiator
Victim-operated IED



Configured as a tripwire-initiated
Victim-operated IED

Figures 187.11 (left), and 187.12 (right)



Configured with a pressure plate
Victim-operated IED



Configured as a radio-command initiated IED

Source: Project Masam

Small directional mine of local production


Contains an estimated 500 g of TNT explosive

Figure 187.13



Source: Project Masam

Figures 187.14 (left), and 187.15 (right)



Source: <https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-yemens-west-coast/>

Figures 187.16 (up)

Comparison between a small directional mine of local production (left) and a GLD-150A directional mine similar to a production by China



Source: <https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-yemens-west-coast/>

Large directional mine of local production


Contains approximately 3 kg of TNT explosive

Figure 187.17



Source: <https://iedawareness.com/2018/04/12/houthi-directional-mines-captured-in-midi-yemen/>

Figures 187.18 (left), and 187.19 (right)



Source: <https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-yemens-west-coast/>

Figure 187.20

Similar characteristics with the M18A2, a large directional mine of Iranian production



Source: <https://armamentresearch.com/iranian-directional-anti-personnel-mines-in-syria/>

Large directional mine of local production

Figures 187.21 (up), and 187.22 (down)



المشاهد الكاملة للعرض العسكري "وعد الإخرة" - المنطقة الخامسة والوية النص والقوات البحرية والجوية



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>

Fragmentation charge (Rock bomb) of local production (Model 1)

Contains 1 - 1.25 kg of probable C4 explosive

Figures 187.23 (up), and 187.24 (down)



Probable C4 explosive filling with ballbearing fragmentation

Source: Project Masam

Fragmentation charge (Rock bomb) of local production (Model 2)

Contains an estimated 500 g (small directional mine) of TNT explosive

Figures 187.25 (up), and 187.26 (down)



Source: Project Masam

Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP), concealed as rock bombs of local production (Model 3)

Likely contain different EFPs and charge configurations, 2-4 kg of TNT per rock mine

Figures 187.27 (up), and 187.28 (down)



Source: <https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/mines-and-ieds-employed-by-houthi-forces-on-yemens-west-coast/>

Landmine of local production (2nd generation, in service in 2016 or earlier)

Contains approximately 5 kg of TNT explosive

Figures 187.29 (up) and 187.30 (down)



Source: Project Masam

Landmine of local production (3rd generation, in service in 2016 or earlier)

Contains approximately 3.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figure 187.31



Source: Project Masam

Landmine of local production (4th generation, probably in service from 2016)

Contains approximately 3.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figure 187.32



Source: Project Masam

Landmine of local production (5th generation, from 2017)

Contains approximately 3.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figures 187.33 (up), and 187.34 (down)



Source: Project Masam

Landmine of local production (6th generation, from 2020)

Contains approximately 3.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figure 187.35



Source: <https://observers.france24.com/en/middle-east/20220921-yemen-truce-houthi-rebels-landmines-civilians>

Blast main charge of local production (Model 1)

Contains approximately 6.5 kg of homemade explosive

Figures 187.36 (up), and 187.37 (down)



Source: Project Masam




Source: <https://cat-uxo.com/explosive-hazards/ied/houthi-main-charge-plastic-main-charge>

Blast main charge of local production (Model 2)

Contains approximately 37 kg of homemade explosive

Figures 187.38 (up), and 187.39 (down)




Source: Project Masam



Source: <https://www.khabaragency.net/news182980.html>

Pressure plate of local production

Figures 187.40 (up), and 187.41 (down)



Source: Project Masam

Anti-lift mechanism attached to the underside of a common style of improvised landmine

Figure 187.42



Source: Project Masam

EFP of local production (single charge)

Figures 187.43 (up), and 187.44 (down)



المشاهد الكاملة للعرض العسكري "وعد الأخرة" - المنطقة الخامسة والوية النصر والقوات البحرية والجوية




Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>

EFP of local production (multiple charges)

Figures 187.45 (up), and 187.46 (down)



المشاهد الكاملة للعرض العسكري "وعد الإخوة" - المنطقة الخامسة والوية النصر والقوات البحرية والجوية



Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qf1j0vbKltQ>

Annex 188: Attacks on civilians

1. The Panel's sources informed on individual cases of civilians killed and injured during indiscriminate attacks carried out by the Houthis. These include:

- On 19 March 2024, in Rada'a, Al-Bayda Governorate, a Houthi convoy of 14 heavily armed vehicles entered a residential area, and planted explosives in a residence. The explosion led to the destruction of neighbouring houses, resulting in the deaths of at least 13 civilians, including nine members of the same family, and four children.

Figure 188.1

Damage caused in Rada's by explosives planted by the Houthis



Source:

GoY

- On 3 February 2024, in the Sabr Al-Mawadim District of Ta'izz Governorate, a 17-year-old boy was killed by sniper fire when he was in the vicinity of his residence.
- On 9 April 2024, in the Sahara District of Amran Governorate, a 35-year-old man was killed for reportedly performing the Maghrib prayer seven minutes after the prescribed time.
- On 24 April 2024, in the Salah District of Ta'izz Governorate, a seven-year-old girl was injured by sniper fire
- On 27 April 2024, a boy was shot by a guard at the entrance of a summer camp in Aflah Al-Yemen District, Hajjah Governorate.
- On July 20, 2024, Houthi armed men stormed into a mosque in the village of Minjarah, in the Al-Sawar district of Al-Mahwit Governorate, and fired live ammunition indiscriminately, resulting in the deaths of a man and a woman and injuring three other women.

2. Furthermore, sources indicated that during the reporting period:

- The Houthis targeted homes in Al-Mashareeh, in the densely populated northern part of Al-Dhale' Governorate. A 40-year-old woman reportedly sustained various injuries from a shell which struck her home. She had shrapnel lodged in her neck and other parts of her body. This incident occurred two days after a similar attack resulted in the death of an infant and injury to his father, following the shelling of their home in the Sulaim area, northwest of the Qatabah District.
- A 15-year-old girl was injured by Houthi-sniper fire on the outskirts of Wadi Al-Kharazah, west of Qatabah, Al-Dhale' governorate. The child was hit when she was reportedly heading to a relative's house.
- Two children aged 3 and 5 were killed and five children and one adult were injured during an attack on residential houses in the village of Habour in Sabir Al-Mawadim District, southwest of Ta'izz.

Annex 189: Attacks on civilian objects

1. The Panel was informed that, on 20 July 2024, a mosque in Manjara (Tyre District, Amran Governorate) was attacked by the Houthis. Live munitions were reportedly shot indiscriminately, resulting in two civilians killed (one male and one female) and three women injured.

2. On 2 January 2024, in the Shamila area of Al-Sabeen District (Amanat Al-Asimah), a building owned by a lawyer and human rights activist was seized. Residents received eviction orders issued by the Houthi-led specialized criminal court. It reportedly read that “the specialised criminal court was imposing a precautionary quarantine on all funds and property owned by” the activist, who was accused of committing “crimes against the security of the State, aiding the enemy and communicating with a foreign state”. It further reportedly advised that “other measures would be taken”, if the instructions were not followed.⁷³

3. The Panel is further investigating alleged attacks against cultural property in Yemen, including damages caused to the Military Museum of Aden and the Sultan’s Palace, in the same city.

Figure 189.1

Military Museum, Aden



Figure 189.2

Sultan’s Palace, Aden



Figure 189.3

Sultan’s Palace, Aden



Source: Panel


⁷³ [https://acjus.org/?l=e/2/A/c/1/4/4/4100/\(ACJ\):-Confiscating-the-property-of-citizens-and-activists-by-the-Houthi-group-is-a-violation-that-affects-fundamental-rights,-and-we-call-for-the-cessation-of-this-violation](https://acjus.org/?l=e/2/A/c/1/4/4/4100/(ACJ):-Confiscating-the-property-of-citizens-and-activists-by-the-Houthi-group-is-a-violation-that-affects-fundamental-rights,-and-we-call-for-the-cessation-of-this-violation)

4. The Houthis have significantly disrupted crucial transportation routes, impeding the smooth flow of individuals and goods across Yemen. Among these routes are major highways linking Sana'a and Aden, such as the Aden-Dali-Sana'a road, the Aden-Ta'iz-Al-Houban road, the Aden-Yafa-Al Bayda-Sana'a road, and the Aden-Tor Al-Baha-Ta'iz-Sana'a road. Additionally, the road connecting the north-eastern governorates from Ma'rib to Sana'a, which is essential due to Ma'rib Governorate's role as a primary supplier of petroleum products, has been affected. Specifically, the road was obstructed at the Nihm crossroads, necessitating a detour through Al Bayda Governorate before reaching Sana'a. The closure of roads have resulted in prolonged travel time by land, consequently driving up the expenses associated with goods transportation due to heightened operational costs and a twofold increase in fuel consumption. For instance, the expense of hiring a truck for transporting a 40-foot container between Aden and Sana'a previously ranged from YR250,000 to YR280,000 but has now surged to YR1,600,000. This, in turn, also impacts the provision of humanitarian services and aid delivery.

5. However, recently, the GoY has taken some steps in repairing and relaying the roads and opening up of some roads and obstructions within its area.

Figure 189.4

Road map of Yemen with indication of blocked roads



Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: Government - Republic of Yemen

Figure 189.5
Impact of the disruption of roads by the Houthis

| The Blocked Main Road | length (km) | Duration in hours | Blocked location | Alternative route | Length (in KMs) | Duration (in hours) | Remarks |
|---|-------------|---------------------------------|------------------|---|-----------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| Aden - Al Dhalea – Sana'a | 365 | 6 (for cars) 18 (for trucks) | Al Dhali | Aden - Yafa - Al Bayda - Dhamar - Sana'a | 566 | 13 (for cars) 15 days (for trucks) | The road is narrow, of one lane, and passes through rugged terrain, leading to delays. |
| | | | | Aden - Tur Al-Baha - Haijat Al-Abd (southwest of Ta'iz Governorate) – Sana'a | 466 | 12 (for cars) | Not suitable for trucks |
| Aden – Ta'iz | 160 | 2 (for cars) 4 (for trucks) | Ta'iz city | Aden - Tur Al-Baha (southwest of Lahj) - Al-Maqtara - Al-Turbah (west of Ta'iz) | 190 | 8 (for cars) | Not suitable for trucks |
| Sana'a – Ma'rib | 173 | 3 (for cars) | Fardhat Nahm | Ma'rib – Al Bayda – Dhamar – Sana'a | 418 | 9 (for cars) | |
| Western International route (Aden - Al-Twal port) | 445 | 6 (for cars) 9 (for trucks) | Al-Hudaydah | Aden – Abyan – Shabwa – Hadramaut (Al Wadia Port): | 600 | 12 (for cars) 18 (for trucks) | About 60 km on an unpaved desert road |

Source: GoY

Annex 190: Critique of Houthis' attacks on the Red Sea followed by arbitrary detention of its author

1. According to sources, in January 2024, Yemeni judge Abdulwahab Mohammad Qatran, who criticized the Houthis for human rights violations and the attacks on the Red Sea, was detained along with his family. They were questioned for hours without legal representation, and the judge was held incommunicado for three days, reportedly in solitary confinement at a Houthi detention centre in Sana'a. The judge was released in June 2024.

Figure 190.1

Message of Judge Qatran on X criticising Houthi attacks on the Red Sea



Unofficial translation

Enough of the antics and muscle building of the Yemeni people. Thirty million people did not delegate you to fight America. Fight hunger, poverty, ignorance, disease, begging. May God bless you abundantly.

Fight corruption and injustice in your courts, department and prisons.

Fight racism in the performance of your state, your group and your faction.

31 December 2024

2. The case of Judge Qatran has been documented by different legal and human rights organisations and entities, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde31/7728/2024/en/>, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/30/yemen-judge-arrested-after-criticizing-houthis> and <https://cihrs.org/yemen-qatran-judgeimmediately-release-arbitrarily-detained-judge-qatran/?lang=en>

Annex 191: Arbitrary detention of teachers and education experts

1. Different sources, including from the GoY, informed the Panel about a distinguishable trend of abducting teachers and education experts who oppose the politicization of the education system and academic curricula.
2. There follow the details, as reported by sources and corroborated by open-source material,⁷⁵ of a case which appears to integrate said trend.

Case Study: Death of Education Expert Sabri Abdullah Ali Al-Hakimi

Overview

Sabri Abdullah Ali Al-Hakimi was a 56-year-old education expert working in the Ministry of Education, in Sana'a. He was reportedly detained and tortured by the Houthi militia and died in detention, on 23 March 2024.

Background and Detention

Al-Hakimi, along with a colleague professor, was abducted by the Houthis at Yaslah point six months prior to his death while traveling to Dhamar Governorate.

As per reports, their homes were subsequently raided, and equipment and books were looted. Both were imprisoned without formal charges.

Al-Hakimi had been in dispute with Houthi authorities over primary and middle school curricula, advocating for educational materials free from sectarian and political biases. The Houthis opposed this view, preferring curricula that supported sectarian mobilization.

Conditions of detention

During his six-month detention, Al-Hakimi was reportedly subjected to torture and ill-treatment. His health deteriorated significantly due to the lack of medical care. He was denied communication with the outside world except for a single visitation where signs of torture were evident.

Release of the Body

Following prolonged delays, the Houthis reportedly released Al-Hakimi's body on 28 March 2024, under the condition that his family bury him swiftly without forensic examination or public disclosure. The family was reportedly threatened with retaliation if they disobeyed, and other male family members were arrested.

Aftermath

Ahmed Saif Hashid, a parliamentarian, is reported to have publicly questioned the official account of Al-Hakimi's death. He reported seeing visible injuries on Al-Hakimi's face and criticized the restricted view of the body, which was not allowed to be photographed. On 25 March 2024, a group of activists, university professors and Member of Parliament Saif Hashid published a letter demanding that authorities conduct an impartial and transparent investigation.⁷⁶ The letter reads that "*deaths in detention in the prisons of the intelligence services have increased*".⁷⁷ In late April 2024, Saif Hashid was reportedly the target of an attempted killing.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ <https://www.sabanew.net/story/en/108804>, <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/292429>, https://justice4yemenpact.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Incident-Report-9-Deaths-in-Detention_English.pdf

⁷⁶<https://www.facebook.com/hommed.fdhd/posts/pfbid02URtHAX-ttjihVbQFjED6sGZS8aQeyh26pwDHLCK5wyLowqqV4dSSrr8p8h6jys1PdI>

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ <https://x.com/ERYANIM/status/1784663096738316712>

Annex 192: Prosecution Office documents relating to the death sentences issued by the Houthi-appointed specialised criminal court

1. The excerpts from the Houthi Prosecution Office contain, among others, the identity of individuals held in custody and sentenced to death by the Houthi-led specialised criminal court.

Figure 192.1
Excerpts of list of individuals sentenced to death by the Houthi appointed specialised criminal court

The document contains two tables of individuals sentenced to death. The first table lists 20 individuals, and the second table lists 15 individuals. Each entry includes the name of the individual, their age, the date of sentencing, and the location where the sentencing took place.

| الرقم | اسم المتهم | العمر | العمل | محل الإقامة | وجه الدلالة |
|-------|---|--------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|
| ١٥ | زيد سلطان صالح العدي المتكفي (صاحب جويدي) | ٢٥ سنة | مزارع | جنز، الأمانة | محبوس |
| ١٦ | جميل علي هادي محمد كندوع المتكفي (الغزي-البراه) | ٣٤ سنة | جندي، وزارة الدفاع | شعلان، الأمانة | محبوس |
| ١٧ | ابراهيم محمد الصديري المتكفي (حسام) | ٢٦ سنة | طالب جامعي | ش/ رداغ /م ذمار | محبوس |
| ١٨ | غندان علي عبد الله الرومي المتكفي (صالح) | ٢٧ سنة | مديرة ذمار | مديرة ذمار | محبوس |
| ١٩ | اسامة محمد الغزي محمد قائل المتكفي (هيثم - عبد الله) | ٢٦ سنة | طالب جامعي | مدينة ذمار، جوار كلية التربية | محبوس |
| ٢٠ | احمد احمد عبدربه ناصر الحجيجي المتكفي (ابو يسلم) | ٤٢ سنة | مدرس | جرف سبيل /م ذمار | محبوس |
| ٢١ | بيهان محمد علي الشيباني | ٣٨ سنة | مزارع | جهران /م ذمار | محبوس |
| ٢٢ | شاداد جبر عبد الله محمد الحجيجي المتكفي (ابو محسن-ابو همام) | ٤٠ سنة | عامل بناء | مبغلة ضوا، /م ذمار | محبوس |
| ٢٣ | طه محمد احمد سعد السماوي المتكفي (ابو بكر) | ٣٤ سنة | مهندس | ش/ رداغ، /م ذمار | محبوس |
| ٢٤ | عبد القريم حسين علي الشنقي المتكفي (ابو شادي) | ٣٠ سنة | طالب جامعي | مدينة ذمار، جولة المحافظة | محبوس |
| ٢٥ | علي احمد علي محمد العبري | ٣٩ سنة | مدير مستشفى المصالي | جوار الجامع الكبير /م ذمار | وجه الدلالة |
| ٢٦ | علي حسين صالح عدل المتكفي (امين) | ٣٥ سنة | طالب جامعي | جهران، /م ذمار | محبوس |
| ٢٧ | علي عبد الله احمد علي الحاشدي | ٢٧ سنة | طالب جامعي | حارة الصلعة، مدينة ذمار | محبوس |
| ٢٨ | محمد عبد التكليف محمد الزراري المتكفي (ابو ليث) | ٣٦ سنة | مقوت | مدينة ذمار | محبوس |
| ٢٩ | محمد عبد الله سعيد الصديري المتكفي (ابو ابراهيم) | ٤٥ سنة | موظف في التربية /م ذمار | موظف في التربية /م ذمار | محبوس |
| ٣٠ | محمد عبد الله عزير زايد الجوري المتكفي (عبدالله) | ٣٠ سنة | موظف في التربية /م ذمار | موظف في التربية /م ذمار | محبوس |

The document contains a table of individuals sentenced to death. Each entry includes the name of the individual, their age, the date of sentencing, and the location where the sentencing took place.

| م | اسم المتهم | العمر | العمل | محل الإقامة | حاليته |
|----|--|--------|-------|--------------------------|-------------|
| 1 | عمار محمد محسن النجار (مختار) | 39 عام | - | مارب | وجه الدلالة |
| 2 | عبد الرحمن احمد سعيد الرامسي (يوسف) | 59 عام | - | مارب | وجه الدلالة |
| 3 | ناصر ميخوفت اسماحيل حسين ثامر (سند) | 35 عام | - | مارب | وجه الدلالة |
| 4 | محمد مقبول حسين الرشيدوي (أبو عسديع) | 48 عام | - | مارب | وجه الدلالة |
| 5 | عبد العزيز علي احمد الحداد (نور الدين) | 46 عام | - | مارب | وجه الدلالة |
| 6 | عبد صالح حميد الجابري (عبد السلام الجابري) | 33 عام | - | مارب | وجه الدلالة |
| 7 | فؤاد محمد حسين قريوش | 48 عام | - | مارب | وجه الدلالة |
| 8 | مجاهد علي صالح الجديسي | 48 عام | - | مارب | وجه الدلالة |
| 9 | سحر حسين محمد العمري المتكفي (طارق - احمد) | 33 سنة | سائق | ش/ تمع الأمانة | محبوس |
| 10 | احمد صالح علي صالح الكحلون المتكفي (امين سفيان-ابو محمد) | 37 سنة | مزارع | السكنين الشمالي، الأمانة | محبوس |
| 11 | صدام علي حسين عايشي العالقي المتكفي (نوران-عاشق-النفوس) | 32 سنة | عامل | بني صريم /م حوران | محبوس |
| 12 | امين يحيى علي عبد الله الششمي المتكفي (فهي-مراد) | 30 سنة | تشاد | خمر /م عمران | محبوس |
| 13 | سيف محمد احمد السخيتي المتكفي (عبدالله) | 37 سنة | جندي | خمر /م عمران | محبوس |
| 14 | سائق يحيى مزارع العيسوي المتكفي (طارق - صالح) | 30 سنة | محا | تمع الأمانة | محبوس |

Source: GoY

2. Death sentences issued by the specialized criminal court appear to often follow prolonged arbitrary detentions and years of enforced disappearance. For instance, in late July 2024, three men (one with a physical disability) who had been convicted to death nine years prior, saw their sentences confirmed. The men are reported to have been kept incommunicado for years, denied legal representation and tortured. Reportedly, according to the National Authority for Prisoners and Abductees, there are 70 civilians under Houthi custody facing execution.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ <https://www.arabnews.pk/node/2558856/middle-east>

Annex 193: Reported influence of Hezbollah on the Houthis' summer camps and the alteration of curricula in Houthi-Controlled Areas

1. Some sources informed the Panel that members of Hezbollah operate in Sana'a, providing assistance to the Houthis, including in running summer camps and in the revision of academic curricula. Houthi-run summer camps are reportedly very similar to those carried out by Hezbollah. Children's uniform and the hijab worn by girls in Houthi summer camps present similarities with those in Hezbollah-run summer camps.

2. The figures that follow show similarities between Houthi and Hezbollah summer camps (uniforms and salute)

Figure 193.1
Houthi summer camp



Figure 193.2
Hezbollah summer camp



Source Figure 193.1: https://x.com/Jehad_mag/status/1783051115551973472

Source Figure 193.2: <https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/hezbollah-and-lebanon-an-in-depth-examination-under-hassan-nasrallah-s-leadership/hezbollah-s-youth-movement-of-terror/>

Annex 194: Indoctrination and Promotion of Hatred, Violence and Discrimination among Children

1. The Houthis use multiple resources to indoctrinate children, promote hatred, violence and discrimination. For instance, sources informed the Panel that in Houthi-controlled areas, children initiate their school day with the following prayer rather than the national anthem:

“Oh God, we entrust you, we entrust you, your Messenger, we entrust Imam Ali, and we entrust whomever you commanded us to appoint, my master and lord, Abdul Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi. Oh God, we disavow your enemy, the enemy of your Prophet, the enemy of Imam Ali, and the enemy of whomever you commanded us to appoint, my master and lord, Abd al-Malik al-Houthi. Humiliation is far from us... Humiliation is far from us... Humiliation is far from us!!”

2. ‘Jehad mag’ is a Houthi open-source tool used to spread sectarian and discriminatory messages among children. Some examples of its content are as follows.

Figure 194.1

Screenshots taken by the Panel from ‘Jehad Mag’s on X



Unofficial translation

Jehad Magazine for Children

The generation of pride and dignity, the generation of knowledge and knowledge



Unofficial translation

Millions of Yemeni children “are steadfast with Gaza and will confront America and those involved with it



Unofficial translation

Participation of Yemeni children in the “Our path with Gaza... forward until victory”

reposted
شبكة الفرقان - Network Al-Furqan
@alforqanet

أطفال اليمن للعدو السعودي
لا تختبروا صبر قائدنا

#معركة_الفتح_الموعود_والجهاد_المقدس
#مجلس_جهاد_الأطفال (@Jehad_mag)

Translated from Arabic by Google
Yemeni children for the Saudi enemy
Don't test our leader's patience.

#معركة_الفتح_الموعود_والجهاد_المقدس
@Jehad_mag - Jihad Magazine

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



7:03 PM · Jul 13, 2024 · 5,326 Views

مجلة جهاد للأطفال
@Jehad_mag

#الصورة_تحتوي
جبل الصرخة
تصوير / كزار الموييد
#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Translated from Arabic by Google
#الصورة_تحتوي
Generation of scream
Photography / Karar Al-Moayyad

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال
Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



6:11 PM · May 9, 2023 · 144 Views

Translated from Arabic by Google
From the messages #أطفال_اليمن of the million-man march "in victory for Gaza, we are proceeding with the fifth stage of escalation"

#أطفال_اليمن #With Gaza until victory

#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



6:00 PM · Jul 27, 2024 · 45 Views

Translated from Arabic by Google
 From the messages #أطفال_اليمن of the million-man march "Loyalty to the blood of the martyrs.. With Gaza until victory"

#أطفال_اليمن With Gaza until victory
 #مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:

مجلة جهاد
 من رسائل #أطفال_اليمن من مليونية "وفاء لدماء الشهداء.. مع غزة حتى النصر"

#أطفال_اليمن مع غزة حتى النصر
 #مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Translated from Arabic by Google
 From the messages #أطفال_اليمن of the million-man march "Loyalty to the blood of the martyrs.. With Gaza until victory"

#أطفال_اليمن With Gaza until victory
 #مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:

11:16 AM · Aug 4, 2024 · 63 Views

11:16 AM · Aug 4, 2024 · 63 Views

المراكز الصيفية

إعداد: إبراهيم المشيط
 تصوير: أبو الفضل الدريسي

وتنفيذ أوائل هذه المراكز الصيفية التي يتعلم فيها الآلاف من الشباب العربي التي تحتضنهم من الأفكار الصالحة وحبها الشغلة والتميز منبهات، فتشرف اليوم أحد هذه المراكز بإقامة العاصمة.

مفيد لمنهج
 مستلزمات الصيفية

لنفس وناجح

يتم تحقيق على طلب
 بالمستوى الدراسي الذي يناسب العمر

كما يجري استغلال الطلاب الذين يتسجلون بالمركز ويتم تسجيلهم

يتم تعليم ثلاثة الفين و
 الفين و

جهد

Unofficial translation
 Flyer for summer camps

Excerpts:

There are summer camps where children learn Quranic culture, which frees them from stray thoughts, and in which there are useful activities and games... Each student enrolls in the appropriate education level...

مجلة جهاد للأطفال
@Jehad_mag

من رسائل #أطفال_اليمن من مسيرة ثابتون مع غزة رغم أنف كل عميل
#أطفال_اليمن مع غزة حتى النصر
#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Translated from Arabic by Google
From the messages #أطفال_اليمن from the march of steadfastness with Gaza in spite of every agent
#أطفال_اليمن with Gaza until victory
#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



4:51 PM · Jul 23, 2024 · 63 Views

مجلة جهاد للأطفال
@Jehad_mag

من رسائل #أطفال_اليمن من مسيرة ثابتون مع غزة رغم أنف كل عميل
#أطفال_اليمن مع غزة حتى النصر
#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال

Translated from Arabic by Google
From the messages #أطفال_اليمن from the march of steadfastness with Gaza in spite of every agent
#أطفال_اليمن with Gaza until victory
#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال


Was this translation accurate? Give us feedback so we can improve:



4:51 PM · Jul 23, 2024 · 63 Views

مجلة جهاد للأطفال
@Jehad_mag · Aug 4

من رسائل #أطفال_اليمن من مليونية "وفاء لدماء الشهداء، مع غزة حتى النصر"
#أطفال_اليمن مع غزة حتى النصر
#مجلة_جهاد_للأطفال



2 49



Unofficial translation/description

Normalisation versus Boycott

Flyer promoting boycott against the “enemy”, referring to the “Zionist” and “America”



Unofficial translation

Yes, the Jews:

- Are the dangerous hostility of the nation that God warned us about and warned us against;
- The children of Israel, who God chose and favoured, bore His message and religion, but when they rejected His guidance and disobeyed Him, He cursed them and became angry with them;
- The Prophet abandoned them where the stone of the books of God were; they deviate from the line of His message;
- No matter how much we try to please them and make concessions to them. We will never achieve peace with them, nor will they be satisfied with us;
- They do not love us and do not wish us any good;
- Those who occupy Palestine and Al-Aqsa Mosque and those who desecrate our sanctity and want to enslave us.



Faith is Yaman - Yemeni proverb.

What a Jew

Muslim advised

The meaning is that no matter how friendly the Jew pretends to be to the Muslim, he harbours evil for him and does not sincerely seek his good. It refers to not relying on someone who disagrees with you in your religion, or sometimes in your belief.

37 Old Jihad (20)

Source: https://x.com/Jehad_mag/status/1754146318560252218

3. Influencers are reportedly heavily involved in mobilizing the masses, rallying thousands of individuals, including children, and disseminating violent and sectarian messages. The following images, taken from a documentary, illustrate a day of demonstrations, in Sana'a, in support of Houthi authorities. Every Friday, after prayer, the Ansar Allah is reported to gather hundreds of thousands of supporters in the main square of the city. Everyone, including the youngest children, is urged to think of Palestine.

Figures 194.2
Screenshots captured by the Panel from a 2024 documentary filmed in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen







Source: <https://www.arte.tv/en/videos/118760-000-A/arte-reportage/>

The following images depict moments in daily life in summer camps. These are powerful tools for promoting violence, hatred, and discrimination among children and youth.

Figure 194.3
Screenshots captured by the Panel from a 2024 documentary filmed in Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen



Source: <https://www.arte.tv/en/videos/118760-000-A/arte-reportage/>

Annex 195: Directive issued by Houthi appointed authority on requirements for the operation of international organisations in Houthi-controlled areas

1. On 17 July 2024, the Houthi-appointed authority issued a directive demanding that international organisations operating in the areas under the group's control obtain its approval prior to hiring any staff, national or international. International organisations are further required to submit their detailed structure with the job title and function of employees.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

Republic of Yemen
Presidency of Republic
Supreme Council
For Management and Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs & International cooperation
General Secretariat

التاريخ: ١٤ / / ٢٠٢٤
الموافق: ٢٠ / / ٢٠٢٤

الجمهورية اليمنية
رئاسة الجمهورية
المجلس الأعلى
لإدارة وتنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية والتعاون الدولي
الأمانة العامة

الرقم: ٢٠٢٤/٧٣١

السادة/ ممثلي المنظمات الدولية العاملة في اليمن

"تهديكم الأمانة العامة للمجلس الأعلى لإدارة وتنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية والتعاون الدولي خالص التقدير"

الموضوع: الهيكل الوظيفي للمنظمات الدولية.

بالإشارة إلى الموضوع أعلاه، واستناداً إلى أحكام المادة رقم (5) من الاتفاقية الأساسية الموقعة معكم، التي نصت على أن تقوم المنظمة بتوظيف كوادر محلية أو أجنبية بحسب احتياجاتها وأنشطتها، وذلك بالتشاور مع الحكومة ممثلة بالأمانة العامة للمجلس الأعلى والحصول مسبقاً على موافقتها... الخ).

في هذا السياق؛ يتم سرعة موافقتنا بالهيكل الوظيفي لكل منظمة موضعاً فيه المسمى الوظيفي، وأسم الموظف، والتفويض بنص المادة الموضحة أعلاه، بأخذ الموافقة المسبقة من قبل الأمانة العامة للمجلس الأعلى قبل استكمال إجراءات توظيف أي كوادر محلية أو أجنبية، بحسب احتياجات المنظمة ومتطلبات مشاريعها وأنشطتها.

وعليه:

نأمل موافقتنا بالهيكل الوظيفي للمنظمة خلال أسبوع من تاريخ إستلامكم لهذا التعميم، وذلك لما للأمر من أهمية في تطبيق ما ورد في الاتفاقية الأساسية من مواد وشروط والتزامات من شأنها تنظيم آلية العمل بين الحكومة اليمنية والمنظمات الدولية العاملة في اليمن.

وتقبلوا خالص تحياتنا ...

أبوهم أحمد الحلبي
الأمين العام

صورة مع التحية لس:-
- مدير مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية - رئيس المجلس .

الهاتف: +٩٦٧ ١ ٤١٦ ١٢٧
البريد الإلكتروني: info.correspondence@scmcha.com
العنوان: اليمن - صنعاء - شارع الحرية - جوار وزارة التخطيط

Source: GoY

Unofficial Translation

Presidency of the Republic

Supreme Council for the Administration and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation

General Secretariat

Date:

1/12/11

Number: 26

Subject: Functional Structure of International Organizations

Dear Representatives of International Organizations Working in Yemen,

The General Secretariat of the Supreme Council for the Administration and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation extends its sincere appreciation to you.

In reference to the above subject and in accordance with Article 5 of the basic agreement signed with your organization, which stipulates that organizations must employ local or foreign staff as needed, in consultation with and with prior approval from the government represented by the General Secretariat of the Supreme Council, we kindly request the following:

Please provide us with the job structure for your organization, including job titles and names of employees, while adhering to the requirement to obtain prior approval from the General Secretariat before completing the hiring process for any local or foreign staff. This request is in line with the provisions of the agreement and is essential for ensuring compliance with the agreement's terms and conditions.

We request that you submit the organization's functional structure within one week from the receipt of this circular. This is crucial for implementing the terms, conditions, and obligations outlined in the basic agreement, which governs the working relationship between the Yemeni government and international organizations operating in Yemen.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

[...]

[...]

General Secretariat

Supreme Council for the Administration and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation

Annex 196: Facebook accounts identified by the Panel of arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas

<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100069181991038>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090419695269>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100073339084079>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100070385013748>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100009144795696>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100085644177040>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068910739101>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100076394770544>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078946869864>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100082336645878>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100089367654514>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100005781396817>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092376588133>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100084214463531>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100041980124439>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100055912167214>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100057138244853>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100013658930714>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100023464780757>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100085179506808>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090858711000>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100093471751991>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092491582012>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100084899035091>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088443758434>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078672855133>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100064081843519>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100042798436449>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100022593847599>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100022615670487>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088847108170>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100043843201985>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100049455045023>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078112421619>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100051918248750>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100095010057378>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100087821389404>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100072535674559>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100068448654609>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088804448849>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100094432729023>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100053185149582>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100076279654300>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100016548902262>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090392468856>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090003906493>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088816089895>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091434221975>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092078379984>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088576837558>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100089113144631>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100086756592360>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100093708284555>

Figures extracted from the related accounts



<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100054499128426>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100081039384059>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091504976127>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100078564827663>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100071818337321>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100006749950951>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100065120104780>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088976470569>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100066451894179>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100029741229295>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100021774343294>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091374281039>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100016090207826>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092680670244>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100081286797981>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100017622091203>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100026950784654>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100015692440375>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100034788863769>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100041726862891>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100010730499222>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100034759011738>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100017187336988>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088305317681>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100089036797123>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100005860776176>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100007550204853>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100015340982387>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100074198676901>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100005505005626>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100079048570418>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091985026918>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100088479603310>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100095482298185>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100008296422491>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100063530207923>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100093551756316>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61553642951391>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61551679636123>
<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61551676585606>
<https://www.facebook.com/alimuhammad.alyemini>
<https://www.facebook.com/aslahslahk>
<https://www.facebook.com/ibnmuaamar>
<https://www.facebook.com/sdyq.hsynmsbqaan>
<https://www.facebook.com/nagi.gapan>
<https://www.facebook.com/jalal.alsowadi>
<https://www.facebook.com/aboskhr.alyemne>
<https://www.facebook.com/ali.alsaiane>



Annex 197: WhatsApp accounts identified by the Panel of arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas

https://chat.whatsapp.com/LBvTP7htTgDBYwBPDf6qlt?fbclid=IwY2xjawE2i0VleH-RuA2FlbQIxMAABHXUNBnOn_EljHHGUqYsJb4VHewNdC1e1GH_2kEE_3LiD7ixZQ67uwwmUJg_aem_xyybBP-Coo7G5eiMLsi_6HQ

<https://chat.whatsapp.com/Cot0atBaQjD4Ejd2iZsICi>

Figures extracted from the related accounts



Annex 198: "X" accounts identified by the Panel of arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas

<https://twitter.com/AlTalhi2tradin>
<https://twitter.com/yosefalmtri>
https://twitter.com/sadq_wsh8046
<https://twitter.com/DergamAlawsh>
<https://twitter.com/mwsam3271>
<https://twitter.com/LslahBn29379>
<https://twitter.com/qkmGAD6akr6vHhz>
<https://twitter.com/abwnshw64747731>
<https://twitter.com/rshyhady3>
<https://twitter.com/mmdlsybry5>
<https://twitter.com/aammss04796954>
<https://twitter.com/almotiaee>
<https://twitter.com/ali772167832>
<https://twitter.com/Alsadrea0313kmn>
<https://twitter.com/NoxEhBjBBRHHwu9>
<https://twitter.com/yaser84779686>
<https://twitter.com/hamadqadr50>
<https://twitter.com/mdljbr201>
<https://twitter.com/almtry772101>
<https://twitter.com/KydlShmakh>
<https://twitter.com/ysylqy7>
https://twitter.com/ywsf_mnyf
<https://twitter.com/MAIjayah41025>
<https://twitter.com/bdalslamun>
<https://twitter.com/Samname9>
<https://twitter.com/AldbyanAsm>
<https://twitter.com/alaslht30514>
<https://twitter.com/HASHAS348623>
<https://twitter.com/eNDYXpXk92Sfe9O>
<https://twitter.com/mwsam3271>
<https://twitter.com/AbdelSalamQat>
<https://twitter.com/TbyNasr>
<https://twitter.com/MustfeAlDhabia1>
<https://twitter.com/8SfnPHKinmF0uL2>
https://twitter.com/hdwan_ly
<https://twitter.com/rshyhady3>
<https://twitter.com/c2sXAYxqmYMzhon>
<https://twitter.com/mslslnslnl>
https://twitter.com/snan_as20
https://twitter.com/Ashraf_Muneef
<https://twitter.com/AdelHormos>
<https://twitter.com/NhMsv0WM2E8tCtM>
<https://twitter.com/bwmmdlqby3>
https://twitter.com/igg_04
<https://twitter.com/RwfySltn>
<https://twitter.com/YSKLMDIbkCTvUwO>
<https://twitter.com/lyrby44932777>
<https://twitter.com/mhm99445>
<https://twitter.com/bdallhalnhmy3>
https://twitter.com/aldbwany_rshad
<https://twitter.com/AlrwhanyAsma>
<https://twitter.com/f489086a52d84b5>
https://twitter.com/hybt_k_slahk

Figures extracted from the related accounts



<https://twitter.com/TahaArms>
<https://twitter.com/MshtryM>
<https://twitter.com/MohammedRiyadhe>
<https://twitter.com/k01mup442MDxa5H>
<https://twitter.com/rfatmhm97368979>
<https://twitter.com/TayfAbn50085>
<https://twitter.com/MuhammadAlTab>
<https://twitter.com/778238427M>
<https://twitter.com/bwmmdlqby3>
<https://twitter.com/AhmedAh11388275>
<https://twitter.com/mtmljfr1>
<https://twitter.com/ybuwZPadLPEft2x>
<https://twitter.com/mansour77373331>
<https://twitter.com/bdllhmn81>
<https://twitter.com/Bs023uFPINwYLJL>
<https://twitter.com/alyashrms29>
<https://twitter.com/lyjmn1jmn1>
<https://twitter.com/m777344073>
<https://twitter.com/yhyyalhd73>
<https://twitter.com/Hassan771413103>
<https://twitter.com/kheeryy>
<https://twitter.com/DhiaaArms>
<https://twitter.com/AlkynAbrahym>
<https://twitter.com/Amerali20321067>
<https://x.com/WjihAl>



Annex 199: Telegram accounts identified by the Panel as belonging to arms sellers operating from Houthi-controlled areas

<https://t.me/amaramar711>
<https://t.me/aleaqil711>
<https://t.me/+azpllrRi3gzYmQ0>
<https://t.me/Hkblbh>
<https://t.me/tahaarms>
<https://t.me/Abwalyas>
<https://t.me/DhiaaArms>
<https://t.me/shehab5b>
<https://t.me/aleaqil711>
<https://t.me/ffegehhheh>

Figure extracted from one of the related accounts



Annex 200: “X” accounts identified by the Panel of Houthi political and military leadership, and/or of media associated, and/or of activists promoting their ideology

<https://x.com/army21ye>
<https://x.com/army21yemen>
https://x.com/Yahya_Saree
<https://x.com/yemenis111>
<https://x.com/yemenis112>
<https://x.com/yemenis113>
<https://x.com/ameenhayan>
https://x.com/Nasr_Amer1
https://x.com/Moh_Alhouthi
<https://x.com/abdusalamsalah>
<https://x.com/alialqhoom>
https://x.com/ansarallah_1111
https://x.com/ansarallah_iraq
https://x.com/ansarallah_kurd
https://x.com/Ansarullah_info
<https://x.com/Ansarullahinfo>
https://x.com/Presidency_Ye
<https://x.com/AhmaaddHamed>
https://x.com/ZAID_garsyy
<https://x.com/MMY1444>
<https://x.com/SecYemen>
<https://x.com/drahmedalshami>
<https://x.com/DhaifAlShami650>
<https://x.com/MohammedAlfrah>
<https://x.com/hamedrizq01>
<https://x.com/AlJawfiAmin>
<https://x.com/alsyasiah>
<https://x.com/BadrSharaf22>
<https://x.com/PopularMedia8>
<https://x.com/AhmdAlrzamy>
<https://x.com/TvAlmasirah>
<https://x.com/ShahidAlmasirah>
<https://x.com/Almasirahbrk>
<https://x.com/almasirahturkey>
<https://x.com/najeebalashmory>
https://x.com/YEMEN_RMC_21
<https://x.com/alyementv1>
<https://x.com/ameenhayan>
<https://x.com/mtahir2>
https://x.com/Houthi_1446_
<https://x.com/almonawer202323>
<https://x.com/AlthawrahNews>
<https://x.com/aliazzehri>
<https://x.com/yemensmc2000>
<https://x.com/albayynaten>

Figures extracted from the related accounts



الععيد يحيى سريع
@army21ye



مكتب رئاسة الجمهورية اليمنية
@Presidency_Ye



محمد علي الحوثي
@Moh_Alhouthi



سفيره أنصار الله
@ansarallah_1111



مركز الاعلام الثوري
@YEMEN_RMC_21



قناة المسيرة
@TvAlmasirah

Annex 201: "X" accounts identified by the Panel as used by the Houthis to indoctrinate the youth

https://x.com/Jehad_mag

Figures extracted from the related account



List of Acronyms

| | |
|---------|--|
| ADNOC | Abu Dhabi National Oil Company |
| AIS | Automatic Identification Signal |
| AQAP | Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula |
| AMR | Anti-Materiel Rifle |
| ARES | Armament Research Services |
| ASBM | Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile |
| ASCM | Anti-Ship Cruise Missile |
| ATGM | Anti-Tank Guided Missile |
| AT | Anti-Tank (Mine) |
| BC | Before (Jesus) Christ |
| C2 | Command and Control (center) |
| CAR | Conflict Armament Research |
| CBY | Central Bank of Yemen |
| CENTCOM | Central Command (US) |
| CIDT | Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment |
| COC | Country of Origin Certificate |
| CRSV | Conflict-Related Sexual Violence |
| CTU | Counter-Terrorism Unit (GoY) |
| DIO | Defence Industries Organization (Iran) |
| DPV | Diver Propulsion Vehicle |
| EOD | Explosive Ordnance Device |
| EOSS | Electro-Optical Surveillance Systems |
| EUC | End User Certificate |
| FSA | Free Syrian Army |
| FSO | Floating Storage and Offloading |
| GBV | Gender-Based Violence |
| GIS | Geographic Information Systems |

| | |
|---------|--|
| GI-TOC | Global Initiative against Trans Organized Crime |
| GoY | Government of Yemen |
| GPS | Global Positioning System |
| HMG | Heavy Machinegun |
| HOCC | Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (Houthi) |
| IED | Improvised Explosive Device |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IHL | International Humanitarian Law |
| IR | Iranian Riyal |
| HRL | Human Rights Law |
| IMO | International Maritime Organization |
| IPR | Individual Property Rights |
| IRGC | Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps |
| IRGC-QF | Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force |
| IRI | Islamic Resistance in Iraq |
| IRIAF | Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces |
| IRIN | Islamic Republic of Iran Navy |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| KH | Kata'ib Hizballah (Iraq) |
| KSA | Kingdom of Saudi Arabia |
| LACM | Land Attack Cruise Missile |
| LMG | Light Machinegun |
| LPG | Liquefied Petroleum Gas |
| MANPADS | Man-Portable Air Defence System |
| MIRS | Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite |
| MMSI | Maritime Mobile Service Identity |
| MR | Military Region |
| MRBM | Medium Range Ballistic Missile |
| MSC | Mediterranean Shipping Vessel |

| | |
|---------|---|
| MV | Maritime Vessel |
| NGO | Non-governmental Organization |
| nm | Nautical Mile |
| NSF | National Shield Forces |
| OFAC | Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (US) |
| OHCHR | Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights |
| OSV | Offshore Support Vessel |
| OWA-UAV | One-Way Attack-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle |
| PIJ | Palestinian Islamic Jihad |
| PKK | Kurdistan Workers' Party |
| PLC | Presidential Leadership Council |
| PMF | Popular Mobilization Forces (Iraq) |
| PoES | Panel of Experts on Al-Shabaab (Somalia) |
| PoEY | Panel of Experts on Yemen |
| RPG | Rocket-propelled Grenade |
| SALW | Small Arms and Light Weapons |
| SAM | Surface to Air Missile |
| SDGT | Specially Designated Global Terrorist Group |
| SEPOC | <i>Safer</i> Exploration & Production Operations Company |
| SESGY | Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen |
| SGBV | Sexual and Gender-Based Violence |
| SMG | Sub-Machine Gun |
| SR | Saudi Riyal |
| SRBM | Short Range Ballistic Missile |
| SWIFT | Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication |
| STC | Southern Transitional Council |
| UAE | United Arab Emirates |
| UAV | Unmanned Aerial Vehicle |

| | |
|-------|--|
| UK | United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland |
| UKMTO | United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNMHA | United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement |
| UNVIM | United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism |
| US | United States of America |
| USD | United States Dollars |
| UUV | Unmanned Underwater Vehicle |
| UXO | Unexploded Ordnance |
| VHF | Very High Frequency (radio) |
| WBIED | Water-borne improvised explosive device |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| YR | Yemeni Riyal |